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This thesis considers delayed prosecutions in the context of transitional justice and the 
Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. In response to the atrocities committed in that conflict, 
Bangladesh government set up a domestic tribunal after 39 years since the atrocities were 
committed, called the International Criminal Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICT-BD). The 
International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 is the governing Act of ICT-BD. The substantive 
crimes under the Act include War crimes, Genocide, Crimes against humanity, Crimes against 
peace and any other crimes under international law. 
 
The thesis primarily considers the role and contribution of the ICT-BD in international criminal 
Law (ICL) and transitional justice. The researcher adopted a qualitative legal analysis 
approach and employed a semi-structured interview technique to collect data from judges, 
lawyers and politicians who are involved with the ICT-BD.  
 
The ICT-BD seeks to undertake delayed prosecutions and achieve delayed justice for the 
victims of 1971 through a domestic judicial forum and at the same time created an avenue for 
the victims to come forward and seek justice. Initial findings of the research indicate that, as 
a domestic tribunal, the ICT-BD has several lessons to contribute to  international criminal law 
in terms of its fight against the culture of impunity, delayed justice, its engagement with old 
evidence, witness protection, sentencing principles and other procedural and substantive law 
challenges. 
 
Despite many criticisms, the interviews undertaken indicated that the ICT-BD has been widely 
accepted by the interviewees in this study. As of July 2019, the Tribunal had delivered 38 
judgments in less than 10 years of its existence. By delivering justice within a domestic, 
Bangladeshi context, the ICT-BD has several contributions to make to international criminal 
law. This thesis will analyse both its strengths and limitations in decreasing the culture of 
impunity in Bangladesh.  
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This thesis considers the delayed transitional justice process in the context of the 
Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. Bangladesh, a South Asian country, which may be little 
known to many, is only 47 years old. This country became independent from West Pakistan 
in 1971, paying a high price of blood.1 During the country’s Liberation War in 1971, three 
million people were reportedly killed, thousands of women were raped, 10 million people had 
become refugees in the neighbouring country India, in nine months.2 According to Doak, the 
context of post-conflict situations varies considerably from each other, and the features of 
transitional justice also differ depending on the particular context.3 In the particular context of 
Bangladesh, a domestic criminal tribunal was chosen to address the atrocities of the 1971 
conflict. As a result, this research focuses on the operation of domestic tribunal and on the 
lessons that may be learnt in the area of International Criminal Law (hereinafter ICL) and 
transitional justice. 
Bangladesh, previously known as East Pakistan, gained independence from West 
Pakistan.4 It is reported that during the Liberation War, the Pakistan army and their local 
collaborators launched numerous systematic and planned attacks against the pro-liberation 
Bengali population.5 Many people including children were killed and a large number of women 
were raped.6 The nature of the mass atrocities include crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
 
 
1 ‘Blood of Bangla Desh’ New Statesman (London, 16 April 1971) 
2 The Chief Prosecutor v Mir Quasem Ali, ICT-BD Case No. 03 of 2013 [ICT-2 Judgment of 2 November 2014] 
para. 6. 
3 Jonathan Doak, ‘Enriching trial justice for crime victims in common law systems: Lessons from transitional 
environments’ (2015) 21(2) International Review of Victimology 139, 154. 
4 Mir Quasem Ali (n 2) para. 6. 
5 Ibid. 
6 The Chief Prosecutor v Ghulam Azam, ICT-BD Case No. 06 of 2011 [ICT-1 Judgment of 15 July 2013] para. 
11. 
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crimes against peace, genocide and other crimes under ICL.7 Soon after the end of the 
Liberation War, the authority of Bangladesh attempted to investigate the atrocities committed 
during the country’s transition. However, as a war-damaged country, and on account of the 
prevailing political context of the time, Bangladesh was not successful in prosecuting the 
perpetrators of 1971.  
Although the war was between East Pakistan and West Pakistan, there were 
international stakeholders too.8 The Soviet Union and India played an important role in the 
creation of Bangladesh.9 On the other hand, strategically, the USA and China were against 
the independence of Bangladesh.10 As a result, these countries and their allies paid little 
attention to assist Bangladesh to try and assess the perpetrators of 1971.11 For this reason, 
in 1973, the Parliament of Bangladesh legislated the ‘International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 
1973’ (hereinafter ICT Act 1973) to try and assess international crimes under a domestic 
tribunal. This constituted one of the world’s first domestic enactments concerning international 
crimes. However, after 1974, on account of changes in the political landscape, the 
policymakers of Bangladesh lost interest in the process of prosecution. This was because the 
then President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and his party the Awami League 
(AL), was overthrown by a military coup in August 1975 after which a new regime came into 
power. As a result, political stability and peace-making took priority over accountability, 
tribunals were disbanded, prisoners were released, and the ICT Act 1973 was abandoned. As 
a result, perpetrators of 1971 enjoyed long-term impunity.12 However, there was always a 
demand for justice from the people of Bangladesh. Nevertheless, the government of 
Bangladesh could not establish any tribunal until 2010 because there was no stable 
 
 
7 International Commission of Jurists, ‘The Events in East Pakistan, 1971: A Legal Study’ (1972) 61. 
8 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan Divided (Alpha Bravo, New Delhi 1984) 157. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid 166 and I77. 
11 Gary Bass, ‘Bargaining Away Justice: India, Pakistan and the International Politics of Impunity for the 
Bangladesh Genocide’ (2016) 42(2) International Security 140, 148. 
12 Ibid 144. 
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democratically elected government until 1991. The AL party lead by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s 
daughter, Sheikh Hasina came into power in 1996, however its primary focus during its office 
term between 1996 - 2001 was to improve the infrastructure and to create a pathway to a 
stable government after years of instability. Yet, there were nationwide campaigns for justice 
from 1991 until 2008 and subsequently, the AL party which came back into power in December 
2008, included an agenda in their 2008 election manifesto to establish a special tribunal with 
the aim of prosecuting the perpetrators of 1971.13 Thereafter, in response to past atrocities, 
the Bangladesh Government set up a domestic tribunal in 2010, 39 years after the atrocities 
were committed. The ICT Act 1973 is the governing Act of International Criminal Tribunal for 
Bangladesh (hereinafter ICT-BD) which covers a wide range of jurisdiction over gross 
violations of human rights including ‘War crimes’, ‘Genocide’ ‘Crimes against humanity’ and 
any other crimes under international law. In analysing the performance of the ICT-BD, this 
research brings to light the inherent tensions between fighting impunity and seeking delayed 
justice in Bangladesh.  
1.1.1 The International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973 
       The ICT Act 1973 was enacted by the parliament of Bangladesh after a thorough analysis 
and scrutiny. At the same time, the Constitution of Bangladesh was amended for the first time 
to give special protection to this particular Act.14 This particular Act adopted the definition of 
crimes under customary international law. It is said that the ICT Act 1973 is the first domestic 
legislation which was based on Nuremberg principles. The enactment of this Act itself was a 
great contribution in its time when the principles of ICL was underdeveloped. In the context of 
1973, this Act created a possibility to expand the enforcement of international law at the 
domestic level. The Act was carefully designed to establish a domestic tribunal within the 
national judicial body, in the particular context of Bangladesh. This particular Act is a 
 
 
13The Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, ICT-BD Case No. 02 of 2012 [ICT-2 Judgment of 5 February 
2013] para. 9. 
14 Preamble of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act 1973. 
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constitutionally protected legislation which was ensured by the first amendment of the 
constitution of Bangladesh. That means, under Article 47(3) of the Constitution of Bangladesh, 
no law can declare the ICT Act 1973 as unconstitutional on the ground of retroactivity.15 
1.1.2 The International Crimes Tribunal(s) of Bangladesh (The ICT-BD) 
Over the last few decades, international criminal tribunals have gained considerable 
attention since the formation of ICTY (International crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia) 
and ICTR (International crimes tribunal for Rwanda). The Prime Minister of Bangladesh made 
a formal request in 2009 to the officials of UNDP and the UN Coordinator in Dhaka for 
assistance from the UN in establishing a criminal tribunal in Bangladesh.16 However, due to 
strong lobbying by Pakistan and its allies such as the US, France, China and other Islamic 
countries, this attempt was unsuccessful.17 Bass, in his article titled ‘Bargain Away Justice’ 
depicted how short term impunity in Bangladesh became long term due to the ‘Politics of 
Impunity’; in his own words ‘Without international support, Bangladesh had few viable 
alternatives for seeking justice for the 1971 atrocities’. 18 
             Finally, the Government of Bangladesh established the ICT-BD in March 2010 
comprising of domestic judges, lawyers and investigators. A second Tribunal was established 
in 2012 to deal with the initial caseload and to give a boost to the speed of prosecution. 
However, currently, only Tribunal 1 is functioning, and Tribunal 2 ceased to function since 15 





15 Article 47(3) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
16 Rashidul Hasan, ‘Jamaat to take on war crime trial’ (30 January 2009) The Daily Star available from < 
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-73558> Last accessed 15 November 2017. 
17 M Rafiqul Islam, National Trials of International Crimes (The University Press, Dhaka 2019) 412 
18 Bass (n 11) 145 & 180. 
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1.2 Aims, Objectives and Statement of Problem           
 This study will contribute to our contextual understanding of ICL and TJ on how a 
Muslim majority country like Bangladesh dealt with criminal prosecution of international crimes 
under a domestic judicial mechanism. The hypothesis of this study is that, ‘A critical analysis 
of the ICT-BD’s operation can provide us important lessons in terms of due process, handling 
old evidence, witness protection and sentencing principles in the areas of ICL and TJ’.  
            The aim of the thesis is to explore the harmonisation process of the domestic judicial 
mechanism of Bangladesh to deal with the crimes under international criminal law. The core 
aim of the research is to concentrate on the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and genocide and does not directly address why those took place. It analysed the 
process of the ICT-BD, not simply as a criminal justice process that prosecutes international 
crimes in a domestic context, but also as a domestic legal system within the wider concept of 
transitional justice. The thesis, therefore, examines the contribution that the ICT-BD has made 
in the areas of ICL and transitional justice, notably the role of ICT-BD in fighting the culture of 
impunity in Bangladesh and serving delayed justice. It examines the lessons, strengths and 
weaknesses emerging from the Tribunal’s approach to due process, handling old evidence, 
witness protection and sentencing principles. The thesis has also analysed the effectiveness 
of the ICT-BD as an avenue of transitional justice through which mass atrocities can be 
addressed and impunity fought. This study has three specific objectives: 
a) To examine the contribution that the ICT-BD has made in the areas of ICL and 
transitional justice, notably the role of the ICT-BD in fighting the culture of impunity in 
Bangladesh and serving delayed justice.  
 
b) To assess the lessons, strengths and weaknesses emerging from the Tribunal’s 
approach to due process, handling old evidence, witness protection and sentencing 
principles.  
 6 
c) To analyse the effectiveness of the ICT-BD, in light of specificities (domestic criminal 
tribunal in a Muslim majority country trying crimes that occurred 40 years prior) as an 
avenue of transitional justice through which mass atrocities can be addressed and 
impunity fought. 
 
It is important to prosecute the perpetrators of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, crimes against peace and other grave violations of human rights irrespective of where 
and when those crimes have been committed. However, due to lack of judicial forum, the 
victims of the Bangladeshi Liberation War of 1971 have had to wait over 40 years to get justice. 
The significant delay, domestic nature of the tribunal and particular cultural context of 
Bangladesh (e.g. being a Muslim majority country faced with issued such as death penalty) 
made it challenging for the ICT-BD to conduct trials. In analysing the delayed prosecutions of 
mass violence at the ICT-BD, this thesis attempts to undertake a closer examination of the 
ICT-BD data, collected through semi-structured interviews, judgments delivered by the ICT-
BD, the legal framework on which it is based and ultimately answer the question: ‘What 
lessons may be learnt from the operation of the ICT-BD in the areas of International Criminal 
Law and Transitional Justice?’. 
The study addresses the following key questions: 
a. How can the transitional justice processes be transposed from the international setting 
to a Muslim-majority country like Bangladesh? 
 
b. Is the ICT-BD an appropriate mechanism for the specific circumstances in Bangladesh 
in the context of transitional justice? And why?  
 
c. What is the nature of due process in the particular context of Bangladeshi TJ?  
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d. How is ICT-BD appropriately handling old evidence?  
 
e. To what extent is the ICT-BD providing protection to the witnesses? 
 
f. To what extent is the ICT-BD consistent in its sentencing practices? 
 
           This thesis will utilize academic literature and analytical data to examine and respond 
to the key questions. The researcher endeavours to present the ICT-BD as an effective 
avenue of justice to the reader by exploring the resources required to facilitate the smooth 
operation of the ICT-BD, current limitations, arguments and the resources required to address 
these issues.  
           The questions in the thesis has been presented with the objective that the discussions, 
clarity, and criticisms can serve as grounds for further research and development of the ICT-
BD. Moreover, recent global conflicts such as the Arab Spring has shown that there is a 
growing need for a role model of a transitional justice system that has adapted domestic laws 
based on local practices to serve as an example to countries with a similar conflict history, 
culture and populace, mainly in Muslim majority countries or countries where similar time 
delays for prosecutions exist. The approach of the ICT-BD in the context of transitional justice 
and international law will be explored to determine if the ICT-BD can be looked upon as an 
example to such countries as, by achieving international relevance and acceptance from other 
countries, and by recognizing and addressing the gaps in the system, the ICT-BD and can 
cement its future as part of a valid, functioning point of reference internally as well as in the 





1.3 Significance of research and reason for selection 
           This study examines whether, from the perspective of some of the actors involved in 
the ICT-BD process (judges, lawyers and politicians), the approach adopted in Bangladesh 
has been comprehensive enough in providing justice, uncovering the truth, providing 
reparation and promoting reconciliation which is considered as fundamental elements of 
transitional justice. Thus, the study examined historical, legal and political issues related to 
transitional justice in general and the model adopted by Bangladesh in particular. Also, this 
study examined the lessons which could be learnt from the operation of the ICT-BD, including 
the judgments it has delivered, and their contribution to the development of ICL and 
Transitional Justice. 
            There is a need for academic research that focuses on the domestic prosecution of 
persons who stand accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the 
aftermath of grave human rights abuses, many states in transition have opted to overlook the 
actions and responsibility of perpetrators, while others have provided amnesty to individuals 
who perpetrated crimes. Supporters of a non-interventionist strategy and of amnesty claim 
that these are practical and necessary means to ensure the reconciliation of people.19 Other 
nations have opted for selective prosecutions, while others have opted for truth and 
reconciliation commissions (TRC’s) or a combination of these. Countries like Spain and Chile 
have not taken the path that Bangladesh has taken, that is, of instituting delayed prosecutions 
almost forty years after the original crimes. Moreover, even in the case of countries that have 
taken a similar path to that of Bangladesh, such as Cambodia, the criminal mechanisms they 
have instituted (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia - ECCC) differ in important 
respects from the mechanism adopted in Bangladesh. This is because, the ECCC receives 
international assistance through the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials 
 
 
19 Diba Majzub, ‘Peace or Justice? Amnesties and the International Criminal Court’ (2002) 3(1) MEL. J. INT’L L 
247, 250. 
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(UNAKRT) and included international actors while the Tribunal in Bangladesh is a domestic 
mechanism which is formed, governed and funded by the Bangladeshi Government and 
domestically staffed. It is for these reasons that the operation of the ICT-BD needs to be 
researched.  
           Although there is extensive literature on restorative justice, retributive justice as well as 
reconciliation, this thesis offers an in-depth analysis and assesses these theories in the 
particular context of Bangladesh. This study has recognised the importance and use of 
domestic mechanisms to deal with crimes and crime prevention in society.  
           This research is particularly important to the researcher; partly because he is a 
Bangladeshi National, but also because he believes in the need to fight impunity even in the 
case of crimes committed several decades ago. By assessing Bangladesh's past and its 
collective actions following the 1971 atrocities, future crimes similar in nature may be avoided. 
There is a growing demand for pluralistic, culture-specific approaches to criminal justice in the 
fields of ICL and transitional justice, and it is important to analyse the contribution made by 
the ICT-BD in this regard. It is also important to analyse the nature of delayed justice in 
Bangladesh; its strengths and weaknesses would guide the future tribunals in a similar nature. 
This research is also important because it has provided an avenue for the victims of mass 
atrocities to come forward and seek justice.  
The researcher also thinks that emphasis should be placed on the ICT-BD’s handling 
of evidence of crimes committed decades ago, which can in future offer lessons for evidence 
in prosecuting similar crimes. This study will highlight the difficulties faced by the ICT-BD in 
achieving its stated objectives, it offers an important starting point that other systems can 
adapt and improve on, with the shared goal of fighting a culture of impunity.  
           Aside from its wider international significance, this study is also important on an internal 
level in Bangladesh because it has uncovered the strengths and weaknesses of the ICT-BD 
and suggests how the tribunal could have improved in terms of witness protection and 
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developing supplementary mechanisms to complement the criminal prosecution. This detailed 
study will also invite the stakeholders of the ICT-BD to improve their operational practices in 
terms of due process.  
1.4 Contribution to knowledge 
There is little academic research available on the specific circumstances of 
Bangladesh partly due to the language barrier as most of the research was published in 
Bengali. Historically, the International Commission of Jurists conducted an investigation in 
1972 to identify the nature of atrocities and the legal position under national and international 
penal law.20 In a 1973 article, Niall Macdermot suggested that the Bangladeshi authorities 
should try the high-ranking Pakistani generals and officials on charges of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity under international penal law.21 Subsequently, in 1973, the 
Bangladeshi Parliament legislated a domestic law incorporating international crimes under a 
domestic tribunal. Later, in 1978, Jordan J Paust and Albert P Blaustein assessed the War 
Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process in Bangladesh under the ICT Act 1973.22  
Linton also contributed to the literature on this subject in her article titled ‘Completing 
the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation.’ In her 
work, she analysed the ICT Act 1973 just before the ICT-BD was established in 2010.23 
Robertson in 2015 also prepared the ‘Report on the International Crimes Tribunal of 
Bangladesh' where he attempted to assess the procedural aspect of the ICT-BD. Also, Menon 
has critically evaluated a certain aspect of the ICT-BD and has contributed towards the 
growing literature of the transitional justice mechanism.24 Further, Rajon in his article titled 
 
 
20 The Events in East Pakistan (n 7). 
21 Niall Macdermot, 'Crimes against Humanity in Bangladesh' (1973) 7 INT'L L 476, 476 
22 Jordan Paust and Albert Blaustein, 'War Crimes Jurisdiction and Due Process: The Bangladesh Experience' 
(1978) 11 VAND J TRANSNAT'L L 1. 
23 Suzzanah Linton, ‘Completing the Circle: Accountability for the Crimes of the 1971 Bangladesh War of 
Liberation’ (2010) 21(2) CLF 191, 191. 
24 Parvathi Menon, ‘International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh’ (2017)  MPILux Working Paper 11, 11. 
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‘Domestication of International Criminal Law: International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, A 
Case Study’ assessed the viability of the ICT-BD as a domestic mechanism.25 Other notable 
contributions to the literature include Professor Mizanur Rahman’s article titled ‘Prosecuting 
‘War Crimes’ in Domestic Level: The Case of Bangladesh’26 where he analysed the 
jurisdiction, constitutionality of the governing Act and the due process aspect of the ICT-BD; 
and Amirul Islam’s book Chapter titled ‘Old Evidence and the context of Bangladesh’ where 
he depicted the historical background of the ICT-BD and the contextual evidential aspect of 
the ICT-BD.27 To date, there is a lack of systematic academic research on the operation of the 
ICT-BD. This research, therefore, aims to address this gap in the knowledge by addressing 
the question: What lessons may be learned from the operation of the ICT-BD in the areas of 
International Criminal Law and Transitional Justice? This research is based on empirical data 
gathered from semi-structured interviews with judges, lawyers, and politicians of Bangladesh. 
The findings from the data would contribute to the growing literature of transitional justice and 
ICL. This research has topicality because the ICT-BD is still undertaking criminal prosecutions 
and lessons from this research may inform future prosecutions in this tribunal. Lessons on 
delayed prosecutions from the ICT-BD may also be relevant to other jurisdictions where 
atrocities were committed but, similar to Bangladesh, immediate criminal prosecutions were 
not possible. 
This research has conducted an in-depth analysis of how the ICT-BD proposes to hold 
accountable, the alleged perpetrators responsible for the 1971 atrocities after 42 years. The 
study has been conducted at a time when trials in ICT-BD are still ongoing. The researcher 
has investigated how the evidence is gathered and how the trials are conducted. The research 
is based on original, empirical data, collected from a series of semi-structured interviews with 
 
 
25 Sanoj Rajan, 'Domestication of International Criminal Law: International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh, A 
Case Study' (2012-2013) 12 ISIL YB INT'L HUMAN & REFUGEE L 132. 
26 Mizanur Rahman & Masum Billah, ‘Prosecuting ‘War Crimes’ in Domestic Level: The Case of Bangladesh’ 
(2010) 1(1) NUJL 5. 
27 Morten Bergsmo and CHEAH Ling (Eds), Old Evidence and Core International Crimes (Torkel 2012) 215. 
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judges, lawyers and politicians who were closely involved with the process of ICT-BD. The 
key findings of the interview data enrich our knowledge in respect to a domestic tribunal’s 
efficacy to serve justice for the victims of mass atrocities and we can learn important lessons 
from the operation of the ICT-BD in terms of delayed prosecution. The researcher is originally 
from Bangladesh and is familiar with the local culture and speaks both English and Bengali; it 
was possible for the researcher to conduct some interviews in the Bengali language and 
translate them into English. As a result, the interview data will be a valuable contribution to 
knowledge. These translations are valuable documents for research in the greater context. As 
such, this thesis will provide a new insight into the practice of domestic courts to try and assess 
international crimes. It also provides a fresh assessment of how transitional societies such as 
Bangladesh use the domestic mechanism to deal with international crimes drawing from 
existing theories of retributive justice.  
1.5 Methodology 
To conduct this study, the researcher collected data through desk research and semi-
structured interviews. The researcher adopted a doctrinal approach to analyse cases, 
legislation, and regulations related to the ICT-BD. In order to supplement this analysis, the 
researcher analysed relevant literature on post-conflict issues, justice, truth, reconciliation, 
reparation, and transitional justice.  
In writing Chapter 8, subsection 8.4.1, data has been collected mainly from news 
articles due to the limited set of data available from other sources that examine how the 
witnesses of the ICT-BD have been intimidated and the difficulties that they faced. However, 
the newspaper articles have been selected cautiously in order to ensure credibility. 
This doctrinal approach was supplemented with empirical data from the semi-
structured interviews. While desk-based research was important to analyse the laws and 
cases related to the ICT-BD, this approach alone could not serve the purpose of understanding 
the operation of this Tribunal. As a result, the researcher needed to collect data using interview 
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techniques. The rationale for the empirical study is that it enabled the researcher to collect 
open-ended data from hard to reach individuals, e.g. judges, lawyers and politicians of 
Bangladesh to explore their thoughts about the operation of the ICT-BD. The initial literature 
review revealed that there is insufficient reliable data available in English on the Bangladeshi 
Tribunal and for this reason, the research adopted a semi-structured interview technique to 
collect reliable and comparable qualitative data.  The objective of the interviews was to secure 
information from stakeholders who have been involved in establishing or in the operation of 
the ICT-BD, but their voices and perspectives have so far, been missing from the academic 
literature on the ICT-BD.  
After careful consideration of the nature of the research to be conducted, the 
researcher decided to use qualitative rather than quantitative research methods. Bryman 
suggests that qualitative research concerns itself with understanding and interpreting people's 
views and their particular circumstances.28 Also, interviews produce rich insights into people’s 
experience, opinions, values and feelings.29 In this particular study, it was important to know 
the views of the judges, prosecution lawyers, defence lawyers and politicians belonging to 
different parties in Bangladesh to understand the operation of the ICT-BD.  
            Interviews are an appropriate method of data collection for this particular research 
study as they uncover people’s experiences, perspectives and textual descriptions about 
transitional justice processes in Bangladesh. Also, the data collected through the semi-
structured interviews added originality to this study because the views of the judges, lawyers, 
and politicians of Bangladesh were not subjected to a systematic study before. Furthermore, 
qualitative interviewing involves the construction or reconstruction of knowledge.30 Mason 
suggests that qualitative interviewing usually relies on in-depth semi structured or loosely 
 
 
28 Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods (6th Edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 28. 
29 Darren G Lilleker, ‘Interviewing the political elite: Navigating a potential minefield’ (2003) 23(3) Politics 207, 
208. 
30 Ibid 29. 
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structured interviewing techniques.31 Qualitative interviewing aims to discover and develop 
new concepts, rather than impose preconceived categories on the people and the events they 
observe. So, data collection through semi-structured interviews would add significant value in 
this study to understand the nature of delayed prosecutions in Bangladesh. 
This study did not interview any victims, perpetrators or members of affected 
communities despite acknowledging the importance of the voices of these groups. As these 
groups are quite large, and the inclusion of a few members would add little value to this 
research. This is one of the limitations of this research. Also, additional ethical approval and 
training would be required to conduct interviews with victims, perpetrators and affected 
communities. The researcher is of the opinion that there may be a separate, victim-focused 
study where the views of those large groups can be reflected through qualitative interview 
techniques. Such a study of victims would undoubtedly be very valuable. Nevertheless, it is 
considered that making available the voices of key stakeholders involved in the ICT-BD, as 
this research does (particularly, given the absence of these voices in the scholarship) is also 
an important and worthwhile endeavour, and this is why this research has focused on key 
stakeholders. Further to that, elite interviewing is another limitation of the semi-structured 
interview method and this current study had faced the same problem because interviews were 
conducted only with judges, lawyers and politicians.  
The term ‘elite’ has been used in a research context to refer to the people who hold a 
significant amount of power within a group.32 Conducting elite interviewing is a challenging 
task and the researcher mitigated those challenges by following authoritative guidance e.g. 
Harvey’s article titled ‘Strategies for conducting for conducting elite interviews’. From the very 
beginning, the researcher attempted to gain the trust of the interviewees so that he could 
obtain high quality data. The researcher attempted to be transparent and provided as much 
 
 
31 Jennifer Manson, Qualitative Researching (2nd Edn, SAGE Publications London 2002) 17. 
32 Willian S Harvey, ‘Strategies for conducting elite interviews’ (2011) 11(4) Qualitative Research 431, 432 
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information as he could to the interviewees. He explained his identity and using an information 
sheet, provided clear information to the interviewees about the aims and objectives of this 
research. Since the researcher is a Bangladeshi citizen, it was easier for him to gain the trust 
of his interviewees. Also, the researcher conducted his own homework before conducting the 
interviews with a view that the interviewees may challenge him on the subject. During the 
interview, the researcher tried to assess the behaviour, speaking voice and mannerisms of 
the interviewees and asked them questions accordingly. The researcher avoided asking close 
ended questions to the interviewees so that they had the opportunity to comfortably answer 
questions. To obtain important data, the researcher asked supplementary questions as some 
of the interviewees did not answer the primary questions asked. Keeping in mind the elite 
interviewing environment, the researcher designed the questionnaire in a way that asked 
simple, “lead-in” questions at the beginning and the more difficult questions in the middle of 
the interview so that he could establish rapport quickly. The researcher noted that towards the 
end the interviews the interviewees could get tired and may provide a less detailed answer. 
To mitigate this issue, the researcher occasionally mentioned how long the interview would 
take. 
The qualitative interview method employed in this study has some benefits and 
drawbacks. Interviews may provide us insights into events and activities that take place out of 
the public eye.33 It gives greater flexibility to collect data and data can be collected according 
to the need of the research. In this particular study, the semi-structured interview method 
helped the researcher to arrive at a more valid conclusion regarding the research questions. 
This method helped to understand the perspectives of the sections of people who are 
associated with the ICT-BD. Also, the researcher had the opportunity to observe the credibility 
of the data provided by the interviewees. This method was useful for this particular research 
because it helped to understand and analyse the experience of Judges, lawyers and 
 
 
33 Lilleker (n 29) 208. 
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politicians of Bangladesh who are associated with the ICT-BD. Using this method, the 
researcher took the opportunity to pursue in-depth information to answer the research 
questions. This technique is also helpful for further research and follow up research.  
There are some disadvantages of qualitative interview methods and this cannot be 
relied upon as a sole methodology.34 For instance, given the limited number of interviews 
undertaken, the interview findings may at most be said to be indicative of broader patterns 
within the ICT-BD. As a result, the researcher reinforced the collected data with the Judgments 
of the ICT-BD and other literatures. Another shortcoming of this method is that the 
interviewees may not offer objective data but rather provide subjective views on the 
effectiveness of the ICT-BD depending on which side they sit. In order to address this matter, 
in the selection of key stakeholders, the researcher made a deliberate effort to select 
stakeholders from different camps (e.g. politicians from different affiliations, both defence and 
prosecution lawyers, etc).  
In the semi-structured interviews conducted, the researcher had asked several specific 
major questions, but the respondents were free to provide responses beyond those queries. 
From the start, the emphasis was on attaining an understanding of the operation of the ICT-
BD based on the perspectives of the various stakeholders (judges, lawyers, and politicians). 
The researcher therefore allowed the interviewees to decide what issues they considered to 
be more important for them and to speak at more lengths on those issues. 
Interviewees were selected from among various politicians, judges, and lawyers. Both 
purposive sampling and snowball sampling were used to select and recruit interviewees. 
Initially, the researcher found the names of the judges and lawyers from the Judgments 
delivered by the ICT-BD and the researcher selected one prosecution lawyer, one defence 





researcher used his own judgment when creating a profile of the individuals who would provide 
information according to the research need. Using the snowball sampling technique, each of 
the selected interviewees were requested to recommend 1-3 interviewees for recruitment 
purposes. In recruiting politicians, the researcher initially used purposive sampling and 
selected 2 politicians from two major parties (Awami League and BNP - Together these two 
parties represent bulk of the other political parties in Bangladesh). Employing snowball 
sampling, those two politicians were requested to recommend other politicians who would be 
able to provide valuable data to this study. The researcher also considered diversity in terms 
of age, religion, gender and political views when recruiting the interviewees. Among the 
participants two people were from the Hindu religion and 16 of them were Muslims, the 
politicians represented 6 different political ideologies, 6 participants were below the age of 45, 
6 participants were between 50-60 and 6 participants were over the age of 60. The researcher 
was able to recruit only one female interviewee due to the nominal presence of women in the 
legal and political sector and the other 17 participants were male. To mitigate personal and 
political bias, the researcher recruited equal number of defence and prosecution lawyers and 
participants from six different political parties.  A total of 18 people participated in the interviews 
(5 recruited through purposive sampling and 13 recruited through snowball sampling) with 
their prior written consent. However, out of the 18 participants, one participant withdrew 
consent from the study before the researcher started analysing the data. Accordingly, all the 
data relating to that participant was securely destroyed. The respondents were given code 
numbers to keep their identities anonymous. 
Before conducting the semi-structured interviews, the researcher tested the interview 
questions through a pilot study involving 3 participants and updated those questions which did 
not seem effective in the pilot study. Following the pilot study, technical words were removed 
from the questionnaire and two questions were rephrased. The interview questions have been 
annexed to this thesis.  
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There were two main limitations of the interview technique employed in this research. 
Firstly, due to the elite nature of the participants, the interview data may not be entirely 
representative of the Bangladeshi society. Secondly, this study excluded the views of the 
victims, perpetrators and the affected community, so the interview data may not represent an 
important section of the society. 
 All the semi-structured interviews were audio-recorded. Some interviewees spoke in 
English while answering the questions, others spoke in Bengali (the official language of 
Bangladesh). The researcher has transcribed all the interview recordings in English. Since the 
researcher can speak the native language of Bangladesh, it was not a problem for him to 
translate the Bengali audio recordings of the interview to English.   
Once the transcription process was complete, the researcher analysed and coded the 
data based on a thematic analysis. He analysed the interview transcripts for commonalities 
and patterns emerging from the data and found seven main themes that emerged from the 
interview data, such as the culture of impunity; delayed justice; due process; evidential 
matters; witness protection; reparation and sentencing principles. These themes were used 










The researcher has used the following codes to analyse the data thematically: 
Table 1: Code names of the participants   
Code of the Participant Short code 
Judges: 
Judge 1  









Prosecution Lawyer 1  
Prosecution Lawyer 2 
Prosecution Lawyer 3 







Defence Lawyer 1 
Defence Lawyer 2 






Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 
Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami Party (BJI) 
Janiya Party (JAPA) 
Gono Forum 
Ghatak Dalal Nirmul Committee 













Table 2: Codes of the questions answered by the participants 
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Table 3: Understanding the references to interview data 





1.5.1 Ethical approval and Risk Management 
         Ethical approval was obtained from the Anglia Ruskin University’s Research Ethics 
Committee before conducting the interviews. The researcher was required to undertake two 
specific training courses as part of the ethical approval. The first training course was titled 
‘Ethics 1: Good research Practice’ and the second training course was titled ‘Ethics 2: 
Research with humans in the health and social sciences’. Both training courses enabled the 
researcher to comply with the good research practice requirements and consider the ethical 
aspect when interviewing humans. The researcher made it clear in the ethical approval 
application form that he must follow all the ethical requirements of the University’s ethics 
committee. For the interviews, the researcher travelled to Bangladesh and conducted pre-
arranged interviews with judges, lawyers, and politicians of Bangladesh, who had been 
involved with the establishment or operation of the ICT-BD. 
        The researcher also conducted appropriate risk assessments as part of the ethical 
approval application because this research required the researcher to conduct a field trip to 
Bangladesh. As part of the risk assessment, the researcher considered the welfare of the 
participants during interviews, duration and type of questions to be asked, method of transport 
(e.g. airplane, vehicle and train) for the field trip and road traffic incidents in Bangladesh. The 
research identified other risk factors and hazards such as hot weather, food poisoning, 
Hepatitis A, diarrhoea and typhoid in Bangladesh. To manage those risks, the researcher 
considered the emergency services in Bangladesh e.g. medical and security. The researcher 
obtained Anglia Ruskin University’s public liability insurance and considered the university’s 
risk assessment policy. The researcher also obtained travel insurance. Weighing up all the 
risk factors, the researcher determined that the risk level was low. The researcher pre-planned 
an itinerary of the interview dates, time, locations and participants name and that information 
was provided to the Supervisor of this study. 
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1.5.2 Scope of the thesis 
            In order to understand the historical context of the ICT-BD, it is important to understand 
the history of Bangladesh and the causes of the atrocities so as to establish a context for the 
prosecution of crimes under the international criminal justice system.  
          However, although the researcher has carried out extensive research on the contested 
history of Bangladesh within the thesis, it has been used purely for analytical purposes and 
was not the central focus of reference for this research. This is due to the core aim of the 
research, which will concentrate on the prosecution of war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide and does not directly address why those took place. However, there is a great 
deal of literature available on the history of Bangladesh and the liberation war of Bangladesh. 
The researcher will elaborate on the justification of the research method in Chapter 3.  
 This research has some limitations. Firstly, in relation to interview data, it was not 
possible to interview a large number of people due to time restrictions and limited funding. As 
a result, the researcher had to rely on the limited set of data to assess important aspects of 
the ICT-BD. In the end, the researcher managed to recruit 4 judges, 8 lawyers and 6 politicians 
for the empirical component of this study. While this may not be a large number, these 
individuals are considered hard-to-reach figures, whose voices have not yet been extensively 
represented in the available literature on the ICT-BD. Therefore, though the findings of this 
thesis may only be indicative, the interview data offers an in-depth and detailed perspective 
on the operation of the ICT-BD which has not been made available before. Limitation of 
resources in the English language was another constraint to this research because there was 
a lack of extensive literature on the ICT-BD such as academic books or journals. Another 
limitation was the geographical distance; this research was mainly undertaken in the UK and 
the subject matter of the research was in Bangladesh. As a result, it was not possible to make 
an actual observation of the trial process over the course of this research.  
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           However, the researcher was able to visit Bangladesh for a short period of time to 
collect data between 6 -20 May 2017 and he had made three visits to the ICT-BD to observe 
the physical settings.  
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
This research is divided into 10 Chapters. Chapter one provides an overview of the 
thesis including a brief introduction, significance of the research, and the methodology used 
for this research. Chapter two deals with the context of the ICT-BD including the nature of the 
atrocities, the alleged perpetrators of the crimes and earlier failed attempts at prosecution and 
reconciliation. 
Chapter three explains the relevant literature reviews and the theoretical framework. 
This chapter focuses on discussing the theoretical foundation of this research and the ICT-BD 
will be assessed through the lens of Transitional Justice. 
Chapter four deals with the features and legal framework of the ICT-BD. This chapter 
firstly discusses the nature of national prosecutions of international crimes and categories of 
ICT’s. Secondly, it discusses the parliamentary debate surrounding the ICT Act 1973. Thirdly, 
it has analysed the substantive laws of the ICT-BD. Finally, it has examined the procedural 
aspects of the ICT Act 1973 and the rules of procedure (RoP) of the ICT-BD. 
            Chapters five to nine presents an analysis of the interview data collected through semi-
structured interviews with reference to relevant literature and the judgments of the ICT-BD. 
Chapter five is dedicated to analysing the interview data in relation to fighting the culture of 
impunity, delayed justice and reparations. Chapter six analyses the interview data in relation 
to the due process aspect of the ICT-BD. Chapter seven presents the interview data in relation 
to the evidential matters of the ICT-BD on how the judges have assessed the old evidence in 
the particular context of Bangladesh. Chapter eight analysed the interview data relating to the 
witness protection aspect of the ICT-BD. This particular chapter explains that the ICT-BD 
could not come with an effective mechanism of witness protection measures. Chapter nine 
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presents the interview data relating to the sentencing principles and capital punishment with 
reference to the judgments delivered by the ICT-BD.  
Chapter ten offers some concluding remarks and important findings based on the 
interview data, substantive laws of the ICT-BD and procedural rules. In relation to culture of 
impunity, the major finding is that although the prosecutions were delayed, the ICT-BD has 
taken a substantial step to end the culture of impunity. In regard to due process, the most 
important finding is that the ICT-BD has defined due process in line with the national wishes, 
long denial of justice and recognised international norms and jurisprudence. In relation to 
witness protection, this study finds that the ICT-BD did not take appropriate measures in 
keeping the identities of witnesses safe. Other notable findings are that the ICTBD judges 
refused to accept hearsay evidence due to lack of corroborative evidence and in assessing 
the punishment, the judgements of the ICT-BD referred to the national wishes and the long 





THE CONTEXT IN DETAIL 
2.1 Introduction 
            This chapter illustrates a descriptive account of the context of the Liberation War of 
Bangladesh and the crimes committed in 1971. This is to provide the reader with a clear and 
cohesive understanding of the injustice many went through and why obtaining justice was so 
important to the people of Bangladesh even decades later. This will also provide the reader 
with a time frame of the events, initial steps and the subsequent creation of the ICT-BD and 
will give the reader an insight into why the memory of the liberation war is still very fresh and 
the pursuit for justice is enshrined in the minds of the people of Bangladesh.  
             Several studies have documented that the world had seen the biggest casualties 
during World War II, which occurred over three continents and killed about sixty million people 
in six years.35 The second largest mass killing was seen during first World War which took the 
lives of 20 million people.36 During the war in Vietnam, three million people were killed.37 The 
birth of Bangladesh was equally devastating; the country emerged through the bloodshed of 
three million people within a short period of nine months.38 It is officially recorded that more 
than 200,000 Bangladeshi women were raped.39 However, the context of Bangladeshi 
transitional justice is not well known in many parts of the world. The ICT-BD was established 




35 Susan Brownmiller, Against our will: men, women and rape (Simon & Schuster 1975) 81, Gary Bass, 
‘Bargaining Away Justice: India, Pakistan and the International Politics of Impunity for the Bangladesh Genocide’ 
(2016) 42(2) International Security 140, and International Commission of Jurists, ‘The Events in East Pakistan, 
1971: A Legal Study’ (1972) 61. 





            Following the independence of Bangladesh, there were several attempts to make the 
perpetrators accountable and those failed due various reasons or did not achieve the desired 
outcome. Attempts of prosecution, reconciliation and amnesty were taken which gave rise to 
several legal debates. International politics had further created various obstacles towards 
justice. The United States and China were against the establishment of any criminal tribunals 
because they were allies of West Pakistan during the 1971 war. China was primarily 
concerned about the Indian military support that Bangladesh was receiving from the Indian 
government at that time and as the relationship between China and India was tense and due 
to the Indian-Sino war of 1962, it feared an attack from India. On the other hand, the United 
states provided military supplies to East Pakistan and was concerned about avoiding a Soviet 
domination the in the South Asian region due to the Cold war as the Soviet Union had 
expressed its support for an independent Bangladesh.40 China and the United States were 
also among the last countries in the world to recognise Bangladesh as an independent state. 
The impact of this geopolitics was that the authority of Bangladesh had to choose whether to 
prosecute the perpetrators or to ensure government security and get recognition for the 
country. Bangladesh also needed to improve its infrastructure, military and economy which 
meant that it needed to work on building strong diplomatic ties with other economically stable 
countries such as the USA. The political turmoil in Bangladesh subsequently buried the 
demand for justice from 1975 until 1990. Nevertheless, following its establishment, the ICT-
BD has so far delivered 38 judgments (as of July 2019) within 9 years from the initial 
establishment.41 At present there are 21 cases pending before the ICT-BD and over 675 




40 Bass (n 11) 148 
41 Judgments of ICT-BD (ICT-1), http://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/judgments.php & Judgments of ICT-BD (ICT-2) 
http://www.ict-bd.org/ict2/judgments.php Accessed 3 July 2019. 
42 Ibid. 
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2.1.1 Legal system in Bangladesh 
             Bangladesh has a dualist common law legal system and international law is not 
applicable directly without the help of an Act of Parliament.43 The case of Bangladesh and 
others v. Sombon Asavhan states that if domestic law is linked to international law, then it is 
the duty of the  domestic courts to apply domestic law complying with the Act of parliament.44 
However, for the application of ‘customary international law’, there is no need of any aiding 
domestic legislation because, by virtue of common practice principle, it is already part of 
national law, subject to the reservation that it does not contradict with an Act of Parliament.45 
There is no clear description in the Bangladeshi Constitution on how international laws are to 
be applied except for the vague concept of supplementary legislation.46  
            From an analytical perspective, the ICT Act 1973, as amended, is clearly an Act of 
Parliament to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons responsible 
for committing genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under 
international law and there is no doubt that it is domestic law.47 However, the Act also refers 
to crimes of international law which are developed by customary international law as a matter 
of source.48 So, if we critically observe the functionality of the ICT Act 1973 as amended, it 
can be seen that the Act has ultimately created room to adopt international law by way of 
reference but there is no formal declaration of incorporating international law except in the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949.49 There is no doubt that treaties such as the Genocide 
Convention and the Regulations annexed to Hague Convention IV are customary international 
law50 and, if there is no conflict with Statute passed by Parliament, aspects of these 
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international treaties are applicable in Bangladesh.51 However, Professor Shah Alam observed 
that Bangladeshi judges are unwilling to refer to foreign treaties without a formal declaration 
to be bound by that treaty.52 The other option is that the judiciary of Bangladesh may accept 
to apply unincorporated treaty after ratification has been done, but did not explain how it could 
be possible to do so.53 However, it is clear that Constitutional Supremacy is preserved in 
Bangladesh and international law will only apply if they are not contradictory with the legal 
authority of Bangladesh.54 
2.1.2 Liberation War of 1971 
               To gain an understanding of the Liberation War of 1971 (alternatively Independence 
War of 1971), it is important to revisit the historical aspect behind the war. British India was 
partitioned in 1947 based on the ‘two-nation’ theory, which gave birth to India and Pakistan.55 
The justification put forward to implement this division was that India would be a country for 
the Hindu majority and Pakistan would be an Islamic country.56 Pakistan was geographically 
comprised of East Pakistan and West Pakistan with India in between.57 The native Bengali 
population along with a majority of Hindus and Bihari’s58 resided in East Pakistan and were 
governed by the Pakistani army. Bangla was the most common language spoken in East 
Pakistan. The people of East Pakistan were discriminated against politically, socially and 
economically and were worse off than the West Pakistanis, the Pakistani Government failed 
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            The East Pakistanis were treated as inferior citizens and their needs and demands 
were ignored by the Pakistani Government for a very long time. Major General (Rtd.) 
Tozammel Hossain Malik, wrote that an impartial observer would have noticed that the West 
Pakistanis, especially the Army, saw the Bengali as ‘niggers’.60 It was widely viewed that the 
Pakistani government had a purely monetary interest in East Pakistan and all the resources 
and money was being invested in building West Pakistan leaving the Eastern province 
financially weak. Dr. Mubashir Hasan, a former federal minister and a close ally of Bhutto had 
stated that East Pakistan was used as a colony.61 It was reported that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
had visited Islamabad once and had reported that he could smell Jute, a product that was 
mainly cultivated in East Pakistan.62  
            The first movement against the discriminatory and undemocratic policies arose in 
1952.63 The authorities in Pakistan decided to impose Urdu as the official language of 
Pakistan, this went against the Bangla speaking majority of East Pakistan who felt that their 
language was considered unimportant and therefore ignored.64 Protests erupted in East 
Pakistan, there was a widespread move to gain recognition for Bangla as a state language, 
this marked the inception of a movement that initially began in order to give equal importance 
to Bangla but developed into a demand for self-determination and eventually independence. 
The failure of East Pakistan to recognise Bangla lead to several lives lost and many 
causalities, this led to the East Pakistanis demanding provincial autonomy and emancipation. 
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, also acknowledged that ‘Bengalis were in fact 
treated unfairly and they were not treated with respect’.65 There was an incorrect assumption 
that the people of East Pakistan supported Hindus and therefore, they were supporters and 
sympathisers of India which made them disloyal to Pakistan as there were great tensions 
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between the two countries.66 It was widely believed that, Hindus were the agents of India, and 
were responsible for creating anti-Islamic ideologies, for this reason they were considered as 
the main culprits.67 
            The Pakistani government also failed to follow the principles of democracy and accept 
the results of the general election of 1970, refusing to hand over the power to form a 
Government to Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the AL party who won the 
majority seats of the National assembly of Pakistan.68 The AL party won 167 of the 169 seats 
allocated to East Pakistan out of 300 seats in the parliament.69 On 7 March 1971, 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman delivered a historic speech which called on the people 
of East Pakistan to strive for independence if the people’s verdict was not respected and power 
was not handed over to the leader of the majority party.70 The people of East Pakistan 
mobilized and took to the streets inspired by the speech of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and on 17 
April 1971, Bangabandhu was declared as the president of an independent Bangladesh by a 
provisional government-in-exile formed in Mujibnagar.71 Syed Nazrul Islam was appointed as 
the Acting President and Tajuddin Ahmed was appointed as the Prime Minister.72 They were 
in charge of overseeing the expulsion of the Pakistani forces in Bangladesh as Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman was in Pakistani custody during the course of the liberation war. 
            The struggle in 1971 was not between centralists and secessionists or between 
integrationists and dis-integrationists, the fight was between democracy and militarism, 
between rights and repression, between human values and inhuman barbarities, between 
justice and tyranny, between human dignity and slavery.73 In 1971, the UK Labour Party 
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spokesman, Mr Denis Healey, stated that the situation in Bangladesh represented ‘a human 
tragedy with few precedents in recent history’.74 The situation in Bangladesh was actually a 
de facto war between the Yahiya regime (West Pakistan) and the rebels (East Pakistan). The 
rebels had announced the formation of a new sovereign People’s Republic of Bangladesh on 
17 April 1971 and formed a provisional government with a President, a Prime Minister and 
other ministers. The newly formed government sent official messages to various countries 
pleading for recognition and to pressure Yahiya Khan to stop the killings, but the world, 
including the United Nations, was unsurprisingly silent.75  
           The fight for an independent Bangladesh began on 25 March 1971 and concluded on 
16 December 1971. At the end of the war, the Pakistani army surrendered before the Joint 
Indian and Bangladeshi forces in Dhaka.76 The idea of a liberated and independent  
Bangladesh attracted a lot of support and encouragement from the people of East Pakistan 
throughout the war, however, there was also opposition, the Pakistani army received support 
from small number of the local population, mainly members of some political groups, Bihari’s 
and a few Bengalis with pro-Pakistani ideologies, who collaborated with the local forces in 
supressing the people of Bangladesh.77 The majority of people belonging to the Hindu faith 
were especially persecuted targeted for atrocities as they were viewed as Indian sympathisers 
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           The atrocities in Bangladesh started on 25 March 1971 after the inconclusive 
discussion in Dhaka between President Yahya Khan and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.79 Linton 
also reported that President Yahya and the West Pakistani politician Bhutto, secretly left East 
Pakistan and the army from the barracks came out to attack the people of Bangladesh.80 After 
midnight, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested and the Pakistan army conducted a military 
operation named ‘Operation Searchlight’ on the night of 25 March 1971 targeting the students 
at the university dormitories, the police headquarters, various market places or shopping 
areas, some residential areas of the working class and the Hindu areas.81 The shooting began 
at midnight and continued until 7.00 am in the morning killing hundreds of students, dead 
bodies were buried in mass graves using a bulldozer.82 It is reported that Police headquarters 
of East Pakistan were attacked with tanks and almost all the people were killed 
indiscriminately.83 
           It is reported that there were no human rights during the nine-month long war and 
‘…every soldier with a gun had supreme authority over life and death and property and could 
use that authority at will’.84  There are three distinct phases to understand the massacres in 
Bangladesh by the Pakistani army along with the local Bangladeshi collaborators. It would not 
be possible for the Pakistani army to commit such atrocities without the help of communal 
political parties such as the Jamat-e-Islami, Muslim League and Nezame Islam.85 The first 
phase of the atrocities started on 25 March 1971. Numerous eyewitnesses ’ accounts 
confirmed the week long horrendous killing of the Bengali people in Dhaka and the local 
intelligentsia were the target of the Pakistan army.86 Along with many civilians, at least 50 
prominent thinkers of Bangladesh including professors were brutally killed by the Pakistani 
 
 
79 Macdermot (n 21) 476. 
80 Linton (n 23) 286. 
81 Macdermot (n 21) 5. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
84 The Events in East Pakistan (n 7) 25. 
85 Shahriar Kabir (ed), On Recognition of Bangladesh Genocide (Forum for Secular Bangladesh 2017) 5. 
86 Ibid. 
 34 
army and female students from the dormitory of Dhaka University were missing.87 The 
Pakistani army was assisted by the local collaborators who formed paramilitaries and took 
part in the atrocities with the Pakistani army.88 The main task of these local collaborators was 
to identify Bengali people who were sympathisers of the AL party. It is reported by B N Mehrish 
that, an eyewitness described the unchallenged atrocities in Dhaka city by the Pakistani army 
under the name of ‘Operation Searchlight’ where there was no resistance from the rebels .89 
According to the eyewitness’s account, there was no prior warning before residential homes 
were raided and burnt down and every citizen the Pakistani army came across was shot and 
killed.90 Due to the indiscriminate killing and destruction, Dhaka city turned into a graveyard, 
dead bodies were eaten by vultures and other animals.91  
            After the massacre in Dhaka on 25 March 1971, the second phase of the brutalities 
began. At this stage, the specific aim of the Pakistani army was to destroy entire sections of 
people who were supportive of the AL.92 So, it appears that there was a specific government 
policy behind the atrocities and the nature of the killings was systematic and widespread. A  
US Senator, Adlai Stevenson stated in a press conference that the massacre by the Pakistani 
army and the local collaborators were ‘a calculated policy to extinguish Bengali culture’.93 It 
was further stated that the operation of the Pakistani army had the potential elements of 
genocide.94 Another feature of the second phase of atrocities was that, hundreds of thousands 
of woman were raped and subjected to sexual violence.95 
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The last phase of the atrocities started before the surrender of the Pakistani army to 
the joint forces of the Indian army and the rebels of Bangladesh.96 It is reported that with the 
assistance of the local collaborators, the Pakistani army and members of the paramilitaries 
arrested over 200 Bangladeshi intellectuals including doctors, engineers, professors and 
journalists and all of them were tortured to death, their bodies were dismembered and 
mutilated.97 The war came to an end when the Indian Army entered Bangladesh to assist the 
rebels of Bangladesh and forced the West Pakistani Army to sign the instrument of surrender 
on 16 December 1971.98 After the Liberation War was over, at least two hundreds bodies of 
Bangladeshi intellectuals were found strewn across in many cities.99  
2.1.4 Local collaborators, auxiliary forces 
            In order to assist the Pakistani Army, on 10 April 1971, leaders of Jamat-e Islami, 
Muslim League and Nezame Islam formed the Peace Committee with a group of people called 
the ‘Razakars’.100 The primary aim of creating this ‘Peace Committee’ was to take part in the 
hostility along with the Pakistani army and to eliminate the ‘Muktijuddha’, intellectuals and 
civilians of Bangladesh who were the sympathisers of the rebels.101 After completing the initial 
training, the Razakars went into remote areas and looted recklessly, killed innocent villagers 
and tortured women.102 They were used as guides by the Pakistani army who were unfamiliar 
with the geographical position of civilians and rebels and they praised their collaborators for 
their assistance.103 In explaining the duties of the ‘Razakars’, General Niazi, stated that they 
were employed to detect and punish the people who were the supporters of an independent 
Bangladesh and AL.104 A particular political party named the Jamat-e-Islami Party, also 
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designed two separate groups such as ‘Al-Badr' and 'Al-Shams Bahini' with the aim of 
targeting and killing the intellectuals of Bangladesh.105 According to Shahrier Kabir, the ‘Al-
Badr' and 'Al-Shams Bahini' imitated Hitler's style and blueprint for killing intellectuals.106     
            Hamoodur Rahman Commission 1972, reported that in response to the excessive 
force used by the Pakistani army, there was no meaningful resistance by the unarmed 
civilians.107 It is also reported that junior army officers of the Pakistani army did not follow any 
norms of armed conflict and summarily executed many unarmed people.108 Lt. Col. S. M. 
Naeem of the Pakistani army stated that, during the atrocities in Bangladesh, army abduction 
of the Bengalis took place on many occasions and summary executions by brush fire was very 
common and many innocent people were executed during the operation.109 Another witness 
Mansoorul Haq, reported that a code word was being used to order the execution of Bengalis, 
rebels and AL supporters.110 This particular witness further stated that there was an oral order 
to eliminate Hindus and at least 500 people were brutally executed near the Salda river.111 
Brigadier Iqbalur Rehman Shariff, in explaining the attitude of senior officers, stated that some 
generals used to ask the soldiers about how many Bengalis they had killed.112 It was also 
common for senior officers to ask junior officers about the number of Hindus they had killed, 
as explained by Lt. Col. Aziz.113 It is objectively reported that the army commanders of the 
Pakistani army had a policy of, ‘…You don’t go around counting the bodies of your enemies, 
you throw them in the rivers and be done with it’.114     
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            In conclusion, it can be said that the main target of the Pakistani army was to shoot 
and kill AL supporters, intellectuals, students and Hindus.115 The Hindus were singled out as 
the enemies of West Pakistan on the grounds of religion and they were blamed to be the 
agents of India.116 Secondly, if any areas showed signs of resistance by the Bengali people or 
the rebels, then the whole area or village was torn down by the Pakistani army and the civilians 
would have to flee or otherwise be killed.117 Another policy was that if the rebels attempted to 
destroy bridges, then the Pakistani army would indiscriminately destroy all the residential 
buildings or homes.118 Also, Hindu villages were destroyed and burnt to the ground and those 
who could not flee were killed.119 Another aspect of the atrocities was the wide spread rape 
by the Pakistani army, and as a result, after the atrocities were over, the authorities of an 
independent Bangladesh had to open a new agency to deal with war babies and rape 
victims.120 According to Anthony Mascarenhas, the Pakistani army had a horrendous official 
policy of ‘kill and burn’ the civilians.121 
           It is reported that the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and local collaborators 
resulted in the killing of approximately 300,000 people and around 200,000 women were raped 
and 10 million people became refugees in India.122 The US Embassy reported in a cable that 
the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army can be considered as a ‘selective genocide’.123 
The report produced by the International Commission of Jurists also suggested that there were 
genocidal elements against people from the Hindu faith.124 
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2.1.5 Failed attempt at reconciliation and prosecution  
            As early as February 1972, just a month or so after Pakistan's surrender, the 
provisional government in Bangladesh was planning to establish an international tribunal in 
order to try the leading perpetrators of the liberation war.125 According to a spokesperson from 
the Indian government, two categories of tribunals were to be created, the first one was to try 
high ranking army officials that planned the atrocities, the second was to try lower ranking 
officials that facilitated the will of the high ranking officials.126 Most of the higher ranking 
officials, who were suspected for the atrocities, managed to return to Pakistan and were 
therefore out of the jurisdiction, however, the newly independent Bangladesh held around 
600,000 prisoners of war, India had 92,000 prisoners of war out of which 195 were suspects.127 
Bangladesh wanted to take criminal proceedings against the all of the POW’s with the 
exception of  260,000 prisoners which it wanted to expel to Pakistan.128 Pakistan urged the 
nations not to take action against the 195 POW’s and also stated that Pakistani civilians were 
also being held by India for purported genocide.129 It was paramount to ascertain if Pakistan 
could assert jurisdiction for these POW’s under  Article VI of the Genocide Convention, which 
both States were party to.130 An argument put forward by Levie has claimed that Bangladesh 
wanted official recognition from Pakistan as an independent state and the POW’s were 
detained for a lengthy period of time in order to pressurise the Pakistani government to achieve 
recognition and 195 suspects were detained while the rest were released under agreement.131 
The politics of political recognition and population exchange would ultimately seal the fate of 
the accountability project in Bangladesh.132 
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            The Bangladeshi authority envisaged genocide charges despite not being a member 
of the Genocide Convention yet and ‘in absentia trials’, for former Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan and General Tikka Khan.133 The following month, it approached among others, Niall 
MacDermot, the British Secretary-General of the International Commission of Jurists for 
further advice.134 In a meeting with the Minister of Law Kamal Hossein, and in a memorandum 
produced by Commission MacDermot, urged the establishment of an international court based 
loosely on the Nuremberg Tribunal, which he thought would carry greater authority than a 
domestic one.135 Yet, he cautioned against allowing Nuremberg too closely by allowing in 
absentia proceedings which he thought would deter foreign lawyers from taking part.136 In 
reality, the formation of the court, which would have been established by Presidential decree, 
would have more closely resembled the Tokyo Tribunal (decreed by Douglas MacArthur) than 
Nuremberg (convened jointly by the four Allies).137 But MacDermot's general advice appeared 
to have been heeded, and Dhaka proceeded towards an ‘Asian Nuremberg’ as described by 
a British official.138  
           The first step was to draw up the court's Charter, titled ‘War Crimes Tribunal order, 
1972'. This was designed to provide the legal framework for the trials of Pakistani civilian and 
military officials in the custody of Bangladesh, plus another 1500 or so Pakistani officers and 
men in the custody of India (including two leading figures: Major General Rao Farman Ali and 
Lieutenant-General Abdullah Khan Niazi). Draft Article 2 stated that the government would 
appoint five judges, it was intended, though not stated within, that two would be from 
Bangladesh, and three from elsewhere.139 Thereafter, the order followed the template set 
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down at Nuremberg, denying state immunity and superior orders as defences, encompassing 
organizations as well as individuals, and allowing for trials in absentia and the death penalty.140  
           The charges set out in Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter namely, crimes against 
peace, war crimes, crimes against humanity and common plan or conspiracy were transferred 
wholly into draft Article 10, with few minor modifications to bring them in line with the 
Bangladeshi situation.141  
            In May 1972, the Bangladeshi barrister M.S. Ali gave a copy of the draft Charter to 
Gerald Draper, a British specialist in humanitarian law, who had previously advised the 
independence movement on Mujibur Rahman's imprisonment in Pakistan.142 While Draper 
was willing to comment on legal questions arising from the draft, he was prepared to 
offer strategic advice to Bangladesh only if it accorded with Foreign Office policy.143 Because 
of its own role at Nuremberg, the United Kingdom could not publicly oppose a tribunal but was 
privately opposed to Bangladesh convening one because it would impose more strains on 
relations with Pakistan.144 As a result, Mr Draper advised Ali that convening a tribunal would 
be unwise.145 On legal questions, he cautioned that the cases must be watertight, and that, 
given that the war was not of an international character, charges of international crimes might 
not be sustained.146 This approach of foreign policy taken by the UK demonstrates how a 
newly independent country struggled to make accountable those who committed crimes 
during the liberation war of Bangladesh. However, Bangladeshi officials did not stop taking 
steps to ensure that they serve justice by establishing tribunals and enacting legislation. 
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            While Bangladeshi authorities were discussing the possibility of establishing a tribunal 
to prosecute Pakistani figures, another trial programme dealing with collaborators was being 
put into place.147 These trials played an important role in establishing the credentials of the 
provisional government led by the AL, but they also attracted international criticism on legal 
grounds.148 There were 73 Special Tribunals set up by the newly independent country to try 
those who had collaborated with the old regime or had, in support of it, perpetrated crimes 
such as murder, rape and arson.149 Their operation was governed by the Bangladesh 
Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order, 1972 (decreed by the President on 24 January 1972, 
but backdated to 26 March 1971).150 The following year, the government passed the ICT Act 
1973 covering crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as 
genocide and embracing any other international crimes.151 However, no tribunal was ever 
established under the ICT Act 1973 until 2010. 
            Justice FKM Abdul Munim, stated that from 24 January to 13 December 1972, up to  
forty thousand people were investigated, twenty thousand were charged and taken into 
custody and less than a thousand people were convicted (with the right of appeal) under 1972 
Collaborators Order.152 Some trials involved very senior figures, for example, Abdul Motaleb 
Malik, the former civilian Governor of East Pakistan, and his Minister of Law, Jasmuddin 
Ahmed, were both sentenced to life imprisonment.153 Malik was found guilty on all charges, 
but he was spared the death penalty on grounds of his age and his past service.154 At the time, 
the AL provisional government was reluctant to allow the defendants to be represented by 
foreign counsel on the ostensible grounds that membership of the Bar in Bangladesh was 
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restricted to nationals.155 On 17 November 1972, British MP Dingle Foot who was instructed 
by the Pakistani authority to defend Malik, arrived in Dhaka without a visa, and instead of 
being admitted (as he clearly expected), was refused entry into the country. Foot's junior, 
Robert Maclennan MP, was admitted but was not allowed to represent Malik.156 Maclennan 
reported to the British Foreign Office that the tribunals under the Collaborators Act were 
systematically problematic as the 1972 Collaborators Act was retrospective; the burden of 
proof in many cases was on the accused; rules of evidence were very sketchy.157  
           Under the Collaborators Act, over 37,000 people were arrested, over 30,000 people 
were charged, out of which 2,848 were tried, 752 convicted and 2096 acquitted.158 The people 
who were arrested, charged and convicted were only from the defeated party, that meant the 
people who aided and abetted the Pakistani Armed Forces, and who waged war or aided and 
abetted in waging war against Bangladesh.159 However, there were no arrests among those 
who fought for Bangladesh. To this extent, it was a type of Nuremberg style ‘victor’s justice’. 
The majority of the local collaborators that were held or convicted were released by way of 
general amnesty declared by the government.160 This declaration of amnesty was not 
extended to those who had committed crimes such as rape, murder and arson, yet a lot of 
suspects and collaborators accused of such crimes were released. One plausible reason was 
that the number of people to be tried was too high and some of them had only committed petty 
crimes.161 A large number of people who the general amnesty did not apply to were 
subsequently released.162  
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            In return for Pakistan’s recognition of Bangladesh on April 1974, the 195 Pakistani 
suspects of perpetrators of genocide and other international crimes were released under a 
Bangladesh–India–Pakistan Agreement on the Repatriation of War and Civilian Internees (the 
Simla Agreement), the then Foreign Minister of Bangladesh stated that Bangladesh was 
offering clemency to the Pakistani perpetrators and would not try them.163 The agreement 
stated words such as ‘‘reconciliation’’ and ‘‘forgetting the past’.164 ’This was a purely political 
manoeuvre, post-war regional disaccords and international politics had become intertwined 
with ICL.165 
            The elected president, Sheikh Mujib, was assassinated in a military coup on 15 August 
1975 and martial law was imposed.166 Following this, General Ziaur Rahman assumed 
presidency and he repealed the 1972 Collaborator’s Act.167 Following that period, in 1981, Zia 
was assassinated by a military coup and was succeeded by Abdus Sattar.168 The following 
year in 1982, all political parties and the constitution was suspended by General Ershad after 
he assumed power.169 Due to the political turmoil that followed, there was no attempt to deal 
with the crimes of 1971. However, in 1990, Jahanara Imam170 attempted to bring the issue of 
criminal prosecutions back into the foreground. She attempted to establish a people’s court 
where exemplary trials were helping to create awareness about the perpetrators of 1971. 
Subsequently, the AL did not come into power until 1996 and in their first 5-year term, the 
party concentrated on party organisation rather than dealing with war crimes. However, before 
the general election in 2008, the AL party included a promise in their campaign manifesto that 
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if they win the election, they would establish tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of 1971.171 
Finally, on 25 March 2010, the ICT-BD was established on the basis of a slightly amended 
version of the ICT Act 1973.172 
2.2 Conclusion 
            At the end of this chapter, it would be pertinent to make some brief observations 
concerning the proposed trials of the suspected Pakistani war criminals and local Bengali 
collaborators since 1972. There was no doubt about the gravity of the violations that had been 
committed in 1971 or the legal competence of Bangladesh to try the alleged perpetrators. In 
Bangladesh, the Pakistani Army indulged in a policy of repression, killings and hangings, the 
massacre of the innocent women and children. The Army violated and failed to protect civilians 
and violated aspects of IHL.   
            There were also strong indications that the Pakistani Army and the collaborators 
sought to commit the crime of genocide in Bangladesh. From the eyewitness accounts and 
press reports cited in this study, it appears that the regime wanted the destruction of the 
Bengalis in Bangladesh. However, from a legal perspective, for the genocidal intent, experts 
suggested that it was clearer that Pakistani army wanted to destroy the Bengali civilians and 
completely exterminate the Hindu population (please see more details in chapter 4.3.5).173 
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CHAPTER 3 
LITREATURE REVIEW AND THEOROTICAL FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction to literature Review on various Transitional Justice mechanisms 
In order to conduct this research, the researcher has considered the ICT-BD as a 
transitional justice mechanism to deal with the past atrocities of 1971. As a result, the 
researcher has conducted a literature review on various forms of transitional justice 
mechanisms, in order to locate the ICT-BD as a possible mechanism in the context of 
countries in transition for the purpose of seeking justice. This chapter also discusses the 
academic debates around the theories of transitional justice. 
Generally, the term ‘Transitional Justice’ refers to the various policies and measures 
applied by societies in transition in dealing with past abuses.174 It may take various forms such 
as criminal prosecutions, truth and reconciliation, purges, lustration, compensation, restitution, 
or any other form.175 Transitional justice aims to encourage the rule of law and make the 
violators accountable, provide justice to the victims and reinstate peace in society.176 As part 
of the reconciliation process, both judicial and non-judicial techniques are applied to address 
the severe violations of human rights.177  
According to Doak, the nature of conflicts in societies in transition significantly vary 
from each other based on the context; for this reason, the transitional justice mechanisms also 
differ from each other.178 He further stated that victim-orientated justice such as truth, 
reparation and victims' participation are important factors to increase the victims satisfaction 
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in relation to the sense of transitional justice.179 To this extent, this study attempted to analyse  
how the ICT-BD is functioning in a Muslim majority country like Bangladesh as a form of 
transitional justice mechanism. 
3.1.1 What is Transitional Justice? 
The legal scholar Ruti Teitel popularised the term ‘transitional justice’ which refers to 
a set of mechanisms to address a particular society’s past violence.180 The concept of 
transition and transitional terms have been used to denote to the situation of when a particular 
society emerge from a period of abuse by the former regime.181 One of the primary purposes 
of transitional justice is to start the reconciliation process thorough various types of responses 
such as prosecution, reparation, amnesty, or truth commission.182 However, achieving 
reconciliation is not the only purpose of transitional justice. The Guidance note of the UN 
Secretary General suggests that:  
…transitional justice is the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a 
society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order 
to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation. These may include 
both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, reparations, truth seeking, institutional 
reforms, vetting, and dismissals, or a combination thereof.183 
According to Sarkin, transitional justice should consider three goals: truth, justice, and 
reconciliation.184 According to Jon Elster, transitional justice can take both judicial and not-
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some general objectives that ‘…include punishing perpetrators, establishing the truth, 
repairing or addressing the damage caused, paying respect to the victims, preventing further 
abuses, promoting national reconciliation and reducing conflict over the past, highlighting new 
commitment to human rights, gaining support from the international community, establishing 
the rule of law and so on’.186  
3.1.2 Developing phases of Transitional Justice 
Jon Elster has analysed the transitional justice mechanisms from historical 
perspectives and drew a picture on trials and purges from more than 2,000 years ago, 
throughout political turmoil in early Athens.187 On the other hand, Gary Bass has given an 
account of the past 200 years’ history of war crimes tribunals.188 Teitel analysed the history of 
transitional justice from World War I, and provided three specific phases of transitional justice 
such as  ‘…the post-WWII phase (the international, ending with the beginning of the Cold 
War), the post-Cold War Phase (associated with a wave of democratic transitions and 
modernization), and the steady state phase (the normalized law of violence at the end of the 
20th Century)’.189  
The first phase was developed by the Nuremburg Military Tribunals which was ‘…set 
up by the victorious Allied powers in order to prosecute high-ranking Nazi officials for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity’.190 This phase was short-lived due to the emergence of 
the Cold War which stopped the possibility of establishing any further international war crimes 
tribunals.191 This phase of transitional justice attracted some criticisms among  which included 
‘…“victor’s justice” and the retroactive application of human rights laws and norms to past 
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conduct’.192 In the first phase, the application of transitional justice can be observed soon after 
the war was over and the main characteristics were ‘…interstate cooperation, war crimes 
trials, and sanctions’.193 The ICT Act 1973 was based on the legacy of Nuremburg and initially, 
it aimed to prosecute the high-ranking West Pakistani (now Pakistan) military officers. 
However, due to the effect of the second phase, Bangladesh could not establish any effective 
tribunals soon after the war. 
The second phase of transitional justice encouraged domestic prosecution within the 
newly independent democratic countries which reduced the compliance with the rule of law 
standards due to political interference.194 During this period, the peace versus justice debate 
arose and restorative justice mechanisms were introduced (e.g. granting amnesty to end 
hostility and establishing truth commissions).195 Thus, this phase created a tension between 
global and local decision making when it came to coming up with the best way to address 
questions of justice in transition.196 Phase two focuses on nation building and introduced a 
different understanding of the rule of law related to a particular political and social context.197 
In the second phase, a contextual approach was adopted to define past human rights 
violations which differentiated the relationship between truth and justice. For this reason, truth 
commissions were popularised compared to criminal prosecutions.198 
The competing notions of peace and justice in the second phase gave rise to questions 
as to the appropriateness of the justice in the first phase.199 The criticisms of the first phase of 
transitional justice encouraged to develop justice beyond retribution in the second phase.200 A 
critical analysis of the second phase of transitional justice demonstrates that here, the 
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transitional justice did not focus only on making the perpetrators accountable, but also on 
rebuilding society, establishing peace and serving justice through diverse rule-of-law 
values.201 For this reason, the notion of transitional justice at this stage incorporated complex 
and diverse political culture with the aim of rebuilding society.202 
The third phase of transitional justice is called the ‘steady-state phase of transitional 
justice’ linked with the most recent violations of human rights which formed a generalised law 
of violence.203 Under this third phase, the nature of transitional justice is to include the 
universal rule of law.204 In Teitel’s third and final phase, it was not a question whether to 
conduct some form of transitional justice, but it was important to consider which method to 
use. At this phase, it has been established that peace and justice should go hand in hand. In 
this phase, a general legal framework of humanitarian justice has emerged to deal with the 
issue of transitional justice, and this created a pathway for the law of terrorism.205 The trial of 
Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussain are the examples of phase three transitional 
justice.206 
The fourth generation of transitional justice is “externally driven”, deliberate and 
executed in a “top-down” fashion with minimal engagement of “the locals”.207 It is suggested 
that the latest phase of transitional justice should make a correct equilibrium between local 
and international stakeholders.208  
Based on specific contexts, the notion of transitional justice developed differently in 
the various parts of the world and these include, Western Europe, Japan, Southern Europe, 
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national and international trials were conducted to prosecute the Nazi officials.210 However, to 
complement the prosecution, a ‘vast purge process (denazification)’ along with other 
reparatory legislations were adopted to rehabilitate the victims of the holocaust.211   
The development of human rights has changed the previous trend of transitional justice 
because modern states are under an obligation to address past human rights violations.212 
After the fall of the autocratic regime of Argentina, a Truth Commission was established in 
1984 to address the past atrocities, and it became a role model for other Latin American 
nations.213 Between 1982-1992, in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay human rights violations 
were investigated by their respective Parliamentary Commission which produced truth 
reports.214 Non-Governmental Organisations also conducted their own investigations in Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay attempting to establish the truth.215 These countries demonstrated an 
emphasis on establishing truth over criminal prosecution, and as a result, amnesty laws were 
introduced.216  
3.1.3 Goals and objectives of Transitional Justice 
There is no single set of goals of transitional justice because appropriate mechanisms 
for dealing with human rights violations depend on the particular goals, culture, and contexts 
of the society in transition.217 Fenwick lists some of the many goals of transitional justice as 
including; establishing the truth regarding past atrocities, building a symbolic pause with the 
past, reinstating the rule of law and democracy, discouraging repeated violations of the past 
atrocities, sentencing the wrongdoers of offences, comforting victims and accomplishing 
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collective reform and reconciliation.218 According to Oduro, the history of the State prescribes 
a nation’s choice on the form of transitional justice, the nature of transition, the particular needs 
of the state in transition, the political forum and the dissemination of administrative control 
throughout and afterward the transition.219 He suggests that when transition to democracy is 
achieved by negotiation, truth commissions and amnesties are usually the preferred option 
and prosecution may not be suitable.220 This is because the 'new' and 'old order', still share 
power as has been in the case of Chile, Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa.221 Orentlicher, 
suggests that prosecution is impossible when the military hands over civil authority to the 
civilian regime, but still retains power by dictating the terms and conditions of the state.222 In 
these circumstances, states may opt to offer de facto impunity, and amnesties which 
encourage forgetting the crimes and moving on.223 
Orentlicher asserts that prosecution is possible where the transition was brought about 
by external conquest as was in the case of Germany and Japan.224  Oduro is of the view that 
the choice is dependent on the relative strength of the demands of the outgoing regime and 
the general public. Trials are an obvious choice when the outgoing regime is weaker or has 
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3.1.4 Justice and Legitimacy of Transitional Justice Processes   
A country in transition should make an avenue to serve justice to the affected 
communities. According to Joinet, justice is a right of the affected communities and the public 
which is also recognised under international law.226 Under international human rights law, 
states are obliged to provide appropriate remedies for the violations of human rights. In order 
to establish rule of law and promote human rights, it is important to serve justice to the affected 
communities.227  
According to Professor Villa-Vicencio, there are ‘…five different forms of justice in 
relation to transition, namely; deterrent, compensation, rehabilitation, recognition and 
exoneration’.228 The aim of deterrent justice is to deter future crimes by providing exemplary 
punishment to the perpetrators.229 The notion of compensatory justice encourages to provide 
compensation to the victims and make the perpetrators of former regimes liable to provide 
damage.230 The main aim of rehabilitative justice is to rehabilitate the victims into the society.231 
Recognition as a form of justice can be understood from the affirmation of human dignity to 
heal the wounds of the victims where perpetrators acknowledged their wrongdoings and 
aimed to correct themselves.232 Lastly, justice as exoneration can be understood when historic 
false accusation is corrected.233  
It is important to note that emotion is often mixed with a transitional justice mechanism, 
which may create a revengeful desire rather than a real wish to carry out neutral justice. In 
certain circumstances, the prosecution can be used as a form of vengeance rather than to 
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achieve justice.234 However, it is argued that emotion and empathy are essential bases of 
justice.235 The preparation of a transitional justice instrument may also be prejudiced by other 
wishes, including the wish for new regime to prove that ‘We are not like them.’236 Here, the 
new leaders are motivated by subjective interest that, if they can prove that they are not like 
the former regime then they will be able to stay in power. However, the new leaders refrain 
from expressing their subjective interest to justify their actions rather, they justify their actions 
stating that they are serving justice to the victims.237 
One of the critical challenges with deterrent justice in countries in transition is the 
danger of political interference. For example, Bangladesh became independent following a 
violent war in 1971 and the newly formed judiciary of the country might have reflected the 
political will of the victorious party. According to According to Mobbek, ‘an authoritarian regime 
is always reflected in its judicial system and by its judiciary’.238 Also, Bangladesh could not 
prosecute the suspected war criminals of Pakistan because of the Agreement of 1974 (Delhi 
Agreement) but decided to prosecute the local collaborators who were still residing in the 
territory of Bangladesh. This sort of political justice lacks procedural fairness under the broad 
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3.1.4.1 Debates on Top-down v Bottom-up approaches 
According to Gready and Robins, limitations of transitional justice exist in two forms: 
foundational limitations and secondary limitations.239 Foundational limitations have two 
phases, liberal peace which is focused on democratic institutions in the context of a modern 
state and top-down state-based approaches. The liberal peace has limitations in the context 
of a nation in transition because of its lack of focus on the needs of local stakeholders and 
instead, placing more importance on the functioning of the state rather than its citizens.240 The 
international and elitist dominance over transitional justice and its resulting lack of recognition 
for local grassroots organisations, pose as a secondary foundational limitation. 241 
Community participation is required for the long-term sustainability of transitional 
justice.242 Top down approach is sustainable for as long as its sponsors are actively engaged 
in the process, therefore it may be less legitimate and effective in the long run due to the lack 
of local ownership. 243  A Bottom up approach which is designed to work with the foundational 
elements of a society which usually are local communities and organisations, puts 
communities and victims of conflict at the heart of transitional justice, thereby ensuring 
sustainability. 244  
Bell opines that the contemporary state of the field argues against the conception of 
TJ as a praxis-based interdisciplinary field.245 She also states that meaningful justice can be 
achieved once all actors are aware and appreciative of ambiguity and difficulties in setting 
clear definitions, goals, concept and designs of the framework of transitional justice but can 
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still work towards shifting the focus from procedural to the core of TJ and contend with the 
past.246  
According to the researcher’s analysis, Bangladesh has adopted the bottom up 
approach, local communities on a major scale, participated in their transitional justice process 
and steered away from the ‘one size fits all’ approach. This could be an important development 
in the current state of the field.  
3.1.4.2 Debates on Universalism vs Cultural relativism  
There are debates around whether culture is the sole source of the validity of a 
Transitional Justice mechanism or whether only universally valid norms should be applied in 
the application of TJ. The Arab uprising in countries such as Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Egypt 
have bought the age-old debate between cultural relativism and universality back into focus 
in the context of transitional justice.247 
Cultural relativists are of the opinion that rights come into existence in a society by 
considering the norms, traditions and socio-economic factors within a society and rights are 
only valid when a society acknowledges these rights.248 A strong argument in favour of cultural 
relativism from a philosophical standpoint is that, morality can also be interpreted differently 
in each society based on differing cultural views.249  
In favour of cultural relativism, Panepinto in her analysis argued that the inclusion of 
social, economic and cultural rights (ESCR) is integral to transitional justice and generate a 
better response from communities in a post conflict setting.250 In the context of Islamic law, 
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she stated that core values of laws based on local cultures can find its place in the international 
setting and become a natural and neutral part of the system.251 However, there are some 
limitations on the approach of cultural relativism to TJ, mainly that, cultural norms can be 
manipulated by elites to represent a political agenda, marginalise minority communities and 
overshadow minority rights within a society using this as a means to assert social control.252 
On the other hand, universalists such as Donelly in the context of Human Rights, 
provided different senses of universality and promoted that all states must adhere to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.253 However, the universality approach is often alleged 
to be a western concept derived from western practices which conflict with local norms.254 
According to Viaene and Brems, transitional process should explore the process of 
cultural relativism meeting universality and vice versa.255 They have also stated that the 
universality approach can be inclusive and flexible to incorporate diversity and cultural 
influences.256  
The researcher’s analysis suggests that Bangladesh has attempted to strike a balance 
between universality and cultural relativity. In terms of due process, it attempted to adopt 
universally recognised norms (see Chapter 6). However, in terms of sentencing and 
admissibility of evidence (see Chapters 7 and 9), it has considered local norms and customs.  
International TJ is presented as a neoliberal conception of western rights that rejects 
traditional practices.257 Panepinto, in the context of a Muslim majority country has provided 
that, core values of Islamic law are viewed as compatible with IHRL, IHL and ICL with the 
opportunity to address potential areas for development.258 Moreover, Bassiouni has 
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emphasised that there is a need to bridge the gap between international law and Islamic law 
paradigms in a conflict setting and contributions from the development and application of 
Islamic Law in a post-conflict setting is vital.259  
The researcher is of the opinion that this area should be given the opportunity to 
develop further and Bangladesh can contribute towards the understanding of how a mixed 
structure incorporating local customs alongside international norms can contribute towards 
development of transitional justice in post conflict situations.  
3.2 Various forms of Transitional Justice, their Strengths and weaknesses 
           There are various forms of transitional justice mechanisms, and each of them have 
their strengths and weaknesses. This subsection aims to deal with various transitional justice 
mechanisms, their strengths and weaknesses, challenges of making transitional justice 
decisions, and the legitimacy of the transitional process. Based on this context, Bangladesh 
has adopted criminal prosecution. However, in some circumstances, a combination of two or 
more mechanisms may be adopted to complement prosecution and provide justice to the 
victims. 
3.2.1 Criminal Prosecution  
States are under a legal obligation to prosecute or at least investigate repeated human 
rights violations. It is considered to be a violation of the international norm if States fail to 
investigate a gross violation of human rights.260 Such prosecutions may occur at different 
levels: through an international tribunal, through an internationalized mechanism or through 
domestic courts. A key argument in favour of international prosecutions is that they can more 
effectively prosecute international crimes in circumstances where the State may be unable or 
unwilling to do so.261 Moreover, international courts are more technically skilled, have the 
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finances, may be more impartial and are more visible to the media than would be national 
courts, making them better placed to prosecute crimes of such magnitude.262  
According to Teitel, criminal prosecutions as a transitional justice mechanism are 
helpful to address the perpetration of human rights violations, and these also help to establish 
the rule of law and order in a post-conflict chaotic society.263 According to Malamud-Goti, 
prosecutions assert democratic values by establishing judicial truth, confidence in the new 
regime, the right of the citizens, and transforming the relationship to achieve reconciliation.264  
Whether international or domestic, prosecutions may provide the victims with a sense 
that their suffering has been recognized and that justice has been done.265 When prosecutions 
are carried out by international tribunals, they serve as means to acknowledge the global 
importance of the crimes committed and provide a forum of international recognition of the 
pain suffered by the victims. At the same time, prosecutions break the cycle of impunity and 
serve to prevent the commission of future crimes.266 Prosecutions serve to provide clear 
evidence to the community that those who attempt to commit human right abuses will be held 
accountable.267 As a result, prosecutions can serve as a powerful deterrent to future human 
rights abuses. Orentlicher asserted that criminal punishment was an effective mechanism in 
preventing future repression.268 However, criminal prosecution may not deter future crimes in 
all the circumstances. In situations where both parties committed similar crimes, victims may 
prioritise other forms of transitional justice (e.g. reparations, reconciliation or truth 
commissions) over criminal prosecution. However, the gravity of the crime is an important 
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factor which may influence the victims to choose other forms of transitional justice over 
criminal prosecution.269 
There are various international legal mechanisms under which the states are under an 
obligation to investigate violations of human rights and serve justice; such obligation is termed 
in Latin as ‘aut dedere aut judicare’.270 If we consider the international humanitarian law, then 
we can see that a state’s obligation to serve justice exists in various treaties as well as in 
customary international humanitarian law.271 According to Cassesse, states have treaty 
obligations under the 1949 Geneva convention to prosecute suspects of  serious violations of 
IHL according to their national jurisdictions.272  
If or when a society decides to undertake prosecution as a means of transitional justice, 
subsequent trials must meet acceptable standards of fair trials. In order to avoid the notion 
that trials are politically motivated or ‘victor's justice', it must not fail to apply laws equally and 
must adhere to strict standards of a fair trial.273 Ensuring that due process is followed is both 
tedious and expensive.274 Also, internationalised prosecutions are said to be a slow process. 
Tribunals are sometimes based in a place different from that of the place of occurrence of the 
crimes, which makes it challenging to gather evidence and makes the process of transporting 
relevant evidence and witnesses to the relevant tribunals very expensive.  
The expenses of international trials are quite high, as a result, selective prosecutions 
have become the norm in most transitional justice prosecutions.275 The goal of limited 
prosecutions, therefore, is to use limited resources on the offenders that bear greatest 
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responsibility.  At the international level, there are various types of criminal justice mechanisms 
such as International Military Tribunals (IMT), Permanent ICC’s, ad hoc tribunals, hybrid 
tribunals, and domestic tribunals with international elements. Some of these will be discussed 
in the sections below. 
3.2.2 Historic Tribunals: Nuremberg & Tokyo 
             After the Second World War, the Allies sought to punish the individual perpetrators of 
the axis for the war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes against peace, genocide, and 
other crimes against civilians.276 The four Allies, France, USSR, UK, and the US, signed an 
agreement on 8 August 1945 to create an IMT which is also known as the Nuremberg 
Tribunal.277 There were eight judges, four principle judges and four substitutes from the major 
Allies.278 The prosecutors were also from the allied states, but the defence was formed of 
German lawyers.279 Based on a similar charter, the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (Tokyo IMT) was established in January 1946. Both these tribunals contributed to 
developing basic principles of ICL. However, these tribunals were highly criticized as being 
victor's justice, and the judges' impartiality was questioned in terms of due process.280 
3.2.3 Ad hoc international tribunals 
            The ad hoc international tribunals were established to deal with crimes committed over 
a certain period of time. They have now closed their doors and are been taken over by the 
residual mechanism. The ICTY and ICTR were established by way of UN resolutions to deal 
with the crimes committed in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and their functions came to an end in 
2017 and 2015, respectively.281   
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            As an institution, the ICTY and ICTR are similar in nature because, both tribunals 
originated from the UN Security Council's resolution, acting under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter.282 From the beginning, these ad hoc tribunals had been highly costly and time-
consuming. Also, these tribunals were located far away from the countries where the atrocities 
took place.   
3.2.4 International Criminal Court 
            The only permanent international judicial institution to deal with crimes under ICL is 
the ICC. This is a treaty-based judicial institution having complementary jurisdiction over 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes of aggression. The ICC was 
established based on the Rome Statute on 17 July 1998 by the UN Diplomatic Conference on 
the establishment of an ICC.283 One of the main limitations of the ICC is that it can only trigger 
its jurisdiction if the individual state is unable or unwilling to prosecute the crimes.284 
             The ICC is distinct from the ad hoc tribunals because it was not derived from the 
Security Council Chapter 7 Resolution which makes it a commitment for an individual state to 
assist the prosecution of crimes under ICL.285 Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the ICC is based on 
prospective legislation rather than retrospective legislation. This means that, ICC cannot 
trigger its jurisdiction if atrocities are committed before the establishment of the Rome Statute. 
3.2.5 Hybrid tribunals 
            Hybrid tribunals or mixed tribunals are formed with both, international judges and the 
judges of the nation where the trials will be held. Also, both national and international laws are 
involved, and both the domestic and international prosecutors are available in these types of 
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a mixed tribunal with both national and international elements. There are two versions of  
hybrid tribunals such as the ECCC, courts in Kosovo and Special Panels for Serious Crimes 
in East Timor which are the judicial organs of the relevant countries.286  
            Another version is that, the body may be international in nature and not part of the 
national judicial system such as the SCSL. In January 2003, the Sierra Leone Government 
maintaining its sovereignty, entered into an agreement with the UN to establish a Special 
Court to try and assess crimes under international law.287 In the situation of Sierra Leone, due 
to the conflict, the judicial system had broken down and the national judicial system was not 
able to prosecute the crimes under international law.288 As a result, the government of Sierra 
Leone decided to establish an international criminal tribunal in their own land with the 
assistance of the UN. Another reason for establishing hybrid tribunals is that the international 
judges would be viewed as neutral, whereas national judges may be influenced by their 
sentiments.289 
              The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) was established by UN resolution at the 
request of the Lebanese Government. The nature of this tribunal is international, but the main 
objective is to try and assess crimes under national law.290 As a result, this particular tribunal 
is trying terrorism as a distinct crime for the first time.291 
            The latest hybrid tribunal is the Extraordinary African Chambers for the trial of Hissene 
Habre in Senegal, established by an agreement with the African Union and the authority in 
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Senegal. The unique feature of this tribunal is that it has triggered the application of universal 
jurisdiction to try an assess the gross violation of human rights.292 
3.2.6 Domestic tribunals  
            When international crimes are tried and assessed under the domestic judicial system, 
it is called domestic prosecution of international crimes or domestic tribunals.  
            According to Cryer, the common expectation is that crimes, including international 
crimes, will be prosecuted at a domestic level.293 This expectation is also reflected in the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal court (ICC) and its principle of complementarity justice, 
which provides that national courts are the starting point for prosecuting international crimes.294 
According to Bassiouni, ‘when treaty is based on the obligation of a state, under international 
criminal law, it is reflected in the domestic legislation, this can be defined as the ‘indirect 
enforcement system’.295 In this respect, the Government of Bangladesh enacted the ICT Act 
1973 to establish an indirect enforcement system of ICL derived mainly from the Genocide 
Convention through a domestic tribunal. 
            Historically, the domestic prosecution of international crimes can be traced back to the 
American Civil War in the 1860’s and Anglo-Boer Wars of the late nineteenth century.296 The 
other notable domestic prosecutions had emerged after the First World War such as the 
Leipzig trials and the Istanbul trials of 1920’s to address war crimes.297 European countries 
like France, Austria and the Netherlands have also conducted domestic prosecution of crimes 
against humanity addressing the Second World War atrocities. 
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            Another notable domestic prosecution of international crimes is the Eichmann trial 
which had addressed the issue of jurisdiction, criminal defence of a superior order and the 
principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law.298 The important examples of domestic 
prosecution of international crimes are the Canadian Finta case and Australian Polyukhovic 
case which have developed the concept of mental elements for crimes against humanity and 
the constitutional validity of ICL legislation.299 After the 1990’s, ad hoc tribunals were 
established to address the issue of Yugoslavia and Rwanda. However, in order to deal with 
the large volume of detainees, Rwanda introduced a new form of ‘Gacaca’ courts in 2001.300  
            The domestic prosecution of international crimes in Bangladesh is one of the latest 
domestic mechanisms dealing with the atrocities committed in 1971.301 The Bangladesh 
Government opted for the domestic prosecution of international crimes. The ICT-BD is a 
purely domestic tribunal prosecuting crimes under ICL. The substantive laws of the ICT-BD 
include Crimes against humanity, Crimes against peace, Genocide, War Crimes, and other 
crimes under international law.302 
            As noted above, the ICT-BD is a domestic tribunal trying crimes under ICL. Domestic 
prosecutions were chosen because of the specific history and circumstances of Bangladesh. 
As also discussed in the theoretical framework above, there is no one-size-fits-all mechanism 
for transitional justice. The ICT Act 1973, which established the ICT-BD, was the first domestic 
Act criminalizing international crimes at the time (in 1973). The Act was unanimously passed 
by the parliament of Bangladesh.303 The ICT-BD has no formal agreement with the UN and is 
composed of local personnel including judges, prosecutors, and defence lawyers. At present, 
all the perpetrators are Bangladeshi nationals. Under the Act, the ICT-BD is entitled to 
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formulate its own RoP, and thus, it has developed rules that are distinct from domestic criminal 
courts.   
3.3 Alternatives and complements to criminal prosecution  
           Criminal prosecution alone may not achieve most of the goals of transitional justice. 
Because many perpetrators may have died naturally due to the long period of impunity or due 
to large number of perpetrators it may not be possible to prosecute every individual. As a 
result, it is important to consider other mechanisms to supplement the criminal prosecution. 
3.3.1 Truth and Reconciliation commissions 
Truth commissions, as defined by Priscilla Hayner, are temporary bodies, empowered 
by and authorized by the state to submit an investigative report on patterns of abuses over a 
period of time.304 Around thirty official truth commissions under various names have been 
established since 1974, popularised by the 1995 South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC).305 There was a considerable difference in authority and investigatory 
mandates structured according to the diverse needs and political situation in each country 
even though there were a lot in common between these bodies.306 
Alice H Henkin clearly stated the importance of truth in her book; she wrote that truth 
should be made a part of a nation's history and that governments were obliged to investigate 
and provide facts.307 Yasmin Naqvi, in her book, had written that telling the truth would provide 
an opportunity for national reconciliation and would also act as a response to the victims 
demanding justice.308 She further noted that the broader objectives of ICL would intertwine 
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strategically with the right to truth.309 Firstly, the truth would be helpful to establish peace in 
the society because the publication of the truth would discourage the repetition of the same 
atrocities in the same context.310 Secondly, the truth is helpful to initiate the process of 
reconciliation as divided societies can re-establish their connection if they know the truth.311 
Yet, the connection between truth and peace, or truth and reconciliation, remains debateable 
because, some argue that investigating the truth may expose past wounds and lead to further 
conflict rather than to peace and reconciliation.312 Thirdly, the truth can play an important role 
in ending impunity because liability can be ensured only if the truth about who committed past 
crimes is known.313 However, the relationship between truth and accountability is not always 
certain, particularly, in process of criminal prosecution. Some authors, favouring truth over 
justice and drawing from Chilean and South African experiences have argued that trials should 
be replaced by truth reports because it may restore and maintain peace by way of 
reconciliation process.314 Also, knowing the truth heal rifts in communities and creates a path 
to accountability.315 Fourthly, it can unify countries and therefore rebuild national identities 
through dialogues between nations about shared history.316 It is said that the establishment of 
the truth had contributed to the renewal of German Unity.317 Finally, the right to truth can create 
an avenue for the victims to know the underlying reality by accessing public documents which 
were previously inaccessible.318 
The limitation of Truth Commissions is that, they do not have any judicial powers like 
courts although some Truth Commissions have powers to access documentary evidence and 
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the South African TRC had the power to grant amnesties which is highlighted below. Truth 
Commissions are effective channels to understand the nature of atrocities, the triggers of 
violence, and the effects. Truth Commissions may also be helpful to depict the overall picture 
of any particular post-conflict atrocities. According to Hayner, truth commissions have at least 
five aims: discovering and acknowledging past atrocities; answering the queries of victims; 
contributing to end impunity and increasing accountability; sketching official responsibility and 
endorsing reforms, promoting reconciliation and establishing social harmony.319 
The South African model of TRC is a unique example of transitional justice mechanism 
which aimed to establish truth and initiate the process of reconciliation. To encourage 
uncovering the truth, the TRC offered a form of incentives to the victims that if they provide 
full disclosure about the atrocities and their involvement, they will then be given amnesty. 
According to Hayner, ‘…only in South Africa has a truth commission been given amnesty 
granting powers’.320 However, the amnesty power of the South African TRC was conditional 
that perpetrators actions had been ‘…(i) motivated by political goals rather than malice or 
desire for gain, and (ii) proportional to the occasion that triggered them’.321 The applicants of 
the South African TRC were required to give full disclosure about the offences and the chain 
of command. 
In the post-conflict situation of Bangladesh, the option for truth commissions was not 
considered due to the nature of the atrocities committed, as explained in Chapter 2. However, 
the West Pakistani authority formed a judicial inquiry commission to investigate the atrocities 
committed during the Liberation War of Bangladesh in 1971. Also, the International 
Commission of Jurists, conducted a legal study of the atrocities in Bangladesh soon after the 
Liberation War discovering the nature of crimes committed. The International Commission of 
Jurists set up a Commission of Enquiry into the events in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) in 
 
 




November 1971 where a commission of three prominent international lawyers were appointed 
to enquire into the reported violations of human rights and the rule of law in East Pakistan.322 
It was agreed by India and Bangladesh that there would be a full cooperation for the 
Commission’s enquiry but Pakistan refused to cooperate stating that it was their internal 
matter.323 The legal study conducted by the Commission contains a factual account of the 
atrocities committed in East Pakistan from March 1971 until December 1971 based on 
published books, newspaper reports, sworn dispositions of refugees in India and oral and 
written statement given to the Commission.324 
           There is no ‘one size fits all’ type of mechanism to deal with transitional justice. Each 
of the mechanisms has its own pros and cons. If a society decides to initiate transitional justice 
mechanisms to deal with historic crimes, it has to consider various factors. The very first issue 
is to determine what needs to be achieved by investigating past atrocities and how this is to 
be accomplished. The goals of investigation may include justice, truth, reparation, 
reconciliation, or a mixture of these. These goals are paramount to dictate the form of 
transitional justice mechanism in a particular context (e.g. criminal prosecution, truth 
commissions or both). Bangladesh did not establish any Truth Commission alongside criminal 
prosecution because of the specific context that the people demanded criminal prosecution. 
Also, the legal study of the International Commission of Jurists partially served the purpose of 
the truth commission. Nevertheless, an effective truth commission in Bangladesh could 
complement the criminal prosecution and the accountability process given that criminal 










The meaning of reparation is limited to compensation, restitution and rehabilitation. 
Restitution should, as far as possible, restore the victim to his or her circumstances before the 
crime was committed.325 Compensation would be provided if the harm suffered can be easily 
quantified in the form of monetary value.326 
According to Teitel, reparatory justice refers to the open acknowledgment of 
responsibility for past atrocities.327 In her opinion, reparations can contribute to the process of 
rehabilitation at an individual level and may assist in rebuilding law and order and 
democracy.328 However, reparation is not a claim laid against individual perpetrators; it is 
instead a claim against the authority for wrongs done by the former regime.329  
In societies in conflicts, the notion of reparation is used in a generalized manner to 
represent various forms of remedying past violations. Tietel notes that the term ‘reparatory 
justice’, ‘…illustrates its multiple dimensions, comprehending numerous diverse forms: 
reparations, damages, remedies, redress, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, tribute’.330 
Hence, reparation may take different forms and is broader than simply the payment of 
monetary reward. Reparation generally may take either material or symbolic forms.331  
               The ICC has developed the concept of reparations in other forms, such as symbolic 
reparation, preventative or transformative value.332 In the case of Katanga, the ICC awarded 
symbolic compensation of USD 250 per victim and stated that, ‘…this symbolic amount, while 
not intended to compensate for the entirety of the harm, does provide meaningful relief to the 
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victims for the harm they have suffered’.333 In Katanga, the judges assessed compensation of 
USD 3,752,620 for the physical, material and psychological harm suffered by the victims.334 
The Chamber also awarded specific collective reparations in the form of support for housing, 
support for income-generating activities, education aid and psychological support.335  
In the Bangladeshi context, there is no provision for the reparation of the victims, which 
is one of the main weaknesses of the transitional justice mechanism. Given that in the 
Bangladeshi situation, the ICT-BD was established a long time after the atrocities were 
committed and many perpetrators have died, reparation (both for the victims, who have had 
to wait for justice for a long time, and their families) could be an effective supplement to the 
criminal prosecution to improve the quality of lawfulness.   
In the case of compensation, one of the key challenges is to recognise the damage or 
pain that is ‘compensable’. So, there is a need to agree first on what forms of grief create 
victimhood.336 There are other challenges incoming regarding ‘…whom to try, sanction, and 
compensate; and how to try, sanction, and compensate’.337  
3.3.3 Amnesty  
Amnesty is usually offered to protect national and general interests. It may be 
conditional or absolute. In the case of absolute amnesty, a State grants itself amnesty to 
protect itself from any form of accountability.338 Conversely, the amnesty that took place in 
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South Africa was a discretionary form of amnesty, granted only when an applicant had fulfilled 
conditions set up by the State courts.339  
The argument in favour of amnesty is that, following a period of violence or civil unrest, 
it is important to heal collective wounds by disregarding historical wrongs. Amnesties do allow 
the law to block criminal prosecution against people of the former regime.340 It is believed that 
by granting amnesties, it is possible to end hatred and hostilities which creates a path for 
reconciliation.341 However, there are conflicting norms regarding amnesties because ICL 
requires violations to be prosecuted, but norms within general public international law allow 
amnesties if they serve to prevent further causalities.342 Many authors think that granting 
amnesty ultimately undermines the deterrent effect of law because the decision to grant 
amnesty is often politically compromised which bargains away the rights of the victims and 
perpetrators enjoy impunity.343 According to Orientlicher, amnesties for international law are 
unlawful because this is contrary to prosecute international crimes.344 The UN policy is also 
against amnesties in international criminal law and the legal position of amnesties was clarified 
by the SCSL in the Kallon and Kamara decisions that amnesties in international law is not 
absolutely prohibited and it is a developing norm in international law.345 Sometimes in order to 
save lives and end hostilities, amnesties may play an important role and for an amnesty to be 
lawful the scope is very narrow.346 
 
 
339 Mark Freeman and Priscilla Hayner P, ‘The Truth Commissions of South Africa and Guatemala, International 
Centre for Transitional Justice’ , available at < 
http://www.idea.int/publications/reconciliation/upload/reconciliation_chap08cs-safrica.pdf> accessed 28 Sept 
2016. 
340 Robert Cryer and others, An Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (2nd Edn, Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 563. 
341 Orentlicher (n 222) 2543. 
342 Cryer (n 340) 566-568. 
343 Ibid 569 mentioned Milliander. 
344 Ibid mentioned Orientlitcher 
345 Cryer (n 340) 566-568. mentioned Prosecutor v. Kallon and Kamara SCSL A. Ch. 13.3.2004 para 82 and 
Kondewa A. Ch. 25.5.2004 para.48. 
346 Ibid 
 72 
The Spanish transition had an uncommon feature ‘involving a deliberate and 
consensual decision to abstain from transitional justice’ and the Spanish government released 
over four hundred political prisoners.347 The nature of the Spanish amnesty law is distinct from 
the Chilean amnesty law of 1978 because the Chilean amnesty was ‘self-amnesty’ by the 
outgoing regime whereas the Spanish amnesty was enacted by the incoming regime.348 The 
Chilean amnesty was challenged and finally reversed due to its ‘self-amnesty’ nature.349  
Nevertheless, because amnesties encourage impunity, it is measured to be an 
impediment to justice, and only a limited number of academics support it as feasible in minimal 
circumstances.350 Also, the Spanish amnesty has not remained unchallenged as there has 
been an increasing social movement that challenges the Spanish amnesty law of 1977.351 
More recently, in 2010, a Spanish judge was suspended by Spain's General Judicial 
Committee on the grounds of ultra vires for by-passing the Amnesty law of 1977.352 These 
recent developments demonstrate the controversy surrounding the amnesty law and that  past 
atrocities are not forgotten. In the particular situation of Bangladesh, a general amnesty was 
granted soon after the Liberation War to a limited extent, only for petty crimes such as theft, 
looting, criminal damage etc. but not for serious crimes such as murder, rape, arson and other 
serious crimes. Initially in 1972, Bangladesh attempted to prosecute the local collaborators 
under the Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunals) Order 1972 (theÔ1972 Collaborators 
Act’) came into force through Presidential Order No. 8 of 1972  and over 30,000 people were 
arrested but due to systematic flaws, the trials could not be completed, and as a result, a 
general amnesty was granted for all small crimes except murder, rape, arson and other serious 
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crimes. However, whether this selective approach was correct is questionable because it was 
not defined which crimes are petty crimes and which crimes are serious crimes. This 
vagueness created confusion and all the people that were arrested were released irrespective 
of petty crimes and serious crimes. Subsequently, the government decided to legislate new 
law to try only the serious crimes under the ICT Act 1973 (see 1.1.1). 
3.3.4 Lustration 
The term lustration refers to the government policies which restrict certain individuals 
from taking certain governmental positions due to their association with the past regime.353 
This policy has been implemented predominantly in countries that were once part of the Soviet 
bloc, including Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and former East Germany. It was perceived 
that former members of the Communist Party could not be trustworthy to conduct democratic 
reforming; therefore, the new governments reacted by not only outlawing the party and 
prosecuting anyone deemed to have connections with the party, but also restricting those 
individuals from certain government and non-governmental posts.354 Although lustration laws 
are controversial, they remain the main method used by these countries to screen former 
communist members for public office. Such information is generally obtained from secret 
police files to determine whether suspected individuals collaborated with the former State 
security service.355 In the situation of Bangladesh, there is no formal policy of lustration due to 
its context and social settings. The numbers of local collaborators in 1971 was very low and 
all the West Pakistani officers returned to West Pakistan. Also, most of the local collaborators 
were socially identifiable and informally, they were precluded to take up any important 
government position. Further, any formal policy of lustration might not be appropriate in the 
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particular context of Bangladesh because of the constitutional protection not to discriminate 
between the citizens of Bangladesh. 
3.3.5 Local justice mechanisms  
Due to the growing trend of cultural diversity in relation to the application of ICL, local 
justice mechanism is becoming more and more popular over time.356 Local justice mechanisms 
have three key characteristics, they focus on the group rather than individual, they seek 
compromise and community harmony and emphasise on restitution rather than punishment.357 
The Gacaca court of Rwanda is one of the finest examples of local justice mechanism where 
village elders convened all parties to a crime with a view to reconcile.358 The Rwandan 
Government formed ‘Gacaca’ jurisdiction to speed up the pace of genocide trials.359 A similar 
approach was seen in Northern Uganda where local traditional justice mechanism was 
adopted.360 The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was also partly inspired 
by local justice mechanisms.361 However, these trials have also attracted significant criticisms 
from the perspective of due process.362  
In the particular context of Bangladesh, no informal or semi-formal local justice 
mechanisms was ever adopted to deal with the atrocities committed in 1971. In the 
researcher’s opinion, local justice mechanisms could be adopted in Bangladesh to deal with 
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3.4 Nature of transitional justice around the world 
To understand various form of transitional justice mechanisms, it is important to 
analyse transitional justice in different parts of the world. While the opposition in Portugal and 
Greece imposed the transitional processes, the one in Spain was led by the elites of the old 
regime (particularly by King Juan Carlos) following the death of General Franco.363 In Portugal 
after the post-1974 coup, a mix of purges and counter-purges, jail, exile, nationalization and 
compensation took place.364 After the collapse of the army administration in Greece in 1974, 
the new regime had taken ‘dejuntafication’ measures; purged people associated with the 
military regime, and introduced criminal proceedings.365   
The Argentinian military leaders were prosecuted, convicted, and punished for the 
offences they had committed throughout the ‘dirty wars’ in the 1970’s and 1980’s.366 The 
granting of pardon or amnesty was introduced at a later stage due to persistent opposition to 
the process from the army and other groups.367   
The nature of transitional justice in Chile was that the amnesty law was introduced by 
the outgoing regime to hinder criminal prosecution. In 1978, the then president of Chile, 
General Pinochet, introduced an amnesty law which created a barrier for criminal trials for all 
human rights violations since September 1973.368 In 1992, the law established a compensation 
policy.369 In contrast to the Argentinian case, Chile had decided to establish criminal 
prosecution and overturned the amnesty law by the Chilean Supreme Court in 1999.370  
However, in the particular context of Uruguay, they deliberately decided to exclude transitional 
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justice.371 As noted by Lewis, ‘the people of Uruguay voted in a referendum to maintain an 
amnesty law designed to protect their armed forces from prosecution’.372 So, the voice of the 
people is an important factor in deciding the form of transitional justice in a particular society. 
Following the fall of communism in Eastern Europe which begun in the late 1980’s, 
transition took place in Poland, Hungary, East Germany (GDR), Czechoslovakia, Romania, 
and Bulgaria.373 These transitional justice developments are branded as post-Cold War 
transitional justice.374 The common feature of these post-communist transitional justice is that 
they adopted criminal prosecution to deal with the past atrocities. Timothy Garton Ash 
observed that ‘…Germany has had trials and purges and truth commissions and has 
systematically opened the secret police files to each and every individual who wants to know 
what was done to him or her-or what he or she did to others’.375 In general, the nature of 
transitional justice in the Eastern Europe was that they primarily focused on reparations and 
purges, with increasing amnesties and fewer prosecutions. 
In the African countries, the notable examples of transitional justice are Rhodesia 
(1979), South Africa (1994), and Ethiopia (1991). According to Jon Elster, in both Rhodesia 
and South Africa, ‘…white economic elite remained after the transition, which was largely 
shaped to safeguard their interests'.376 Similar to Spain and Uruguay, Rhodesia had decided 
not to initiate any transitional justice process.377 Truth commissions were established in Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone.378 In Rwanda, we clearly see both supranational and national transitional 
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processes as well as traditional ‘Gacaca’ courts.379 Sierra Leone combines criminal 
prosecutions and truth commissions to serve justice to the affected communities.380   
In some situations of transitional justice, both the incoming and outgoing regime might 
have been involved with the atrocities. In this respect, it is noted that the ‘…delicate question 
is whether retribution shall be one-sided or even-sided - whether acts of wrongdoing shall 
include only crimes committed by agents of or collaborators with the former regime, or whether 
crimes committed by the opposition and its supporters to the regime should also be 
covered’.381 In South Africa, both the former regime and the opposition were subject to the 
same method of transitional justice.382  
3.5 Conclusion: Choosing Transitional Justice Mechanisms 
In choosing a form of transitional justice, a society has to determine whether it is 
necessary and feasible to penalize the wrongdoers of mass crimes and whether this will 
establish sustainable peace.383 There are various factors such as international community, 
political and economic settings, social and religious norms which may influence the nature of 
transitional justice mechanisms adopted by a particular society. The TRC in South Africa, the 
ICTR and the Gacaca courts in Rwanda, aimed at reconciliation.384  
The Bangladeshi Government opted for criminal prosecution due to the gravity of the 
offences perpetrated during the 1971 conflict and also because there was a strong 
determination among the Bangladeshi society to ensure that such crimes should not go 
unpunished, even after such a long lapse of time.385 In the particular context of Bangladesh, 
national culture and public opinion contributed towards the selection of criminal prosecution 
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to deal with transitional justice. Bangladesh as a Muslim majority country has defined its 
domestic criminal tribunal according to its local culture and norms. Before establishing the 
criminal tribunal, the Awami League party had to incorporate in their election manifesto that if 
they came to power, they would establish a criminal tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators of 
1971. Subsequently, they received overwhelming majority in the election, thus, the public gave 
the mandate for establishing a criminal Tribunal. The appellate division of the Supreme court 
of Bangladesh also considered the public sentiments in deciding appropriate punishment.  The 
violent nature of the atrocities, long term delay, and a significant period of a culture of impunity 
were all factors in the decision to establish criminal prosecution as an appropriate transitional 
justice mechanism in Bangladesh. It is argued that, on account of the specific situation of 
Bangladesh, a truth commission on its own would not have been an effective remedy in 
Bangladesh because of the long period of the culture of impunity. However, the truth 
commission as a supplement of prosecution would be an effective viable option. However, it 
is not known why this was not considered in the particular context of Bangladesh. Similarly, 
amnesty could not achieve justice in Bangladesh. The parliamentary debate of 1973 indicated 
that criminal prosecutions were heavily supported by the citizens of Bangladesh at the time. 
Moreover, the AL government came to power in 2008 with the mandate from the people that 
the perpetrators of 1971 would be prosecuted under a domestic tribunal. 
According to Aukerman, ‘…those who have not suffered cannot presume to determine 
for those who have, what should be attempted through transitional justice’386 Transitional 
justice should address the wishes, pleas, and political realities of the mistreated society, while 
at the same time acknowledging the global community's right and responsibility to intervene.387 
Accordingly, in Bangladesh, the prosecution preferred to reflect the political realities of the 
society and the national desire.  The Bangladeshi approach is distinctive because they have 
 
 
386 Miriam Aukerman ‘Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding Transitional Justice’ 
(2002) 15(1) HARV HUM RTS J 39, 43. 
387 Ibid. 
 79 
established a domestic tribunal without international funding. This domestic tribunal adopted 
universally recognised norms (e.g. due process) of transitional justice as well as retained their 
local cultural norms (e.g. capital punishment). Thus, the ICT-BD became a fourth-generation 
domestic tribunal dealing with international crimes which attempted to create a balance 
between universalism and cultural relativism. However, the direct applicability of international 
law thorough the ICT-BD depends on the status of international law in the domestic legal 
system.388 Although, the ICT-BD is a purely domestic tribunal, it is mostly independent and 
comes with an infrastructure that is completely separate from the national judiciary. However, 
the judgments of this Tribunal can be challenged through to the highest court of the land. 
In terms of delayed prosecution, the ICT-BD can be compared to the ECCC. Although, 
the ECCC was established in Cambodia, it had recruited both foreign and domestic judges 
and prosecutors. Also, UN funding was available for the operation of the ECCC and it was a 
mixed tribunal and not a pure domestic tribunal like ICT-BD. However, being a pure domestic 
tribunal, ICT-BD bears a higher risk of impartiality because judges are selected from national 
judiciary and they might be influenced by public sentiment. The ICT-BD can also be compared 
with the Iraqi High Tribunal which recruited national judges, but they were assisted by 
international advisers.389 However, both Iraq and Bangladesh being Muslim majority countries 
retained capital punishment as the highest punishment. 
The dominant understanding of transitional justice relates to the investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of perpetrators of past abuses.390 Hayner asserts that, the rule 
of law shall be at the heart of transitional processes, and hence that accountability shall be 
ensured according to the law.391 Although, prosecution was the most feasible option for 
Bangladesh, this mechanism alone cannot achieve the wide range of goals of transitional 
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justice. It would wise to adopt supplementary mechanisms such as Truth Commission and 
Reparation programme to complement the criminal prosecution. Bangladesh has adopted the 
South African style truth commission which has become a contemporary standard example of 
truth commissions, based on the TRC established in 1995.392 In the course of truth 
commissions, the victims may be compensated by the state in the form of free education, free 
medical and psychological treatment, and even monetary compensation.393 Commissions 
often establish permanent reminders of the legacy of such abuses, such as monuments and 
ceremonies, with the aim of acknowledging the pain of the victims.394 Given that the 
prosecution is taking place more than 40 years later, this mechanism alone may not bring the 
bulk of the perpetrators to justice. Also, many perpetrators have died due to the time lapse 
and in this regard, criminal prosecution may not serve any effective form of justice to the 
victims. However, if we also consider the economic factors related to reparation in 
Bangladesh, then it does clarify why Bangladesh could not develop any effective reparation 
programme. On the other hand, truth commission was not considered due to the specific 
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FEATURES OF THE ICT- BD  
4.1 Introduction 
            This chapter analyses the features of the ICT-BD, including substantive and 
procedural law. It also discusses the formation and functions of the ICT-BD. The International 
Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 (hereinafter ICT Act 1973), is the governing Act of the ICT-BD. 
This particular Act was enacted with the aim of prosecuting the perpetrators of 1971 who had 
committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other crimes under 
international law. The RoP’s of the Tribunal 1 and Tribunal 2 were formulated in 2010 and 
2012, respectively. Both the RoP’s are identical. According to Hossain, the ICT Act 1973 has 
borrowed the legal principles of the Nuremberg trials and made, ‘…a significant contribution 
to the development of ICL at the time’.395 According to Robertson, the ICT Act 1973 was the 
first legislation based on the legacy of Nuremberg, and historically, it was a significant 
development for the national prosecution of international crimes.396 Before discussing the 
formation and jurisdiction of the ICT-BD, the following para will provide a brief overview of 
some of the international and domestic criminal tribunals that have preceded it. 
The ICT Act 1973 is based on the legacy of the Nuremberg tribunal. Also, the grave 
nature of atrocities committed in Bangladesh is similar to that of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Sierra 
Leon and Cambodia. For these reasons, this study made frequent references to the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, ICTY, ICTR, ICC, ECCC, SCSL and other internationalised 
tribunals. This is helpful in clarifying how the ICT-BD being a domestic tribunal, is transposing 
universally recognised norms within a Muslim majority country like Bangladesh. It would be 
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worth mentioning that the nature of transitional justice in Bangladesh is distinct from other 
Muslim majority countries like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Iraq due to the delayed prosecution 
and the grave nature of atrocities committed in Bangladesh, including genocide. In Tunisia, a 
Military Tribunal was established to prosecute the former president Ben Ali and he was 
sentenced to life in prison.397 However, the tribunal was criticised for being a military tribunal 
trying civilians in an unorganized manner and lacking a clear strategy.398 The Trial of Hosni 
Mubarak is important to consider because it has established an important example of the 
contextual understanding of accountability complying with universally recognised due process 
standards.399  
4.2 Parliamentary Debates relating to ICT Act 1973 
           Before enacting the ICT Act 1973, there was a parliamentary debate scrutinizing 
various aspects of the Act. This Act is a constitutionally protected legislation. 
4.2.1 Constitution (First Amendment) Bill 1973 
             It appears from the records that there was a parliamentary debate to amend the 
constitution of Bangladesh for the first time in order to provide special protection to the 
governing Act of the ICT-BD. A parliamentarian, Sri Monoranjan Dhar stated that the 
perpetrators of 1971 wanted to extinguish the Bengali nation from the world and disrespected 
their legitimate demand for self-determination.400 As a result, in order to make the perpetrators 
of 1971 accountable for their heinous crimes, a decision was made to amend the constitution 
of Bangladesh.  
            Mr Dhar stated that, ‘…honourable speaker, you might have known that prosecuting 
war criminals is not new and the name of Nuremberg Trial, Tokyo Trial and Yamashita Trial 
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are the recent examples and for this reason, it is important to amend our constitution so that 
we can make the perpetrators accountable’.401 He further explained that if the Constitution is 
not amended, then the perpetrators may rely on the fundamental rights given under the 
constitution and it would not be possible to make them accountable for their heinous crimes.402 
For this reason, he proposed to amend the constitution so that there can be no barrier to 
prosecute the perpetrators of 1971. However, he proposed to ensure due process and justice 
for the perpetrators of 1971.  
             Another Parliamentarian, Sri Manbendra Narayan Larma stated that the inclusion of 
clause 3 of Article 47 of the Constitution of Bangladesh interplays with Article 31, 35 and 44 
and for this reason, the accused persons under the proposed International Crimes Act would 
not receive proper fundamental rights.403 He further explained that the proposed bill would not 
give the accused persons the right to go to the highest court of the country against the decision 
of the proposed tribunal, and this aspect of the amendment is contradictory with the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and with the Charter of the United Nations.404 So, it seems that 
Mr Larma was not against the Constitution (First Amendment) Bill 1973; instead he wanted to 
make sure the proposed Act had proper due process to ensure the rule of law.   
            Another Parliamentarian Mr Amirul Islam stated that the Bill had been brought to solve  
future disputes between the Constitutional rights and the proposed Act.405 He further opined 
that, ‘it does not matter what is in the international law, our Act will be domestic law and we 
will prosecute the perpetrators of 1971 and right to go to the supreme court is not necessary 
since it can unnecessarily delay the process’.406 After the debate, the Speaker asked the 










said ‘No’ and then the Speaker asked whether the Bill should be passed without any delay 
and the majority said ‘Yes’.407  
            Following the vote, the Law Minister, Sree Monoranjan, Dhar explained the proposed 
amendments to the members of the Parliament. After the discussion, the Speaker asked the 
members of the parliament who were in favour of the Bill to stand up, and they all stood up. 
Then, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman proposed that, ‘this bill relates to the 
amendment of the constitution so, although we voted, it is important that those votes are in 
the record’.408 For this reason, the speaker put the bill on division for voting and finally the 
Constitution (First Amendment) Bill 1973 was passed unanimously by 254 votes out of 254.409  
4.2.2 International Crimes (Tribunal) Bill 1973 
           The main aim of the International Crimes (Tribunal) Bill 1973 was to prosecute the 
people who had committed genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes against 
peace and any other crimes under international law. A parliamentarian, Mr Moinuddin Ahmed 
Manik was of the opinion that only 195 war criminals would be primarily accused under the 
Act and according to him, this figure was very low because, under the command of General 
Tikka Khan and General Niazi, some 93,000 armed forces had committed atrocities including 
genocide and crimes against humanity, there were also local collaborators who may have 
joined the ‘Peace Committee' or the ‘Rajakar Bahini' for various reasons and it was not 
proportionate to try only 195 war criminals leaving the other perpetrators at large.410 He 
attempted to explain that all the people who were part of the auxiliary forces may not have 
committed crimes and many might have been involved with the auxiliary forces simply to save 
themselves from the atrocities, and there should be a process to identify those innocent 








the political members of minor political parties.411 It seems that during the Bill stage, Mr Manik 
anticipated that the proposed Act may be misused to oppress the members of political parties 
to express a different opinion.   
            A parliamentarian, Mr Serajul, opined that, ‘this Bill is introduced not because we want 
to take revenge on them or that we are in the mood of anger' instead ‘it is a law for clearing 
the conscience of humanity at large’.412 He said, if one considers that the 1973 Act as vengeful, 
it may be wrong given that, out of 70,000 people, Bangladesh initially identified 195 POW’s to 
vindicate their sense of justice.413 Mr Sirajul Haque also stated that, ‘we are going to bring 
these people to punishment not because they devastated our land but because we have a 
responsibility towards suffering humanity and the entire population of the world is looking up 
to us’.414 During the parliamentary debate, it was explained that the ICT Act 1973 had 
incorporated all the known norms of justice. It appeared from the above that during the Bill 
stage, the ICT Act 1973 had incorporated the then international criminal jurisprudence. Further 
to that, the Act has contributed to the development of ICL because being domestic legislation; 
it has made provisions for providing the accused the right to appeal.   
4.3 Analysis of the Substantive Laws of the ICT-BD 
          The governing Act of the ICT-BD was drafted into the first phase of Transitional Justice 
in 1973. According to Cassese, ‘international criminal law is a ‘rudimentary branch' of law, and 
the meaning of substantive laws are gradually broadening.415 At present, there are four 
categories of crimes, definitions of which are broadly accepted by ICTY, ICTR and ICC and 
these crimes are the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and, in the case 
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aggression was not within the jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR. As mentioned earlier, the 
definition of the above-mentioned crimes is broadening by the practices of ICT’s, the ICT-BD 
in its judgments also clarified the definition of some crimes and their elements. 
4.3.1 Jurisdiction of the ICT-BD  
            Section 3(1) deals with the ICT-BD’s adjudicative jurisdiction which states that the 
Tribunal will have jurisdiction to try and punish any individual or group of individuals, or 
organisations, or any members of armed, defence or auxiliary forces, irrespective of his 
nationality, who commits or has committed, in the territory of Bangladesh, whether before or 
after the commencement of this Act, any of the crimes mentioned in sub-section (2).417 So, it 
appears that the jurisdiction of the ICT-BD is not only restricted to try and assess the crimes 
committed in 1971; it also covers crimes committed at any time either in peace or war.418 Also, 
the jurisdiction was carefully designed, keeping in mind the specific circumstances of 
Bangladesh and as a result, crimes committed during international or non-international armed 
conflicts were within the jurisdiction of the ICT-BD. However, a restriction of the jurisdiction is 
that, to make an individual responsible for the crimes defined under the Act they, ‘…must have 
been a member of an armed, defence or auxiliary force at the time of the offence and the 
offence must have been committed in the territory of Bangladesh’.419 One of the special 
characteristics of the ICT Act 1973 is that it has been designed to prosecute not only the armed 
forces but also the ‘auxiliary forces', individual or a group of individuals.420  
4.3.2 Crimes against humanity  
            In the absence of any specific treaty in relation to crimes against humanity, individual 
States previously adopted their own approach in formulating the definition.421 The elements of 
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crimes against humanity entails that: they constitute a serious attack on human dignity 
including ‘grave humiliation’ or ‘degradation’; they are part of a governmental policy or of a 
widespread or systematic practice of de facto authority; they are prohibited and punishable 
regardless of whether they are perpetrated during war or peace; and the victims of the crimes 
may include civilians or persons that do not take part in armed hostilities.422 The concept of 
crimes against humanity originates from customary international law, and these offenses can 
be committed either during armed conflict or in times of peace.423 The crimes against humanity 
can also overlap with war crimes such as the mass killing of civilians which can be defined as 
war crimes as well as crimes against humanity.424 However, the difference between war crimes 
and crimes against humanity can be seen from the context that crimes against humanity can 
occur during peaceful times and in the absence of any armed conflict.425 Some have argued 
that genocide is a particular type of crime against humanity, but others have argued that 
genocide is a separate category of crime due to the specific intent requirement.426 
            There are differences in the definition of crimes against humanity stated in the 
Nuremberg Charter, ICTY, ICC, and the ECCC. Generally, the definition of crimes against 
humanity should consist of at least five elements: firstly, there must be an attack427; secondly, 
the nature of the attack should be widespread or systematic428; thirdly, the attacks are aimed 
at civilians429; fourthly, the attacks are inhumane and cruel, infringing recognized values of 
mankind and humanity430; and finally, the perpetrators should have knowledge about the attack 
(the link between the accused and the attack).431 The ICC statute going beyond the customary 
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international law, added another element which was, the listed crimes must be committed 
‘…pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack’.432 
           The elements of crimes against humanity applied by the ICT-BD differ greatly from the 
internationally recognised elements.  
4.3.3 Crimes against humanity under the ICT Act 1973 
            Section 3(2)(a) of the ICT Act 1973 deals with the crimes against humanity. According 
to this particular section, crimes against humanity are certain acts (murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, torture, rape or other 
inhumane acts), ‘…committed against any civilian population or persecutions on political, 
racial, ethnic or religious grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated’.433 
            At the surface, it appears that the definition of crimes against humanity excluded 
certain acts which are included in the Rome Statute such as sexual slavery, enforced 
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization and other forms of sexual violence. This 
has restricted the scope of the definition of crimes against humanity and left it to the 
imagination to consider what other inhumane acts could be. The definition of crimes against 
humanity is similar to the approach adopted by the Nuremberg Charter, but the only difference 
is that ICT Act 1973 did not confine the crimes within a certain period of time.   
            The technical problem with the definition is that, like the Nuremberg Charter and ICTY 
Statute; it did not include certain important elements of the crimes such as a widespread or 
systematic attack. However, the ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence established that crimes against 
humanity must be ‘widespread' or ‘systematic'434 and it has been reflected in the Statute of the 
ICC and ECCC as mentioned earlier.  Also, the definition of the ICT Act 1973 did not make 
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any reference to the fact that, in order to make an individual liable for crimes against humanity, 
he/she should have knowledge of the nature of the acts. The link between the accused and 
the attack does require the accused to have committed a prohibited act that falls within the list 
of attack and that they had knowledge about the nature of the attack.435 A single act of an 
accused may be considered as a crime against humanity if it forms part of the attack.436 
            Given that the ICT Act 1973 was originally drafted in the early seventies, it has left 
some issues for the judges to decide based on interpretation and assumption. However, the 
definition under ICT Act 1973, rightly omitted the ‘armed conflict requirement’ which is no 
longer a requirement for crimes against humanity as confirmed by the Tadić case and the 
report of the International Commission of Jurists.437 Even if the armed conflict had been an 
element under the ICT-BD's Act, it would not add any difficulties defining crimes given that 
there were evidently armed conflicts in 1971.438  
            It appears from a judgment of the ICT-BD that, a defence counsel has made reference 
to the fact that definition of crimes against humanity of the ICT-BD does not explicitly contain 
the ‘widespread or systematic’ element for constituting the crimes against humanity.439 
However, in the case of Abul Kalam Azad, it is reflected that there is a lack of 'consistency' in 
defining crimes against humanity by various ICT’s.440 It is further stated that, ‘the definition of 
‘Crimes against humanity’ as contemplated in Article 5 of the ICTY Statute 1993, neither 
requires the presence of 'Widespread and Systematic Attack' nor the presence of 'knowledge' 
as conditions for establishing the liability for 'Crimes against Humanity'.441 However, from a 
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human rights approach, if the definition of a crime is not clear enough then it would be against 
an accused’s rights to know the allegation against him or her.    
            It appears from the case of Azad that he was found guilty of the offence of abduction, 
confinement, and torture as ‘crimes against humanity' on charges no 1 & 2.442 The facts of the 
charges were that, the accused along with seven to eight armed men had gone to the victim 
Anjali Das's house told her father to hand over his daughter Anjali Das to the accused, but 
when denied, the accused and his cohorts took away Anjali Das forcibly. Later on, Anjali Das 
committed suicide fearing any further violence, presumably sexual in nature.443 So it seems 
that the accused forcefully abducted, tortured and confined a young girl from a Hindu family 
and considering the background of the atrocities of 1971, it is suggested that the motive behind 
the abduction might have been to sexually abuse the girl which meets the threshold of ‘other 
inhumane acts'. On the other hand, the term abduction and confinement can be compared to 
the ICC's list of enforced disappearance, but the problem is that during 1971, enforced 
disappearance was not recognized as a crime under customary international law. The 
definition of crimes against humanity as developed by the ICT-BD lack clarity. The absence 
of clear definitions and the inconsistent application of the definitions in the cases before ICT-
BD created a high risk of arbitrary application of the law.   
4.3.4 Crimes against peace 
            Section 3(2)(b) of the ICT Act 1973 provides that crimes against peace include, 
‘…planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements, or assurances.444 This provision is the identical reflection 
of the Nuremberg Charter. Crimes against peace mean waging a war of aggression, in 
violation of international treaties.445 The General Assembly of the UN adopted the definition of 
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aggression as the crimes against peace in 1974.446 To make an individual accountable for 
crimes against peace, it is important to prove that the individual was in a position of leadership, 
and ‘act of aggression’ by must be established by the state and a ‘manifest violation of the UN  
Charter’ must be stipulated.447 
            The analysis of the wording of Section 3(2)(b) of the ICT Act 1973, suggests that, 
although it has adopted the definition of the Nuremberg Charter, it did not include other parts 
such as, ‘…or participation in a Common Plan or Conspiracy for the accomplishment of any 
of the foregoing’. According to Linton, ‘This omission may perhaps reflect the continental 
lawyer’s traditional distaste for this notion of criminality that is prevalent in the common law 
system, and the notion of common plan’ which was very controversial at Nuremberg’.448 As of 
26 June 2019, the ICT-BD (Tribunal 1 & Tribunal 2) has delivered 38 judgments and the crimes 
against peace have not been used so far. In the particular context of Bangladesh, the 
applicability of crimes against peace would be restricted to the time from when the war became 
international. As there was no war of aggression in the context of Bangladesh, the crimes 
against peace has little scope of application.  However, this particular provision has a symbolic 
and psychological value that the atrocities committed by the Pakistani authorities can be 
theoretically defined under this provision.449 
4.3.5 Genocide 
            Mr Macdermot, who contributed in drafting the ICT Act, reported in 1973 that there 
was a broad allegation by the Bangladeshi people that the Pakistani army was guilty of 
genocide.450 He said, in Bangladesh,‘ genocide' is perceived to be large-scale killings, and it 
is a highly emotive term.451 He further stated that, ‘there would be great difficulty in establishing 
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the intent to destroy the Bengali people,' but there is a strong case to establish specific intent 
for the purpose of genocide in relation to the attack on the Hindu people.452 Since the ICT-BD 
is only prosecuting the local collaborators, the genocidal charges are mostly related to 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to 
commit genocide and conspiracy in genocide. 
            According to UN General Assembly Resolution 96(1), genocide ‘is a denial of the right 
of existence of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of individual 
human beings’.453 According to Article 2 of the 1948 United Nations Convention, the prevention 
and punishment of the crime of genocide can be defined as certain acts, ’…committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group’.454 There are 
at least three important jurisprudential elements of the crime of genocide such as; the 
development of the concept of genocide and the requirements to prove genocide before an 
international criminal tribunal; evidentiary obstacles; and legal defences against genocide 
charges.455 
            The exhaustive list of acts is ‘…killing members of the group; causing serious bodily 
or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group'.456 Article 3 of the genocide convention added that conspiracy, incitement, attempts, 
and complicity to commit genocide are punishable as genocide. According to Cassese, the 
above definition of genocide has some flaws because it has ignored cultural genocide, it did 
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 Section 3(2)(c) of the ICT Act 1973 provided that:  
            Genocide: meaning and including any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, religious or political group, such as: 
(i) killing members of the group. 
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part. 
(iv) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. 
(v) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.458 
            In the above definition, Linton identifies some differences from the definition of UN 
Convention and states in her own words, ‘Political groups are added, and the phrase ‘‘as such’’ 
has become ‘such as’.459 She explained that ‘the turn to ‘‘such as’’ not just shifts the emphasis 
away from the targeting of the protected groups to the core crimes, but it also turns the 
Genocide Convention’s closed list of core crimes into a merely illustrative list.460 The inclusion 
of political group as a protected group is not recognised by the internationally recognised 
definition of genocide. There are at least two problems with including political groups within 
the definition of genocide. Firstly, the attributes of political groups are not stable. Secondly, 
members of certain political groups join the party voluntarily rather than inherit it at birth and 
this differentiates them from other protected groups.461 However, being a pure domestic 
tribunal, the ICT-BD deviated from the definition of genocide under customary international 
law. Thus, the relationship with cultural relativism can be observed from the ICT-BD’s 
definition of genocide. 
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            In the case of Md. Mahbubur Rahman, the ICT-BD stated that ‘genocide’ is the 
deliberate and systematic attack intending to cause destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, 
religious or political groups which includes causing serious bodily or mental harm to members 
of the group.462 So, under the ICT Act 1973, the definition of genocide is extended to ‘political 
groups’ which also reflects the contemporary understanding of genocide. It appears from the 
ICT-BD judgments that many accused were charged and found guilty of genocide and this 
has been discussed below. 
4.3.6 Notion of genocide reflected in the ICT-BD judgments 
           In the case of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, the ICT-BD found him guilty on the 
offence of the killing of a religious group as genocide as specified in section 3(2)(c) (i) of the 
1973 Act under four separate charges (Charge numbers 2, 4, 5 and 6).463 One of the four 
charges is that in 1971, in order to destroy in whole or in part the Hindu community, the 
accused along with a group of Pakistani army abducted seven un-armed civilians, out of which 
six persons were inhumanly tortured to death in the presence of the accused. As a result, the 
accused was charged for the physical participation and also for substantially contributing to 
the actual commission of the offence of genocide under 3(2)(c)(i).464 Another charge read that, 
on 13 April 1971, accused Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, along with his accomplices and the 
Pakistani Army opened fire on the unarmed Hindu civilian population killing 30/35 Hindu 
persons. 465 
            The most recent judgment by the ICT-BD was delivered during the revision period of 
this thesis; it was the case of Md. Mahbubur Rahman466, this particular accused was charged 
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with and convicted of genocide. This particular accused was found ‘guilty of participating, 
abetting, assisting, substantially contributing and facilitating, by his act and conduct, forming 
part of a systematic attack and the killing of 33 Hindu civilians constituting the offence of 
‘genocide’ under the Act of 1973.467 The critical analysis of this case suggests that although 
the ICT Act 1973 does not include the modes of liability and inchoate crimes, it does 
criminalise individuals for attempt, complicity and conspiracy. Another important observation 
is that most of the genocide charges are based on complicity, this is because the tribunal is 
only prosecuting the local collaborators. Thus, an argument on the extent of justifiability in 
prosecuting the secondary offenders leaving at large the principal offenders can be produced. 
It should be noted that due to jurisdictional limitation, the ICT-BD at this moment is unable to 
prosecute the Pakistani army officers who were directly involved with the atrocities committed 
during the liberation war of Bangladesh because those army officers were repatriated after the 
liberation war had ended.   
           In relation to the specific intention requirement, it appears from the latest judgment of 
27 June 2019, that the ‘specific intent’ of the enterprise was to destroy the substantial part of 
the Hindu community of the locality under the Mirzapur District of Tangail.468 It is stated that 
the destruction of a group does not mean its total destruction and substantial destruction would 
be sufficient to infer the intent of the accused.469 The judges of the ICT-BD stated that specific 
intent requirement for genocide, ‘cannot be tangible, and it cannot be proved by direct 
evidence’.470 Further, it is stated that ‘Intent[ion] is a mental factor which is hard, even 
impracticable, to determine and as such, it may be proven through inference from a certain 
number of facts unveiled and the pattern and magnitude of attack’.471 However, considering 
justice value e.g. due process, the researcher argues that if judges are empowered to 
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construct the mental element of genocidal crime through inference, then their subjective notion 
may undermine the credibility of the process. Also, given that the ICT-BD is conducting 
delayed prosecutions, it would be challenging to make the right inference from the decades 
old facts. 
           In the judgment, it is stated that although targeting part of the community qualifies as 
‘substantial’, for the propose of inferring the ‘genocidal intent’, merely the number of individuals 
belonging to Hindu religious group killed cannot be the only precondition for the inference of 
‘genocidal intent’.472 The judges also made reference to the ICTY’s case of Jelisic which states 
that there are two forms of genocidal intent, such as; intention to destroy a large group, and 
intention to destroy a selected number of people.473 In this regard, it said in the ICT-BD’s 
judgment that genocide, ‘…is a coordinated attack against the human multiplicity of a targeted 
group aiming to cause a grave destructive effect on the group'.474 So, the killing of a limited 
number of people can add the destructive effect of the protected group, which can give rise to 
genocidal intention.   
            Almost all the charges relating to genocide indicate that, ‘…the accused encouraged, 
assisted and provided moral support’  for the commission of genocide.475 This aspect reflects 
the ICTR’s case of Nahimana where it was stated that encouragement and moral support 
either expressed or implied, including presence near the scene of the crimes may give rise to 
individual criminal responsibility.476 As a result, the accused were found to be liable for the 
offense of genocide  before the ICT-BD due to conscious presence at the crime scene. It can 
be observed that the judges of the ICT-BD repeatedly stated that, ‘It has been jurisprudentially 
settled that those who make their contribution with the shared intent to commit the offence can 
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be held ‘equally liable’, regardless of the level of their contribution to its commission’.477 The 
researcher is of the opinion that there should be a clear threshold as to the level of contribution 
to the crime. It would be procedurally unfair to impose liability for mere presence at the crime 
scene. Also, the meaning of ‘shared intent’ is unclear. If we consider the particular context of 
Bangladesh, for the commission of a particular genocidal crime, there may be a diverse range 
of motives. Whilst the Pakistani army may have had the genocidal intention, the local 
collaborators may have participated in the crime for personal gain as opposed to genocidal 
intention and this aspect has not been clarified within the judgments of the ICT-BD. 
4.3.7 Interim findings 
            It appears from the above, that although the ICT Act 1973 included ‘political groups' 
as a further group within the ambit of the genocidal target group, to date, the ICT-BD has not 
found anyone guilty of genocide for attacking a political group. It is reported by various outlets 
that people in Bangladesh assumed that the Pakistani military actions and auxiliary forces 
constituted genocide by destroying in whole or part the Bengali nation as an ethnic or racial 
group.478 Although this argument may be plausible for the Pakistani army, it is not plausible as 
to why the local collaborators, who are predominantly Bengali, would want to destroy part of 
their own nation. For this reason, a forum of jurists opined that it would be difficult to prove 
genocide in a court of law for destroying the Bengali nation due to lack of specific intent.479 
Alternatively, it is suggested that the Pakistani authority targeted members of four identifiable 
groups such as the AL (political group), Intellectuals, students, and Hindus (religious).480 It is 
reported that ‘…anyone identifiable as belonging to one of these groups was liable to be shot 
at sight, or to be arrested and in many cases, severely ill-treated…'.481 While such an approach 
would invoke ‘political’ groups, the judgments delivered by the ICT-BD so far indicate that most 
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of the genocide charges are related to the religious group of Hindus as the shared intention of 
destroying the Hindu community was common to both, the Pakistani army and the local 
collaborators. 
            The definition of genocide by the ICT Act 1973, can be criticized stating that it has 
departed from the Customary International law. However, in the particular context of the 
atrocities in Bangladesh, the inclusion of political group as a protected group within the ambit 
of genocide by the ICT Act 1973 is a forward-thinking approach providing protection to the 
political groups which is also supported by many academics including Cassese.482  Also, the 
ICT-BD is a domestic tribunal and there are no barriers preventing the inclusion of political 
groups within its domestic law. In the context of Bangladesh, the war was based on political 
grounds and the Pakistani army conducted military operations to punish the Bengali people 
who were the sympathisers of the Awami League party. So, in a broader perspective, there 
were elements of destroying wholly or partly the people belonging to a particular political 
group. But the danger of such an inclusion should also be considered because political groups 
are not permanent, and members of this group can voluntarily join. It appears from the 
judgments delivered by the ICT-BD that, due to the complexity around the inclusion of political 
groups, no one was convicted for genocide on this ground. 
4.3.8 War Crimes 
            A war crime is a serious violation of fundamental rules and customs of war in armed 
conflict, which is also known as International Humanitarian Law (IHL).483 War crimes have no 
requirement of widespread or systematic commission, and a single act may give rise to 
individual responsibility.484 The first precise source of warfare rules is included in ‘The Hague 
Regulations’ prohibiting unlimited and unnecessary injury to enemies at warfare.485 
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Section 3(2)(d) of the ICT Act 1973 defined war crimes as, 
War Crimes: namely, violation of laws or customs of war which include but are not 
limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose 
of civilian population in the territory of Bangladesh; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners 
of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages and detainees, plunder of public or 
private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity. 
            The above definition has been borrowed from the Nuremberg Charter, and there is a 
minor modification which is the addition of killing ‘detainees’ and restricting the territory of the 
crimes within Bangladesh.486 Thus, the definition adapted within the context of Bangladesh. 
            According to Cassese, ‘war crimes may be perpetrated in the course of either 
international or internal armed conflicts, that is, civil wars or large scale and protracted armed 
clashes breaking out within a sovereign state’.487 War crimes do not apply during times of 
peace; its commission is restricted to armed conflict only.488 It appears from the ICT-BD's 
judgments that no one has been charged under this particular section. It appears that this 
section was an application for the POW's of Pakistan who were able to return to Pakistan 
through an agreement. The researcher concludes that for the specific circumstances of 
Bangladesh, this particular section has little role to play in practice although it does have great 
symbolic value demonstrating that the acts committed by the Pakistani army were triable as 
war crimes. 
4.3.9 Attempt, Abetment or Conspiracy: Section 3(2)(g) 
            This section refers to inchoate crimes under international law. Under the Geneva 
Convention, conspiracy to commit genocide is a crime, but section 3(2)(g) of the ICT Act 1973 
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extended the crimes to any crimes under the Act. However, the inchoate offence of conspiracy 
was used at the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals but only for crimes against peace.489 In 
contemporary international law, conspiracy does not give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility except in the case of genocide.490 In practice, both conspiracy and attempt have 
very modest roles to play in ICT-BD.  
            In the case of Jabbar Engineer,  the accused was, ‘charged for conspiracy, abetting 
and facilitating the commission of offenses of abduction, murder, torture, plundering [other in 
humane act] and persecutions on religious ground as crimes against humanity as specified in 
section 3(2)(a)(g) (h)’.491 Since the definition of conspiracy is not defined under the ICT Act 
1973, the tribunal borrowed the concept from the domestic penal code such as section 120A 
of the dispensation of justice as confirmed in the appeal judgment of Chief Prosecutor Vs. 
Abdul Quader Mollah.492 The tribunal defined conspiracy as, ‘…an inchoate offense refers to 
an act of agreeing to commit a substantive crime to further plan and policy' between two or 
more persons.493 In explaining the meaning of abatement, the Court of Appeal of Bangladesh 
in the case of Abdula Quader Molla made reference to section 109 of the domestic penal code. 
The explanatory note of abatement states that, ‘an act or offence is said to be committed in 
consequence of the abetment when it is committed in consequence of the instigation, or in 
pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid which constitutes the abetment'.494 
           So, the ICT Act 1973 defined attempt, abatement and conspiracy within their domestic 
criminal law because references were made to the domestic penal code. This is how the ICT-
BD attempted to strike a balance between universally recognised norms within the domestic 
criminal law norms. 
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4.3.10 Complicity in or failure to prevent crimes: Section 3(2)(h) 
            The crimes under section 3(2)(h) give rise to omission liability under ICL, that means 
if someone is under a duty to prevent the commission of certain acts, then that particular 
individual would attract liability under this section. This is an important element of international 
criminal law, but it remained challenging to define complicity because it is listed only in the 
definition of genocide under international law. The ICT-BD did not confine it within genocide 
but considered it as a mode of liability for all crimes under the ICT-BD’s jurisdiction. 
            A hypothetical example of complicity can be given to illustrate this aspect, if a 
commander fails to prevent people under his command from committing atrocities, then he 
may attract liability for failing to prevent people under his duty, and this is analogous to the 
superior's command responsibility. The term ‘complicity' has been defined by reference to the 
case of Akayesu where it was stated that ‘A person may be tried for complicity in genocide 
‘even where the principal perpetrator of the crime has not been identified, or where, for any 
other reasons, guilt could not be proven’.495 In the case of Azam, the ICT-BD applied the term 
of complicity to make the accused liable because the accused participated in a meeting with 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan where the accused expressed his full 
cooperation with the aim of establishing peace in the region.496 Thus, he attracted liability 
under the head of complicity for all crimes committed. However, the approach adopted by the 
ICT-BD in this regard can be criticised for not clarifying the mental elements of the crimes or 
for the poor definition of the mental element. 
4.3.11 Accessors, abettors and auxiliary forces 
            Section 3(2) (g) (h) of the ICT Act 1973 have broadened the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
to try and assess the accessors, abettors, and auxiliary forces of the Pakistani Army. It should 
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be noted that this particular feature was borrowed from Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter 
which states as follows: 'Leaders, organizers, instigators, and accomplices participating in the 
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing 
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan’.497  
4.3.12 Modes of liability: Joint enterprise & Superior responsibility 
            Section 4(1) provides that, if any crime as specified in section 3 is committed by several 
persons, each of such person is liable for that crime in the same manner as if it were done by 
him alone. It appears from the judgments delivered by the ICT-BD that this section has been 
widely used to cover the auxiliary forces of the Pakistani army.  
            Section 4(2) of the ICT Act 1973 deals with superior command responsibility. 
Command responsibility is an inculpatory doctrine which can give rise to individual criminal 
responsibility for the crimes committed by the subordinates of the commander.498 In the case 
of Yamashita, US authorities accused him of failing to control the troops under his command  
from committing widespread atrocities.499 In the case of Ghulam Azam, it is stated that, ‘For a 
person to be regarded as a superior, he must have a position of command or authority (in a 
military context), a more general term, applicable in both military and civilian settings’.500 It is 
also stated that a civilian superior is not required to be officially recognized as superior rather, 
a de facto position would suffice.501 
            In relation to the ‘knowledge requirement' of the superior, the ICT-BD stated that the 
mental element is an abstract phenomenon which needs to be identified, ‘…from the facts, 
circumstances, and from the context of the case'.502 Interestingly, the ICT-BD took the burden 
of constructing the mental element of the superior and discharged the prosecution from 
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producing any evidence in this regard. The words of the judgment read that, ‘The burden is 
more upon the tribunal to infer than on the prosecution to produce evidence specifically, as 
the knowledge requirement was primarily not mentioned in section 4(2) of the ICT Act, 1973 
explicitly’.503 Thus, section 4(2) of the ICT Act 1973 is technically suggesting a form of strict 
liability in ICL.504  
4.4 Analysis of Procedural Rules of the ICT-BD 
           Under section 22 of the ICT Act 1973, the ICT-BD has formulated its own RoP. 
However, there is no separate body of rules, similar to the ECCC and the SCSL, in order to 
govern the procedure of the ICT-BD due to its domestic nature.505 Since there is no separate 
supervisory body to oversee the performance of the ICT-BD, it raises concerns in relation to 
its transparency and judicial independence.  
4.4.1 Applicable laws           
           The RoP of the ICT-BD made the tribunal distinct from the domestic courts, in terms of 
the flexible approach of evidential rules.  
            Section 23 of the ICT Act 1973 stated that the domestic Criminal Procedure Code and 
the Evidence Act 1872 are not applicable in the proceedings of the ICT-BD.506 Also, Section 
19 of the ICT Act 1973 stated that the tribunal is not bound to follow technical rules of 
evidence.507 
Although, the ICT-BD has no distinct rules of evidence, the RoP ensures that 
universally recognised norms of evidence would be applicable. Thus, we can see an element 
of universalism in the operation of the ICT-BD. Under Section 19(1) of the ICT Act 1973, the 
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Tribunal may admit any evidence which it deems to have probative value. Rule 56(2) of the 
RoP further stated that, the Tribunal shall have the discretion to consider hearsay evidence. 
The case laws of the Tribunal further developed the applicable evidential rules of the ICT-BD. 
4.4.2 Investigation agency and the prosecution team 
            Under Section 7(1) of the ICT Act 1973, the government of Bangladesh established a 
prosecution team. Rule 17-20 of the RoP of the ICT-BD, deal with powers and functions of the 
prosecutors. Under Section 8(2) of the ICT Act 1973, appointed prosecutors have 
investigatory power and provisions relating to the investigation are applicable to them.508  
            Under Section 8(1) of the ICT Act 1973, the government of Bangladesh established 
an Investigation agency. Rule 3-16 of the RoP of the ICT-BD, deal with powers and functions 
of the Investigation Agency. After receiving a complaint, investigators are required to proceed 
in person to the spot, investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and if necessary, 
take steps for the discovery and arrest of the accused.509 After completing the initial 
investigation, the investigation officer is required to submit a detailed report along with the 
necessary documentation.510  
 It appears to the researcher that the prosecutors and Investigation agencies are 
appointed by the government and the process of selecting cases for trial is not clear. It raises 
questions regarding the objectivity of the selection process for cases and judicial 
independence. It was not possible for the researcher to obtain information on how many cases 
were closed following the initial investigation and it is assumed that following initial 
investigation, almost all the cases went to the trial stage. Also, there is no clear legal provision 
regarding right to legal representation at the time of investigation and this aspect can be 
criticised in terms of due process. 
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4.4.3 Warrant of arrest and right to bail 
            After an initial investigation, if prima facie case is found against a suspect, then the 
investigation officer may seek the arrest of the suspect though the prosecutor from the tribunal 
and local law enforcement agencies are empowered to execute the warrant of arrest.511  A 
unique feature of the RoP is that if a suspect is already in custody, then the investigation must 
be completed within 12 months; otherwise, bail will be granted.512 Although other tribunals 
emphasized that investigation should be completed without any delays, the ICT-BD’s RoP 
states the exact time frame so that the accused are not detained long-time arbitrarily.513 
4.4.4 Forming charges against the accused  
          Under Rule 18(1), the Chief Prosecutor or any other prosecutor authorized, will take 
into account the investigation report and prepare a formal charge in the form of a petition and 
submit it before the tribunal.514 Section 16(1) of the ICT Act 1973, stated the requirements for 
a formal charge against an accused and section 16(2) required that a copy of the formal 
charge and any accompanying documents must be given to the accused at a reasonable time 
before the trial.515 
           Under Rule 50 of the RoP of the ICT-BD, the threshold to prove the charge is ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’ and burden of proof is on the prosecution.516 The threshold of ‘beyond 
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4.4.5 Trial 
             According to Rule 35, once a case is ready for trial, the tribunal shall proceed to hear 
the case in accordance with the procedure of trial under section 10 of the Act and firstly, the 
decision is to be made on the charge framing matter. Section 10 of the ICT Act 1973 deals 
with the procedure of trial; the charge shall be read out; the accused person shall be asked 
whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. After recording a plea of guilty or not guilty, the witnesses 
from both sides will be examined before the verdict is delivered. 
4.4.6 Right to Interpreter and Counsel 
            The section 10(2) of the ICT Act 1973 states that, the proceedings of the tribunal shall 
be either in Bengali or in English and section 10(3) provided a provision for an interpreter to 
be available to the accused and witnesses.517  
            Section 12 of the ICT Act 1973 empowered the tribunal to direct the authority to provide 
counsel at the expense of the government if the accused is not represented by any counsel.518 
This legal representation assistance for the accused is available at any stage of the case. 
4.4.7 Trial in Absentia 
            Section 10A of the ICT Act 1973 permits trial in abstention if the Tribunal finds a reason 
to believe that the accused person has absconded or concealed himself so that he cannot be 
produced for trial.519 Rule 32 of the RoP of the ICT-BD states that, after the publication of a 
notice in daily newspapers, if the accused still fails to appear before the tribunal on the 
specified date and time, the tribunal will consider the accused as an absconder and the trial 
of the accused shall commence and be held in absentia.520  
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            Trial in absentia is clearly contrary to due process and universally recognised norms 
of human rights. However if we consider the trend of ‘Arab Spring’ in countries like Tunisia 
and Egypt, it appears that in Muslim majority countries, trial in absentia is acceptable as it was 
in the case of Ayyash in Lebanon under the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (SLT).521 Similarly, 
the ICT-BD has retained the provision of trial in absentia considering local norms and customs.   
4.4.8 Rules of Evidence 
            As mentioned above, the tribunal is not bound to follow the domestic criminal law and 
the Evidence Act of 1872. Section 19(1) of the ICT Act 1973, provides that the tribunal shall 
not be bound by technical rules of evidence and is encouraged to adopt flexible rules of 
evidence.522 This particular section also stated that the tribunal might admit any evidence 
having probative value.523 Section 19(4) authorized the tribunal to take into its judicial notice 
of the fact, common knowledge which is not needed to be proved by adducing evidence.524 
Under section 56(2) the tribunal has the discretion to consider hearsay evidence by weighing 
its probative value.525 The accused has the right to cross-examine the witnesses against him 
to determine the credibility of oral evidence.526 In relation to the alibi defence, Rule 51 of the 
RoP of the ICT-BD provides that, it is the defence who has to prove the defence of alibi. 
4.4.9 Judgment and Sentencing 
                        Section 20 of the ICT Act 1973 deals with judgment and sentencing matters. It 
is required that judges should give the reasoning for guilt or innocence. In relation to 
sentencing, section 20(2) provides that, ‘Upon conviction of an accused person, the tribunal 
shall award sentence of death or such other punishment proportionate to the gravity of the 
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crime as appears to the tribunal to be just and proper’.527 The wording of this particular section 
indicates that after finding an accused guilty, the first task of the tribunal is to consider the 
death penalty unless there are any other reasons why the death penalty should not be applied. 
This aspect has been elaborately discussed later in this thesis (see Chapter 9).  
           The ICT-BD has no separate body to carry out sentencing, it is the responsibility of the 
national prison authority to execute the sentencing. Section 368. (1) of The Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CrPc) 1898 states that, the method of execution for a person sentenced to death 
is hanging.528 This is the only form of execution for capital punishment in Bangladesh. 
            The ICT-BD follows the principle of retribution and deterrence to determine sentences, 
namely that punishment must be proportionate to the crime committed. As it stands, the ICT-
BD does not have any official sentencing guidelines and trial judges usually apply their 
discretion depending on the case.529 Islam, on his research paper proposed certain mitigating 
or aggravating factors that can be taken into account while determining sentences such as the 
gravity of the crime, age of the offender, economic conditions, custody period, uncertainty, 
effect of the offence on the victim and plea bargaining.530 The researcher is of the opinion that 
in the context of Bangladesh, although there are no official guidelines, mitigating and 
aggravating factors considered by the courts have placed importance on public sentiments, 
gravity of crime and not only the suffering of the victims as some victims had passed away 
before the trial or sentencing but the suffering of the society as a whole. Mitigating factors 
such as age have also been considered while determining sentence as in the case of Ghulam 
Azam.531 The ICT-BD’s judgments provided some observations in regards to the consideration 
of aggravating circumstances in determining sentence which has been elaborately discussed 
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in Chapter 9.532 Although it has been difficult to establish clear rules of sentencing precedent 
in the ICT-BD, some guidelines set in the judgement of Ali Ahsan Mujahid,533 in relation to the 
gravity and nature of participation, level of influence and culpable affiliation with the armed 
forces, have later been reiterated in the case of Mir Quasem Ali to determine sentence.534 
           The ICT-BD has strived to provide clear rationales behind sentencing in the judgments. 
The researcher is of the opinion that the rationales and judgments provided by the ICT-BD 
has value to set in place a precedential mechanism for other Muslim majority countries who 
can reflect back to the judgments of the ICT-BD for rationale and retributory objectives in 
sentencing, thus contributing to International law. 
4.4.10 Right of appeal 
            Section 21 of the ICT Act 1973 deals with the right of appeal for the accused and the 
prosecution challenging conviction and sentence to the Appellate Division (AD) of the 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh.535 This feature of the ICT-BD is significant because the 
accused are able to challenge the judgments of the ICT-BD to the highest court of Bangladesh. 
Also, the decisions of the Court of Appeal are subject to review. In order to comply with the 
overriding objectives of speedy trial, section 21(3) & (4) provided a time limit of 30 days to 
lodge an appeal by either party or 60 days to dispose of the appeal respectively. Rule 26(3) 
of the RoP of the ICT-BD permits either party to apply for a review of any of the tribunal's 
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4.4.11 Protection of witnesses and victims 
            Under Rule 58A, the ICT-BD is empowered to direct the government to ensure the 
protection, privacy, and well-being of the witnesses and or victims. Rule 53A (3) of the RoP of 
the ICT-BD provides that video trials may be held for the protection of witnesses and both the 
prosecution and the defence counsel are required to maintain confidentially of the proceedings 
and the identity of the witnesses. If either the prosecution or the defence fails to maintain the 
confidentiality requirement, they shall then be prosecuted under section 11 (4) of the ICT Act 
1973 (please see Chapter 8 for more details on witness protection).  
4.4.12 Fair trial attributes  
            A critical aspect of the ICT-BD is that the governing Act was legislated in 1973 
considering the then customary international law and conception of due process. It should be 
noted that the concept of due process in the area of ICL has gone through a substantial 
amount of change. As a result, the ICT Act 1973 had to be amended to comply with the 
contemporary due process standard. The RoP of the ICT-BD had to go through an amendment 
to address the due process issues. In addition to the above-mentioned provision, other notable 
fair trail attributes include protection against self-incrimination under Rule 43(7); safeguards 
related to confessional statements under Rule 25(2) & Section 14(2), safeguards against 
possibilities of torture or coercion, duress or threat of any kind under Rule 16(2); adequate 
time for preparing defence under Rule 38(2); presumption of innocence under Rule 43(2), 
etc.537 Rule 42 also permits the ICT-BD to allow foreign lawyers subject to the approval of the 
Bangladesh Bar Council.538 
            Despite having the above fair trial attributes, the due process aspect of the ICT-BD 
has been criticized from various quarters. According to Robertson, although it is common that 
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newly established tribunals do attract criticisms for the procedural difficulties, the criticisms for 
ICT-BD are comparatively more.539 According to him, one of the main procedural faults of the 
ICT-BD is that the governing Act has excluded the accused to seek fundamental rights 
ensured under the constitution.540 In relation to alibi, he stated that the ICT-BD followed an 
incorrect approach in shifting the burden on the defence and deviated from the principle of 
ICTR established in the case of Protais Zigiranyirazo.541 The procedural aspect of the ICT-BD 
has also been criticized for following the trend of Nuremberg Trials in many aspects, including 
retaining the death sentence. However, according to Menon, the trial in absentia and death 
penalty aspect of the Nuremberg trials ‘…were unanimously affirmed by the first General 
Assembly of the United Nations’.542 Menon further stated that despite several shortcomings, 
the Nuremberg trials were widely accepted and taking a different approach towards ICT-BD 
would be a double standard approach. 
4.5 Composition of the ICT-BD 
           The ICT-BD has four major bodies: The Office of the Prosecutor, investigation Agency, 
Registry, and Judicial Organs. The prosecutors, investigators and judges all are from 
Bangladesh. 
4.5.1 Structure of the Tribunal  
            Section 6 (1) of the ICT Act 1973 permits the government to set up one or more 
tribunals by way of notice in the official Gazette consisting of a Chairman and not less than 
two and not more than four other members.543 The standard practise is that  the tribunal judges 
in Bangladesh are appointed from the district judges. However, pursuant to section 6(2) any 
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sitting judge or qualified judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, may be appointed as a 
Chairman or member of a Tribunal.   
            The first tribunal was established on 25 March 2010 by notification to the official 
gazette which is known as ICT-BD-1 and for the purpose of speedy trial, a second tribunal 
was established on 22 March 2012 which is known as ICT-BD-2. The Second Tribunal remains 
non-functioning since 15 September 2015. The ICT-BD is currently based in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. 
4.5.2 Appointment process of judges  
            In relation to the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Article 
95 (1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides that, ‘The Chief Justice shall be appointed 
by the President, and the other Judges shall be appointed by the President after consultation 
with the Chief Justice’.544 Article 95(2) provides that to be qualified as a judge, a person must 
be a citizen of Bangladesh and have at least 10 years of experience as an advocate of the 
Supreme Court or at least 10 years of experience holding judicial office in Bangladesh or 
having special qualifications prescribed by law.545 
            Under Section 6(1) of the ICT Act 1973, the government of Bangladesh is empowered 
to appoint the Judges of the ICT-BD. The judges are from civilian backgrounds and not from 
military backgrounds. The judges are required to be Bangladeshi citizens and qualified to be 
a judge in the Bangladesh judiciary as required under the Constitution of Bangladesh. The 
judges are required to be independent when making decisions on any matters. The panel of 
judges is composed of at least three judges, and one of them acts as a chairman.   
             The appointment process of the judges of the ICT-BD has been criticized in terms of 
the independence of the judges. According to Menon, the exclusive authority for the 
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appointment of the judges is in the hands of the government, and this is alarming in relation 
to maintaining the principle of independence of the tribunal.546 This appointment process of 
the ICT-BD is one of the main limitation of a domestic tribunal dealing with international crimes. 
Since local judges only are recruited by the government, there is a lack transparency regarding 
their appointment, it can undermine overall credibility of the ICT-BD. Furthermore, the country 
is standing on such volatile political grounds and selectivity of the judges’ appointment would 
give rise to questions as to whether the government appointed the judges to serve the purpose 
of the government. It would be appropriate to form an independent body to appoint judges and 
prosecution teams in order to maintain transparency and judicial independence. On the other 
hand, if we consider the fact that judges of the tribunal are already qualified to be a part of the 
Bangladesh judiciary and that they would be oath bound to perform their duty independently, 
then the risk of being impartial may be mitigated. Another issue regarding the appointment of 
judges is that, gender diversity was not considered and as a result, there is no female judge 
in the ICT-BD. However, if we consider the social setting of the country and the fact that 
women are underrepresented in the elite professions then it is understandable as to why there 
are no female judges at the ICT-BD. The criticisms attracted by the ICT-BD in terms of 
appointment of the judges may provide important lessons for any future tribunals in the South 
Asian Countries or Muslim majority countries.  
            In relation to decision making, Section 6(6) of the ICT Act 1973 states that if there is a 
difference of opinion among its members, the opinion of the majority shall prevail, and the 
decision of the tribunal shall be expressed in terms of the views of the majority.547 So, it can 
be seen that, dissenting opinions are permitted under the ICT Act 1973 providing final verdict. 
This has provided an area of development because the judges have the option to provide their 
subjective analysis of the case. 
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4.5.3 Office of the Tribunal 
             Rule 60 of the RoP of the ICT-BD provides the Powers and Functions of Registrar 
and Deputy Registrar. The Registrar is the Chief Administrative Officer of the Office of the 
Tribunal and prosecutors submit the cases to him or her for the purpose of presenting before 
the tribunal. The main task of the registrar is to assist the tribunal in the performance of its 
functions under the authority of the Chairman and play the role as the spokesperson of the 
tribunal.548 The registrar is assisted by deputy registrar and delegates certain powers to him 
or her.  
4.5.4 Budget of the ICT-BD 
            Maintaining an ICT is costly business. The ICT-BD is wholly financed by the 
Bangladeshi government and did not seek any financial assistance from the UN, unlike ad hoc 
tribunals and hybrid tribunals. The ad hoc and hybrid tribunals such as the ICTY, ICTR, ECCC 
are financed by the UN. The ICT-BD is still an ongoing process, and at this stage, it is not 
possible to give a complete picture of the costs of the tribunal. Moreover, the ICT-BD did not 
publish any formal report on budget and funding issues. However, it has been reported that 
initially, the tribunal budget was $1.44 million.549 This number of the initial budget is deficient 
compared to other ICT’s. Robertson said that the government had provided inadequate 
funding for the tribunal and that would have an impact on the standard of justice delivered by 
the tribunal.550 The ICT-BD has the option to provide government sponsored defence counsel 
and legal representation to the defendants if they are unable to afford their counsel. Since the 
Tribunal is financed by the government and there is no official public information on the budget, 
it may raise questions about the transparency of the ICT-BD. This aspect again undermines 
the overall credibility of the Tribunal. However, a separate research can be conducted on the 
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budget issue and considering the main focus of this current research, it was not possible to 
elaborate on the budget issue any further due to lack of data. It is reported that from 2009 until 
2017, the ICT-BD's average allocated budget was $216 million (approximately $2.8 million per 
year), and the actual costs of the ICT-BD were $190 million (approx. $2.15 million per year).551 
From 2009 until 2017, the ICT-BD was able to deliver 27 judgments and 10 cases at the trial 
stage.552 Comparing to ICTR, ICTY, ICC, and ECCC, the costs of the ICT-BD is very low. This 
is because the Tribunal employed domestic personnel and resources. Within a decade, the 
ICTY and ICTR have received $4.5 billion to cover the expense of the tribunals.553 It is reported 
that the ECCC in a decade’s time spent $300 million but delivered only three judgments which 
attracted criticisms on the effectiveness of ECCC.554 
           If we consider the cost benefit analysis, it will give us a lucrative picture that 
comparatively, the ICT-BD spent less amount of resources and delivered a significant number 
of judgments since its establishment. However, the ICT-BD has already attracted criticisms 
for being underfunded and raised questions as to whether international standard justice can 
be served with the underfunded budget of the ICT-BD. On the other hand, the ICT-BD can 
provide us a lesson that cost-effective domestic tribunal can be an effective way to deal with 
past human rights violations in any country. The ICT-BD has provided an indication that the 
prosecution of international crimes is no longer a multibillion-dollar business. Despite its 
limitations and criticisms, the attempt of the ICT-BD in providing delayed justice may 
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4.6 Conclusion 
             The primary intention of the ICL is to enforce the international obligation of criminal 
prosecution through an indirect enforcement mechanism. As a result, the establishment of 
domestic tribunals is strengthening the enforceability of the rules of international criminal 
conventions. The ICT-BD is a purely domestic mechanism with international elements. Due to 
its domestic nature, it has attracted several criticisms in terms of definition of its substantive 
laws, appointment procedure of judges and prosecutors and a low budget to run the tribunal.  
            The substantive law and principles of the ICT-BD are borrowed from the Nuremberg 
trials. The governing Act of the ICT-BD was enacted by the parliament of Bangladesh after a 
thorough parliamentary debate. As part of the substantive law, the ICT Act 1973 has given a 
potentially vague definition of crimes against humanity and has broadened the definition of 
genocide. The application of the substantive laws of the ICT-BD has also heavily relied on the 
inchoate offense and joint enterprise in ICL. This has raised issues of legitimacy as the ICT-
BD is subject to serious levels of selectivity due to historic reasons as the tribunal is only 
prosecuting the local collaborators whereas, the principle offenders were able to escape 
prosecution. Due to jurisdictional limitations, the ICT-BD is unable to make principal offenders 
accountable for their criminal acts. This has created a dilemma in defining crimes and 
establishing the mental element of the crimes under the ICT-BD’s governing Act. However, 
the ICT-BD can be considered as an example that even though justice was delayed, it had 
not been totally denied.  
 The ICT-BD’s credibility has been called into question in relation to the appointment 
procedure of the judges of the tribunal since there is no independent body to recruit the judges 
of the tribunal. However, the verdict of the tribunal is not the ultimate say and all verdicts of 
the Tribunal can be challenged through to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court and 
the Appellate Division’s judgment is also subject to review. Thus, if there is any concern 
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regarding the impartiality of the judges, then that judgment can be challenged to highest court 
of Bangladesh on grounds of procedural unfairness. 
             The ICT-BD's sentencing practices are determined by social and cultural aspects as 
well as long denial of justice and national wishes. From the very beginning, the procedural 
laws of the ICT-BD have been criticized from various quarters. As a result, both the governing 
Act and the RoP had to be amended to incorporate the accepted standards of due process 
and presumption of innocence, beyond a reasonable doubt, and interlocutory appeal was 
included as part of procedural laws. Thus, the analysis of the ICT-BD’s substantive laws 
provides us important lessons on how a domestic tribunal can attempt to make a balance 
between internationally recognised standards as well as respective local norms. Despite 
having some inherent limitations, the ICT-BD is a cost-effective domestic measure which has 































CULTURE OF IMPUNITY, DELAYED JUSTICE AND REPARATION 
5.1 Introduction 
              Chapters 5 to 9 present the perspectives of the stakeholders (judges, lawyers, and 
politicians) involved in the establishment or operation of the ICT-BD, which the researcher 
collected by way of semi-structured interviews. This chapter deals with three key themes that 
have emerged from the data: (a) the ICT-BD's role in fighting a culture of impunity; (b) the 
implications of delayed justice and (c) the issue of reparations. Concerning the culture of 
impunity, this sub-section also investigates why Bangladesh could not establish a functioning 
tribunal investigating the crimes soon after the liberation war in 1971. Also, the extent to which 
delay may affect the prosecution of international crimes and in case of delayed justice, if 
reparation can supplement the prosecution to serve justice to the victims.  
           To maintain a consistent fashion, Chapters 5-9 have been structured under 5 sections 
(e.g. Introduction, international legal position, legal position of the ICT-BD, analysis of data 
and conclusion). In writing the international legal positions, frequent reference has been made 
to ICTY, ICTR, ICC, SCSL, ECCC and other relevant tribunals. This comparative analysis is 
valuable in this study because this would help us understand how the ICT-BD has made a 
balance between internationally recognised norms and local cultural norms. 
5.1.1 Definition of impunity  
            It is challenging to offer a comprehensive definition for impunity, which encompasses 
all the different aspects implied in the term; this may be due to the nature of impunity, which 
has become so ‘ubiquitous'.555 In simple terms, impunity means the lack of effective remedies 
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for victims.556 A victim centred approach shows the very personal and subjective side of 
impunity: ‘…sitting next to the torturer [of the victims] and feeling powerless’.557 However, the 
meaning of impunity includes more than the above. It describes a social phenomenon 
characterizing and affecting a whole society.558 By denying survivor’s access to truth or access 
to justice, impunity continues the historical interpretation of the oppressors and denies the 
necessary acknowledgment and reparation for victims and survivors.559 
            As a starting point, it may be helpful to consider the definition of Opotow, who 
describes impunity as ‘…the exemption from accountability, penalty, punishment, or legal 
sanction for perpetrators of illegal acts’.560 This particular author adds that impunity ‘…can 
occur before, during, or after judicial processes'.561 There are three main aspects to this 
definition that are worth highlighting. First, is the emphasis placed here upon the lack of 
‘accountability’562  as opposed to the absence of an effective remedy for victims.563 According 
to Blumenson, international serious crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and 
others (jus cogens crimes) must be prosecuted, and that justice is not achieved without formal 
trial or punishment.564 The second aspect of Opotow’s definition concerns the various 
moments in which impunity may arise. This is mirrored in Amnesty International’s account of 
impunity that impunity may arise before, during or after the judicial process such as not 
investigating the crimes, not bringing the perpetrators to trial and not providing verdict or not 
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enforcing the verdict.565 The third aspect of Opotow’s definition refers to the causes of impunity 
that impunity is the result of political considerations and compromise or ‘realpolitik’.566 The fight 
against impunity includes political measures to establish the truth, to construct a collective 
memory, to bring the perpetrators to court, and organizational reforms to prevent society from 
suffering the same kind of atrocities again.567  
            The concept of impunity must be kept separate from the concept of immunity.568 
Immunity from prosecution is a doctrine of international law that allows an accused to avoid 
prosecution for criminal offences.569 Immunity comes in two forms, the first is functional 
immunity or immunity ratione materiae.570 This is immunity granted to people who perform 
certain functions of a state.571 The second is personal immunity or immunity ratione 
personae.572 This is immunity granted to certain officials because of the office they hold, rather 
than in relation to the actions they have committed.573  
5.1.2 Culture of Impunity 
              A culture of impunity is seen as one of the main challenges of ICL, and in many 
countries, it has not been possible to serve justice for the past atrocities they have suffered.574 
Such impunity has emboldened perpetrators and has encouraged repeated violations of 
ICL.575 The investigation and prosecution of international crimes, including genocide, crimes 
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against humanity, and war crimes is a fundamental component of transitional justice.576 The 
primary goal of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)  is ‘to put an end to 
impunity for the perpetrators’ [...] ‘of the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community as a whole’.577 This is an indication that the area of ICL has seen a long period of 
a culture of impunity for various reasons.   
              According to Bassiouni, impunity arises due to the conflicting goals of realpolitik and 
justice at both, the international and national levels.578 One of the primary purposes of criminal 
law is deterrence so, if there is impunity, this purpose of deterrence will fail, and it is necessary 
to make those who have committed crimes under international law accountable.  
5.2 International position of the culture of Impunity  
All over the world, around 75 to 170 million people were killed during the twentieth 
century in more than 250 different types of conflicts.579 Yet, most of the perpetrators of these 
crimes escaped justice due to political considerations.580 In Turkey, justice for the victims of 
the Armenian killings was abandoned for political reasons.581 
Impunity was an underlying cause of the genocide in the former Yugoslavia (ICITY) 
and in Rwanda (ICTR).582 The concept of impunity in the Rwandan context developed a sense 
of frustration and hopelessness among the victims.583 The ICC was established following the 
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success of the ad hoc tribunals, the ICTY and the ICTR.584 Thus, a trend of political legitimacy 
developed to end culture of impunity despite several limitations.585 
The situation in Cambodia suggests that the cultural interpretation of Impunity is vital 
to deterrence. 586 The trials of former Khmer Rouge leaders in the ECCC has opened a flood 
gate to violence which has been a challenge for the country to control.587 Human rights 
violations are very common in many political and cultural environments where corruption 
exists due to impunity.588 The ECCC has interpreted impunity based on the cultural and 
religious traditions in Cambodia. However, familiarity and perspective on impunity based on 
local norms can be very complicated and can often either support or clash with each other.589 
The differences in objectives of realpolitik and justice is the cause of impunity nationally 
and internationally.590 In a nation trying to achieve stability, political practicality is often parallel 
to the objective of pursuing retributive and restorative justice through accountability.591 The 
pragmatic approach of realpolitik is not burdened with moral obligations. 592 It is evident from 
history that side-lining long-term objectives such as harmony and restoration in order to 
appease temporary goals, is disadvantageous for the society in the long run. This 
unequivocally leads to the failure in addressing the needs of the society to bring perpetrators 
of serious crimes to justice and remedy victims by combating differences of opinions even 
after the truth has been accepted.593 
Member states of the U.N are obligated to work together with the organisation to attain 
the ‘standard of achievement’ goals of the charter established in 1948 which are, universal 
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respect and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion. However, the commitment excluded execution or 
prosecutions for violations.594 On the other hand, there was a requirement for signatory 
commitment on the International Convention on the prevention and punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide which attached liability for violations by the General Assembly that also upheld 
the five principles of the Nuremberg charter which attached individual responsibility for war 
crimes, crimes against peace and crimes against humanity.595 
It is internationally recognised that individuals and states have duties and 
responsibilities to prevent crimes against International law, failure to do so would result in 
being held accountable and responsible as provided in the provisions of International law.596 
There are various provisions under international law such as the Article IX of the Genocide 
convention and Article 6 of the charter of International Military Tribunal that states can rely on 
to steer away from Impunity under international criminal law by imposing individual 
responsibility.597 Advisory opinions on the legal responsibility of successor states in 
prosecuting violations against International law by former regimes can be sought from 
organisations such as the Security Council, General Assembly, ECOSOC or any other 
specialised agencies.  
The international community has had an opportunity to learn from the Pinochet case 
as its distinctive facts of a domestic court in a separate state bringing forth a former head of 
state to stand trial for human rights violations is unprecedented.598 It may seem that there is a 
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responsibility for successor states to prosecute individuals belonging former regimes for 
human violations as a duty imposed by international law.599 There exists great legal difficulties 
and political barriers in securing fugitives and some seem to have escaped the reach of 
justice.600  
5.3 The position of culture of impunity in Bangladesh 
The nature of the Bangladeshi culture of impunity should be understood with reference 
to its political culture. The country has gone through a large of period of political violence and 
military rule. The analysis of the causes and results of impunity for mass atrocities in 
Bangladesh can give us valuable insight as to how the country confronted the problem of 
international justice. Bangladesh stands as one of the most important cases where the pursuit 
of war criminals was foiled, resulting in a disturbing impunity for one of the ugliest episodes of 
the Cold War.601  
The declassified government papers released by the Indian government provide us an 
understanding of some real reasons of the culture of impunity in the context of Bangladeshi 
transitional justice.602 This would be helpful to validate the empirical data collected through 
semi structured interviews. The Pakistani government was able to pursue the government of 
Bangladesh and India not to prosecute the soldiers as war criminals. Both Bangladesh and 
India had chosen international security over justice with a view to make peace with Pakistan.603 
Due to lack of substantial military and political power, Bangladesh could not prosecute 
the Pakistani soldiers.604 When the Pakistani prisoners were repatriated, Bangladesh was left 
with the only option to prosecute the local collaborators. Despite having a significant military 
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victory and a strong moral drive for prosecuting the perpetrators of 1971, international criminal 
law could not be applied in Bangladesh. Similar to the situation in Cambodia, Bangladesh had 
obstructions such as poverty, corruption, mismanagement and bloody military coups in its 
early attempts at justice. However, there was always a societal demand to prosecute the 
remaining local collaborators in Bangladesh to end impunity. Even so, there was no stable 
democracy until 1991 to reflect the societal demand. Further to that, the development of 
politics of Islamist parties assisted the culture of impunity.  
5.4 Analysis of interview data: Culture of Impunity 
           The interview data concerning the culture of impunity in Bangladesh provided a 
contextual picture. In explaining the nature of impunity in the Bangladeshi situation, the 
participants confirmed that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross violation 
of human rights were committed during the liberation war of 1971 but no effective tribunals 
were established until 2010.605 In the case of Mujahid, the ICT-BD addressed the issue of 
impunity in the following way: 
The perpetrators of the crimes could not be brought to book, and this left a deep 
scratch on the country's political awareness and the whole nation. The impunity they 
enjoyed held back political stability, saw the rise of militancy, and destroyed the 
nation's Constitution.606 
            One of the ICT-BD judges interviewed opined that, the extent and magnitude of the 
atrocities committed by Pakistani soldiers were so grave that Dhaka based US diplomats sent 
a telegram signed by 20 of them led by the head of the Mission Mr. Archer Blood, informing 
the US government of the grave nature of atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and their 
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local collaborators.607 In explaining the reason behind the atrocities in Bangladesh, a particular 
interviewee stated that in 1971, the people of Bangladesh wanted freedom from West Pakistan 
but the pro-Pakistan supporters in Bangladesh, mostly the supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami did 
not agree with them and they committed mass crimes for ideological reasons.608 This particular 
politician further commented that the murder, arson, looting and rape were committed during 
1971 not for personal interest but for ideological interest.609 He explained that it is the obligation 
of the Bangladeshi government to serve justice to the victims of 1971.610 
              In explaining the reasons for impunity, a senior BNP politician stated that, ‘political 
instability is the main reason and some government wanted to establish a tribunal and some 
government did not want'.611 A particular judge who took part in the interview stated that, ‘Well, 
it took a very long time, for the trial to begin, my personal view is the trial should have been 
started earlier’.612 He reaffirmed that ‘the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujib, 
wished to see the trial started as early as 1975 and that is why he initiated and introduced his 
bill which became the Act of 1973 in the year 1973, and it was unanimously passed by the 
parliament'.613 This particular interviewee stated that after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman in 1975, people who came to power were pro-Pakistani and they abstained from the 
idea of trying the perpetrators of the offences during the Liberation War.614 Thus, the culture 
of impunity had begun in the situation of Bangladesh.  
             A judge, who took part in the interview, stated that, ‘the perpetrators of the 1971 have 












trial could not take place earlier’.615 He also explained that, ‘Awami League which is in power 
now was in power during the intervening period from 1996-2001 but for a very short period of 
5 years, they could not organize the thing, they lost again and after that they came to power 
in 2009’.616 He said it was one of AL parties election manifestos that they would try the 
perpetrators of 1971 for humanitarian crimes.617 The trial of war criminals was a major 
commitment that AL made in its 2008 election manifesto and the overwhelming victory that 
they received mandated them to proceed with the commitment.618 
              Most of the interviewees mentioned that the ‘Tri-Partite Agreement’ (also known as 
Delhi Agreement, 1974) between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh in 1974 contributed to the 
culture of impunity in the Bangladeshi situation.619 Under this agreement, 195 Pakistanis listed 
as war criminals were released to Pakistan.620 It had a great impact on the overall prosecution 
of the perpetrators of 1971.621 Although Pakistan promised to prosecute 195 alleged war 
criminals, they failed to maintain that promise.622 It appeared from a particular judgment that 
the Bangladeshi government was under diplomatic pressure to release the 195 war 
criminals.623  
           N. Jayapalan, in his book, sums up the issue in the following way: 
……India left no stone unturned for helping Bangladesh to get recognition from other 
countries and its due place in the United Nations. India gave full support to the August 
9, 1972 application made by Bangladesh for getting the membership of the United 
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direction. In February 1974, Pakistan gave recognition to Bangladesh and it was 
followed by the accord of recognition by China. This development cleared the way for 
Bangladesh's entry into the United Nations. In the context of Indo-Pak-Bangladesh 
relations, the April 1974 tripartite talks between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh 
produced an important agreement leading to the repatriation of 195 Pakistani POWs 
who were still being detained in India because of Bangladesh’s earlier decision to try 
them on charges of genocide and war crimes.624 
Article 13 of the Tripartite Agreement states that, ‘there was universal consensus that 
persons charged with such crimes as the 195 Pakistani prisoners of war should be held to 
account and subjected to the due process of law’.625 On the other hand, Article 15 of the 
agreement states that, ‘having regard to the appeal of the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the 
people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the mistakes of the past Government of 
Bangladesh had decided not to proceed with the trials as an act of clemency’.626 Here two 
things are important to note; firstly, Bangladesh agreed not to try the listed war criminals within 
their territory but Pakistan gave undertaking that those war criminals suspects will be 
prosecuted in Pakistan; secondly, ‘forgiveness or immunity to the persons committing offenses 
in breach of customary international law was disparaging to the existing law, i.e. the Act of 
1973 enacted to prosecute those offences’.627 
             In explaining the reasons for developing a culture of impunity, a particular participant 
mentioned that the prosecution attempt was stopped by the assassination of Bangabandhu 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman on 15 August 1975 and later, his colleagues were killed on 3 rd of 
November 1975.628 He further stated that following the assassination, a completely different 
government took over and they ceased to administer the law of 1973.629 This particular 
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interviewee also mentioned that a new government allowed the Pro-Pakistani politicians to 
form a party and take part in politics.630 According to this interviewee, Army General Ziaur 
Rahman rehabilitated many people who were anti-liberation and his attitude was indifferent 
with regards to prosecuting the perpetrators of 1971.631 The interviewee also stated that, Ziaur 
Rahman had repealed the Collaborators Act, struck out secularism from the constitution and 
replaced it with religious provisions.632 He said that despite the political unwillingness, there 
was always a very high demand for justice from the victims of 1971 and their family 
members.633 However, due to the lack of free and fair elections held by the military rulers after 
1975, the true desire of the majority people of Bangladesh could not be reflected in the 
parliaments and also in the governments.634 A particular interviewee stated that the military 
governments were mostly busy with their vested priorities rather than the wishes of the 
people.635 
              One of the Jamaat-e-Islami politicians stated that the Bangladesh government 
attempted to establish a tribunal soon after the liberation war based on domestic criminal law, 
but due to lack of evidence during that time it was not possible to conduct trial.636 He said that 
the government offered a general amnesty to the perpetrators of 1971.637 However, the 
general amnesty was not applicable for the perpetrators who had committed crimes such as 
murder, rape and arson. He opined that a reconciliation process was conducted to establish 
peace rather that hatred and after 1975, the Collaborators Act was expressly repealed by the 













                A politician from AL party opined that Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, a BNP 
politician, was in power in Bangladesh and destroyed a lot of documents relating to the cases 
which were filed against him in 1972.639 This AL politician further stated about Mr Salauddin 
that, ‘he became the minister in Bangladesh and shared power with other convicted war 
criminals such as Mujahid, Nizami and others’.640 A prosecution lawyer stated that, ‘much 
evidence was officially destroyed by a government of anti-liberation war’.641 He reaffirmed that, 
‘the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman made the trial process difficult as 
there was political turmoil which made it less important to establish tribunal’.642  
              A particular interviewee stated that being very weak in international politics, 
Bangladesh could not establish any competent tribunal to try Pakistani war criminals soon 
after the liberation war, but Bangladesh did start prosecuting local collaborators.643 However, 
as mentioned earlier, after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the process of the 
prosecution was stopped and Ziaur Rahman freed all the detained people under the 
Collaborators order and in 1977 the law was repealed.644  
               A participant reaffirmed that, ‘in 1975 Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was assassinated and 
Jamaat-e-Islami was restored in politics by Ziaur Rahman, and many detained accused were 
released by  Ziaur Rahman’.645 He said under section 293 of the Bangladesh penal code, the 
prosecution could withdraw charges at any time and war crimes related cases were withdrawn 
under this section after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and as a 
result, there was no scope for revised tribunal or trial.646 He explained that, ‘before 2009, no 












and except for AL, political will was not strong enough to prosecute war criminals of 1971 for 
another government in power’.647 This particular interviewee further stated that that ‘countries 
like Turkey, Pakistan, and Middle Eastern countries reacted badly when the tribunal delivered 
judgments against the leaders of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami’.648 This was because, Jamaat-
e-Islami is an Islam based political party and they had good political connections with some of 
the Muslim countries like Turkey, Pakistan and other Middle Eastern countries. 
5.4.1 Reasons for establishing the ICT-BD 
             In relation to the question, ‘Why was ICT-BD only established recently?’ the 
participants have provided mixed answers. An AL politician stated that, ‘ in one-word tribunal 
has been established to end the culture of impunity and to serve justice to the victims of 1971 ’. 
This politician reiterated that, their party led the liberation war of 1971 and for this reason, it is 
their political, social, and ideological responsibility to prosecute the perpetrators of 1971.649 
            However, the politician of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami reacted differently. According 
to this particular politician, the ICT-BD was established solely for political gain by the AL 
party.650 This particular politician stated that most of the people prosecuted by the tribunal 
were influential opposition leaders who had significant influence over the general public.651 He 
also added that the AL party is a secular party and they are trying to divide the Islamic party 
in Bangladesh.652 For this reason, widespread protests were seen when the verdict of Delowar 
Hussain Sayeedi was delivered. According to him, the Tribunal is very selective when 
prosecuting the opposition leaders.653 The Tribunal was selective in a sense that it only tried 











were able to return to West Pakistan. The claim made by this particular interviewee that only 
opposition leaders were tried was not founded because people from various political and non-
political background were charged and tried. 
5.4.2 Problems due to the culture of Impunity 
            In explaining the problems of the culture of impunity, a judge stated that due to 
significant time lapse, a lot of issues were raised by the defence.654 Firstly, it was argued by 
the defence that the unexplained delay of 40 years created doubt in the fairness of the trial.655 
However, the prosecution has put forward the counter-argument that, ‘there is no limitation in 
bringing a criminal prosecution, particularly when it relates to ‘international crimes' committed 
in violation of customary international law’.656 Secondly, it was argued that the 1973 Act was 
purposefully amended to include ‘individual’ and ‘group of individuals’ and for this reason, the 
accused cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of the Act.657 Thirdly, it was argued that the 1973 
Act was enacted to prosecute the recognized 195 listed war criminals of Pakistan who were 
pardoned by ‘Tripartite Agreement of 1974’ and without prosecuting them, the auxiliary forces 
cannot be tried under the Act.658 However, the prosecution stated, ‘...that the “tripartite 
agreement” which was a mere “executive act” cannot hinder in bringing a prosecution under 
the Act of 1973 against “auxiliary force”, an “individual” or “group of individuals"…’.659 Further, 
it has raised issues linked to the intention of the parliament to enact the law. It appears from 
the judgment that the intention of the framers of the legislation was not only to prosecute the 
195 listed war criminals of the Pakistan armed force but also ‘any person' belonging to armed 
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to the Rome Statute and jurisprudence of ad hoc Tribunals are not adopted.661 These issues 
would not have emerged if the tribunal had been established soon after the atrocities were 
committed. 
                In explaining the problem of the culture of impunity, one of the prosecution lawyers 
stated that the victims had suffered an extended period of injustice.662 He also stated that due 
to impunity, ‘…so much fear was injected into the mind of these victims and witnesses’.663 
Another prosecution lawyer stated that due to impunity, they had to face a lot of obstacles 
such as systematic propaganda against the tribunal.664 He mentioned that a British-based 
lawyer was appointed to criticise the tribunal and also, a lobbying firm was appointed for the 
same purpose.665 
               A particular participant stated that, ‘my subjective opinion would be that because of 
time-lapse, there is a growing perception that they did not commit any offence and they 
claimed to not having guilty mind when they committed crimes’.666 Another participant stated 
that it would have been easier to prosecute actual perpetrators soon after the liberation war in 
1971 because the nation was united at that time, and no questions would have arose regarding 
the tribunal.667 A particular interviewee opined that, most of those who have been convicted 
and executed by the ICT-BD became the wealthiest people in the republic at the cost of who 
suffered during 1971.668 He narrated that, ‘people like Mir Qasim Ali669 and Salauddin Quadwer 
Chowdhury became the richest people in the country’ and if they were tried in 1971, then they 
would not have had this opportunity.670  
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             Another interviewee stated that due to the culture of impunity, the accused have 
integrated into the society and people have started accepting them, they became well known 
political figures and they did some good for people of Bangladesh to reposition themselves in 
the society.671 This particular participant further stated that, had the tribunal had been 
established under the ICT Act 1973 soon after the liberation war, then the problems of 
evidence could have been avoided and it would have been more comfortable for the people 
involved with the tribunal to do their job efficiently.672  
5.4.3 Role of ICT-BD ending the culture of Impunity 
                 In relation to the role of the ICT-BD in ICL, J4 stated that, ‘although it was very 
much delayed, the ICT-BD has taken a great step to end the culture of impunity’.673 He is of 
the opinion that the ICT-BD has put an end to the long-term culture of impunity, and it will 
definitely bring peace to the society in the long run.674 According to him, the judgments 
delivered by the tribunal will be considered as authentic documents to establish the truth.675 
Another participant, J1 stated that the ICT-BD is attempting to end the culture of impunity, 
serve justice and achieve peace.676 Furthermore, the establishment of the ICT-BD is 
remarkable at least to some extent, people will feel that there is no scope for impunity. As an 
institution, the ICT-BD is establishing the precedent that, ‘an offender will be punished today 
or tomorrow'.677 
                According to J2, ICT-BD is an example that will deter future crimes of a similar 
nature, and it will heal the pain of the victims for not getting justice for a long time.678 P6- ALP 
stated that, the ICT-BD has an important role in ICL in terms of enforcement ability by breaking 
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the culture of impunity and this will assist in developing a law-abiding society in Bangladesh.679 
The interviewee P3-JAPA is of the opinion that the ICT-BD has symbolic value in deterring 
crimes and stated that the principal purpose of establishing the Tribunal was to serve justice.680 
He further stated that along with prosecuting the perpetrators of 1971, the ICT-BD would 
provide psychological comfort to the victims and their family members at the same time.681  
However, there are opposing views such as that of DL2 who opined that, prosecution 
in the ICT-BD is creating divisions in the Bangladeshi society by accusing people after more 
than three decades since the crimes were committed.682 He also stated that the delivery of the 
judgment of  Maulana Sayeedi is an example that the ICT-BD has created social chaos where 
more than 100 people have died.683 Another defence lawyer DL1 opined that, ‘if the tribunals 
were established soon after the liberation war, there might not be outrage or dispute'.684 He 
said ‘after 45 years, it is really strange to bring accusation’.685 He thinks for the sake of the 
country’s development, amnesty could be appropriate in the best interest of the country.686 On 
the other hand, PL1 stated that, ‘to serve justice and to achieve the goals of transitional justice, 
prosecution is more appropriate at this moment’.687 However, he suggested other 
complementary mechanisms and in his own words, ‘there could be other mechanisms like the 
holocaust denial law’.688 The interviewee P3-JAPA opined that if justice is served through a 
flawed system, then the persons under the trial will have suffered a lot and those who are 
observing will have lost confidence in the justice process.689 According to him, like impunity 
 
 












itself, if the judge's neutrality is in question then, ‘it is a very dangerous sign for judicial 
culture’.690 So, along with the culture of impunity, it is equally important to uphold the rule of 
law and a proper system of due process. Despite having some limitations, the ICT-BD is at 
least breaking the culture of impunity for the atrocities committed during the country’s 
liberation war.  
5.4.4 Systematic criticisms of the ICT-BD  
              The interviewee  PL2 stated that along with their continuous development, they had 
to face many obstacles such as systematic propaganda against the tribunal, which contributed 
to the culture of Impunity.691 He also stated that, a London based barrister had been appointed 
to criticise the tribunal and a lobbying firm was also appointed solely to criticize the tribunal.692 
The entire defence team was trained in London at the firm of this London-based barrister.693 
They had the opportunity to observe War Crimes Tribunals from around the world.694 It is said 
that many applications made in connection to the ICT-BD were carefully drafted by the London 
based law firm and sent over to Bangladesh to support the defence team.695 A prosecution 
lawyer stated that, as a result of the work of this lobbying firm, a number of the Human Rights 
organizations were misguided by the appointed lobby firm which supported the defence.696 
According to him, those human rights organizations were used in order to support the people 
who had committed genocide in Bangladesh.697 Thus, it can be observed that the general 
criticisms of TJ as discussed in Chapter 3 are reflective here because, Human Rights 
organisations assessed the credibility of the ICT-BD’s due process aspect from a western 












                According to a prosecution lawyer, one of the accused who was the treasurer of the 
Jamaat-e-Islami party, officially hired a lobbying firm and spent 25 million US dollars to criticize 
the ICT-BD at various international governmental and non-governmental organizations.698 
                 Most of the perpetrators were rich, which made it difficult but not impossible to prove 
their guilt.699 They tried to misguide justice in many ways with their money; they even appointed 
a lobbying firm to assist them internationally, which was well documented.700 In brief, the 
perpetrators used all the ways possible to misguide the justice system.701 
To summarise the above, it can be said based on the interview data that, political 
instability was the main reason for the impunity in the Bangladeshi context of transitional 
justice. In particular, the assassination of Prime Minister Shiekh Mujibur Rahman stopped the 
trial process, and a subsequent undemocratic military government was not willing to prosecute 
the perpetrators of 1971. Due to the long period of impunity, the perpetrators had enjoyed a 
free life. The majority of interviewees think that the ICT-BD was established to end the long 
period of impunity. In the Bangladeshi context, due to the long period of impunity, the ICT-BD 
had to face systematic criticism. Some interviewees believe that the accused people, who 
were very financially solvent, hired lobbyist firms to criticise the tribunal. Due to a substantial 
period of delay, the victims of atrocities suffered a lot due to not getting justice. The section 
below discusses the nature of delayed justice in Bangladesh. 
5.5 An analysis of interview data: ICT-BD and Delayed Justice 
                The ICT-BD has been prosecuting crimes from more than 40 years ago since 2010, 








past three decades, the perpetrators have enjoyed impunity and integrated into the society 
and politics of Bangladesh.   
                For the victims of the mass atrocities who are seeking justice, the time taken for 
investigating the crimes is an essential factor in evaluating how victims experience justice. If 
victims have to wait for a long time to seek justice, they become frustrated, this lowers their 
expectation of justice and renders the delayed prosecution unworthy. Former British Prime 
Minister, William Gladstone, stated that 'justice delayed is justice denied'.702 Delay is one of 
the key challenges with prosecuting international crimes and in many situations like 
Bangladesh, the prosecution and the investigation of mass atrocities take place decades after 
the commission of the crimes.703  According to Whiting, delayed prosecution, ‘…can diminish 
the deterrent value of such prosecutions, undermine the quality of the evidence in the case, 
allow perpetrators to continue living in impunity (and continue committing crimes) ’.704 
According to him, due to the delayed prosecution, victims become ‘discouraged and 
marginalized’ and they lose confidence in the judicial system.705 However, in some cases, 
delayed prosecution of international crimes may give rise to fresh evidence, and truth. In the 
case of Radovan Karažić, the delay was beneficial and detrimental; beneficial in the sense 
that better evidence became crystallized and detrimental in the sense that victims had become 
demotivated due to the long delay.706 According to Bergsmo, in a post-conflict situation, delays 
occur due to the lack of capacity to investigate crime as the society is still recovering from 
traumatic memories. Authorities have to prioritize reconstructing the fragile society, law and 
order, and political environment.707  
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If there is a long delay in prosecuting the perpetrators of mass atrocities, it can increase 
the pain and suffering of the victims and their family members.708 The victims and their family 
members feel betrayed by the justice system when they see the perpetrators are walking 
freely. As part of the healing process, it is important that victims and survivors can feel that 
justice been done; otherwise, it will be difficult to move on.709 
                  There are various factors behind the delay in investigating crimes in the transitional 
justice situation. The notable factors are the volatile political environment, lack of judicial 
capacity, diplomatic pressure etc. Post-war societies are keen to focus on establishing peace, 
rebuilding infrastructure and economy, law and order rather than focusing on the prosecution 
of atrocities during a society's transition. Below, the researcher discusses the factors behind 
the delays in investigating the crimes committed in Bangladesh in 1971.  
               A stable political environment is necessary for investigating a post-war society. In 
the particular situation of Bangladesh, the entire country's infrastructure was broken down, 
and there was no functioning law and order. It was the first task of the new authority to end 
the hostilities. Along with other duties, the new government in January 1972 declared that 
judicial action would be taken against the perpetrators of 1971 and invited the citizens of 
Bangladesh to end hostilities. Thus, in the Bangladeshi situation, the first step was to end the 
hostility and violence so that law and order can take shape. Also, the authority promised to 
investigate the crimes. 
                As a newly independent country, it was crucial for Bangladesh to get recognition 
from other countries and build diplomatic relationships with them. One of the politicians that 
was interviewed stated that Bangladesh was able to get the membership of the United Nations 
on a condition that Bangladesh will not prosecute the suspected war criminals of the Pakistani 
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army.710 Initially, Bangladesh was denied UN membership on two occasions, in 1972 and 1973 
due to objection from China who provided veto on behalf of Pakistan.711 It appeared from the 
Recommendation to the General Assembly regarding membership that, ‘During the period 
under review all applications for admission have obtained the Council’s recommendation with 
the only exception of the application of Bangladesh’ which failed to obtain it upon its initial 
consideration but was recommended upon reconsideration’.712 Finally, Bangladesh was able 
to get the membership of the UN on 17 September 1974 after a controversial agreement was 
made among India, Pakistan and Bangladesh that the suspected war criminals from Pakistan 
will be released to Pakistan.  
               A particular politician the researcher interviewed stated that, in 2010, the ICT-BD 
was established primarily to prosecute the auxiliary forces of the West Pakistani Army that 
committed crimes in the Bangladeshi territory during the liberation war of Bangladesh in 
1971.713 He said that the West Pakistani war criminals were repatriated by the government 
with the condition that they will prosecute the war criminals in West Pakistan, and, the 
Hamdoor Rahman Commission set up by West Pakistan also recognized that the accused 
were indeed war criminal suspects.714 He added that Pakistan never fulfilled their promise to 
prosecute those war criminals, which was publicly made to take back the prisoners of war 
(POW).715 According to this particular politician, in the situation of Bangladesh, the main 
reason of delay is political turmoil and the assassination of President Shiekh Mujibur Rahman 
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               Another politician stated that, due to delay and political turmoil in Bangladesh, the 
War Criminals or their associates assumed power in the government and over the course of 
time, they had destroyed a lot of significant evidence and documents relating to genocide or 
gross violation of human rights.717 He mentioned the case of Salauddin Quader Chowdhury718 
and stated that while he was in power, he destroyed a lot of documents relating to the cases 
which were filed against him in 1972.719 He further mentioned that Salauddin Quader 
Chowdhury became a minister in Bangladesh and shared power with other convicted war 
criminals such as Mujahid, Nizami and others.720 So, it appears from the interview data that 
there are allegations of destroying many official evidence which might have contributed to the 
delayed prosecution. It is important to note that these allegations have neither been proven 
nor disproved by any independent body. This particular politician further stated that due to 
significant delays, the Jamaat-e-Islami had become a rich political party in Bangladesh.721 He 
also said that, ‘…they got funding from {the} Middle East and also they have conducted 
business in Bangladesh with the money they looted in 1971’.722 According to him, they 
accumulated billions of dollars over time being in an advantageous position as they shared 
government power in Bangladesh.723 
Another politician stated that there were no similar tribunals like ICT-BD soon after the 
liberation war, but there were laws under which many people were accused and tried at that 
time.724 According to him, a man called Chikon Ali had been given the death penalty under the 
Bangladesh Collaborators (Special Tribunal) Order 1972.725 He further stated that around 














this particular politician, most importantly, the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman made the trial process difficult as there was a lot of political turmoil which made it 
less important to establish a tribunal.727  
                A particular Judge stated that, ‘after the assassination of B B Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman, process of the prosecution was stopped and Ziaur Rahman728 freed all the detained 
people under the Collaborators order and in 1977 the law was repealed ’.729 Thus, the 
willingness of the authorities is an important factor, in the absence of which delay may occur 
in the prosecution of crimes in a post-conflict situation. Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of the 
assassinated president and the leader of the AL party, stated in the election manifesto of 2008 
that if they win the election, they will investigate the crimes of 1971.730 Subsequently, her party 
won the election and formed the government. Thus, having a mandate from the people of 
Bangladesh, the ICT-BD was established in March 2010.  
                In explaining the post-war situation of Bangladesh, a particular politician said that 
the entire country was destroyed by the war, the infrastructure was broken and it was a priority 
for the government to rehabilitate rape victims, war children, establish police and military 
service and rebuild the infrastructure.731 According to him, ‘some hostile countries created a 
man-made famine in Bangladesh after the liberation war, and [the] newly born Bangladesh 
had to face all the challenges’.732 He also said, ‘many accused were working in Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia and London to regain a united Pakistan and their legacies are manipulating the media 
like BBC and Al-Jazeera’. A judge of the tribunal stated that ‘…being very weak in international 
politics, Bangladesh could not establish any competent tribunal to try Pakistani war criminals 
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of the participants stated that there were some practical difficulties for the Bangladeshi 
authority to carry out a thorough investigation of the crimes committed during the country’s 
liberation war because the authorities had to prioritize rebuilding the society, economy,  
infrastructure, law and order.  
 5.5.1 Effects of delayed prosecution 
             Cohen explained, ‘three inter-related problems as to the way the passage of time 
affects evidence and the ability to prove a case beyond a reasonable doubt’.734 Firstly, Cohen 
considers establishing and documenting the identity of the accused; secondly, he considers 
the, ‘…problems of collective memory, as opposed to individuals’ personal experience, that 
may taint the way witnesses describe what they saw and experienced’735; thirdly, he considers 
‘…the inter-relation of trauma and the passage of time on memory’.736  
               A politician the researcher interviewed stated that, some convicts before the ICT-BD 
were in government power in Bangladesh after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, 
they even became ministers and for this reason, a lot of official documents were destroyed by 
them.737 The properties they looted during the atrocities in 1971 were illegally earned 
property.738 A few people left the country, a few people were rehabilitated into politics and over 
time, their statutes rose in the Bangladeshi society and they became economically strong, 
these issues created some problems due to time lapses.739 
            A defence lawyer while sharing his experience, stated that transitional justice normally 
applied immediately after an event, he witnessed summary executions of a lot of anti-liberation 
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activists by the rebels, and as they were against the independence of Bangladesh, their 
relatives did not disagree with the execution.740  
             A prosecution lawyer that was interviewed, stated that due to time lapses, collecting 
fresh evidence, investigation and admitting evidence becomes difficult and in the Bangladeshi 
situation, the ICT-BD had to deal with the time lapse issues in relation to admissibility of 
evidence and collecting witnesses.741 The ICT-BD is a pioneer of serving delayed justice and 
Bergsmo said, ‘there may in fact be an increase in such prosecutions in the future as the 
pursuit of individual accountability for such crimes becomes a norm, rather than an exception, 
with societies increasingly willing and able to investigate atrocities perpetrated in their past’.742  
              In explaining the problem of delay, a particular politician of Jamaat-e-Islami stated 
that, ‘because of time lapse, wrong perception was developed by the AL party and witnesses 
are being manipulated by the perception that developed over time and could not provide an 
accurate description of the events'.743 He also stated that, ‘the victims of the crimes were also 
living with misleading perception for a long-time’.744 He further mentioned that, ‘the accused 
have been living peacefully for a long time and they became normal citizens of the country, 
contributing towards the country’s economy’.745 
             According to Cohen, these problems are not uncommon to long-delayed prosecutions 
and they may arise as normal evidentiary issues in many trials.746 This author further 
mentioned that in a delayed prosecution, a defence lawyer's position would be that, since 
there is a long delay between the actual time of the commission of the crimes and the trial 
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             A particular prosecution lawyer stated that, due to significant time lapses, many 
victims were unwilling to describe crimes such as rape, due to the social stigma associated 
with the crime.748 Cohen observed that due to the delay, perpetrators often used falsification 
or substitution of identity documents which make it difficult for the witnesses to identify the 
perpetrators.749 He mentioned the case of John Demjanjuk [aka Ivan]750 and explained that 
whereas Israel identified him as ‘Ivan the terrible’, Demjanjuk’s defence argued that he was 
inaccurately identified as Ivan and his conviction of death sentence was overturned based on 
new evidence.751       
            In the case of Quader Molla,752 the defence raised similar arguments as that of 
Dejanjuk that, Abdul Quader Molla is not the ‘butcher of Mirpur’ and there were many issues 
in the identification of the accused by the witnesses.753 It is observed in the judgment that, 
‘…therefore, identification of accused on dock 40/41 years after she had seen the said 
‘Bangalee person’ at the crime site cannot be relied upon at all as it is not even possible to 
keep one’s face memorized particularly for a traumatized wife of victim’.754 It is also mentioned 
in the judgment that: 
Like all elements of a crime, the identification of the accused must be proved by the 
Prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. In assessing identification evidence, it is to 
be taken into account a number of relevant factors, including the circumstances in 
which each witness claimed to have observed the accused; the length of the 
observation; the familiarity of the witness with the accused prior to the identification; 
and the description given by the witness of his or her identification of the accused. But 
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familiar as to the identity of the accused even since prior to the alleged event. None of 
these two witnesses claim so.755 
             In explaining the effect of delay in defining crimes, a Judge that was interviewed stated 
that due to time lapses, prescribing crimes were difficult and document-related issues were 
raised.756 He further stated that, ‘it was difficult to establish the mental elements of crimes 
because of significant time lapse’.757 He said the definition of genocide has been broadened 
to cover the political group.758 According to him, because of time lapse, witnesses could not 
explain appropriately and they had to rely on additional corroborative documents to give 
weight.759 He said that, they had to rely on newspaper articles, authoritative books and articles 
before giving weight.760 He further observed that victims of the crimes suffered mentally for a 
long time due to not getting justice and they became emotional during the trial.761 He explained 
that because of the time lapse, there was a growing perception that the accused persons did 
not commit any of the offenses and the accused persons during trial claimed not having a 
guilty mind when they committed crimes.762 This particular judge, however said that, based on 
available evidence, they were found guilty and punishment was given.763 According to him, the 
verdicts of the ICT-BDT are important because, they show that the length of delay does not 
matter and that justice had been served.764 
                  A defence lawyer the researcher interviewed stated that delay was not a problem 
for him as a defence lawyer, but it might have been a problem for the prosecution team.765 
According to him, primarily, the delay was beneficial to the defence team.766 He said that they 
 
 













mainly cross-examined the witnesses and observed from his subjective point of view that 
allegations were not proved due to delay.767  
                  According to a prosecution lawyer, it would be less challenging to establish crimes 
by way of evidence if there was no significant delay like 45/56 years.768 He also explained that 
the amount of time and labour they invested could be much lesser than that which they 
invested for the ICT-BD.769 He also added that, ‘…after the liberation war, witnesses’ memories 
were fresh but due to delay many witnesses have died, many witnesses’ memories faded and 
prosecution had to deal with these issues’.770 
            A defence lawyer stated that the accused had established their position in the country 
due to significant time lapse and people had started accepting them, they had become well 
known political figures and they did few good things for the people of Bangladesh.771 According 
to him, due to the delay people had started seeing the accused persons in a different light as 
the years passed, it would have been logical to prosecute them in 1971 and no questions 
would have been asked. The subsection below analysed how delay may contribute to the 
prolonged suffering of the victims of 1971. 
5.5.2 Suffering of victim and witnesses 
              In addition to the above analysis of the effects of delay, the significant time lapse also 
contributed to the prolonged suffering of the victims and the affected community. A judge that 
the researcher interviewed opined that due to delay, ‘…definitely the victims suffered mentally 
as they were denied justice for a long time’.772 He further stated that, ‘perpetrators got free life 










put Bangladeshi flag[s] in their cars.773 According to him, due to significant delays, ‘some 
people left the country, some people were rehabilitated into politics and over time, they 
became strong in the Bangladeshi society, they became economically strong and these issues 
created some problems during trial’.774 This particular Judge also said that, ‘the victims waited 
too long for justice and many victims have died too, and their successors are not even aware 
of the historic injustice suffered by their predecessors’.775 
             A prosecution lawyer stated that, ‘due to time lapses so much fear was injected into 
the mind of these victims and witnesses’.776 He added that, ‘…the first thing they had to fight 
was fear; they had to ensure them, make them believe into the tribunal that it will work and 
only then they came and gave their testimonies'.777 He explained that, after five or six 
executions of the sentences, the witnesses and the victims started to believe tribunal’s 
capacity.778 According to him, the accused persons before the ICT-BD became so much 
embedded into the society of the rural villages that the victims are still afraid.779  
           The ICT-BD is seeking delayed justice for the victims of 1971. The delayed prosecution 
has a particular feature because victims have already suffered injustice seeing the 
perpetrators at large. As a result, long denial of justice may be a factor in assessing the 
atrocities adopting a flexible approach in terms of procedural rules. However, a delay cannot 
compromise the rights of the accused to have a fair and impartial hearing. Also, in cases of 
delayed justice like Bangladesh, prosecution alone may not serve proper justice to the victims. 
As a result, other forms of transitional justice mechanism may supplement the criminal 
prosecution. The majority of the interviewees opined that in the particular context of 











The section below has discussed the necessity of reparation in the particular context of 
Bangladesh, where the ICT-BD is seeking delayed justice. 
5.6 Reparation as a supplement to criminal prosecution  
              Reparation is an essential aspect of the transitional justice mechanism and in limited 
circumstances, providing reparation to the victims can rehabilitate them and allow them to 
recover from historical trauma (see more details at 3.3.2). According to Gillard, ‘…reparation 
is an important part of enforcement and can play a significant role in deterring future 
violations.780 It may not be possible to serve complete justice in the area of transitional justice; 
instead; it is possible to serve some form of justice. In a particular situation like Bangladesh, 
where crimes were committed decades ago, prosecution alone may not serve justice. The 
victim’s right to prosecution includes the right to reparation in some circumstances.  
Victims are identified as those who have directly or indirectly suffered from the gross 
violation of human rights or war crimes; their family members are included too. For example, 
if a father from a family perishes due to the mass atrocities committed by the convicted 
individual, then his immediate family members and dependents will be considered as victims. 
The governing Act of the ICT-BD defined a victim as, ‘…a person who has suffered harm as 
a result of the commission of the crimes under section 3 (2) of the International Crimes 
(Tribunal) Act, 1973’.781 This definition, however, did not include any organisations as victims.   
            In the current regime of ICL, some form of reparatory justice became crucial to 
complement the criminal prosecution. According to Teitel, transitional reparatory justice 
negotiates individual and collective liability and assists to shape the political identity of the 
liberalizing state.782  
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5.7 International Legal position on Reparation 
            The ICC in 1998, created a comprehensive legal provision to provide reparation to the 
victims of International Crimes. Under Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute, the court has been 
given the power to determine the extent of damage and loss for reparation, compensation and 
rehabilitation.783 Article 75(2) is significant because it has made it possible for the court to 
make an order against the convicted person and made reference to the trust fund under Article 
79 of the Rome Statute.784 Thus, the Rome Statute encouraged the establishment of a trust 
fund under Article 79 out of which reparations should be provided to the victims.785 However, 
the reparation mechanism of the ICC is a, ‘…contentious matter in politics and legal terms’.786 
According to the Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) of ICC, principles of reparation should address 
relevant, ‘…philosophical questions related to the right of victims of international crimes to 
reparations, such as addressing the relationship between reparations and reconciliation’.787  
            The representation made the ICTJ mention three recommendations for the ICC in 
relation to the decision on reparations to victims. Firstly, it is submitted that the ICC should 
determine the class of victims who would be able to qualify for reparation.788 Secondly, the 
ICC should make it accessible for the victims to claim reparation following an effective 
procedure.789 Thirdly, the decision should support the right of victims through appropriate 
transitional justice mechanisms.790 In relation to reparation on an individual basis, ICTJ 
submits that the direct victims of the crimes, including that victims of sexual violence should 
be considered first.791  
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            Since there is a similarity between ICT-BD and ECCC in terms of significant delay, this 
section analysed how the ECCC dealt with a reparation programme to complement criminal 
prosecutions. The original version of the ECCC’s Internal Rules had ambiguous provisions of 
reparation and if the accused person had no assets, the ECCC Chamber could not provide 
any alternative remedy.792 Accordingly, the first case before the ECCC (Case 001) stated that, 
apologies or expressions of remorse from the accused were, ‘the only tangible means by 
which [the accused] could acknowledge his responsibility and the collective suffering of 
victims'.793 
               Rule 23(1) of the Internal Rules of the ECCC, was introduced by an amendment to 
assist the Civil Party participation at trial. The aim was to focus on the needs of the victims 
and their participation at trials. Due to the amendment in the Internal rules, civil parties are 
now able to participate in the cases individually and from the pre-trial to the trial and further 
stages, ‘…they comprise a single, consolidated group, whose interests are represented by 
one Cambodian and one international Civil Party Lead Co-Lawyer supported by the Civil Party 
Lawyers’.794 
                  A notable aspect of the Cambodian tribunal is that in some cases, the surviving 
victims were able to become parties in the cases concerned against the former Khmer Rouge 
officials.795 The surviving victims who were able to become parties in the criminal trials are 
considered as civil parties in criminal prosecution. The role of these civil parties in criminal 
cases is to assist the prosecution and instigate reparation claim.796 These participating victims 
are known as civil parties, and they assist the prosecution and may claim for reparations. 
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However, the ECCC's order of reparation is limited to ‘collective and moral' reparations only, 
and there is no scope for individual financial compensation.797 
5.8 Legal position of ICT-BD on Reparation 
           The ICT-BD has no clear legal provisions recognising reparation or compensation for 
the victims or the affected community. Section 20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 is clear in expressing 
the retributive nature of justice.  A judge the researcher interviewed stated that, one of the 
limitations of the ICT-BD is that there is no provision for providing reparation to the victims.798 
However, subsequent legislation may be implemented to deal with this issue.799 Section 53 of 
the Penal Code 1860 of Bangladesh provides that, as a least punishment, an offender may 
be fined and his property may be forfeited.800 However, there is very little application of this 
provision even under the ordinary criminal justice system of Bangladesh. 
There are other international legal provisions which are applicable in Bangladesh, 
relying on which reparation may be considered as an effective remedy for the victims. Firstly, 
under Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, everyone has the right to have 
an effective remedy. Secondly, Article 2(3)(a) of the ICCPR 1966 provides that any person 
whose rights are violated shall have an effective remedy.801 However, in the case of Syed Md. 
Qaiser, the prosecutor claimed reparation for the victims of sexual violence, but the Tribunal 
rejected the prosecution’s argument on three specific grounds. Firstly, the Tribunal stated that 
RoP of the Tribunal is a mere procedural law and not substantive law.802 Secondly, the 
Tribunal stated that the RoP cannot override the substantive law of the ICT-BD. Thirdly, the 
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ICT Act 1973 did not make any reference to reparation.803 Also, the Court of Appeal of 
Bangladesh in the case of Quader Molla made reference to Article 8 of the UDHR and Article 
2(3) of the ICCPR and provided an indication to provide effective remedies to the victims.804 
The researcher is of the opinion that due the local judicial culture of Bangladesh, 
reparation has not developed as a common remedy for the victims of crime. Bangladesh does 
not have sufficient resources, and this may be a factor for not considering reparation as an 
effective remedy, at least for the victims of rape. The section below attempted to analyse the 
empirical data in relation to a reparation mechanism to complement the criminal prosecution. 
5.9 An analysis of interview data: Reparation  
                 During the interview, a question was asked to a particular judge whether 
prosecution is enough to serve justice for the atrocities committed in 1971. The judge opined 
that, prosecution is not enough to serve optimum justice.805 According to him, there should be 
other supplementary measures to complement the trial process.806 This particular judge further 
stated that, ‘…reparation from the property of the [convicted] accused could be an effective 
way to rehabilitate the victims of the crimes or relatives/family members of the victim’.  807 He 
also suggested that, ‘…government should legislate law for acquiring the property of the 
perpetrators as they looted property during the 1971 war and these properties can form the 
foundation of providing reparation to the victims or their family members'.808 This aspect of the 
judge’s observation is important to analyze that some of the accused before the ICT-BD 
accumulated properties during the liberation war in 1971. The accused had looted the 
unattended properties of the civilians who had to flee the country and seek refuge in India. 
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Evidence suggests that the Hindu809 civilian population, were the prime targets of the 
perpetrators in 1971. Due to their religious identity, they were categorically labeled as pro-
liberation and pro-Indian. Their lands, shops, houses and other properties belonging to them 
were declared as ‘Gonimoter Mal’, a term used to express the acquisition of property during 
the war under Islamic law. So, it would be unjust to allow the accused persons and their 
successors to possess the properties gained by the accused during the 1971 liberation war. 
             The ICC has formed a Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) for the purpose of providing 
reparations to the victims. Similarly, some interviewees are of the opinion that the ICT-BD 
could amend its Rule of Procedure for the purpose of enabling the judges to pass appropriate 
order collecting resources from the convicted individuals and redistributing the resources 
through the trust fund. However, the problem that arises here would be to evaluate the 
properties going back to 45 years from present time. For this reason, the politicians who took 
part in the interview did not show an adequate interest in developing any reparation 
programme.  
              A particular defense lawyer opined that, instead of criminal prosecutions, there could 
be restorative forms of justice including providing reparation to the victims.810 He said, ‘…there 
could be a different way to identify the perpetrators and serve justice to the actual victims by 
way of reparation and amnesty'. 811  
               A particular prosecution lawyer stated that it is not possible for the ICT-BD to achieve 
all of the goals of transitional justice.812 In his opinion, the ICT-BD is mainly focusing on 
prosecution and making people accountable for their crimes to end the culture of impunity.  813   
 
 






             According to him, ‘…the only thing missing currently is providing reparation to the 
victims. 814 Another judge on the same issue stated that, this was one of the areas where the 
ICT-BD could not be successful in relation to the reparation of the victims because the Act is 
not comprehensive on this question.815 This particular judge further stated that: 
…we believe that like the victim of any other offence, the victims of the offences of the 
1971 and those victims who were killed, their dependents should be compensated and 
that compensation should not be only symbolic it should be real it should be financial 
and it should [be] sufficient to repair the loss they have suffered. There are several 
reasons, most of the people that have been punished under this Act have really built 
billions, millions they are very rich and the money they accumulated are all ill-gotten. 
They became rich in 1971 because they looted.816  
            It appears from the above quotation that the judge thought that it is necessary to 
provide reparation to the victims so that prosecution can be complemented. In particular, the 
judge referred to the fact that some of the accused have acquired properties from their 
involvement with the atrocities in 1971. However, due to lack of legal mechanisms, the judges 
of the ICT-BD were not able to give any orders to provide reparations to the victims of 1971 
or their family members. 
5.9.1 Reason for not providing reparation to the victims of ICT-BD 
             Why the ICT-BD judges could not come up successful plan to develop the area of 
reparation is an important question. One obvious answer to this question is that in Bangladesh, 
there is no legal mechanism to deal with this issue. Secondly, there was no clear policy about 
assessing reparations for the victims. Thirdly, it was the priority of the Tribunal to deliver 







             The policymakers of Bangladesh were also unwilling to proceed with implementing 
any legislation fearing a floodgate of potential claims. 
            There is a growing trend that victims of violations of human rights are entitled to seek 
compensation. However, there are many other factors to consider before attempting to 
instigate any reparation mechanism. A particular politician that was interviewed stated that, 
there was speculation in the policymaking level that introducing any reparation would give rise 
to criticism.817 Further, he mentioned that the particular social structure in Bangladesh is such 
that allegations of corruption would be made against the government in regards to the Trust 
funds of victims.818 He further stated that in a situation like in Bangladesh, the actual trial 
process of the ICT-BD would be affected if focus is given to the reparation issue.819 
               The need for reparation is a significant issue to be considered as some the alleged 
perpetrators or the accused have died during the trial. If there is no system of providing 
reparation, there will be a gap of justice and in this way, impunity will infinitely exist in some 
circumstances.  
5.9.2 Lack of legal provision to deal with reparation 
               A judge in replying to the question relating to reparation stated that, some of the 
accused before the ICT-BD were financially resourceful and it would be appropriate to enable 
the tribunal to order seizing their properties and build up a reparation fund.820 During the 
interview, the judge opined that, ‘…there is a demand and I think the demand is quite justifiable 
that their ill gotten money should be confiscated by the government under the law, by making 
law and then distribute it to the victims of 1971’. 821 He also stated that legislating any such law 









constitution because there is a special provision in the constitution of Bangladesh giving 
protection to the ICT Act 1973.822 According to him, legislation to allow the government to 
enable them to confiscate the wealth of the convicted individual may not be declared ultra 
vires to the constitution and that as a democratic country, the demand of the people should 
be reflected thought the Act of the parliament.   
               Another judge of the ICT-BD stated that during his time at the ICT-BD, the judges 
discussed about the provision of reparation because there is no provision in the governing Act 
of the ICT-BD.823 This particular judge opined that they could not develop any provisions to 
provide reparation to the victims due to legal technicality issues.824 This particular judge opined 
that, reparation could be a supplementary form of justice which could extend the aim of 
prosecution.825 
               Another prosecution lawyer stated that due to the lack of adequate legal provision, 
it was not possible to provide reparations to the victims of 1971.826 He further stated that the 
RoP included a provision of victim protection, and the government is responsible for ensuring 
victim protection.827 However, this particular provision did not say anything about providing 
reparations to the victims. For this reason, although the Prosecution raised the issue of 
providing reparations in several cases, the ICT-BD did not directly mention about providing 
reparation. 828  
              Another politician stated that a lot of the accused are now elderly, and many of the 












to this particular politician, reparation could be useful to complement justice in limited 
circumstances where the perpetrators have died during the trial process.830  
5.9.3 Economic and Political consideration  
               The establishment of a reparation programme may not be an issue for the more 
resourceful and developed countries, but it may be an issue for a developing country like 
Bangladesh. It could be one of the policy reasons that due to financial aspects involved with 
the reparation mechanism, there is no adequate legal provision to provide compensation to 
the victims of 1971. Many states are reluctant to introduce reparation for the victims fearing 
that there may be a floodgate of claims for the historic violations.831 
                 A particular prosecution lawyer stated that, ‘…providing reparations are not at the 
hand of the Tribunal, rather, it is up to the Parliament to legislate new law in this regard’.  832 
So, it appears that lawmakers in Bangladesh have a duty to implement the law in relation to 
providing reparation to the victims of 1971.  
                  A particular politician of the Bangladeshi Jamaat-e-Islami party, stated that 
providing reparations to the victims is the matter of the policymaker.833 He said reparation is 
important to deal with transitional justice mechanism especially when trials are conducted after 
so many years have passed and many perpetrators had already passed away, but for this 
mechanism, a huge resource is necessary which cannot be afforded personally.834 According 
to him, this reparation liability ultimately lies with Pakistan, the actual cause of the suffering 
and loss and in a position to provide reparation.835 He further elaborated that in relation to 











He said historically, West Pakistan (now Pakistan) is responsible for the sufferings of the 1971 
victims in Bangladesh.837 According to him, an individual accused should not bear the burden 
of providing reparation.838 
                Although the international criminal responsibility of individuals for international 
crimes is now well-established, reparation to victims has not been fully developed yet.839 The 
main problem of the reparation programme in the Bangladeshi situation is bearing the costs 
of the reparation mechanism. Since the ICT-BD is trying local collaborators that of 
Bangladeshi origin, the majority of the interviewees recommended the creation of appropriate 
legislation so that the properties of the convicted perpetrators can form a trust fund out of 
which in exceptional circumstances, reparation can be provided.   
             A politician of AL stated that the ICT-BD has limitations in regard to giving reparations 
to the victims and there should be a supplementary legal mechanism to deal with this issue.840 
He stated that the primary purpose of transitional justice is to bring back peace in society 
through justice. He also opined that without justice, peace could never be achieved.841 
According to him, if the prosecution cannot serve justice due to the natural death of the 
perpetrators, then reparation could be an essential element for the victims of the atrocities of 
1971.842 He further stated that the victims, ‘…may forgive but may never forget’. 843 This 
particular politician further stated that the ICT-BD should continue delivering judgments, and 
victims should be given reparation as quick as possible in order to provide honor to the victims 
and their families. 844 He opined that it is important to let the future generations know that the 













           Reparation is an essential transitional justice mechanism which may complement 
criminal prosecution in the particular context of delayed justice in Bangladesh. However, the 
ICT-BD could not develop any reparation mechanism to complement delayed criminal 
prosecution. The majority of the interviewees think that, a lack of legal provision and financial 
resources were the main reasons why the ICT-BD could not come up with any reparation 
mechanism for the victims. 
5.10 Conclusion and interim findings 
                From the above, we can conclude that the culture of impunity, delay in the justice 
process and reparation are interlinked with one another, the culture of impunity has been partly 
built due to the delay in the justice process. This delay further causes the victims and 
witnesses to lose faith in the justice process; therefore, a majority of interviewees stated that 
in a situation like Bangladesh, reparation could supplement the prosecution. Others held a 
view that reparations could delay the justice process even further. 
             According to the definition of Opotow, it seems that the nature of the impunity in the 
situation of Bangladesh can be understood primarily as the lack of accountability. Since 
accountability is the antithesis of Impunity, we can see in the situation of Bangladesh that lack 
of accountability is the main reason for the development of the culture of Impunity.  
                The second dimension of the Opotow’s definition made reference to the different 
situations under which impunity may arise such as not investigating the crime, not bringing 
suspects before the tribunal, not reaching verdicts, not sentencing or not enforcing the 
sentencing.846 In the particular context of Bangladesh, there was always a moral drive and 
societal demand for justice and for these reasons even though late, a tribunal has been 
established to investigate the crimes. The important lessons which may be learnt in this 
 
 
846 Susan Opotow, ‘Reconciliation in Times of Impunity: Challenges for Social Justice’, 14(1) Social Justice 
Research (2001) 149, 149. 
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respect is that, societal demand is an important factor which can give mandate to an authority 
to investigate past atrocities. 
              Also, the Bangladeshi situation provided valuable insights into how impunity may 
develop based on ineffective early legal attempts under the domestic criminal justice system. 
So, it may be said that the ICT-BD provided an indication that in addition to Opotow’s definition, 
impunity may arise due to national priority and ineffective legal attempts (this is also related 
to realpolitik further explained below). Here, national priority indicates how a newly 
independent country prioritizes the task of rebuilding a nation and it may take decades to 
instigate the process of accountability by way of establishing a special tribunal. 
               The third dimension of Opotow’s definition refers to the main root of the impunity as 
the political consideration and compromise or ‘realpolitik’.847 In this respect, the majority of the 
interviewees are of the opinion that the main source of the impunity in the situation of 
Bangladesh is related to the political consideration and the prevailing political context at the 
time. 
 The ICT-BD has demonstrated the nature of impunity which can be understood from 
different points of view. Firstly, the establishment of the ICT-BD is an attempt to decrease the 
culture of impunity and increase accountability by way of a domestic legal mechanism dealing 
with international crimes. Secondly, the ICT-BD is addressing the issue of historic trauma 
which has been built through the development of the culture of impunity and contributing to 
healing the psychological damage of the victims and their family members for the denial of 
justice for a prolonged period of time. Thirdly, it may not be possible to achieve complete 
justice for a situation such as that of Bangladesh after a substantial period of delay, but some 
form of justice may be achieved through criminal prosecution. Fourthly, the early restorative 
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means of justice, such as general amnesty, did not play any meaningful role in addressing the 
issue of impunity and accountability in the Bangladeshi situation. The majority of the 
interviewees were of the opinion that the ICT-BD has been more impactful in ending the culture 
of impunity in the field of ICL. Although this study focuses on the situation of Bangladesh, the 
findings may well have a bearing on similar situations around the world, particularly in South 
Asian and Muslim majority countries. With regards to delay, the establishment of the ICT-BD 
may provide us an important lesson that ‘Justice delayed is no longer justice denied’. When it 
comes to prosecuting crimes of the utmost gravity, ‘considerations of material justice for the 
victims now prevail over formalistic notions of legal certainty’.848 
              Germany convicted a 91-year old Nazi war criminal, John Demjanjuk on 12 May 2011 
for his involvement in a concentration camp 70 years ago where he acted as a guard; this 
suggests that in some cases, justice may be delayed but justice was served.849 Similarly, the 
contribution made by the ICT-BD in relation to delayed justice is quite significant, it assists in 
reviving many forgotten atrocities around the world because there is no time bar for 
prosecuting crimes under ICL. Furthermore, the ICCPR enabled States to abolish any legal 
provisions which may potentially hinder prosecution and gross violation of human rights. 
            Concerning reparation, most of the interviewees stated that in a situation like 
Bangladesh, reparation could supplement the prosecution. Other’s took a different view that 
reparation related provisions would make the prosecution process slower. The substantive 
law of the ICT-BD (e.g. the ICT Act 1973) has no express provision for reparation. As a result, 
the ICT-BD rejected the prosecution’s argument to provide reparation to the victims of rape. 
We can learn an important lesson by considering the effects of the delayed prosecution, that 
prosecution alone may not serve complete justice and other supplementary mechanisms may 
complement the prosecution. Similar to the mechanism of ECCC as mentioned above, the 
 
 
848 Jn Aro Hessbruegge, ‘Justice Delayed, Not Denied: Statutory Limitations and Human Rights Crimes’ (2011-
2012) 43 Geo. J. Int'l L. 335, 384. 
849 Ibid. 
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ICT-BD could also amend its RoP’s to include legal provision for reparation. A majority of the 
interviewees have acknowledged that the ICT-BD could not develop a comprehensive 
reparation mechanism for the victims of 1971. It is still open for the judges of the ICT-BD to 
amend its RoP’s to include reparation and compensation provisions for the victims. Some 
participants are of the opinion that the legislators of Bangladesh should introduce reparation 
related national laws. However, according to Bassiouni, only legal mechanisms giving the 
victims the right to reparation would not serve any meaningful purpose if there is no separate 
mechanism giving compensation to the victims.850 Accordingly, similar to Article 79 of the ICC, 
the ICT-BD can form a trust fund for the eligible victims, and at the same time, there should 
be appropriate law in place so that those who are convicted by the tribunal can have their 
properties confiscated. However, there are at least two challenges in developing any 
reparation program in the particular context of Bangladesh. Firstly, many perpetrators might 
have already died or may be difficult to locate. Secondly, if the located perpetrators have no 
resources, then any reparation program would not be feasible.  
           The lesson that can be learned from the ICT-BD in this respect is that, in case of 
delayed justice, reparation can supplement the prosecution to serve justice to the victims. It is 
not too late for the authorities in Bangladesh to look into the issue of making appropriate 
legislation which would enable the victims to seek compensation from the convicted war 
criminals. The willingness of the policymakers in Bangladesh could make it possible to provide 











            The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the interview data that was collected through 
semi-structured interviews and in particular, the perceptions of participants with respect to the 
due process followed by the ICT-BD in the course of the initial investigations and delivering 
judgments. This Chapter has also analysed the nature of due process followed by the ICT-BD 
from an analysis of its judgments and decisions, and to what extent the due process complied 
with the existing international practices. Due process is a broad concept, and there are various 
approaches on how it should be applied in ICL tribunals and in domestic tribunals. The 
previous chapters have discussed the domestic nature of the ICT-BD. This Chapter has 
attempted to analyse how a domestic tribunal dealing with international crimes has applied 
the principles of due process, and to what extent lessons drawn from the ICT-BD could 
contribute to ICL and transitional justice. 
            According to Bassiouni, the goals of ICL are, ‘...to include the prevention and 
suppression of international criminality, enhancement of accountability and reduction of 
impunity, and the establishment of international criminal justice’.851 On the other hand, the 
goals of international criminal procedure refer to respect for human rights and due process 
principles and that the perpetrators are given fair trial rights before an independent and 
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6.1.1 Meaning of due process 
           Due process is a fundamental element in democratic countries which maintains a fair 
and effective judicial system.853 According to Knoops, due process can be understood as an 
assurance or guarantee based on which institutional actions can be authoritative and it has a 
bearing on public confidence in the judicial process.854 In a criminal trial, the concept of due 
process can be explained as the minimum rights that are given to an accused.855  
           The meaning of due process can also be understood by scrutinising US based 
academic resources as they carry international significance. The history of due process can 
be traced back to Article 39 of the Charter of Liberty (Magna Carter) and it means that, 
everyone is entitled to the safeguards provided by the law of the land and that law should be 
applied properly by institutions  before depriving an individual of their freedom.856 Sir Edward 
coke stated that, due process protected all personal liberties and was identical to common 
law.857 However, in the American constitutional system, due process is guaranteed under the 
fifth and fourteenth amendment of the constitution as opposed to the English constitutional 
system which relies on a mix statues and  common law.858 The US judicial system considers 
the fairness of the  judicial systems in other states before enforcing foreign judgments.859 This 
shows us that the umbrella of international due process norms and the context of due process 
in  domestic settings based on cultural applications can vary greatly.860 
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            There are contradictory opinions regarding what qualifies as due process and its 
relationship with a fair trial.861 At an international level, the generalised concept of due process 
was codified in the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
regionally in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).862 Further to that, the 
general principle of criminal law and binding authority of international law may give rise to the 
issue of due process.863 It can be compared to a form of standard which assists in gaining 
public confidence and a fair balance between the rights of an accused and victims.864  
            There are various stages of due process, such as drafting the substantive laws, the 
investigation stage, and trial stage. 
6.1.2 Substantive and Procedural due process 
            In order to administer ICL and transitional justice, there are a set of rules regulating 
international criminal proceedings called procedural criminal law that governs the various 
stages of international criminal trials.865 Also, there is another set of rules defining what acts 
amount to international crimes, which is called substantive law.866  
            The concept of substantive due process refers to the situation where lawmakers are 
required to make law in such as a way that does not treat people unfairly.867 On the other hand, 
procedural due process refers to the situation where officials are required to apply law using 
a fair procedure equally applicable for all.868  
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6.1.3 Development of due process concept 
            The development of due process in international criminal adjudication can be traced 
back to the Nuremberg Charter and the RPE of the IMT where certain rights were guaranteed 
to the defendants through the due process principle.869 Article 16 of the Nuremberg Charter 
guaranteed five rights to the defendants which were, the right to know full information 
regarding the allegation against an individual, right to give any explanation relevant to the 
charges during preliminary examination, right to understand the trial in a language he or she 
understands, right to conduct his or her own defence or getting assistance from counsel, right 
to present evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him or her.870 However, 
Professor Bassiouni criticised the nature of due process rights in the Nuremberg Charter, 
saying that, ‘…the procedural rights afforded the defendants were quite limited’ compared to 
the contemporary standards.871 According to Zappalà, there were no due process safeguards 
during the investigation phase before the Nuremberg trials and presumption of innocence was 
not expressly stated.872 Also, defendants were not given any right to remain silent and right to 
be released on bail.873 Additionally, there was no right of appeal for the defendants.874 
However, Gordon argued that before the Nuremberg trial, human rights law was not developed 
in a contemporary fashion, and for this reason, the tribunal could not adopt the due process 
in today's fashion.875 As a result, Safferling and Bassiouni suggested that the Nuremberg 
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tribunal paid some respect to the rights of an accused both in the Charter and the Rules of 
Procedure.876  
6.2. International application of Due Process 
            The due process of ICL was revisited in the ICTY, ICTR and later by the ICC. 
According to Arbour, the ICTY and ICTR have brought significant changes in the due process 
principles of ICL.877 There were six procedural steps during the investigation phase to ensure 
due process to the accused, and the ICTY reflected the due process guarantee enshrined in 
Article 14 the ICCPR.878   
            The primary basis of the due process rights is the Article 14 of the ICCPR which 
contains a list of due process rights and notable rights  which are: fair and impartial tribunal, 
public trial, adequate time for preparation of  defence, not to be compelled to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt, right to know charges against an individual, right of an accused to 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty, right to legal representation, right of appeal, right of 
bail, right to cross-examine the witnesses against an accused, adequate prosecutorial 
discloser, avoiding delays, right to review conviction at a higher court, etc. 
            In order to ensure due process principles, the ICTY and ICTR have amended their 
RPE 45 times and 27 times, respectively. Gordon in his article suggested that the due process 
in ICL has developed primarily to protect the fundamental human rights of an accused and 
there is a fundamental difference between the nature of due process in the national and 
international models namely that, national models rely on their own agencies for investigation, 
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compliance and enforcement, whereas international models rely on external bodies and the 
cooperation of states to procure evidence and suspects.879  
6.3 Legal position of Due Process in the ICT - BD 
           One of the main criticisms against the ICT-BD is that it fails to follow International 
standards of due process.880  It seems that the title of the act itself seems to generate the 
opinion that the act must adhere to International standards and the government of Bangladesh 
has shown commitment to follow certain International obligations by ratifying the Rome statue. 
The ICT Act through amendments, has provided provisions to ensure fair trial and guarantee 
certain fundamental rights of the accused. These different provisions such as the RoP’s of the 
ICT act have been discussed more elaborately in Chapter 4. However, its decision not to 
amend Article 47(A) and 47(3) which does not provide accused persons same constitutional 
rights as other citizens has gathered criticisms. Article 31 protects accused from retrospective 
laws, Article 33 guarantees a fair trial and Article 44 allows the enforcement of those 
guaranteed rights. Before the 2009 amendment which allowed appeals to the tribunals, the 
accused were denied interlocutory appeals. There are calls for the act to follow the legislative 
origin of the ICT Act and to investigate political bias.881 The below sections go through the 
analysis of the information received from the semi structured interviews in order to understand 
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6.4 Analysis of Interview Data 
           After providing a basic understanding of due process, the researcher has discussed 
below the interview data, which have been divided into four sections; Standard, procedure, 
comments and criticisms under separate headings for the purpose of clarity.882  
6.4.1 Standard: Due process in practice 
             One of the judges during the interview stated that under the ICT Act 1973, the crimes 
are clearly defined and they followed the law accordingly when they conducted the trial.883 He 
said, ‘we followed the trial process of the Nuremberg Tribunal to some extent and adapted to 
present time legal application’.884 
             Another ICT-BD judge who was also the chairman of the tribunal stated that each of 
the stages of the ICT-BD had followed proper due process.885 He stated that, although there 
was no review in the legal framework of the ICT-BD, there is a review system against every 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and that review right has been given to the 
accused under ICT Act 1973.886 He further explained that in the ICT-BD case of Quader Molla, 
it was an issue of whether the review was applicable in cases under ICT 1973 Act, and later 
it was decided that review would be given.887 He also asserted that, ‘so I think sufficient scopes 
were given to the accused to defend themselves’.888 He further stated, ‘when I was a lawyer, 
I used to deal with Human Rights issues and also in our jail code there were some provisions 
to take accused friendly decisions to allow them wider rights'.889  He also said that, ‘as a judge 
I did allow the accused Golam Azam to bring home-cooked food after reviewing their petition 
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and with the condition that food will not be harmful to the accused'.890 He said this type of 
rights given to an accused is a rare case in Bangladesh.891 He said that, an accused named 
Delwar Hussain Sayeedi became ill during trial and, ‘I ordered to ensure best available 
treatment for him’.892 In the case of Sayeedi, the prison authority was directed to provide 
treatment at the choice of the accused, a special diet was requested by the accused and a 
health-friendly vehicle for his transport was also provided.893 
             A particular judge stated that, ‘…we allowed remand for questioning, I made a system 
that accused will remain in a house during questioning’. He stated that he usually allowed 
remand during daytime not at night, and a doctor and lawyer could be in the next room to 
observe that the rights of the accused are protected during questioning.894 He said, 'this type 
of rights has [had] never been seen in our country’.895 The judge further narrated that an 
accused could have his lunch during questioning, and in the evening, they could return to 
jail.896 These were a few things which have been allowed by the tribunal when he was the 
chairman of the tribunal.897 He believes these practices have been developed since he left the 
tribunal.898 
              However, a particular defence lawyer stated from his practical experience that, he 
had dealt with many criminal trials as a defence lawyer, sometimes judges delivered judgment 
against his client's favour, but he always had the satisfaction that whatever a judge decided 
was right.899 However, based on the way that the ICT-BD delivered judgment; he did not have 















He said that, ‘if this satisfaction is not present, then the purpose of establishing a tribunal 
would fail because there would be no peace or reconciliation through the tribunal.'901 Another 
defence lawyer stated that the tribunal could not achieve the aim of transitional justice, and he 
believed that most of the people in Bangladesh assumed that the tribunal was not neutral.902 
             The defence lawyer further opined that, ‘from my personal point of view, it may be 
wrong to say due to my limitations of knowledge on this subject matter that investigation, 
prosecution, judges, and witnesses were all set and they were under central command’.903 He 
further stated that, ‘the way ICT-BD was designed, they simply followed that plan, the trial did 
not follow the typical judicial culture of Bangladesh’.904 He further stated that the prosecution 
could use all the state power and agents to prepare their case; on the other hand, the defence 
team was oppressed by the state missionary.905 He mentioned that the premises that they 
used to conduct their office work was under pressure as the police used to visit the premises 
on a regular basis.906 
6.4.2 Standard: Substantive Due process and International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973 
          As discussed in the introduction, the concept of substantive due process requires that 
lawmakers draft law in a way that is equally applicable to all and for this reason, it is important 
to analyse how the governing Act of the ICT-BD was drafted. One of the politicians that the 
researcher interviewed, stated that after the 1971 Liberation War, the Prime Minister 
‘Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’,907 in his first speech on 10 January 1972 invited the 
citizens of Bangladesh not to take the law into their own hands as a lot of atrocities had already 
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would be prosecuted for crimes under ICL following due process principles.908 Also, when the 
interviewee became the law minister on 12th January 1972, it was ordered that there would 
be no summary executions.909 One of the first tasks he took upon was drafting the constitution 
of Bangladesh and making a special law for war crimes prosecution which is known as the 
ICT Act 1973, and it was given special protection under the constitution in the first amendment 
stating that, any law would not challenge prosecution under this Act.910  
            It appears from the initial stages of drafting the governing Act of the ICT-BD that, due 
process was considered at least to the extent that the perpetrators were saved from summary 
executions with a view to give them legal rights by trial. This particular interviewee further 
stated that they had the task of systematically collecting evidence and appointed some of the 
most senior lawyers as prosecutors, they are named as follows, Subita Ranjan Paul, Serajul 
Hoque, and Aminul Hoque.911 This suggests that straight after the liberation war, Bangladesh 
attempted to prosecute the perpetrators of 1971 in a systematic way through the judicial 
system and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman himself promised to provide justice through due process.  
            The interviewee further stated that they produced a draft law and presented the draft 
at the International Conference held in Dhaka in 1973 where distinguished international 
criminal lawyers including the vice president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and 
other experienced lawyers and academics were present at the conference.912 He also 
mentioned that before finalising the draft, they received suggestions from the participants of 
the conference and approved the draft.913 They were then invited to another ICL conference 
in Italy in 1973, and the interviewee went there along with two prosecutors (Subita Ranjan 











whole session and received comments from the top international criminal lawyers and eminent 
people who were prosecutors at Nuremberg and so, all the people present discussed this draft 
and showed positivity in relation to the provisions for fair trial, giving proper opportunity to the 
accused persons to defend themselves and proceedings were seen to be neutral, impartial 
and open to public trials.915  
            Another participant stated that, ‘…I think the governing Act of the ICT-BD is an 
excellent piece of legislation despite having few minor issues which were amended 
subsequently’.916 A particular judge who took part in the interview stated that the ICT Act 1973, 
‘...contained all the provisions of the due process and international standards and there should 
not be any question about the accuracy of the law because it was updated legislation in its 
time’.917 A particular politician stated that, ‘…there are sufficient legal provisions to ensure 
fairness and defence has the option to appeal and review the decision of the tribunal before 
Supreme Court’.918 It is further stated by another participant that the defence team exercised 
appeal rights before the court of appeal; decisions of the tribunal were reviewed before final  
judgment was delivered therefore, there should not be an issue of due process under the ICT-
BD's legal mechanism.919  
            One of the prosecution lawyers stated that, ‘…I have observed Cambodian Tribunal, 
ICTR, ICTY, ICC, and Latin American Tribunal; comparatively the ICT Act 1973 is more 
accused friendly and the ICT-BD's RoP gave absolute rights to the accused'.920 He further 
stated that the RoP gave more rights to the accused rather than the victim.921 He also 











punishment, but subsequently it was given to the prosecution after amending the 1973 Act’.922 
He further narrated that ‘…under the RoP, the defence team got more rights than the 
prosecution team despite applying several equality principles’.923  
            Another judge of the tribunal reaffirmed that ‘…in all the stages of the tribunal due 
process are[is] in place’.924 He restated that before establishing tribunals, judicial forums were 
formed to consult the adequacy of due process.925  
So, it appears that the ICT Act 1973 was legislated to ensure a fair trial and stop summary 
executions. The purpose of drafting the ICT Act 1973 was to install the rule of law. At the 
drafting stage, the Act was thoroughly scrutinised to adopt recognised principles of law. 
6.4.3 Standard: Procedural due process and the ICT-BD 
            The governing Act of the ICT-BD made it clear that the principles of national criminal 
code and Evidence Act have no significance to the procedural aspect of the ICT-BD.926 The 
ICT-BD has its own RoP in terms of procedural issues. It is noted in the judgment of the Chief 
Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla927 that, the ICT Act 1973 and the RoP have incorporated the 
procedural rights of the Article 14 of the ICCPR.928  
            A judge of the tribunal, who took part in the interview, stated that, ‘...I think comparing 
to other similar tribunals around the world, our ICT-BD has no shortage of standard and we 
can even claim that in terms of international standards, the legal framework of the ICT-BD is 
more advanced’.929 The judge further narrated that he had the opportunity to observe the 
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as an observer, he exchanged information and shared ideas and discussed various aspects 
of international criminal tribunals before being a judge for the ICT-BD.930 Another participant 
stated that, ‘…in all the stages of the process fair process was ensured, judges were 
independent, after proper investigation charges were constituted against each accused’.931 
This particular participant also stated that after the preliminary hearing, each case went to trial 
for a full hearing and during the preliminary hearing, the defence team used interlocutory 
appeals frequently to ensure due process.932 When a question was asked on whether the 
accused or their lawyers were given adequate time, the judge stated that, ‘…they were given 
sufficient time to gather evidence and witnesses’.933 The judge also confirmed that 
‘…interlocutory appeal rights were given to the defence team and they have used interlocutory 
appeal several times’.934    
            However, both substantive and procedural provisions have caused concern among 
human rights groups.935 Human rights advocates and legal observers have said that offence 
under the ICT Act 1973 must be clearly defined and due process rights for the accused must 
be enhanced.936 It is alleged that the amended ICT Act 1973, did not provide suspects a right 
against self-incrimination or a right to legal counsel when being questioned by the police, nor 
did it give them adequate time to prepare a defence.937 However, it appears from the analysis 
of Rule 24(1) of the RoP of the ICT-BD that any statement made by the accused during 
interrogation or investigation cannot be adduced as evidence against the accused and 
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ICT Act 1973 ensures that reasonable time is to be given to the accused to understand the 
charge against an accused and prepare defence. 
            One of the politicians (Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami)938 stated that, due process is 
being used very technically in the ICT-BD’s legal mechanism.939 He further stated that, ‘…in 
theory there are sufficient provisions in place to ensure a fair trial and due process’.940 But he 
mentioned that in practice, this tribunal [ICT-BD] was largely biased.941 He alleged that 
‘…almost all the judges are appointed by the ALP and they are the supporters of the 
government’.942 Further, Menon stated that the lack of transparency in the appointment 
process of the judges and prosecutors raises questions concerning the norm of neutrality of 
the tribunal.943 
            It is further observed that under Section 6(2) of the ICT Act 1973, to be appointed as 
the tribunal chairman or member, an individual has ‘…to be a judge at the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh’ and they must be Bangladeshi nationals.944 If we compare the appointment 
process of the ICT-BD with SCSL, ECCC it appears that the latter had provision to appoint 
foreign judges along with domestic judges, but the former had no such provision to ensure 
judge’s neutrality and objectivity.945 The judges of the ICT-BD are appointed by the 
Government of Bangladesh at their discretion. As such, there is a potential for bias as judges 
may be selected based on their political views or social standing. Also, under Section 6(8) of 
the ICT Act 1973, both prosecution and defence have no right to challenge the appointment 
of the judges.946 But the appointment of the Supreme Court bench judge could be challenged 
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and in the case of Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Mollah,947 defence made an application 
challenging the appointment of a particular judge ‘… on grounds of violation of the Code of 
Conduct of Judges under the Constitution of Bangladesh’.948  
            Robertson stated that, the 1973 Act ‘…was something of a wonder of its time – the 
first legislation devised to deliver on the legacy of Nuremberg...’ and the Act is partly the work 
of Niall MacDermott Q.C.949 He further opined that the 1973 Act is a well-meaning piece ‘…but 
now an out-dated prototype for post-Nuremberg war crimes court…’ and by 2009, the Act had 
been superseded by the modern international tribunals such as ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ICC 
which have incorporated an up to date concept of human rights standards.950 The main 
concern raised by Robertson was that the ICT Act 1973 does not allow to question the 
appointment of the Judges of the ICT-BD.951 Although the appointment of the judges of the 
tribunal could not be challenged, the verdict of the tribunal could be challenged to the highest 
court of the land. Also, the appointment of judges of the highest court of the land can be 
challenged, and the defence team had exercised their right to challenge the appointment of a 
judge of the highest court of the land.952  
6.4.4 Procedure: Due process of ICT-BD at the investigation stage 
            In the case of Quader Molla, it was stated that the ICT-BD has guaranteed the required 
procedural protections of the defendant's right to fair trial both in the pre-trial phase and during 
the trial.953 A prosecution lawyer confirmed that an investigation agency had been formed to 
assist the tribunal with the most skilful and professional investigators of the country.954 A judge, 
 
 
947 Quader Mollah (n 13). 
948 Menon (n 297) 8. 
949 Robertson (305) 54. 
950 Ibid. 
951 Ibid. 
952 In the case of Abdul Quader Molla, ICT.BD. CASE NO. 07 OF 2011, the Defence team made an application 
challenging the appointment of Justice Samsuddin Chowdhury Manik on the ground of violation of the Code of 
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 179 
who took part in the interview stated that, the investigation stage is very important and the 
investigators do not take part in the judicial process but, during their investigation, they try to 
find out prima facie case and they examine potential witnesses.955 He also narrated those 
investigations are conducted for the tribunal by very senior officers in their capacity who are 
also highly trained.956  
             However, Menon alleged that neither the ICT Act 1973 nor the ICT-BD RoP, provide 
any rights to the suspects during the investigation stage.957 Nevertheless, it appears from the 
case of Quader Molla that the Tribunal had developed a practice that:  
‘…at the time of interrogation defence counsel, a doctor shall be present in a room 
adjacent to that where the accused is interrogated' and during break time they are 
allowed to consult the accused, despite the fact that statement made to investigation 
officer shall not be admissible in evidence.958 
           It is alleged that the suspects are not entitled to the assistance of a counsel of their 
own choice or to free legal assistance if they are unable to afford it.959 However, in practice, 
the accused are allowed to select their counsel within the jurisdiction, and if unable to afford 
counsel, then the State sponsored defence lawyers are available for them, including an 
interpreter.960 Under Section 12 of the ICT Act 1973, the accused are entitled to get defence 
counsel provided by the government fund in all the stages of the case if the accused are 
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            Menon alleges that during the investigation stage under the ICT-BD, it is possible to 
examine a suspect orally and there is no privilege against self-incrimination.962 However, it 
appears from the case of Quader Molla that during the investigation stage, ‘statement made 
to the investigation officer shall not be admissible as evidence'.963 Also, under Section 14 of 
the ICT Act 1973, any statement or confession a suspect makes must be done in front of a 
Magistrate as part of the investigation process and such evidence may be used against the 
accused.964  
           Once a suspect is arrested, there is a time-limit of one year and by this time, 
investigation in a particular case must be completed; otherwise, suspects should be released 
on bail. This stipulation of the time limit is unique to the Act because other tribunals merely 
gave direction for the investigation to be concluded without undue delays, but the ICT Act 
1973 has provided a clear timeline.965  
            Also, in relation to the warrant of arrest, the Rule 9(3) of RoP of the ICT-BD provides 
that, at the time of executing the warrant of arrest, a copy of allegations is to be served to the 
suspect.966 Further, Rule 18 (4) provides that, ‘The Chief prosecutor shall file extra copies of 
formal charge and copies of other documents for supplying the same to the accused(s) which 
the prosecution intends to rely upon in support of such charges so that the accused can 
prepare his defence’.967 In the case of Mujahid, it was stated that ‘…right to disclosure has 
been adequately ensured so that the suspect person can have a fair opportunity to defend his 
own interest'.968 The tribunal has given the opportunity to the accused to have privileged 
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communications with their counsels, in prison as and when prayed for and this right was 
exercised by Ali Ahsan Muhammad Mujahid .969 
             The ICT-BD, since Ali Ahsan Mujahid's detention, had received several applications 
seeking his release on bail and the issue was dismissed by way of fair hearing after giving 
sufficient opportunity to both sides.970 It appears the tribunal had taken maximum caution to 
ensure that an accused is free from ‘coercion and torture of any kind and ordered the presence 
of an engaged counsel and a doctor at a room adjacent to the room of the ‘safe home’ where 
the Investigation Agency was allowed to interrogate the accused’.971 The judgment of Mujahid 
mentioned that the Tribunal under its discretionary power given by Rule 46A of the RoP, has 
adopted numerous practices for ensuring a fair trial by providing all possible rights to the 
accused.972 For instance, one of the accused was allowed to bring home-cooked food and 
maintain specials diets.  
6.4.5 Procedure: Due process and evidential flexibility  
              A particular judge stated that every legal system must be fair, not only fair but visibly 
fair and referred the case of ex parte Sussex Justices, that justice not only is done but must 
be seen to be manifestly and undoubtedly done.973 So, justice must be seen to be fair and 
flawless and must be free from all kinds of imperfections.974 He is of the opinion that as far as 
justice is concerned, the ICT-BD has delivered fair judgments based on the evidence before 
the tribunal.975  
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             A defence lawyer stated that the judges were lenient towards documentary evidence; 
otherwise, it would not have been possible to prove a single fact.976 He said that it would be 
the right approach to establish the tribunal under the international body; the tribunals could 
have more support from the international body, and it would attract fewer criticisms and public 
faith in the tribunals would increase.977 He also said that if the tribunal could be established 
under the guidance of the United Nations, then the admissibility of evidence could be applied 
differently and the accused would feel more secure.978 Another defence lawyer stated that, 
‘the judges have adopted a favourable approach accepting evidence which has raised the 
issue of bias and the judges accepted a lot of hearsay evidence in a ‘dangerous way’.979 
However, it appears from the case of Sayeedi, that the number of oral evidence was coupled 
with documentary evidence, and it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Mr Sayeedi 
was a prominent member of the auxiliary force and he had actively participated in different 
atrocious activities in association with the Pakistani occupation forces.980 
              Another participant stated that ‘in the case of Quader Molla, an issue arose when a 
prosecution witness was asked about the accused shirt’s colour during the trial and the witness 
provided two different versions of the colour’.981 He explained that, ‘this is a serious 
inconsistency in the domestic criminal law, but it is not an issue in international criminal law’.982 
He explained that, ‘here the question is, did the person know that he has to give evidence 
after 40/45 years and he had to memorise the colour of the shirt? If the answer is no, then this 
type of inconsistency is not a problem for international criminal law evidence’.983 He further 












law of ICT-BD] will not be guided by conventional evidence Act’. He said the defence team in 
the case of Quader Molla raised the conventional evidence Act issue and for this reason, the 
tribunal did not give him the severest punishment.984 He further explained that the prosecution 
raised the argument in their favour that, the tribunal was leaning towards the conventional 
evidence Act (e.g. domestic criminal law evidence Act) and Mr Molla was not only a member 
of the Al- Badar but also a leader and he has to take the superior responsibility for being a 
leader.985 
             A particular defence lawyer stated that, ‘the evidence law was relaxed and it did give 
extra benefit to the prosecution team to prove allegation’.986 He added that if a normal standard 
would be followed, there could be very little chance to prove the allegation against the 
accused.987 However, a judge of the tribunal stated that, ‘during this trial, we had to consider 
witnesses and evidence very cautiously because of significant time-lapse, we had to rely on 
corroborative evidence’.988 He acknowledged that they had to adopt a flexible approach for 
admitting written witness statement for both the defence and prosecution for clarity.989 In 
chapter 7 of this thesis, a detailed analysis of the evidential matters of the ICT-BD has been 
discussed. 
6.4.6 Procedure: Right of Appeal  
            Majority of the interviewees stated that the accused before the ICT-BD have the right 
to challenge the verdicts of the tribunal to the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Further, a 
particular participant also confirmed that the decision of the AD was easily reviewable.990 He 











Nuremberg trials, and finally, the convicts have a right to apply for clemency to the head of 
state under the constitution of Bangladesh.991 This particular participant is of the opinion that 
the accused persons have a much higher right in the ICT-BD than those accused under the 
Nuremberg Charter.992 
           Concerning the right of appeal of the prosecution, a participant stated that, initially there 
was no right of appeal before the ICT-BD for the prosecution against the conviction, they had 
limited right in case of acquittal, but the convict had a certain appeal right.993 So, the law had 
to be changed to make it equal in a sense that, since the defence or the convict has a right of 
appeal, there should always be a right of appeal for the prosecution.994 He said that, ‘the right 
of appeal should not be unbalanced, it should be balanced and it should be reciprocatory’.995 
As a result, the parliament amended the law giving the prosecution right of appeal against 
conviction and against the sentencing.996 The judge further narrated that, opinion was sought 
from amicus curiae regarding amendment of the law.997  
            Equality of arms of due process is that, both the prosecution and defence should have 
the same level of rights. This issue was addressed by the ICT-BD in the case of Chief 
Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla. The majority of the interviewees are of the opinion that the 
ICT-BD made an important development in relation to the equality of arms in the due process 
by enabling the prosecution a right of appeal against the conviction. This aspect of 
development had not been seen in any previous ICT’s. However, this amendment had 
attracted criticisms from around the world because the 2013 amendment of the ICT Act 1973, 











6.4.7 Procedure: Rights of the defence lawyer 
             One of the defence lawyers stated that he felt the typical situation of ordinary court 
proceedings which he previously observed was not seen at the tribunal.998 He said that there 
was a bit of an ‘anxious situation’ at the ICT-BD. He added that entry to the tribunal was subject 
to strict check-up.999 He alleged that, ‘the way normal courts are open; this openness could 
not be seen at the tribunal'.1000 There was a lot of security which created fear in the minds of 
the defence lawyers. This particular participant stated that their ‘bodies were searched, 
mobiles were taken away, and they felt difference [discrimination] between [the] prosecution 
and defence lawyer’.1001  
            Another defence lawyer quoted, ‘I felt [an] informal discriminatory policy towards 
defence lawyers compared to the prosecution lawyers.1002 He said, ‘...the way we were 
checked, searched and mobiles taken; those were not seen for the prosecution lawyers ’. He 
further narrated that ‘...although, both we and the prosecution are lawyers but they 
[prosecution lawyers] were treated specially'.1003 He added that the environment of the ICT-
BD was not equal for prosecution and defence lawyers as it was prosecution friendly.1004 On 
another point, a defence lawyer stated that ‘..of course I think it is important to establish a 
tribunal to try and assess the mass crimes which were committed during the country's 
liberation war in 1971 but at the same time, I think it is important to see proper legal application 
to serve justice’.1005 Another defence lawyer stated that, ‘...there were [was] a lot of security 
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            A particular defence lawyer stated that in the course of collecting evidence for the case 
of Mr Sayeedi,1007 defence teams went to Pirujpur where they were harassed by the Chatra 
League [student wing of the AL party].1008 He said they went to a police station to seek help, 
but the police officer was not available at the office, and they had no help from the state 
agency.1009 He further stated that except for the trial period in the court, they were always 
afraid of the authority.1010 
            However, a particular judge stated that the interests of the defence team had been 
fully protected and they have been given all the opportunities to put up their case based on 
evidence and submission.1011 He further observed during the trial that the defence lawyers 
were very competent.1012  
            Rights of the defence lawyers are essential to ensure a fair trial and lack of this element 
may undermine the credibility of a tribunal. Two defence lawyers, who have participated in the 
interview, stated that they did not receive equal treatment compared to the prosecution 
lawyers. The Human Rights Watch reported that they had received complaints from defence 
lawyers stating that the authorities were harassing them and that they were under 
surveillance.1013 However, it is not clear why they were under surveillance. Whether the 
defence lawyers were under surveillance for their own security or any potential conspiracy is 
not clear. However, for the sake of fair trial, it is important that the defence lawyers can work 
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6.4.8 Comments: Experience of judges and lawyers 
            One of the prosecution lawyers stated that the prosecution team was formed with the 
most senior criminal law lawyers. Mr Golam Arif Tipu was initially appointed as the chief 
prosecutor, and the interviewer was appointed as the prosecutor at the same time. He 
described that, previously, there was no example of such a tribunal in Indian- sub-continent, 
and for this reason, the application of ICL at the domestic tribunal was a totally new judicial 
concept in Bangladesh.1014 He also clarified that the ICT Act 1973 has no relation with 
Bangladesh’s domestic criminal evidence related law.1015 
            One of the ICT-BD judges stated, ‘the definition, evidential aspect and punishment 
guidelines were all new to them.’1016 He further added that over time, the tribunal gained 
competency to deal with the crimes under international law.1017  
            A particular prosecution lawyer stated that, ‘…initially the people associated with the 
tribunal had no prior experience in the field of international criminal law ’.1018 However, they 
were experienced in the domestic criminal law sector.1019 Although, they did not have any 
practical experience, they had observational experience of how other international crimes 
tribunals operate. He further stated that, prosecution developed their skills in relation to the 
principles and practices of international crimes as the ICT-BD moved forward.1020 He also 
stated that the prosecution team had been given sufficient opportunity to develop their skills 
to deal with the crimes and trial process.1021 When a question was put forward to him on 












duties effectively, he stated that, ‘…the legal framework of the tribunal was sufficiently precise 
which made it possible for the prosecution to deal with the crimes’.1022 
            In relation to the efficiency of the prosecution, a particular interviewee is of the opinion 
that although the prosecution team built up some experience and skills, there is still further 
scope for development.1023 He said that he is aware that the prosecution team has a link with  
other international tribunal prosecutors, but a more formal link was necessary.1024 Another 
politician stated that, ‘…as far as I know, initially there was a problem for the lawyers and 
judges to understand the law because previously no tribunal was ever established in similar 
nature’.1025 He, however reaffirmed that, ‘…our lawyers and judges were experienced with the 
traditional criminal justice system, which included Code of Criminal  Procedure (CrPC) and 
this traditional law did not define what genocide or war crimes was’.1026  
             The majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that, the prosecution team took 
a bit of time to understand the law and definitions of the crimes.1027 The ICT Act 1973 was in 
English, and it was later translated into Bengali for a better understanding of the governing 
Act.1028 One of the politicians stated that, ‘…an easy reading book was prepared by Justice 
Mohammad Golam Rabbani where every single section of the 1973 Act was explained in 
Bengali, and the Nuremberg Tribunal was our role model’.1029 
            Muhammad Rafiqul Islam, a professor of Bangladeshi origin in Australia’s Macquarie 
University Law School, stated in an interview that, ‘…from [the] government's perspective, I 
would say that certainly, the government was not well prepared for the tribunal because if you 












without proper research.’1030 He further stated that the Cambodian government did not carry 
out their own research, but they hired Yale Law School to conduct research on their behalf, 
but in Bangladesh, no official or institutional research was carried out before establishing the 
Tribunal.1031 He opined that initially in the process of establishing the ICT-BD, there was a lack 
of intellectual issue.1032 He said, ‘when we talk about justice it is not only political or socio-
economic, it is also an intellectual issue’.1033 He further stated that, ‘… the judges, prosecutors 
or defence lawyers of the ICT-BD never formally studied international criminal law; however, 
they are developing their skill gradually in English, which we called learning by doing'.1034 So 
he claimed that judges, investigators, and lawyers did not have the necessary knowledge 
before starting the tribunal; instead, they are learning through the working process of the 
tribunal.   
            One of the prosecution lawyers stated that, ‘…the judges of the tribunal are very 
experienced, and to my knowledge, no other tribunals appointed such experienced judges 
from the highest court of a country’.1035 He further stated that any party might appeal to the AD 
of the supreme court of Bangladesh which is the highest judicial forum of Bangladesh.1036 It is 
important that the tribunal decisions are subject to review by the highest court of Bangladesh. 
This is the reflection of safeguards to ensure due process. One of the tribunal judges 
confirmed that, ‘…the prosecution team was given practical observational training similar to 
[the] international criminal tribunal’.1037 He further asserted that, ‘…the defence team got direct 
assistance from London based barristers who prepared their submission and legal 
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arguments’.1038 However, no formal training like Continuous Professional Development (CPD) 
is available either for lawyers or for the judges of the ICT-BD. Another judge of the tribunal 
stated that initially at the pre-trial stage, alleged perpetrators were brought to the tribunal 
through proper investigation and they were self-recognised criminals and most of them were 
found guilty.1039 A particular politician added that all the prosecutors are senior lawyers with 
good standing and the prosecution sought the international legal opinion which enhanced the 
experience of the lawyers.1040 
             In explaining the experience of the defence lawyers, a particular judge stated that 
some of the lawyers from the defence before both; the tribunal and the AD of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh were highly equipped with all the decisions delivered by the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and other tribunals.1041 In his opinion, defence lawyers were more competent than the 
prosecution lawyers.1042  
             The majority of the interviewees stated that the lawyers and judges of the ICT-BD had 
no practical experience of dealing with international crimes. Although the judges and 
prosecution team were given training, nothing as such is suggested in relation to the defence 
team except the fact that defence team received direct support from a London based firm of 
barristers. Most of the participants are of the opinion that initially, the people associated with 
the ICT-BD were inexperienced but gradually, they have developed their capacity. However, 
it appears from the early judgments that the lack of initial experience did not affect the final 
judgment and the observations made by the Court of Appeal broadly confirmed the same.1043 








1043The Chief Prosecutor v Abdul Quader Molla, Criminal Appeal No.24-25 OF 2013 [17 September 2013]. 
 191 
Appeal for further scrutiny, and the researcher has covered this particular issue in chapter 9 
later in this thesis.  
6.4.9 Criticisms: Victors’ Justice 
            A defence lawyer stated that the ICT-BD is attempting to serve victor's justice or 
revengeful justice, and to this extent, the goals of transitional justice are not being achieved 
by this tribunal.1044  
           A politician of Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party said that, ‘there should be some 
clarification that crimes were committed not only by pro-Pakistani but also by the pro-
independent party’.1045 He claimed that, ‘prosecution is only dealing with the pro-Pakistanis, 
not any rebels who might have committed similar crimes’.1046 However, another participant 
stated that, ‘this is natural that the State, which succeeded in defeating the violator, will 
prosecute the perpetrators’.1047 He further elaborated that the state will include their norms in 
their legal framework.1048 He explained that before enacting the ICT Act 1973, the authority of 
Bangladesh passed ‘the Bangladesh National Liberation Struggle (Indemnity) Order, 1973’ 
protecting the rebels from prosecution.1049 He explained that there is no single tribunal of 
international crimes, including the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals that are free from 
criticisms.1050 Nonetheless, it is an obligation for a state to prosecute people who committed 
crimes under ICL.1051 He narrated that, ‘this may have two different views, one from victorious 
people and another from defeated persons and I do not want to put any abrupt comment on 













tribunal and there are different views on this point where there may be some controversy 
too.1053 He said the accused persons normally claimed that they are innocent from their point 
of view, but legal analysis, producing evidence, examining witnesses, and reviewing decisions 
ultimately decide guilt.1054 So, comparing to other international tribunals, the ICT-BD has 
followed all the aspect of transitional justice.1055 The aforementioned politician stated that, 
‘foreign observers were satisfied with the procedural aspect of the ICT-BD’.1056 
            A small number of participants stated that establishing the ICT-BD was not necessary 
considering the goals of transitional justice. They supported that an alternative step could have 
been taken such as truth commissions or reparation. They said that due to the significant time 
lapse, producing evidence would not be possible if evidential law was relaxed and there may 
be future judicial debate regarding the trial process.1057 One of the defence lawyers said, ‘as a 
defence lawyer, I have a limitation, and I cannot tell you many of my observations regarding 
the tribunal’.1058 However, the majority of the interviewees stated that the tribunal had taken a 
good step towards justice and identified principal offenders who were still alive.1059 
6.4.10 Criticisms: Constitutional issue and Due process 
            ICT-BD applies domestic law, and the tribunal is not involved with international judges 
or lawyers.1060 However, it has also been argued that the ICT-BD is not a ‘pure’ Bangladeshi 
tribunal because a 2010 amendment removed some basic constitutional protections given to 
defendants before other domestic courts in Bangladesh.1061 So, it seems that Robertson 













of this status of the ICT-BD on due process and fair trial are that: firstly, judges’ objectivity may 
be questioned because there is no international judge; secondly, the ICT Act 1973, as 
amended in 2010, creates a distinction between the accused before the ICT-BD and the 
accused before other domestic tribunals in Bangladesh, offering less constitutional rights to 
the former, giving rise to issues of due process.  
            Article 47A1062 of the Bangladeshi Constitution, stated that an accused under the ICT 
Act 1973 could not go to the higher court for judicial review.1063 In 2010, a prominent defence 
counsel of the ICT-BD stated that an accused under the ICT Act 1973 could not invoke Article 
26 (Laws inconsistent with fundamental rights to be void); Article 27 (that everyone is equal 
under the law); and Article 44 (Enforcement of fundamental rights).1064 He also made reference 
to Article 35(1) of the Bangladeshi Constitution, which provided a safeguard against 
retrospective legislation.1065 He claimed that the ICT Act 1973 is against the rule of law. 
Moreover, Article 47(1) stated that the rights guaranteed under Article 31 (Right to protection 
of law), clause 1 of article 35 (protection against retrospective legislation) and 44 (Enforcement 
of fundamental rights to High Court Division) shall not apply to any person to whom a law 
specified in clause 3 of Art 47 applied, this means that, if there is a case filed against anybody 
under the ICT Act 1973, then he cannot bring those rights once accused. This provision is 
contradictory with the general concept that an accused is presumed to be innocent until proven 
guilty because if we presume an accused to be innocent, then he should have all the rights 
granted to any other individual until proven guilty. Furthermore, Clause 3 of Article 47 of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh provided a barrier for those who are alleged under the ICT Act 
1973 to seek remedies from the Supreme Court under the constitution.1066 
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            One of the main criticisms of the ICT-BD is that, the accused are not allowed to 
challenge the jurisdiction of the tribunal or bring any constitutional challenges.1067 Also, the 
accused are not allowed to rely on the constitutionally protected right of not to be charged on 
any retrospective legislation. This created an anomaly given that the accused are the citizens 
of Bangladesh; they should be able to rely on constitutional rights.   
            In relation to Article 35 of the Constitution, although in principle the application of 
retroactive law is not allowed in criminal law, retroactive statutes are allowed in certain 
circumstances. The ICT Act 1973 is a constitutionally protected legislation; anything under the 
Act cannot be unconstitutional. Also, the Australian High Court allowed the retrospective 
application of a national war crimes law in the Polyukhovich case1068 stating that, ‘the 
retrospective operation of the Australian War Crimes Act was authorized by the constitution 
since the operation was a matter incidental to the execution of a power vested by the 
constitution in the parliament’.1069 Also, the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL, and other ad hoc Tribunals 
backed by the UN have been constituted under their respective retrospective statutes, and 
only the ICC is founded on prospective Statute [Rome Statute].1070  
            Although, there are some anomalies in relation to the constitutional rights of an 
accused before the ICT-BD, in the case of Quader Molla, it was stated that provisions of the 
ICT Act 1973 and the rules offer adequate compatibility with the rights of the accused 
enshrined under Article 14 of the ICCPR.1071 The amendments of the ICT-BD’s RoP included 
right to the presumption of innocence, right to a fair and public hearing with counsel of their 
choice, right to bail, the prohibition against double jeopardy, protection against self-
incrimination, burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt and provision for a victim and witness 
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protection scheme.1072 It is further stated that, the ICT-BD not only considered its own due 
process principles but also followed settled jurisprudence from other similar tribunals.1073  
6.4.11 Criticisms: Openness and Fairness 
             A particular participant stated that, ‘…in terms of fairness, the tribunal could be more 
open, it is not easily accessible, although there is a serious security concern’.1074 He said there 
was a confusion regarding the review and the Attorney General opined that there is no scope 
of review for the ICT-BD verdict; however, the right of review was subsequently given to the 
accused.1075 He further stated that, ‘…a person associated with the tribunal said that jail code 
would not be followed for the war criminals, but ‘these were just saying[s], not applied’.1076 But 
according to him, ‘these comments shape public perception of the tribunal and created doubt 
for few people but not many’.1077 He opined that there could be a consented mechanism to 
work together.1078 
            Another politician stated that, ‘one or two foreign lawyers could be allowed by way of 
gaining permission from Bar Council for the sake of fairness’.1079 He said in the case of  the 
‘Agartala Conspiracy case’,1080 a foreign lawyer was allowed by the Bar Council of East 
Pakistan.1081 However, another participant stated that ‘right to appoint foreign lawyers was also 
given to the defence team and the accused, subject to the long-standing practice that only 
Bangladesh Bar Council authorised persons can practice law in the territory of Bangladesh’.1082 
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He said, ‘it is similar to other common law jurisdiction[s] such as England, if I go to England, I 
will not be allowed to practice law in their country'.1083 He further added that the ICT-BD is 
conducting trials publicly and international media are reporting its activities, and there should 
not be any issue regarding the openness.1084 
6.4.12 Criticisms: Due process and political interference  
              In relation to political interference, most of the interviewees seem to be supportive of 
the tribunal and deny any political interference. However, it should be noted that these 
interviewees are the supporters of the tribunal, and their views may be influenced by their 
support of the tribunal.   
             A particular participant stated that, ‘I agree that trial is necessary to prosecute 
criminals, but it also needs to be fair and free from political influence’.1085 Concerning political 
interference, a participant judge stated that, ‘personally I never got any request or 
recommendation from any political person, not even opposition parties’.1086 He believes there 
is no influence by any political party.1087 All the judges, who took part in the interview, are of 
the opinion that they performed their duties independently and impartially, and they were not 
politically motivated or influenced.  
            A particular participant stated that there is a general perception that the tribunal is 
politically motivated because over time, the accused rehabilitated into Bangladeshi politics.1088 
Another interviewee stated that the establishment of the tribunal was largely supported by the 











international bodies’.1090 A defence lawyer stated that the AL government established the 
tribunal to punish their opponent political party leaders rather than to serve justice.1091 He 
further added that, ‘it is apparent that they did not establish any tribunal in 1996 when they 
came into power because during that time Jamaat was not very popular and powerful’.1092 He 
opined that Jamaat came into power jointly with the BNP in 2001 and the AL party feared that 
they would not be able to come to power if BNP and Jamaat were together, so they established 
the tribunal for political gain.1093 
           However, another participant stated that the establishment of the tribunal is basically 
the repetition of Bangabandhu’s1094 words that war criminals will be tried on the soil of 
Bangladesh and, ‘that was translated into law later and that commitment was reflected in 
recent times’.1095 However, a BNP backed politician stated that, ‘the AL party established the 
tribunal and most of the accused are members of a particular political party like Jamaat-e-
Islami and a couple of BNP leaders’.1096 He further explained that, ‘since those people are the 
opposition of the current ruling party, so there is a possibility of political motive conducting the 
tribunal’.1097 A defence lawyer corroborated that the AL government established the tribunal to 
punish their opponent political party leaders.1098  
           A prosecution lawyer stated that, ‘I do not know in what respect the tribunal is politically 
motivated’.1099 He said that the governing Act of the tribunal was enacted in 1973 and it was 














manipulation is nothing but a generic comment.1100 A BNP politician stated that, ‘from our party, 
we say that we want justice for the crimes committed during 1971 by collaborators but it should 
be free from political gain’.1101 He further stated that since the tribunal has started functioning, 
they have some reservations in relation to the investigation process that there may be a 
political motive behind the tribunal.1102 
           A judge of the tribunal opined that the crimes committed were in a context of political 
turmoil and the killings were politically motivated.1103 However, there is no relationship with the 
judicial process and politics.1104 The judge further confirmed that, ‘the tribunal is independent 
of the government or the authority and the judges are independent'.1105 The judge further 
clarified that, ‘there may be some benefit enjoyed by particular political party/parties, but this 
must be separate from political interference’.1106 A prosecution lawyer stated that the ICT-BD 
is a domestic tribunal for international crimes, and it was established to serve justice primarily 
to address the atrocities committed in 1971.1107 He further explained various reasons for 
establishing the tribunal that: 
Firstly, the ICTA 1973 was enacted to serve justice to the victims of 1971 and to 
prosecute the perpetrators of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and 
other gross violation of human rights. However, due to political instability, no tribunal 
could be established until 2010. Secondly, the ICT-BD was established to end the 












government of Bangladesh is under an obligation to prosecute perpetrators under 
international criminal law.1108 
            A politician stated that, ‘critiques are simply repeating that the ICT-BD is a politically 
motivated court, it has no standard, it is not following due process; it is a Kangaroo court 
etc’.1109 He also stated that, ‘our continuous effort made it possible to make the trustworthy 
person understand that ICT-BD is functioning following recognised international standard’.1110 
He said even the US Ambassador Mr Stephen Rapp, expressed that the ICT-BD was 
functioning well.1111 He added that the British lawmakers and Swedish parliamentarians have 
acknowledged that the tribunal of Bangladesh is a role model for other countries seeking 
delayed justice.1112  
6.4.13 Criticisms: Role of media and perception of due process 
           The media has played an essential role in influencing public perceptions of the 
operations of the ICT-BD. The majority of the interviewees are of the opinion that in some 
high-profile cases, the accused appointed international lobby firms to criticise the ICT-BD. 
Also, some interviewees suggested that the international media had played a significant role 
in forming a negative perception that the ICT-BD was not following due process. A politician 
from AL stated that the AL party had to face a large volume of negative propaganda since the 
ICT-BD began operating.1113 He said that media sources like BBC and Al-Jazeera were 
misguided by the propaganda and created a hostile image for the AL party.1114 He also stated 
that politically affiliated people who are involved with many organisations and who have 











BD is punishing Islamist politicians or clerics.1115 In fact, many people from Bangladesh 
Jamaat-e-Islam were initially accused of crimes under the ICT Act 1973 for their involvement 
with the atrocities in 1971. After the liberation war, those people became leaders of the 
religion-based political party.  
             A particular participant stated that, ‘it has been acclaimed worldwide that there has 
been criticism, there is no doubt about it, you cannot shout at the mouth of the critiques’.1116 
He said critiques will always criticise anyway but, ‘it is generally accepted that the standard of 
trial and standard of AD's decisions in Bangladesh have been world-class'.1117 He also 
explained that, ‘…sometimes, it is even stated that the standard maintained by the Bangladesh 
Tribunal and the AD have been better and superior in some aspect to the judgments passed 
by other tribunals’.1118 So, the decisions of the ICT-BD and AD of the Supreme Court in 
Bangladesh can enrich the applicability of international law domestically.1119 
            A prosecution lawyer stated that, ‘the Human Rights organisations were misguided by 
the appointed lobbyists which supported the perpetrators'.1120 A particular interviewee stated 
that, ‘from previous experience, it can be seen that media like BBC, Al-Jazeera and other 
international media have their own policy or criteria to assess regional or national problems 
and most of the time they perform wrong assessment'.1121 He gave the example of the Vietnam 
war and the Liberation War of 1971 and said that, ‘media did wrong assessment'.1122 He said 
that the media failed to understand or report that in the Bangladeshi situation, perpetrators or 












evidence.1123 Another politician from Jatiya Party said that a few Muslim majority countries 
(e.g. Turkey, Pakistan and some middle eastern countries) were critical when the tribunal 
delivered judgments against the leaders of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party.1124 He said 
this was mainly because of Pakistan's sympathetic view towards the accused under the ICT 
Act 1973 fearing that in future, Bangladesh may attempt to prosecute their army officers who 
took part in the atrocities of 1971.1125 
 6.5 Conclusion and Interim findings 
           The generalised concept of due process was articulated in Article 14 of the ICCPR, 
and it seems from the interview data that the majority of the interviewees are of the view that 
the ICT-BD has provided appropriate due process safeguards to the accused.1126 A particular 
interviewee stated that after detailed deliberation and following expert advice, the parliament 
unanimously adopted the ICT Act 1973 to, ‘…provide for detention, prosecution, and 
punishment of persons of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes 
under international law, and for matters connected therewith’.1127 
        The interim findings show that, majority of the respondents interviewed were of the view 
that the ICT Act 1973 and its RoP afford all the standard fair trial safeguards to the accused. 
However, there are conflicting opinions provided by some politicians and defence lawyers that 
in practice, due process principles have not been followed appropriately.1128 It is important to 








1127 Preamble of the ICT Act 1973, available at < https://www.ict-bd.org/ict1/pdf/The%20Act%20of%201973.pdf> 
last accessed 15 June 2016. 
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            The majority of the interviewees opined that the ICT-BD's foundation was based on 
the Nuremberg Charter and for this reason, the governing Act of the tribunal had to be 
amended to ensure it reflected contemporary due process principles. Whereas the Nuremberg 
tribunal had no right of appeal to a higher court or a provisional release option, the ICT-BD 
made these due process safeguards available to the accused persons before it. This 
distinguishes the tribunal from other international tribunals and in the researcher’s opinion, 
can set a contextual precedent for other South Asian and Muslim majority countries to follow 
in order to provide a fair justice mechanism not only to the victim but also to the accused.  
            In relation to substantive due process, a particular interviewee stated that the main 
objective of enacting the governing Act of the ICT-BD was to ensure due process. Even 
Robertson opined that the ICT Act 1973 was a masterpiece in its time. However, the concept 
of due process has evolved significantly due to the development of human rights and the 
contemporary ad hoc and hybrid tribunals such as ICTY, ICTR and SCSL. For this reason, the 
government of Bangladesh appointed the Bangladesh Law Commission to review the 1973 
Act, and the scope of the Act was broadened so that anyone within the territory of Bangladesh 
who has committed crimes under ICL can be prosecuted under the Act. Also, several fair trial 
rights from Article 14 of the ICCPR were included after amending the ICT Act 1973 and the 
RoP of the ICT-BD. Also, the judges have used their discretion and allowed interlocutory 
appeals, bringing home-cooked food and treatment at the choice of the accused. 
            In relation to procedural due process of the ICT-BD, there are divided opinions; the 
judges of the tribunal stated that procedurally, there was no short of the quality of the due 
process. The majority of the interviewees confirmed that sufficient time was given to the 
defence team to prepare their case, and interlocutory appeal rights were available. It is also 
confirmed that the defence team has used interlocutory appeals on numerous occasions. On 
the other hand, the politician of Jamaat-e-Islami and defence lawyers provided a contradictory 
opinion that in practice, there was no proper procedural due process for the accused.   
 203 
             The judgments of the ICT-BD suggest that there is no ‘one size fits all’ concept of due 
process rather this concept is relative, and the ICT-BD has defined the due process in line 
with the national wishes, long denial of justice and recognised international norms and 
jurisprudence. A critical analysis suggest that minimum standard of due process has been 
provided to the accused under the ICT Act 1973 because RoP was amended in 2011 to 
include right to the presumption of innocence, right to a fair and public hearing with counsel of 
their choice, right to apply for and be granted bail, prohibition on convicting a person twice for 
the same crime, prohibition on requiring the accused to confess guilt, prosecution bears the 
burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, creation of a victim and witness protection 
system.1129 The Human Rights Watch commented on the amendments stating that, the ICT-
BD’s RoP addresses the key problems of the due process issues but not all the aspects such 
as clarifying the definition of crimes, and victim and witness protection.1130 
               The ICT Act 1973 was given special protection under Article 47A of the Bangladesh 
Constitution, that means provisions of this particular Act cannot be challenged on 
constitutional grounds. Many critics, including Robertson, Menon, and Chopra argued that 
since the subsequent amendment of the Act excluded the accused from safe constitutional 
guards, it has an impact on the quality of the due process. However, Professor M Rahman 
argued that, the validity of Constitution derives from its people itself and Bangladesh is a 
democratic country so it is entirely a domestic judicial matter of Bangladesh on how they define 
due process applicability to the accused under national criminal code and the accused under 
the 1973 Act.1131 Bangladesh has secured independence through a liberation war (the war was 
 
 
1129 Jon Lunn and Arabella Thorp, ‘Bangladesh: The International Crimes Tribunal’ (3 May 2012) House of 
Commons: International Affairs and Defence Section 3. 
1130 Bangladesh: Guarantee Fair Trials for Independence-Era Crimes, Human Rights Watch, 11 July 2011  
available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/bangladesh-guarantee-fair-trials-independence-era-crimes 
Last accessed 15 March 2019 
1131 Rahman & Masum Billah (n 26) 18. 
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unjustly imposed) and the proclamation of Bangladesh independence forms the genesis of the 
Bangladeshi Constitution.1132 
             The safeguard against retrospective legislation is not applicable for law which is 
designed to prosecute and punish the international crimes which existed as crimes at the time 
of their commission. Similarly, the crimes committed in 1971 in the territory of Bangladesh 
were recognised as crimes under international law. The ICT Act 1973 criminalises acts, which 
were crimes under customary international law. Also, Bangladesh is a party to the ICCPR, 
and Article 15(1) permits post-facto legislation to try and assess crimes under ICL. 
            In relation to the rights of an accused during the investigation stage, it appears that 
although the suspects have the right to bail if an investigation cannot be completed within one 
year, in practice, no one has been granted bail by the tribunal due to lack of progress during 
investigation stage. It appears that the investigation agency was able to complete investigation 
within the stipulated timeframe. This stipulation of time is significant because other 
international criminal tribunals mentioned a reasonable time without giving a time frame. In 
terms of clarity and arbitrary detention, this aspect of the ICT-BD may be considered as a 
small contribution to the development of ICL and transitional justice. 
            The ICT-BD has granted bail to the accused on a few occasions on health grounds. 
The defence team attempted to take the benefit of health grounds in the case of the Chief 
Prosecutor -Vs-Muhammad Shahidullah where the accused was on bail due to health issues. 
In this case, it was argued that the accused was physically incapable due to illness and also 
mentally impaired, defending his case if a charge is framed.1133 Subsequently, the prosecution 
submitted that it was important for the accused to understand the charge against him when 
the charge is framed and if the suspect is mentally impaired then proceedings should not 
 
 
1132 Ibid.  
1133 The Chief Prosecutor Vs Muhammad Shahidullah, ICT- BD Case No.07 of 2017 [Order No.06 of 25.02.2018]. 
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progress unless the suspect's mental soundness is confirmed.1134 The tribunal directed to refer 
him to the Civil Surgeon of Dhaka to ascertain his mental soundness. Very recently, in April 
2019, an accused of ICT-BD has been granted bail on health grounds. The accused Gulzar 
Hossain Khan, has been granted bail on three conditions; firstly, he should respond whenever 
the court summons; secondly, he must maintain contact with his Dhaka based relatives and 
thirdly he cannot contact the witnesses of the case.1135 
             In relation to the experience of the lawyers, the majority of the interviewees stated 
that the people involved with the tribunal developed experience over time. The prosecution 
lawyers that were interviewed stated that they were experienced lawyers dealing with national 
criminal law, but they had no prior experience dealing with the issue of ICL and a new set of 
evidential law.  
            One of the most important findings is that tribunals dealing with international crimes 
often attract the attention of the international community for apparent reasons. There are 
various factors such as international lobbying, diplomatic pressure, and the negative role of 
media, which might have been affected the credibility of the ICT-BD. The authority should 
have an active intellectual, strategic policy combatting these issues. However, in the situation 
of Bangladesh, initially, there seemed to be an intellectual gap prior to establishing the ICT-
BD. No formal research was conducted before establishing the tribunal.  
            Even if we consider the Cambodian Tribunal, it appears that their tribunal did not start 
functioning without appropriate prior research. However, in Bangladesh, no official or 
institutional research was carried out before establishing the tribunal. Majority of the 




1135 Mizanur Rahman, ‘War crimes: Accused gets bail on health grounds’ Dhaka Tribune (Dhaka, 3 April 2019), 
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not learn before starting the tribunal; instead, they are learning through the working process 
of the tribunal. However, a particular judge stated that the initial lack of experience did not 
affect the judgments or justice, which has been reflected by the comments made by the AD of 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. The defence lawyers or the opposing politicians did not 
raise any concerns regarding the lack of experience and whether it had affected the initial 
judgments because there is a three-stage process before the excluded decision is delivered. 
            Generally, it is believed that the defence lawyers are in a disadvantageous position in 
the criminal tribunals compared to the prosecution lawyers. This is because the prosecution 
lawyers have the advantage of using government agencies (e.g. Police, magistrate and local 
administrators) in investigating matters and collecting evidence. In terms of equality of arms, 
this disadvantageous position of defence lawyers is a notable criticism of the due process 
notion. The defence lawyers of the ICT-BD also raised their concern in this regard. One of the 
defence lawyers even stated that the lawyers of the defence team had faced discrimination 
such as extra security checks compared to the prosecution lawyers when entering the tribunal. 
The limited number of defence lawyers that were interviewed also raised concern that they 
could not work freely as they felt they were perhaps, under surveillance. However, the 
prosecution lawyers expressed an opposite view that security of the prosecution lawyers was 
an important issue. A particular prosecution lawyer stated that even he himself was under 
threat.  
            The due process aspect of the ICT-BD is, however, criticised from various quarters. 
The critics in relation to due process principles alleged that the ICT-BD falls short of 
internationally recognized standards of due process.1136 There are allegations that the 
governing statute is vague, RoP’s are unclear in terms of due process. It is also alleged that 
the accused have not been given sufficient due process rights as they had been interrogated 
 
 
1136 War Crimes & The Rule of Law (22 September 2011) South Asia Journal available from < 
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without the presence of legal representatives. A particular judge that was interviewed indicated 
that the allegations were unfounded. Many of the allegations are based on the legal position 
before amending the RoP in 2011. After the amendments of the RoP, the criticisms were 
narrowed down. 
During the researcher's short stay in Bangladesh in May 2017, the researcher 
observed that police protection had been given to the prosecution lawyers due to serious 
concerns regarding security. However, when the researcher had interviewed the defence 
lawyers, there was no such police protection for them, and when asked if they had sought any 
police protection from the tribunal, a particular defence lawyer did not provide an affirmative 
answer. The majority of the interviewees are of the opinion that the defence team being in a 
financially advantageous position were able to hire international legal experts to assist them 
in the preparation of their arguments and submission. One prosecution lawyer stated that the 
defence team had not only hired international legal experts but also hired an international 
lobby firm to pressure the government and to criticise the tribunal. 
           Returning to our key question as to the nature of due process in the context of 
transitional justice in Bangladesh, the ICT-BD offers three important lessons. Firstly, the 
concept of due process may be defined by referring to the long delay, established historical 
facts, national wishes and the judicial culture of a particular jurisdiction. The ICT-BD has 
strived to meet one of the main aims of a transitional justice which is to hear the voices of the 
people. The due process system in Bangladesh has not only listened to the voices of its own 
people by protecting the ICT Act under Article 47 of the constitution, but it has also considered 
international opinions and criticisms and amended the act accordingly. The amendment of the 
ICT Act shortly before and during the process of ongoing trials have been met with criticisms, 
but the latter amendments guaranteeing more rights of the accused have been appreciated 
globally. This could serve as an example to other post conflict countries.  
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           The second lesson that can be learnt from the ICT-BD is that, the ICT-BD has created 
an opportunity to scrutinize the decision of the tribunal to the highest court of land via right of 
appeal and review. This is a critically necessary process in countries awarding the death 
penalty as the highest form of punishment. 
            The third lesson from the ICT-BD is that, the ICT-BD has not developed an 
independent appointment body to appoint judges and prosecutors for which it has attracted 
criticisms. Nevertheless, the reflection of the judgments suggests that there is no evidence of 
bias and   all decisions are taken based on the evidence before the ICT-BD and sufficient 
reasoning is provided. Even though the appointment of the ICT-BD judges could not be 
challenged, the decision of the ICT-BD could always be reviewed by the highest court of the 
land, and the appointment of the highest court judges can be challenged. So, there is a check 
and balance system at least to ensure that the judgments of the ICT-BD are not legally flawed 
or erroneous. Overall, considering the judgments, interview data, and opinions of the critiques, 
it seems that the ICT-BD has blended the notion of due process applied by international 













EVIDENTIAL MATTERS OF THE ICT-BD 
7.1 Introduction 
            This Chapter attempted to analyse the lessons that can be learnt from the operation 
of the ICT-BD’s handling of old evidence and hearsay evidence. In order to answer the main 
research question, this Chapter analyses interview data collected through semi-structured 
interviews and various evidential aspects of the ICT-BD with particular reference to the 
established principles of the historic international criminal tribunals such as Nuremberg trials, 
ICTY and ICTR and ICC. The historical development of the evidential rules has been given 
particular attention in assessing whether the ICT-BD has provided any valuable insight into 
the further development of the evidence rules of ICL and transitional justice. The approach 
taken by the ICT-BD has also been considered along with the quality of evidence before the 
ICT-BD. Also, it has been assessed whether the judges gave sufficient reasoning in assessing 
evidence and to what extent the ICT-BD reflected accepted evidential rules in its practices. 
Specific focus has been given to the issue of how the ICT-BD dealt with the hearsay evidence 
and how evidential weight has been assessed considering the cultural context of Bangladesh. 
The ICT-BD has adopted a cautious approach towards admitting hearsay evidence, without 
further corroborating evidence the tribunal did not admit hearsay evidence. 
7.1.1 Types of evidence  
            There are two elements in evidence which are, the fact in issue (factum probandum) 
and the evidentiary fact (factum probans).1137 The fact in issue requires a particular fact to be 
established and the evidentiary fact is to support the fact in issue establishing the fact to be 
true.1138 Primarily, there are two types of evidence; establishing fact such as ‘direct evidence’ 
 
 
1137 Mark Klamberg, Evidence in International Criminal Trials (Martinus Nijhoff 2013) 115. 
1138 Ibid 115. 
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and ‘indirect evidence’ (circumstantial evidence).1139 In the ICT-BD, both direct and indirect 
evidence have been used. In both types of evidence, there may be evidentiary facts 
establishing a particular fact, and collateral facts influencing the probative value of the 
evidence.1140  
            The Nuremberg Tribunal admitted the evidence which was relevant to establish the 
true facts including official government documents, the report by the International Red Cross, 
affidavit, deposition, signed statements, diary, sworn or un-sworn letter and statement, copy 
of any relevant document and hearsay evidence.1141 As per section 19(1) of the International 
Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973, the ICT-BD is also empowered to admit evidence ‘…without 
observing formality, such as reports, photographs newspapers, books, films, tape recordings 
and other materials which appear to have the probative value'.1142 
7.1.2 Objectives of the Rules of Evidence 
            It is not the objective of the Rules of Evidence to establish historical truth; instead, it is 
the main objective of the rules of evidence to establish ‘trial truth' or ‘judicial truth'.1143  A flexible 
approach to admissibility of evidence in ICL has been developed since the Nuremberg trial, 
and weight has been placed on the totality of the evidence. The judges have been given 
considerable discretion to admit the evidence. There are competing issues such as crime 
control, fair trial, truth, and expeditious proceedings, which are all interrelated. The complexity 
of the mass atrocity cases and the absence of juries in such trials may be the reasons for the 
flexible approach in admitting evidence in international criminal trials.1144 Article 15 of the ICTY 
stated that, the judges are empowered to formulate the RPE’s necessary for the proper 
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1140 Ibid 117. 
1141 Ibid 342. 
1142 Sayeedi (n 55) para. 65. 
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administration of justice.1145 The ICT-BD has also followed a flexible approach on the 
admissibility of evidence with some safeguards.  
7.2 International legal position on Rules of Evidence  
            The historic Nuremberg tribunal heavily relied on documentary evidence and 
comparatively, gave lesser rights to the accused persons, and for this reason, the same 
practice would not be acceptable today due to the subsequent development of the human 
rights.1146 The judges of the Nuremberg tribunal however were very flexible. The Nuremberg 
Charter empowered the judges to produce the necessary rules of evidence and procedure.1147  
Also, judges were from diverse legal systems, and their mixed perspectives on evidence 
started the development of the evidential aspect of the ICL.1148 
            The Nuremberg Tribunal was not bound to follow the technical rules of evidence 
because of the large number of accused, the complexity of the cases, and to ensure 
expeditious procedure.1149 Article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter provided that, in order to 
ensure expeditious and non-technical procedure, the tribunal shall admit any evidence if it has 
probative value.1150 A critical analysis suggests that the witnesses of the atrocities during WWII 
were scattered around the world, many official documents were destroyed by the Japanese 
and for this reason, it was necessary to adopt a flexible approach for admissibility of 
evidence.1151 A resemblance of this aspect of the historic international criminal tribunal can 
also be observed in the Bangladeshi situation where official documents were destroyed over 
time, and many eyewitnesses have died due to the long denial of justice.   
 
 
1145 Article 15 of the ICTY. 
1146 W J Fenrick, ‘In the Field with UNCOE: Investigating Atrocities in the Territory of Former Yugoslavia’ (1995) 
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of Evidence ' (2008) 12 INT'L J EVIDENCE & PROOF 1. 
1149 Nuremberg Trial Final Report Appendix L: Ordinance 7, available from 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt07.asp accessed 20 November 2018. 
1150 Article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter. 
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            The judges of the ICTY made their own RPE and amended it twenty-two times to adapt 
with due process.1152 Further, the ICTY judges interpreted the RPE inconsistently at different 
times.1153 This is an indication of the complexity of the rules of evidence surrounding the 
application of ICL. The critical issue of formulating evidential rules is to make an adequate 
balance ensuring expeditious administration of justice and giving sufficient rights to the 
accused to defend their case.1154 The judges of the ICTY actually followed the limited 
guidelines of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and created its own adversarial approach to the 
evidential rules.1155  
            The general rule on the standard for admissibility defined in ICTY and ICTR Rule 89 
is as follows: 
(A) A Chamber shall apply the rules of evidence set forth in this Section and shall not 
be bound by national rules of evidence. (Amended 1 Dec 2000 and 13 Dec 2000)  
(B) In cases not otherwise provided for in this Section, a Chamber shall apply rules 
of evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and are 
consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.  
(C) A Chamber may admit any relevant evidence which it deems to have probative 
value.  
(D) A Chamber may exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial.  
(E) A Chamber may request verification of the authenticity of evidence obtained out 
of court.  
 
 
1152 Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedure for International Criminal Law? The Rules of the ICTY in 
Gideon Boas & William A. Schabas (Eds) International Criminal Law Developments in the Case Law of the ICTY 
(Brill Academic Publishers 2003) 1. 
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(F) A Chamber may receive the evidence of a witness orally or, where the interests 
of justice allow, in written form.1156  
 
It seems that under the above-mentioned Rule, the trial chamber is not bound to follow 
the national Rules of evidence. Also, it is imperative that the tribunal should apply the rules of 
evidence for a fair determination following the general principles of law. The vital aspect of 
Rule 89 is that tribunal may admit any evidence which has probative value and exclude any 
evidence which has no probative value. The SCSL in determining the method of admitting 
evidence did not, however, consider probative value as paramount and stated that evidential 
weight is a separate issue, and judges should determine it at the trial stage.1157 Last but not 
least, Rule 89 permitted to admit evidence both in the oral form or written form.  
7.3 Legal position of the evidential rules of the ICT-BD 
Under Section 23 of the ICT 1973 Act, the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) 1898 and 
the Evidence Act 1872 are inapplicable for the trial under ICT-BD.1158 This echoes Rule 89 of 
the ICTY and ICTR. 
             Rule 54 allowed the prosecution to admit documentary evidence in the absence of the 
maker of the statement and its photocopies are also said to be admissible provided the 
evidence has probative value.1159  
           Rule 56 (2) permitted hearsay evidence to be admissible by its discretion, considering 
the reliability and probative value of the evidence. Rule 56 (3) clarified that, ‘Any statement 
made to the investigation officer or to the Prosecutor in the course of investigation by the 
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1158 Sayeedi (n 55) para. 35. 
1159 Rule 54 of the RoP of the ICT-BD. 
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accused is not admissible’.1160 Rule 57 of the RoP of the ICT-BD reflected Rule 89 (B) of the 
ICTY that, all the rules should be applied for a fair determination of the matter within the Act.1161 
7.3.1 Method of evaluating evidence: Standard of proof 
            The method of evaluating evidence is determined by the required level of standard of 
proof. In common law systems, there are two standards of proof such as ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’, and ‘on the balance of probabilities’ and in criminal proceedings, it usually is ‘beyond 
reasonable doubt’.1162 The ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is sufficiently a high standard where 
more than one reasonable person would come to the same conclusion based on evidence.1163 
According to Blakesley, the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard means if there is any 
reasonable doubt on the evidence, then the conviction cannot be given.1164 The historic 
Nuremberg tribunal had acquitted Mr Schacht and Von Papen, because the allegations 
against them could not be proven ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’.1165  
            It is important to consider that lower than ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ is used for charge 
framing and issuing warrant of arrest. The standard of ‘substantial grounds’ is used at the pre-
trial stage to take into consideration a particular case. Also, in issuing a warrant of arrest a 
‘reasonable ground to believe’ standard is used.1166 As discussed earlier, one special feature 
of the ICT-BD is that the burden of proof shifted to the defence in relation to a suspects alibi 




1160 Rule 56 of the RoP of the ICT-BD. 
1161 Rule 57 of the RoP of the ICT-BD. 
1162 Klamberg (n 1137) 128. 
1163 Klamberg (n 1137) 128. 
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Trial’, Nouvelles Etudes Pénales , vol. 13 BIS , (1998), 87. 
1165 The Avon Project: Judgment : Von Papen and Schacht, Available from 
https://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/judschac.asp accessed 4 December 2018. 
1166 Klamberg (n 1137) 143. 
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7.3.2 Admissibility of Evidence 
            According to Cassese, it is the established principle of the common law that, '…all 
relevant evidence is admissible unless it is inadmissible'.1167 The justification behind this 
assertion is that, judges are professional and they are capable of determining the proper 
weight to give to the evidence, and they evaluate the evidence fairly and objectively.1168 
              According to Friman, in terms of admissibility of evidence in international criminal 
tribunals, the main focus should be given on the fair determination of the cases following the 
principles of its own Statute and the general principles of law.1169 The judges have essential 
roles to play in adopting and amending the rules if necessary, and their function is a ‘fluid 
process'.1170 
            The main feature of the admissibility rule under ICL, is the 'totality of the evidence' 
approach, which allows the judges to make a rounded assessment of the all available 
evidence.1171 The issue which is left to the individual judge is the amount of weight to be given 
on particular evidence - based on credibility and reliability of that evidence.1172  
7.3.3 Probative value and weight of Evidence 
            In assessing the evidence, the task of the judges is to evaluate ‘the probative value’ 
or ‘weight of the evidence’.1173 The term ‘probative value' can be defined as the aspect of any 
evidence which can prove or disprove a point in issue.1174 The ICL has developed an approach 
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that has given importance to the totality of the evidence in determining the relative weight for 
the evidence.  
            The exciting issue is that there is no specific law that states how judges should 
evaluate evidence in terms of giving weight. As a result, Klamberg has supported the argument 
of legal realists that to some extent, evaluation of evidence by the judges may be guided by 
their subjective preferences.1175   
7.3.4 Corroborating Evidence 
            Corroborating evidence is not directly related to confirm the allegation, but to reaffirm 
the reliability of the related evidence which requires support.1176 It may be relevant to issues 
concerning admissibility as well as evaluation of evidence. The ICTY and SCSL reaffirm that, 
‘…corroboration of evidence is not a legal requirement, but rather concerns the weight to be 
attached to the evidence’.1177 
7.4 Analysis of the interview data 
           Kelsall has compared the ICTY with ‘a Mercedes Benz, crawling at a pitiful pace along 
Sierra Leone’s potholed roads: prestigious, maybe, but ill-adapted to the local terrain’.1178 
According to him, international criminal tribunals should be tailored to deal with the particular 
cultural context.1179 In this regard, the ICT-BD is a customised domestic tribunal dealing with 
international crimes. The judges and lawyers and investigators have relevant cultural 
knowledge which is important to consider in assessing the evidence and witnesses. 
 
 
1175 Mark Klamberg, ‘Fragmentation and Criminal Procedure’ in Larissa van den Herik and Carsten Stahn (eds) 
The Diversification and Fragmentation of International Criminal Law (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) 618 
1176 Black’s Law Dictionary, 2004, 596. 
1177 Prosecutor v Kordić and Čerkez, ICTY Case No. IT  95-14/2) [ Appeal Chamber Judgment 17 December 
2004] para. 274; Fofana and Kodewa , [SCSL  Appeal Chamber Judgment of  28 May 2008] para. 199. 
1178 Tim Kelsall, Culture Under Cross-Examination: International Justice and Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(Cambridge University Press 2009) 256. 
1179 Ibid.  
 217 
7.4.1 Availability of evidence before ICT-BD 
          In explaining the availability of evidence, a particular politician stated that there were 
already a lot of documents, reports, films, footage, newspaper articles available depicting what 
had happened during 1971.1180 According to this politician, through the trials, the evidence had 
been re-examined and provided evidential value in criminal proceedings.1181 This particular 
politician further narrated that he does not think there are any disputes about the perpetrators 
and scale of atrocities because various independent media have reported these since 
1971.1182 He also added that academic research had been conducted on the events of 1971, 
and many facts and crimes are well established.1183 The politician also opined that, ‘…if you 
go to the villages in Bangladesh in almost every village, you will find mass graves where 
innocent people were buried’.1184 This is important to consider that the nature of evidence 
under ICL is different from domestic criminal law and for this reason, evidence such as mass 
graves demonstrates the level of crimes committed in a particular area. On another point, a 
prosecution lawyer mentioned that, '…literally it is impossible to get direct evidence proving 
guilt’ for the crimes under ICL and that was the idea when the Nuremberg statute was 
framed.1185  
7.4.2 Statements of the witnesses 
            Witnesses are essential in the international criminal proceedings in establishing 
accurate fact-finding. Combs, in her article, has given a detailed account of the testimonial 
deficiency and the judge’s treatment of witness testimony in international criminal trials.1186 
She has conducted an empirical analysis of 342 prosecution witnesses who testified before 
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the ICTR and found deficiencies in the evidence.1187 According to her research, some 
witnesses before the international criminal tribunals explained the same set of facts multiple 
times on different occasions and thus discrepancies arose from the same person’s 
statement.1188 Combs also claimed the following: 
My previous research found such inconsistencies to be a prevalent feature of witness 
testimony in all of the international criminal tribunals I studied, and they pertain to a 
whole range of topics relevant to the disposition of the trial. Some inconsistencies 
centre on such details as dates, distances, duration, and numbers[sic], whereas others 
concern central aspects of the crime and/or the defendant's involvement in the 
crime.1189 
           However, Combs maintains that whatever the quality of the evidence before a tribunal, 
it will not affect the accuracy of its findings provided that judges made an accurate assessment 
of ‘…the quality of the evidence and finds facts in accordance with that assessment’.1190  
           A judge of the tribunal reaffirmed that ‘during the trials, we had to consider witnesses 
and evidence very cautiously because of significant time-lapse, we had to rely on 
corroborative evidence’.1191 This particular judge also acknowledged that they had to adopt 
flexible approaches for admitting written witness statements for both the defence and 
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7.4.3 Cultural factors assessing witnesses 
            It is important to note that cultural factors are relevant when assessing any written 
statement or oral evidence before international criminal tribunals where judges are from a 
different culture. However, there is no such tension in the ICT-BD because judges are from 
the same cultural background. On the other hand, it should be noted that there is also danger 
if judges are from the same cultural background because historical truth may guide the sense 
of judgment of the judges when assessing the evidence. According to Zenebe, judges should 
not be from the same nationality as the accused because the witness may not come to give 
evidence before a judge of their own nationality.1193 However, Cryer has provided a different 
opinion that local judges are capable of considering the cultural and social norms when 
assessing evidence to give the evidence a real meaning.1194 Cryer has given an example from 
the case of ICTR, that in the Rwandan culture, people do not give direct answers, and the 
answers have to be decoded to be given true meaning.1195 Also, in some cases, the witnesses 
may not be familiar with maps, film and graphic representations of localities and judges should 
not find adverse credibility in this regard.1196 In some cases, the witnesses seem to be evasive, 
giving oral evidence.1197  
             According to Cryer, judges on international courts should take into account the cultural 
and linguistic differences because it would show respect to the victims of international 
crimes.1198 This is an indication of how the evidential aspect is affected if the tribunal is 
established far away from the country where the crimes had been committed. This problem 
can be avoided by establishing a domestic tribunal, which can be observed from the 
experience of ICT-BD. Kelsall in assessing the efficacy of the ICTY, in the particular context 
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of Sierra Leone, argued that, ‘…Western legal precepts and procedures were unsuited to 
judging adequately’ the facts, nature of crimes, and credibility of witnesses in the cultural 
context of Sierra Leone.1199 He stated that due to lack of requisite cultural knowledge, the 
judges could not assess the credibility of the witnesses appropriately. According to him, local 
culture is an essential factor to take into account, for administering proper justice.1200 
7.4.4 Quality of Evidence  
              A particular defence lawyer stated that the prosecution produced weak evidence and 
many witnesses in support of the prosecution could not give reliable evidence; nevertheless, 
the judges accepted their evidence very liberally.1201 According to him, ‘the evidence law was 
relaxed, and it did give extra benefit to the prosecution team to prove allegation'.1202 He further 
stated that ‘if normal standards would have been followed there could be very little chance to 
prove the allegation against the accused’.1203 
          In the case of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the prosecution has successfully proved 19 
charges by oral testimony and documentary evidence and 5 charges have been proven by the 
statements of witnesses.1204 In this case, the prosecution produced a list of 138 witnesses and 
defence submitted a list of 48 witnesses defending the case against the accused.1205 During 
the trial, both the prosecution and defence had examined 20 witnesses who were witnesses 
of the occurrence.1206 In passing the verdict judges stated the following: 
The incidents took place [a]bout 40/41 years back in 1971 and as such memory of live 
witnesses might have been faded and as a result discrepancy may have occurred in 
their versions made in the tribunal. The case before us depends mostly on narratives 
of live witnesses who claim to have witnessed the occurrences and sustained trauma 
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as well. Their testimonies are based on their explicit memories. Despite the 
indisputable atrocities of the crimes committed during the War of Liberation in 1971 by 
the Pakistani Soldiers in collaboration with the local perpetrators like accused Delower 
Hossain Sayeedi we require to examine the facts constituting offences 
dispassionately, keeping in mind that the accused is presumed to be innocent.1207 
 
             Now, if we analyse the approach taken by the judges of ICT-BD in assessing 
evidence, it appears that the judges have taken into account the significant time-lapse and 
how it might have affected the memory of the witnesses. The judgment acknowledged that 
some of the witnesses sustained trauma, and their memories were unambiguous.1208 Also, the 
judges predominantly reminded themselves that the accused is presumed to be innocent. 
            In assessing the individual liability of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the tribunal judges 
considered facts of common knowledge, the context of the attack, documentary and 
circumstantial evidence, political status of the accused at the time of occurrences, relationship, 
‘…of the accused with the local Pakistani armed forces and his participation in the commission 
of offences charged’.1209 
            Based on the above interview data and information from the judgments, it can be said 
that, on one hand, given the gravity of the crimes and delayed prosecutions, the ICT-BD has 
to adopt more flexible rules of evidence. However, from the perspective of the defence, at 
least, judges were being very flexible with the admission of evidence and adopting inclusive 
approaches to assessing probative value. 
7.4.5 Hearsay Evidence 
                  The general rule in common law is that hearsay is inadmissible with some 
exceptions under which hearsay evidence may be admissible. A particular defence lawyer 
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that was interviewed opined that judges were lenient to admit evidence in favour of the 
prosecution.1210 A particular defence lawyer stated that, ‘…if judges would not take a flexible 
approach in admitting evidence not a single allegation could be proved'.1211 A particular judge 
narrated, however, that, ‘…it is true that the ICT-BD relied on hearsay evidence; however, 
cautions were taken, and corroborative evidence was relied upon to give any weight to the 
relevant hearsay evidence'.1212 This particular judge further explained that direct evidential 
problems arose because many eyewitnesses had passed away, and a lot of fresh evidence 
had been destroyed when the alleged perpetrators assumed power in the government of 
Bangladesh.1213   
            According to a particular participant, evidential flexibility is apparent in the trials of the 
ICL in particular, where crimes were committed many decades ago.1214 He further opined that 
the judgments of the ICT-BD would add legal value for the available evidence, and it will 
contribute to some form of justice.1215 
            A judge that was interviewed stated that the ICT-BD had followed a cautious approach 
when it admitted hearsay evidence.1216 He reaffirmed that at the appeal stage, before the AD 
of the Supreme Court, he had the chance to scan all the evidence before him and said that all 
the convictions were based on evidence and judges have given sufficient reasoning for 
evidential weight.1217 According to him, although hearsay evidence is admissible, most of the 













            In the case of Tadić,  the ICTY stated that, in assessing the probative value of hearsay 
evidence, special attention should to be given to the reliability of the evidence.1219 It was 
emphasised that in admitting any hearsay evidence, the tribunal should consider whether the 
statement was ‘voluntary, truthful and trustworthy’.1220 Also, the ICTR in the case of Akayesu, 
has reiterated that hearsay evidence is admissible, but caution has to be followed as required 
by Rule 89.1221 
             Defence lawyers of the ICT-BD in Bangladesh alleged that the prosecution produced 
weak hearsay evidence and the judges accepted their evidence and that the accused had 
been denied the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses in some cases especially when 
the prosecution presented hearsay evidence.1222 However, an AD Justice stated that hearsay 
evidence is acceptable in most of the international tribunals such as Nuremberg tribunal, 
Tokyo tribunal, ICC and other ad hoc tribunals created by the UN and similarly the ICT-BD 
also admitted hearsay evidence.1223 He said that, in drafting the ICT 1973 Act, many aspects 
of the Nuremberg charter were borrowed, and admissibility of hearsay evidence is one such 
aspect.1224 According to this judge, the Rome Statue followed the ICT Act 1973 to some 
extent.1225 
            The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY provided guidelines when admitting hearsay 
evidence and provided that the relevant factors include whether the statement was given 
under oath, subject to cross-examination, first-hand, made through translation; made 
contemporaneously to the events; given under formal environment i.e. before a judge. 1226  
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         Under the ICC’s legal framework hearsay evidence is also admissible, and in the case 
of Lubanga, four documents were presented which were admitted as hearsay evidence.1227 
             There are at least four criteria for admitting hearsay evidence. Firstly, hearsay 
evidence should bear a sufficient level of reliability.1228 Secondly, there should be an 
explanation for admitting hearsay evidence in terms of necessity.1229 Thirdly, hearsay 
evidence is available without any difficulties along with other corroborative evidence this type 
of evidence is helpful for the administration of justice.1230 Fourthly and most importantly, 
hearsay evidence should be relevant to the case.1231 
             On the other hand, hearsay evidence is against the right of an accused to cross-
examine the witnesses against him.1232 Also, the maker of the statement may rely on deception 
and later may reveal the information to be incorrect.1233 Further, later evidence may suggest 
that the statement maker was under duress to give a statement or the statement can be 
fabricated.1234 
             An AD justice held that, the hearsay evidence admitted by the ICT-BD have basis and 
they have reliability and they appropriately passed the test.1235 This particular judge mentioned 
that they have seen whether the hearsay evidence can be relied on before giving any 
weight.1236 He also emphasised that they did not wholly rely on hearsay evidence; the hearsay 
evidence was supported by other corroborative evidence.1237 It appears from the case of 
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Sayeedi that, if hearsay evidence is not corroborated by other evidence, then that evidence 
may be disregarded.1238 
 In the ICT-BD cases, the prosecution relied on a number of newspaper articles which 
are normally not admissible under domestic criminal law. However, a newspaper article would 
only be admissible if, ‘…it is necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and its 
admission is within the trial judge's exercise of discretion’.1239 
            A judge who was interviewed referred to the newspapers of 1971 produced by the 
prosecutors and the investigators, most of those newspaper was from a political party called 
Jaamat-e-Islami which in fact was the political party that participated in the crimes against 
humanity.1240 He reaffirmed that hearsay evidence was corroborated by this evidence as well 
as other documentary evidence and also by direct evidence.1241  
            The participant also gave an example by referring to the case of Salauddin Quader 
Chowdhury1242 that, ‘the man Nuton Kundu was killed in 1971, his son gave evidence, in the 
case of Qader Molla, lots of villagers gave evidence, and those who were direct victims gave 
evidence’.1243 Another example that was provided by this particular judge mentioned that, ‘a 
lady whose husband was killed, who was raped, gave evidence although she had become old 
but she remembered things because people do not normally forget, easily these sort of 
dramatic events'.1244 So, in terms of quality of evidence, the ICT-BD had the opportunity to 
hear from direct witnesses of the crimes and other corroborative evidence assisted the tribunal 
to establish judicial truth. 
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             It appears that the judges of the ICT-BD have refused to admit hearsay evidence on 
multiple occasions if the required test had not been passed.1245 In the case of Salauddin 
Quader Chowdhury, it was stated that uncorroborated hearsay evidence might not have 
probative value.1246 The following information is notable: 
The evidence adduced by P.W.18 is found to be purely hearsay and uncorroborated 
testimony, and as such, no person can be held guilty based on such hearsay and 
uncorroborated evidence as it has no probative value. Therefore, it is evident that 
prosecution has failed to produce any reliable evidence to connect the accused with 
the commission of offences of crimes against humanity and genocide as specified in 
the above charge. Ms. Tureen Afroz, the learned Prosecutor by referring to decisions 
of the ICTY Chamber in Simic, Tadic and Zaric (2003) has submitted that there is no 
need to corroborate hearsay evidence and as such hearsay evidence can be accepted 
as reliable evidence.1247 In consideration of our social value and human behaviour, we 
failed to accept the above submission of the learned Prosecutor. In the above context, 
it is our considered opinion that it is very much unsafe to convict a person based on 
uncorroborated single hearsay evidence. Thus, we hold that the prosecution has failed 
to prove charge no. 1 beyond a reasonable doubt.1248 
Although it is not a requirement that hearsay evidence should be supported by 
corroborative evidence as per the case of Tadić, the ICT-BD has taken a very cautious 
approach. The most important aspect of the above quotation is that in determining the 
probative value of hearsay evidence, the judges of the ICT-BD considered the social value 
and human behaviour. Cryer's work partially supports this aspect of the judge's findings that 
cultural factors are relevant in assessing the evidence before the international criminal 
tribunal. 
           A judge interviewed said that he, ‘…was one of the judges in the panel of appeal which 
heard Quader Molla's appeal and there were some direct eyewitnesses, it was the same with 
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the case of the second one, Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, there were direct witnesses and it was 
the same with the third one which I heard Kamaruzzaman had direct eyewitnesses.1249 So, 
although hearsay evidence is admissible, they were supported by other evidence in the ICT-
BD.1250 
7.4.6 Effect of time and old Evidence  
            If the evidence before an international criminal tribunal is old, that does not mean the 
evidence is weak. In assessing old evidence, the ICTY judge Alphons M M Orie suggested 
that drawing inference from evidence presented, it is more important to take into account the 
psychological factors affecting the evidence than a legal approach.1251 Also, the collective 
memory of a society may influence the testimony of witnesses.1252 There is a chance that 
effect of time on evidence of international crimes could be positive and negative, and in a book 
review, Kristin did sum up the position well that:   
…effect of time on the trials of core international crimes: on the one hand, access to 
archives may improve over time, and so the passage of time could improve the amount 
and quality of documentary evidence’. On the other hand, crime scenes could erode 
over time, and memories of specific events could fade. Time is an especially critical 
matter in both international criminal trials and domestic trials that address core 
international crimes because both typically start only after a considerable amount of 
time has elapsed since the commission of the crimes.1253    
The collective memory is an issue for international criminal evidence in particular when 
dealing with old evidence. In many cases, the evidentiary testimony is influenced by 
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and assess crimes committed many decades ago. As a result, sometimes witnesses testify in 
a way as if they had actually observed the event.1254  
             One of the important findings in the situation of Bangladesh is that the ICT-BD has 
demonstrated the effect of time on the evidential aspect and Kristin in his book review, 
mentioned the latest developments in Bangladesh as a timely case study.1255 The memories 
of witnesses have a different phase of encoding, retention, and retrieving of information and 
traumatized victim’s memory have special characteristics.1256 The expert reports by historians 
may also play an important role in relation to the admissibility of old evidence.1257  
            A particular judge explained that due to time-lapses, witnesses could not explain 
events appropriately, and they had to rely on additional corroborative documents to give 
weight.1258 He further stated that they had to rely on newspaper articles, authoritative books, 
and articles before giving weight.1259 This particular judge observed that victims of the crimes, 
suffered mentally for a long time due to not obtaining justice, and they became emotional 
during the trial.1260 This indicates that judges of the ICT-BD were cautious when considering 
the evidence before them.   
           A defence lawyer that was interviewed stated that they did not face any problems due 
to time-lapses and even that they were in a strong position.1261 He asserted that the 
prosecution produced weak evidence, and many witnesses in support of the prosecution could 
not give reliable evidence.1262 According to him, the judges of the ICT-BD accepted 
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prosecution's evidence very liberally.1263 According to this particular defence lawyer, it is 
practically impossible to prove allegation 45 years after the crimes had been committed.1264  
        In explaining his experience, a prosecution lawyer stated that they had to face difficulties 
collecting evidence as there was a significant time gap, and a government of anti-liberation 
war officially destroyed much of the evidence.1265 This particular prosecution lawyer further 
stated that many witnesses were unwilling to give evidence due to the fear of being attacked 
by the perpetrators and their associates.1266 He also said that when the prosecution assured 
them safety and made them feel safe, they then came forward to give evidence.1267 He said, 
‘it did take time, but finally we were able to obtain evidence and witnesses’.1268 
           In explaining the particular situation of Bangladesh, a judge of the ICT-BD stated that, 
‘…due to significant time-lapse, the nature of acceptable evidence is quite different from 
national criminal law because the events of the war are recorded objectively in the various 
sources’.1269 
7.5 Conclusion and interim findings  
            The Bangladeshi experience of dealing with old evidence is an important aspect and 
lessons drawn from the operation of the ICT-BD would bring valuable insight for the 
development of ICL and transitional justice. The majority of the interviewees are of the opinion 
that the ICT-BD has adopted a comprehensive rule of evidence and followed the principles 
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stated that the presumption of innocence had been maintained and the general burden of 
proof is on the prosecution.   
            According to Doherty, there is very little difference between the practice of domestic 
and international trials because in both the cases an accused is given a fair, just and 
expeditious trial finding of truth beyond a reasonable doubt.1270 However, the main differences 
between the domestic criminal law and ICL are the flexibility of the rules of evidence, the 
complexity of the cases and jurisdiction.   
           Most of the participants are of the view that the judges of the ICT-BD had taken a 
holistic approach in assessing the relative weight of particular evidence. Majority of the 
interviewees also stated that although a flexible approach of admissibility of evidence has 
been followed by the ICT-BD, this flexibility has been assessed with making reference to the 
quality of evidence and reasoning given for giving weight to particular evidence. In the ICT-
BD, we have seen that the judges have considered the totality of evidence rather than 
undermining the whole evidence-based on mere inconsistencies.   
           It appears from judgments of the ICT-BD that the judges have considered the cultural 
factors in assessing oral and written testimony of the witnesses. Majority of the interviewees 
stated that the judges of the ICT-BD, made reference to the social value and behaviour of the 
local people in assessing the evidence given by the witnesses. 
           One potential contribution of the ICT-BD’s evidential rule to ICL and transitional justice 
is in relation to alibi defence, the burden of proof is shifted to the defence. This aspect is 
particularly important in the Bangladeshi context in terms of delayed prosecution. However, 
this is against the concept of presumption of innocence. For this reason, the RoP of the ICT-
BD was amended in 2011 and the rules made it clear in this regard that, ‘...Mere failure to 
 
 
1270 T A Doherty, 'Evidence in International Criminal Tribunals: Contrast between Domestic and International 
Trials' (2013) 26 LJIL 937. 
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prove the plea of alibi and or the documents and materials by the defence shall not render the 
accused guilty’.1271  
            In relation to hearsay evidence, the contribution made by the ICT-BD is that due to 
lack of corroborative evidence, the judges refused to accept hearsay evidence. The ICT-BD 
has now developed guidelines for adopting hearsay evidence. For there to be probative value, 
hearsay evidence should be supported by other corroborative evidence. 
           In assessing the probative value of hearsay evidence, the judges of the ICT-BD 
considered the ‘social value’ and ‘human behaviour of the Bangladeshi society.  
             Dealing with old evidence is another lesson which may be drawn from the operation 
of the ICT-BD. As per the results from the above interview data, the ICT-BD has adopted a 
particular approach on how to deal with old evidence. The particular context of the ICT-BD, 
the nature of the evidence, the approaches taken by the judges are considered to be valuable 












1271 Rule 51(3) of the ICT-BD. 
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CHAPTER  8 
WITNESS PROTECTION 
8.1 Introduction 
             This Chapter discusses various aspects of the witness protection measures in ICL. It 
has also analysed the interview data collected through semi-structured interviews in assessing 
the witness protection aspect of the ICT-BD. However, before analysing the interview data, 
the existing practices and jurisprudence relating to witness protection developed by other 
international tribunals have also been considered. The interviewee judges and prosecution 
lawyers have expressed their views that the ICT-BD has limitations in relation to the protection 
of witnesses before the ICT-BD. Further to that, both prosecution and defence have also 
raised concerns about witness tampering and intimidation. The lessons learned from the ICT-
BD concerning the witness protection would be helpful for the further development of ICL and 
transitional justice. As a domestic tribunal, the ICT-BD could not come up with any effective 
witness protection measures at an early stage. Attempts were made to form witness protection 
committees within local administrations but due to lack of adequate training, these did not 
perform well.  
            Before analysing the interview data, the next sections define the nature and scope of 
witness protection and its main elements. These sections have also analysed various aspects 
of witness tampering, witness intimidation, and how the earlier criminal tribunals have 
responded to these issues. Furthermore, to assess the nature of witness protection in the 
Bangladeshi situation, reference has been made to the recognized jurisprudence and 
experience developed by ICTY, ICTR, ICC and other similar ICT’s. The issue of witness 
protection at the ICT-BD has been analysed from various different perspectives: Firstly, to 
consider the extent to which the witness protection issue has affected the trial process; 
Secondly, to consider to what extent the ICT-BD has adequate legal mechanisms, institutions, 
and personnel’s to implement the provision of witness protection; Thirdly, how the ICT-BD has 
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responded towards the witness protection issues in Bangladesh; Fourthly, whether any 
lessons can be learned from the ICT-BD in relation to witness protection. 
             One of the crucial aspects of ICL is witness protection, so that, the victims and 
witnesses are not subject to further violence. It is said that, ‘…a failure to protect witnesses 
can allow organized criminals, terrorists and other criminals to intimidate witnesses and to act 
with impunity’.1272 Witness protection is one of the pre-conditions of the success of a judicial 
process because witnesses are live evidence.1273 Although there is adequate academic work 
on the functions of the ICT’s, there are still some areas for improvement in the way such 
tribunals deal with the protective measures for the witness.1274 For the purpose of a fair trial, 
an accused is entitled to know the witnesses against him and has the right to cross-examine 
the witnesses. Thus, witness’s identity and whereabouts can be easily published, and this may 
create a severe security issue for the witnesses and victims. In practice, witness protection in 
criminal proceedings is given either by police or by witness protection programs permanently 
or temporarily. If the threat to witness security is very high, then appropriate protective 
measures and formal protection programs are also necessary, including relocation and 
change of identity.1275  
8.1.1 Definition of Witness and its scope  
           A witness can be defined as a person who will or has provided a formal statement, 
either in the written form or orally or both, to be used in the proceedings of the Court. 1276 
According to the European human rights framework a witness ‘…means any person 
 
 
1272 K R, 'A Missed Opportunity to Reform Witness Protection' (2013) 59 CRIM LQ 441, 441. 
1273 Chris Mahony, ‘The Justice Sector Afterthought: Witness Protection in Africa’ (Institute of Security Studies 
Pretoria 2010), 1. 
1274 Markus Eikel, ‘Witness Protection Measures at the International Criminal Court: Legal Framework and 
emerging practice’ (2012) 23 CLF 97, 98. 
1275 Chris Mahony, The Justice Sector Afterthought: Witness Protection in Africa (Institute of Security Studies 
Pretoria 2010), 1. 
1276 Eikel (1274) 98. 
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irrespective of his/her status under national procedural law, who possesses information 
relevant to criminal proceedings’.1277  
            For this particular section, witness protection means to provide security and safety to 
the individual and their family members who have appeared before the tribunal and have given 
formal evidence. The family members will also come to the ambit of witness protection if they 
are likely to be attacked or threatened just because of the evidence given by the main witness. 
As a result, this section analysed the legal framework and policies in Bangladesh relating to, 
‘… protect witnesses whose cooperation with law enforcement authorities or testimony in a 
court of law would endanger their lives or those of their families’.1278  
8.1.2 Intimidation of Witnesses 
            Witness intimidation ‘…means any direct, indirect or potential threat to a witness, 
which may lead to interference with his/her duty to give testimony free from the influence of 
any kind whatsoever'.1279 Intimidation may also occur because the witness belongs to a 
minority social or religious group and ‘…in a position of weakness therein'.1280 
            There are various strategies employed by the interested parties to intimidate the 
witnesses. Firstly, the accused may intimidate the witness by requiring them to face the 
accused at the court.1281 Also, the family members, followers, or acquaintances may be 
present in the courtroom during the trial, which may also inject fear into the minds of the 
witnesses. Secondly, intimidation may also occur if the accused decides to represent 
himself/herself where the accused can directly ask a question to the witness.1282 Thirdly, if the 
 
 
1277 Appendix to Recommendation No. R (97)13 of the Committee of Ministers to member states concerning 
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1278 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Good Practices for the Protection of Witnesses in Criminal 
Proceedings Involving Organized Crime (2008) 1. 
1279 Recom. No. R(97) (n 1277). 
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witnesses identities are disclosed, then interested parties can secretly contact them and 
manipulate or bribe them with rewards or scare them with harmful threats to the witness or 
family members.1283 Intimidation of witnesses was an issue before the ICT-BD, and later in 
this chapter, the nature of intimidation has been discussed. 
8.1.3 Witness Tampering 
           Witness tampering is another form of intimidation which might have occurred due to 
lack of witness protection measures. Witness tampering, ‘…means threats, both expressed 
and implicit, to witnesses and/or their families, as well as bribes or other inducements’.1284 The 
very first case before the ICTY had to deal with witness tampering issues and this was 
elaborately considered in the other cases such as Macedonia and Kosovo.1285 In the first case 
of the ICTY, the Tadic case, it was alleged that the witness Dragon Opacid, ‘…had been 
coached by the Bosnian government to invent claims of atrocities, in particular, the killing of 
his father by Bosnian Serbs’.1286  
           The severe form of witness tampering can be a situation where a witness is intimidated 
not to testify at all or testify that a particular incident did not happen or a particular defendant 
was not involved and this issue was observed in the ICTY case of Haradinaj.1287 In this case, 
a witness called Kabashi, came to the court but did not answer any substantive questions to 
assist the trial.1288 The trial chamber later arranged a video conference for him to testify from 
the United States, but Kabashi refused to testify although he was a key witness and a former 
member of the Kosovo Liberation Army.1289 In the case of Haradinaj, the trial Chamber 
observed that many key witnesses, ‘…expressed a fear of appearing before the trial chamber 
 
 
1283 Ibid . 
1284 Robert Cryer, 'Witness Tampering and International Criminal Tribunals' (2014) 27 LJIL 191, 192. 
1285 Ibid. 
1286 Ibid 193. 
1287 Ibid. 
1288 Prosecutor v Haradinaj, Balaj and Brahimaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, [Trail Chamber Judgment of 3 April 2008] 
para. 27 
1289 Ibid para. 27. 
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to give evidence' and as a result protective measures were adopted to keep the identity of 34 
witnesses anonymous from the public.1290 
             In the case of Jelena Rasic, the accused admitted that she bribed an important 
potential witness in the Lukic and Lukic case, and asked the witness, ‘…to confirm, sign, and 
verify a pre-prepared witness statement (‘Tabakovic Statement’) in exchange for 1,000 Euros 
and by offering him additional money to testify on behalf of Milan Lukic’.1291 She further 
admitted that she provoked Tabakovic to find other witnesses who were in the Bosnian and 
Herzegovina army and who would give evidence in return for money.1292 In another case, the 
defendant was convicted for contempt of court three times consecutively, due to the fact that 
sensitive information of the protected witnesses was released by the defendant endangering 
their protection.1293 
             In the cases of Bizimingu and Simba, the defence alleged that the government of 
Rwanda had intimidated and manipulated the defence witnesses not to give evidence in favour 
of the defendant.1294 However, the trial chamber’s findings in this respect suggested that for 
one witness, the allegation made by the defence was not proven and in respect of the other 
witness, although there was a threat, it had not materially affected the decision.1295 
            In the case of Brima, the SCSL had to deal with witness intimidation where wives of 
the accused came to know the personal details of the protected witnesses and the witnesses 
were intimidated after they had given evidence at the trial.1296 In the same case, other 
 
 
1290 Ibid para. 22. 
1291 Prosecutor v Jelena Rasic, ICTY Case No. IT-98-32/1-R77.2-A [Appeal Chamber Judgment of 16 November 
2012] para. 3. 
1292 Ibid. 
1293 Prosecutor v Seielj, ICTY Case No. IT-03-67-R77.4-A, [3rd judgment of 20 May 2013, public version issued 
on 30 May 2013]. 
1294 Prosecutor v Bizimingu, Mugenzi, Bikamumpaka and Mugiraneza, Case No. ICTR-99-50-T [Trial Judgment 
of 30 September 2011] paras. 108-110. 
1295 Cryer (n 1284) 193. 
1296 Independent Counsel v Brima, Samura, Case No: SCSL-200 5-01, [Judgment in Contempt Proceedings of 
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defendants Kanu and Kamara, were found guilty of contempt of court for offering a bribe to 
the witnesses even while they were in custody.1297 
          In the Special Tribunal of Lebanon (STL), the names of the possible prosecution 
witnesses were released which suggests that the witnesses were either influenced not to give 
any evidence or to fabricate the evidence.1298 Also, in the case of Lubanga,1299 ‘… there were 
also significant allegations of witness tampering, intended both to incriminate and to exculpate 
Lubanga’.1300 
          As discussed above, almost all of ICT’s had to deal with the issue of witness tampering 
or witness intimidation, and the situation of Bangladesh is not free from these issues. The 
cases before the ICT-BD suggest that both prosecution and defence have made complaints 
regarding witness intimidation and tampering. Later in this chapter, the witness intimidation 
and witness tampering issues has been discussed more elaborately. 
8.1.4 Various stages of Witness Protection  
             Participation in proceedings can carry a level of risk to victims and witnesses. This 
risk of security may exist at various stages, from investigation to post-trial. As a result, it is 
important to make an assessment of the real risk and perceptions of threats to the safety of 
the witnesses and take appropriate measures so that their participation can be ensured.1301 




1298 Cryer (n 1284) 193 mentioned ‘Tribunal Condemns Attempts to Interfere with Judicial Process', STL press 
release, 11 April 2013; 'STL Appoints Investigator to Probe Unauthorised Disclosures', STL press release, 2 July 
2013. 
1299 Lubanga (1138). 
1300 Cryer (n 1284) 193 mentioned Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ICC-
01/04-01/06-2842, 14 March 2012. 
1301 Commonwealth Secretariat, Best Practice Guide for the Protection of Victim/Witness in the Criminal Justice 
Process, Meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers and Senior Officials, Provisional Agenda Item 4(d)  (14 July 
2011) 10. 
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environmental, social, and cultural situation, the security situation and the availability of 
security and policing, and the potential threat’.1302  
8.1.5 Anonymity as a Witness Protection 
             As discussed earlier, witness intimidation and tampering are the main problems of 
achieving justice before the ICT. The cost-effective measure to provide witness protection in 
this particular aspect is the anonymity of the witnesses. However, it is often legally challenged 
on the grounds that the accused has the right to a fair trial and public hearing and the right to 
cross-examine the witnesses before the tribunal. Nevertheless, in the landmark case of Tadic, 
it was reasonably permitted to admit anonymous witnesses when necessary.1303 Although 
generally international tribunals such as ICTY, ICTR, and ICC have achieved a reputation in 
terms of fairness, the decision in the Tadic case was criticized from various quarters for 
allowing anonymous witness.1304 As the anonymity of that particular witness restricted Tadic's 
right to cross-examine all the witnesses before the court and on this particular ground, the 
defence did appeal the final judgment in the Tadic case.1305 However, the Appeals Chamber 
held that the right to cross-examination is not absolute when witness protection is at stake.1306 
8.1.6 Delayed Disclosure  
             Since anonymity of witnesses is questionable, the delayed disclosure of the personal 
details of the witnesses is an alternative protective measure. Delayed disclosure denotes that 
information regarding the witnesses will be disclosed to the defence when it is necessary for 
the defence to prepare an accused’s case rather than keeping the witnesses anonymous.1307 
 
 
1302 International Criminal Law & Practice Training Materials: Victims & Witnesses (Part of the OSCE-
ODIHR/ICTY/UNICRI Project “Supporting the Transfer of Knowledge and Materials of War Crimes Cases from 
the ICTY to National Jurisdictions”) 11. 
1303 Natasha A Affolder, 'Tadic, the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of International Procedural Law' (1998) 




1307 Sangkul Kim, ‘The Witness Protection Mechanism of Delayed Disclosure at the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals’ (2016) 9 JEAIL 53, 55. 
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Under the delayed disclosure measure, the prosecutor is entitled to keep the personal details 
of the witnesses secret before the time determined by the court, generally before the 
commencement of trial.1308 The practical aspect of delayed disclosure is that, certain 
information identifying the witnesses will be redacted before being disclosed to the defence.1309 
8.1.7 Balancing the rights of an accused and witness protection 
             In terms of a fair trial, the accused has some basic rights such as examining the 
witnesses against the accused. On the other hand, providing witness protection is another 
aspect of achieving justice because witnesses are live evidence, and they often carry a risk of 
security due to their cooperation with the trial proceedings. As a result, it is important to create 
a careful balance between the protective measures for the witness and upholding the rights 
of an accused by giving him or her the opportunity of examining the witnesses against him or 
her and a fair, impartial public hearing.1310  
           In the case of Tadić, Judge McDonald stated that anonymity of witness in exceptional 
circumstances is in line with Rule 75 of the RPE because ‘…fair trial ‘means not only fair 
treatment of the defendant but also of the prosecution and witnesses’.1311 This particular judge 
identified five criteria for balancing the rights of an accused and the witness protection 
measures such as, a real fear of the witness in concern; the importance of the testimony; 
strong credibility of the witness; the non-existence of a long-term national witness protection 
program and the necessity.1312 Besides, the security of the witnesses can be preserved by 
distorting the face and voice of the witness concerned, by way of Video-conferencing, safe 




1309 Ibid 179. 
1310 Maille Brady Bates, 'A Balancing Act: The Rights of the Accused and Witness Protection Measures' (2014) 
17 TRINITY CL REV 143. 
1311 Ibid mentioned Tadić. 
1312 Ibid. 
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assurance that they will not be detained by the prosecution if they come forward to give 
evidence.1313  
8.2 International Witness Protection measures 
 
            The witness protection measures should equally be applicable for both prosecution 
and defence witnesses.1314 Before assessing the witness protection aspect of the ICT-BD, it 
would be helpful to make references to the practices before the ICTY, ICTR and ICC. In the 
case of Šešelj, it is stated that witnesses from both prosecution and defence may be given 
protection if it is legitimately needed.1315 
              The ICTY and ICTR have taken a similar approach in adopting witness protection 
measures. These two tribunals emphasized on keeping the identity of the witnesses 
confidential and adopted various measures in this respect such as using pseudonyms, non-
disclosure of identity until necessary for adequate preparation of the defence, image and voice 
distortion, testifying behind a screen, via closed circuit television or in closed session.1316  
               The statute of the ICTR and ICTY specifically mentioned that the RPE should include 
witness protection measures and emphasized protecting the identity of the witnesses and 
victims.1317 Rule 53 of the ICTY included a non-disclosure provision under which the tribunal 
is empowered to order the government and accused not to disclose certain documents or 
information until further order.1318 Rule 75 of the RPE of the ICTR also mentioned non-
disclosure provisions for the protection of witnesses and victims.1319 Article 21(2) of the ICTY 
Statute expressly mentioned that the accused is entitled to a fair and public hearing subject to 
 
 
1313 Ibid.  
1314 Ibid 10. 
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1316 Training materials (n 1214). 
1317 Article 22 of the ICTY Statute and Article 21 of the ICTR Statute. 
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Article 22 which provides protective measures to the witnesses and victims.1320 This means 
that an accused persons right to cross-examine the witness(s) is the primary consideration 
and protecting the witnesses is the secondary consideration.1321 
             Under the Rome Statute, the ICC has established the Victims and Witnesses Unit 
("VWU") which has been renamed as the Witnesses and Victims Section ("WVS") to ensure 
witness protection to the victims and witnesses. Under Articles 54(3)(f) and 68(1) of the ICC 
statute, the prosecution is also responsible for employing protective measures at the pre-trial 
and trial stages.1322   
            Along with judicial protective measures, the ICC has also developed non-judicial 
protective measures by following some good practices.1323 These non-judicial measures 
include Initial Response System (IRS), Security Risk Assessment (SRA), and Individual Risk 
Assessment (IRA).1324  
8.3 The Law relating to victim and witness protection in Bangladesh 
           The legal framework of Bangladesh dealing with witness protection is inadequate. 
Section 506 of the Penal Code of Bangladesh is the starting point of witness protection which 
provides that witness intimidation is a criminal offence and punishable.1325 However, it did not 
provide any precautionary remedy; instead, it merely made it a crime if someone intimidated 
a witness at a criminal proceeding. Section 151 and 152 of the Evidence Act of 1972 provides 
cursory respect to the witnesses during questioning at trial.1326 
 
 
1320 Article 21-22 of the ICTY. 
1321 Sangkul Kim, ‘The Witness Protection Mechanism of Delayed Disclosure at the Ad Hoc International Criminal 
Tribunals’ (2016) 9 JEAIL 53, 54. 
1322 Article 54 and 68 of the Rome Statute. 
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1324 Ibid. 
1325 The Penal Code of Bangladesh 1860, Section 506 [Bangladesh]. 
1326 Section 151 of the Evidence Act 1972 of Bangladesh, available from 
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             There was a directive in Bangladesh from a writ petition of the High Court in 2010 
namely BNWLA v Government of Bangladesh, where it was said that, ‘…Government shall 
take immediate steps to enact law for introduction of witness and victim protection system for 
effective protection of victims and witnesses of sexual harassment as well as the people who 
come forward to resist sexual harassment’.1327 This High Court directive is only limited to the 
witnesses of sexual violence and to date there is no formal witness protection program in 
Bangladesh.  
               Article 35 of the Constitution says that those accused of a criminal offence shall be 
entitled to get a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial court or tribunal.1328 
This means that the witnesses identity should be disclosed and accused should be able to 
cross-examine the witnesses against the accused. As discussed above, in the case of Tadić, 
in exceptional circumstances, it is more important to provide protection to the witnesses rather 
than maintaining the fair trial rights of an accused to know the witnesses against him and to 
cross-examine the witnesses. 
            After analysing the domestic legal framework of Bangladesh relating to witness 
protection, if we consider the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act 1973, it appears that it has 
no express provisions for witness protection. However, Chapter VI A of the RoP of the ICT-
BD (as amended) deals with the issue of witness protection. Under Rule 58A (1), the tribunal 
is empowered to pass appropriate order (by its own initiative or by an application from either 
party) to the relevant bodies to provide protection, privacy and well-being of the witnesses and 
victims.1329 Under this particular rule, the government is obliged to provide accommodation 
and if required and also provide security and surveillance during the stay of witnesses as 
 
 
1327 Writ Petition No. 8769 of 2010 BNWLA v. Govt. of Bangladesh. 
1328 Article 35 of the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
1329 Rule 58A of the RoP of the ICT-BD. 
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directed by the tribunal.1330 This particular rule, however, did not say anything about a 
permanent witness protection program.  
8.3.1 Law Commission Reports 
            The Bangladesh Law Commission provided at least two detailed reports to the law 
ministry for the protection of witnesses and victims. The first report (hereinafter ‘first report’) 
published in 2006 observed that witnesses and victims in Bangladesh are ‘…vulnerable to 
threats, intimidation, coercion and harassment by the offenders or their associates and for 
these reasons, the victims and witnesses are unwilling to assist the investigation or testify 
before court at trial stage.1331  
             As early as 2006, the Law Commission reiterated that, ‘…there is an urgent need for 
making a new law providing for the rights, privileges and protection of the victims and 
witnesses and where necessary, their family members’.1332 The Law Commission also 
mentioned that witnesses are reluctant to give evidence in the court or tribunal fearing the 
safety of their life, properties and family members.1333 The Law Commission further observed 
that in Bangladesh, in most of the cases involving the powerful and influential suspects, 
‘…witnesses turn hostile, making the whole process of justice infructuous'.1334 The Law 
Commission in their report also observed that on many occasions, witnesses become 
untraceable due to the influence by the suspects or their associates where the suspects are 
rich or influential.1335  
 
 
1330 Rule 58A of the RoP  of the ICT-BD. 
1331 Law Commission-Bangladesh, ‘Final Report on a proposed law relating to the protection of victims and 
witnesses of crimes involving grave offences' (Report 74 of 17/10/2006) < 
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              On 9 February 2011, the Law Commission of Bangladesh published its second report 
(hereinafter ‘second report') where it is stated that except for Section 151 and 152 of the 
Evidence Act, there is no modern legal framework to provide protective measures to witnesses 
in criminal trials.1336 It is also reported that judges have ordered the relevant authorities to 
provide appropriate protection to the witnesses who have raised concerns about their 
safety.1337 However, since there is no specific legal framework for providing any protection, 
the authorities could not implement the order/directives from the court. The second report 
further stressed that although there is a social pressure on the government to make laws in 
relation to witness protection, no up to date steps have been taken in this regard.  
             The second report also suggested that the witness protection law has been developed 
over the last two decades by the establishment of some ad hoc tribunals, ICT’s and the 
permanent ICC1338 As discussed above, the earliest comprehensive legal mechanism relating 
to witness protection was addressed by the deputies of the ministers of EU states in a meeting 
in 1985 which is known as Recommendation Rec(85)11.1339 The European standard of witness 
protection provided a series of recommendations which was later reflected in the witness 
protection measures in the ICTY followed by ICTR and ICC. Most of the common law countries 
have also developed their laws relating to witness protection. The present trend of the ICL is 
to encourage and influence the development of an effective and powerful witness protection 
measure. In this respect, reference can be made to the Model Witness Protection Bill 
developed by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC); the manual of Good 
Practices for the Protection of Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings Involving Organized Crime 
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STUD 276. 
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and the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, 
1985.1340 
             Most importantly, the Law Commission also made specific reference to the ongoing 
ICT and the ICC’s rules relating to witness protection. The second report further sought an 
opinion from experts around the world and rectified the draft bill made by earlier reports in 
2006 (first report) on the same point.1341 The recommendation 14 of the second report is mainly 
designed to address the witness protection of the ICT-BD. It is opined that the number of 
witnesses before the ICT-BD is sufficiently large and threats towards the witnesses would 
come from organized groups.1342 It is further stated that wherever  international crimes are 
tried, such as domestic tribunal or international court; State's protection is the main source of 
protection for the witnesses.1343 The second report recommended that in order to protect the 
witnesses, there should be a national policy, program, and implementing body.1344 Further, it 
was also recommended that primarily, there should be witness protection offices in every 
major city, and gradually it should be expanded to the district level.1345  
             From the above two reports of the Law Commission of Bangladesh, it appears that 
the judiciary has identified the problems with witness protection measures in Bangladesh and 
how it has been affecting the justice process in Bangladesh. However, the amended version 
of the ICT Act 1973 did not include any provisions regarding witness protection. Although, the 
amended RoP of 2011 inserted the new Chapter VIA and the new Rule 58A (1) giving the 
tribunal some power to direct the authorities of the government to provide witnesses and 
victims appropriate protection. It seems that the ICT-BD has no direct power to provide 
protection to the victims rather, it had to rely on government bodies. One important observation 
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in this particular regard is that the government failed to understand the importance of witness 
protection. So, the legal status of the witness protection issue was broadly overlooked at the 
beginning of the Tribunal. 
8.4 Analysis of interview data: Observation of the Appellate Division Judge  
                 The ICT-BD has given very little attention to ensure an appropriate mechanism to 
deal with witness protection. The judges of the tribunal did not play an active role in providing 
appropriate protection to the witnesses. A particular judge, who took part in the interview, 
stated that many witnesses of the ICT-BD were actually threatened by the accomplices and 
relatives of the accused persons and even few of the witnesses were killed.1346 According to 
him, over the course of time, some of the accused persons have gained power due to their 
involvement with politics in Bangladesh.1347 This particular judge also opined that the issue of 
witness protection would not be a severe issue if trial could have established soon after the 
liberation war because the situation was different and the accused persons had no influence 
like they have at the present time.1348 It seems the issue of witness protection became severe 
due to the significant time lapse since the crimes were committed. He also mentioned that 
some of the accused were able to establish themselves within the mainstream politics of 
Bangladesh under the pro-Pakistani government, and they accumulated not only wealth but 
also became powerful socially and politically.1349 Some of the accused became ministers, 
some of them became members of the parliament, and as a result, they also developed their 
political muscle.1350 
              When a question was asked to a Judge on whether the ICT-BD has sufficient 









be more rigorous Act for the protection of the witnesses, police protection for example’.1351 So, 
it appears from the Judge's observation that there was a lack of police protection and physical 
protection of the witnesses who gave evidence before the ICT-BD. The Judge made reference 
to the investigatory agency's experience in gathering live witnesses that,  ‘…many witnesses 
said when the investigatory team went there, please for god sake don't call me as a 
witness'.1352 It is important to note why the witnesses were unwilling to give evidence before 
the tribunal; one possible answer would be lack of witness protection. The witnesses did not 
feel confident that they would be protected if their safety was threatened. At the pre-trial stage, 
the investigators did not employ any protective measures in terms of keeping the identity of 
the witnesses secret.   
                The Judge further stated that many witnesses avoided the investigators and their 
daughters and sons said, ‘…for god sake, spare my father he will not give evidence’.1353 It 
appears that there was no adequate protection for those who gave evidence and who wanted 
to give evidence before the ICT-BD.1354 It is reported that in some cases, the accused persons 
tried to bribe the witnesses not to give evidence against them, this would not have happened 
if the tribunal could have been established soon after the atrocities were over in 1971.1355 It 
appears that one of the primary deficiency of the ICT-BD's protective measures was the 
insufficient mechanism to ensure witness protection. For this reason, some of the witnesses 
before the ICT-BD were allegedly murdered as reported by various news reports.1356   
 








1356 Shah Ali Farhad, ‘Protect witnesses and victims’ Dhaka Tribune (Dhaka, 28 December 2013) available from 
< https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2013/12/28/protect-witnesses-and-victims> accessed 17 
November 2018. 
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             It appears that in the Bangladeshi situation, that there is no unified system of witness 
protection and some witnesses initially declined to give evidence fearing persecution or harm 
by the followers or the family members of the accused. As discussed above, Bangladesh does 
not have a separate and distinct law for the protection of victims and witnesses of international 
or serious crimes. However, as for the victims and witnesses of cases at the ICT-BD, there 
are certain legal provisions (e.g. Section 506 of the Penal Code of Bangladesh & Chapter VI 
A of the RoP of the ICT-BD) relying on which reasonable safety and security can be given to 
the witnesses before the ICT-BD if judges make the best use of the provision.1357 
                The Economist reported that, ‘…the immediate effect of the latest verdict [of 28 
February 2013] from the ‘International Crimes Tribunal’ was the worst single day of political 
violence in the history of modern Bangladesh’.1358 The accused, Delowar Hossain Sayeedi1359 
who was an important leader of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami party, was convicted by the 
ICT-BD for murder, abduction, rape, torture, and persecution in 1971. The student wing of the 
Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladeshi Islami Chaatra Shibir and their supporters had reacted violently 
causing the death of at least 35 people including four police officers.1360 It was a serious 
indication of the safety and security of the witnesses who testified against Mr Sayeedi. 
However, the ICT-BD failed to take adequate measures to deal with the immediate threats 
towards the witnesses. 
              It is reported that due to lack of witness protection measures, in 2013 three 
prosecution witnesses were murdered.1361 It is also reported that violence had escalated 
 
 
1357 Shah Ali Farhad, ‘Protect witnesses and victims’ Dhaka Tribune (Dhaka, 28 December 2013) available from 
< https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2013/12/28/protect-witnesses-and-victims> accessed 17 
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1358 Banyan, ‘Bangladesh's war-crimes trials: Bloodletting after the fact’ The Economist (1 March 2013) available 
from <https://www.economist.com/banyan/2013/03/01/bloodletting-after-the-fact> accessed 18 November 2018. 
1359 Sayeedi (n 55).  
1360 Banyan (n 1358). 
1361 Sayed Samiul Basher Anik, ‘When will we get witness protection law?’ (15 June 2018) available at < 
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2018/06/15/will-bangladesh-ever-get-a-witness-protection-law> 
accessed 15 November 2018. 
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against the people who were involved with the administration of justice process of the ICT-BD 
and witnesses, prosecutors and judges of the ICT-BD were the prime targets.1362 It is further 
reported that to frighten the people, judges and prosecutors, a few unidentified people threw 
bombs and, ‘attacks[ed] the residences of ICT-BD Chairman Justice ATM Fazle Kabir and 
Judge of the AD of the Honourable Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Justice SK Sinha’ and the 
houses of some of the prominent prosecutors.1363  
               According to Adams, ‘…the killing of a prosecution witness will frighten past and 
future war crimes trial witnesses and some may choose not to testify’.1364 He further opined 
that to ensure witness protection, law should be amended to safeguard protection to the 
witnesses presenting themselves before the ICT-BD including, ‘…safety, dignity, privacy, and 
physical and psychological well-being.’1365  
               A key prosecution witness, Wahidul Alam Junu against Salauddin Qader Chowdhury 
was found dead in Chittagong.1366 The accused SQ Chowdhury was a powerful politician of 
Chittagong and, one of the Chittagong based prosecution lawyers, Rana Das Gupta opined 
that Mr Junu’s murder was linked to him giving witness against the accused Mr Chowdhury. 
Mr Junu’s family members stated that before giving evidence to the ICT-BD, he was 
threatened not to give evidence and later it seemed that he was murdered for testifying before 
the ICT-BD.1367 It appeared from another report from the Daily Star (a prominent daily English 
newspaper in Bangladesh), that this particular witness's details were published, and reference 
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1365 Letter to the Bangladesh Prime Minister regarding the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act by Brad Adams 
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1366 Anik (n 1361). 
1367 The Daily Star ‘WITNESS AGAINST SQ CHY: Left dead at Ctg hospital’ (24 February 2013) available from < 
https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-270263> accessed 18 November 2018. 
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was made to his deposition.1368 However, during this research, it was not possible to verify 
independently whether the murder was linked to him giving evidence before the ICT-BD.  
                Another prosecution witness Mostafa Hawlader, was murdered on 8 December 
2013 at his home by an unidentified individual, and it was thought that he was killed because 
he gave evidence against Delwar Hossain Sayeedi.1369 Before his death, Hawlader had 
received several death threats from unknown callers, and the local police provided him initial 
protection.1370 But the family could not afford to provide free food to the police constable who 
would give him protection and according to his son, ‘…feeding the police would cost more 
than his father could earn in a day’.1371 The availability of the police is limited in the rural areas 
of Bangladesh and for this reason, the police constable had to stay continuously at the house 
of the witness and they had to provide food for the police constable free of charge but the 
witness was very poor and could not afford to provide free food to the police constable who 
would give him continuous protection at his home and outside. On the other hand, the police 
had no additional funding to cover the food costs of the constable. Further, since the witness 
used to live in a rural area, it was not possible for the police constable to buy food from the 
market; instead, he had to rely on the witness's family for food. Eventually, the police constable 
was told by the witness that he does not require police protection. This issue indicates that the 
police protection given to Mr Hawlader was not given under any witness protection program, 
and it was an informal method of providing protection to an individual by a local police station. 
According to preliminary police investigations, the attackers of Mr Hawlader were the followers 




1368 The Daily Star ‘SQ CHY'S RESIDENCE IN '71: Witness testifies on abduction, torture’ (13 February 2013) 
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                So, although the RoP of ICT-BD included some provision to provide victims and 
witnesses necessary protection, it is not enough to simply to make legal provisions. In addition 
to making legal provision, it is fundamentally important to develop logistics and institution. 
Further, it is equally important to train the officials who would identify the witnesses at risk and 
adopt appropriate measures to deal with the issues. Also, there should be a supervising body 
to monitor the performance of the officials and periodic review should be prepared concerning 
the continuous risk of the witnesses. 
               Along with the witnesses, at least two judges of the ICT-BD were targeted in 2013.1373 
The death of Mostafa Hawlader is the result of ineffective witness protection measures or lack 
of appropriate protective measures.1374 A particular Judge stated that, ‘…one of the main 
deficiency of the ICT-BD is that of the witness protection, there was no sufficient mechanism 
to give protection’.1375 That is why some of the witnesses were killed because those convicted 
people were very influential.1376  
                 A critical analysis of the Bangladeshi situation suggests that a number of suspects 
before the ICT-BD were high profile politicians from Jamaat-e-Islami and BNP and had their 
own base of supporters and followers.1377 As a result, some prosecution witnesses, who had 
testified against the suspects, were targeted by the agents of the suspects for the purpose of 
retaliation.1378  
                Another prosecution witness, Ranjit Kumar Nath, who testified in the case of Ali 
Ahsan Mujaheed was targeted with a petrol bomb.1379 Not only the witnesses but also their 
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family members were targeted, for example, Ahmed Imtiaz Bulbul was a prominent witness in 
the case of Ghulam Azam, his brother Ahmed Miraz was killed to frighten the other prosecution 
witnesses.1380 Mr Miraz’s dead body was found near a railway track in Kuril, Dhaka.1381 The 
witness Ahmed Imtiaz said that, ‘I feel insecure and so do my wife and son’.1382 
               In June 2018, another prosecution witness Mr Shumon Zahid was found dead near 
the railway tracks in the Bagicha area of Khilgaon.1383 It was reported by Shahjahanpur police 
station that Shumon lodged a General Diary (GD) with the police station seeking protection 
after which, a police patrol team used to look after him on a regular basis.1384 There is a 
similarity between the deaths of Mr Miraz and Mr Zahid, both their bodies were found near 
railway tracks in Dhaka. It is unknown to date whether the deaths are linked to lack of witness 
protection or if these are mere coincidences. It was not possible during the course of this 
research to follow up on the murder cases filed for the above-mentioned deaths of the 








1380 The Daily Star, ‘Ahmed Imtiaz Bulbul's brother found dead in city’ (19 March 2013) available at < 
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1383 The Daily Observer ‘Another uncalled-for death of a prosecution witness’ (24 June 2018) available from 
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1384 Ibid. 
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8.4.2 National and District Committees  
                 The Human Rights Watch (HRW) had previously made a suggestion to the 
Bangladeshi authorities to set up a competent body within the ICT-BD’s administration, in 
order to look after the protection of witnesses before the ICT.1385 The Law Commission made 
recommendations on two occasions, to develop witness protection measures and institution. 
As a result, the National and District level committees have been formed to look after the 
witness protection issue.1386 Following the Law Commission's recommendation, District 
committees headed by deputy commissioners have been formed, but the witnesses did not 
play an active role in reporting any threats they received, and this formation of committees 
became ineffective.1387 The aim of forming the national and local committees were to 
strengthen the local authority within the existing local administration. This attempt was indeed 
cost effective but proved to be ineffective due to lack of experience. The committees failed to 
assess the individual risk of the witnesses and their family members, who testified before the 
ICT-BD. Also, the witnesses did not engage with the committee members and there was a 
lack of co-ordination. The idea introduced by the Bangladeshi government, is a unique one in 
terms of cost effectiveness, but it could not be fully developed due to lack of training, logistics 
and strategies. 
8.4.3 Interim orders and Witnesses’ Protection 
                The issue of witness protection and its effect on trial process can be observed from 
the interim order of the ICT-BD. On 20 March 2012, the prosecution filed an application 
requesting the tribunal to admit the statements made by 46 witnesses and recorded by the 
investigating officer, on the grounds that their attendance could not be procured without an 
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amount of delay.1388 In the petition, it was stated that prosecution witnesses (P.W) Usha Rani 
Malaker, was too ill and had lost her memory and was unable to travel to the tribunal in 
Dhaka.1389 It was also reported that Sukharanjon Bali had left his house around four months 
before the petition was filed, and since then he has been untraceable.1390 It is further reported 
that prosecution witnesses, Ashish Kumar Mondal, Sumoti Rani Mondal, and Samar Mistri 
were also untraceable since the 1st week of February 2012, and it has been said that they 
had secretly left for India because they did not feel safe being witnesses for the prosecution.1391 
The petition made by the prosecution revealed that many eyewitnesses who became 
witnesses for the prosecution had been threatened by the arms cadre of Pirojpur who were 
supporters of the accused [Delowar Hossain Sayeedi], as a result of which the witnesses felt 
terrorized and went into hiding, and their whereabouts could not be traced.1392 For these 
reasons, the prosecution urged the tribunal to admit written statements of the said witnesses 
as evidence under section 19(2) of the Act because their attendance could not be procured 
without an amount of unreasonable delay.1393 However, the accused contested the petition by 
filing a reply on 28 March 2012, contending that the application, if allowed, would seriously 
hinder the rights to a fair trial under the domestic and international criminal legal system.1394  
               Regarding Sukharanjan Bali, it was argued that if he was really missing, then the GD 
would have been filed at the very least. The defence denied that the following witnesses: 
Ashish Kumar Mondal, Sumoti Rani Mondal, and Samor Mistri were missing.1395  
               The judges of the tribunal observed that the defence lawyers had submitted 
newspaper clippings annexed with written objections against the prosecution lawyer's 
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application to admit written statements from some of the witnesses as evidence. In the interim 
order, Judge stated that:  
Regarding the annexure of some newspaper clippings of the Sangram dated 
24.03.2012, Naya Digonta dated 27.03.2012 and Amar Desh dated 25.03.2012 which 
were annexed with the reply of the defence. The Tribunal took a serious view on some 
matters stated in those reports which included interviewing some witnesses, publishing 
and placing those before the tribunal after annexing them with the reply while the 
matter was in session of the tribunal and order has not yet been passed. This was 
clearly interfering [with] the justice process.1396   
 It appears that a particular newspaper named the Daily Naya Diganta, had made 
detailed reports about the discussion of a journalist and some of the witnesses; it was 
surprising that a journalist could talk to a witness on a sub-judicial matter, reproduce it in the 
newspaper and in addition to that, make comments involving merit of the matter.1397 The 
judges of the tribunal also observed that the accused persons had appointed paid journalists 
to meet the prosecution witnesses and report the discussed matter using their own 
interpretation.1398 The judges were convinced that the allegation from the prosecution, which 
stated that people in support of the accused were going to prosecution witnesses and 
threatening them from attending the tribunal was true.  
8.4.4 Hostile Witness 
                 Mr Bali,1399 who was the primary prosecution witness in relation to his brother’s 
murder, later became a witness for the defence team.1400 The prosecution presented this 
particular witness before the ICT-BD, but the tribunal did not take his statement.1401 A particular 
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was abducted in front of them.1402 He also stated that he made a complaint before the tribunal 
and acknowledged that they were a bit loud at the tribunal during appeal.1403 Subsequently, 
the tribunal made an inquiry with the prosecution team, which contended that no such thing 
happened.1404 The senior police officer was also sent to investigate the matter, and he 
confirmed that no such events took place.1405 The court then concluded that there was no 
evidence before them regarding the allegation of witness abduction; moreover, the court 
issued a ‘show cause' notice in response to the aggressive behaviour of the defence 
lawyers.1406 This particular defence lawyer stated that the abducted witness was later 
discovered in a jail cell in India.1407 It was not possible for the researcher to independently 
verify the reason as to why the prosecution witness Mr Bali became a defence witness and 
why he went to India. However, presumably, this particular witness was subjected to 
intimidation. This is an important lesson on how a witness may be subject to intimidation and 
future transitional justice mechanisms can adopt appropriate policies to avoid such issues for 
the purpose of fair disposal of justice. 
           During a press conference held on the 8th of November 2012, the Chief prosecutor, 
referred to a GD No. 773, which was filed on the 25 th of February 2012 and alleged that Bali, 
who was one of the witnesses was intimidated by the defence team and as a result, gone into 
hiding.1408 He had also stated that the defence engaged in ‘False Propaganda’.1409 The 
Investigation Officer’s deposition on the 5th of August 2012 stated that this GD was filed at the 
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             Regarding witnesses Ashish Kumar Mandol, Sumoti Rani Mandol and Samor Mistry, 
the prosecution stated that after 31 January 2012, they went to a village from Dhaka and since 
then, they are untraceable.1411 People had speculated that they had probably travelled to 
India.1412 The local police officer was requested to send them to the tribunal, and he informed 
the respected parties that the witnesses were not present at their address and explained the 
possibility that the witnesses might have left for India, therefore, their presence at the tribunal 
was not possible.1413  
               A particular prosecution lawyer stated that fearing for their safety, many 
eyewitnesses and victims were unwilling to describe crimes, for example, rape victims, due to 
social stigma were unwilling to disclose information of the crimes that were committed against 
them.1414 This prosecution lawyer also stated that despite their fear, some witnesses came 
forward to give evidence to enable the tribunal to serve justice for the victims.1415 According to 
him, many people were unwilling to give evidence fearing the perpetrators and that if they give 
evidence, they will be targeted and harmed.1416 He said there were a couple of incidents with 
the security and safety of the witness protection, and two witnesses were murdered, but it 
could not be conclusively said that they lost their lives because they were providing evidence 
before the tribunal. 1417  
             Another prosecution lawyer stated that the ICT-BD has some provisions regarding 
witness protection, but there are no provisions to provide protection after trial.  1418 However, 
an analysis of the ICT Act 1973 reveals that there is no express provision for witness 
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protection. It seems that the prosecution lawyer might have referred to the Rule 58A (1) of the 
RoP of the ICT-BD. This prosecution lawyer acknowledged that due to financial constraints, 
the current protection measures are not sufficient, but still, they are trying to provide protection 
to the witnesses as much as they can.1419 According to him, there should be a clear mechanism 
for witness protection.1420 Many of the witnesses are under police protection at the moment.1421 
Although it is mentioned in the ICTA 1931, that protection to the witnesses has to be ensured, 
there is however, no law on this area1422 and no witness protection measures have been 
implemented to date.1423  
             A prosecution lawyer stated that due to time-lapses, a lot of fear was injected into the 
minds of victims and witnesses. 1424 He said the first barrier they had to overcome was fear; 
they had to reassure witnesses regarding their safety, and only then the witnesses could come 
forward and provide their testimonies.1425 He explained that, ‘After five or six executions of our 
sentences, the witnesses and the victims started to believe [in the] tribunal’s capacity’.1426 He 
also stated that even now when the accused are being tried, the victims are still afraid due to 
the social and political statuses of the accused.1427 He further mentioned that witness often 
asked him that, ‘…you can save me in Dhaka but can you save me at my home at night?.1428 
This represents the ongoing fear of the witnesses before the ICT-BD. He further elaborated 
on this point that the witnesses expressed their concern that they have to share the village 
where relatives or family members of the accused persons reside and they would not feel safe 















big challenge for the Tribunal.1430 A prosecution lawyer further observed a lot of attempts to 
create impediments for the tribunal such as bribing the witnesses with money, threatening the 
witnesses, murdering the witnesses, etc.1431 
8.5 Conclusion and Interim findings 
               The protection of witnesses plays a key role in the successful functioning of the court. 
Majority of the interviewees are of the opinion that in Bangladesh, the trend is such that the 
witnesses do not wish to come to the courts to give their statements and evidence as they feel 
unsafe. One particular participant stated that the court has a duty to take appropriate 
measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity, and privacy of 
witnesses. 
                In the RoP of the ICT-BD, provisions were introduced to provide witness and victim 
protection because witnesses will not come forward to give evidence if they do not feel safe 
for themselves and their family members. There is a possibility that cases may collapse if 
witnesses do not come forward to give evidence. For this reason, witness protection is 
fundamental. However, the ICT-BD could not develop a satisfactory mechanism concerning 
witness protection so far. The witness protection measure does not solely depend on the ICT-
BD rather, the total judiciary, executives, local authorities and law enforcement agencies may 
find a plausible solution. They could identify the issues of witness protection at various stages 
such as pre-trial, during trial and after trial. During investigation, the investigators may conduct 
risk assessments of the potential witnesses and report to the local authorities and law 
enforcement agencies. There should be a clear policy defining the role of the various agencies 
regarding witness protection and appropriate training should be given to the people associated 






              The protection of witnesses at the pre-trial and post-trial stages has particular 
significance, and it is important at the pre-trial stage, that witnesses are able to receive 
protection without seeking judicial order.1432 As a precaution, names of the witnesses should 
be kept secret during the investigation stage because at this stage, many civil parties have 
access to the sensitive information which could jeopardize the safety issue of the 
witnesses.1433 Also, post-trial protective measures are also significant to look after the physical 
and psychological well-being of witnesses after they return to their normal daily life.1434 Some 
witnesses may live in rural areas where police protection is limited, and in that case, local 
authorities may be given support and training to protect the witnesses along with the local 
police.1435 
                 When the ICT-BD was established, there was no specific legal provision for witness 
protection measures to deal with the witnesses of the ICT-BD. Later in 2011, the RoP was 
amended to include witness protection measures in the legal framework. The ICT-BD did not 
have any specific witness protection measures at the pre-trial stage. Later, following the 
recommendation from the Law Commission of Bangladesh, they established the district 
committee to oversee the overall safety and well-being of the witnesses before the ICT-BD. 
However, there were at least two problems they had to overcome in order to make the witness 
protection measures effective: firstly, inadequate training or experience of the personnel 
dealing with the witness protection issue of the ICT-BD. It appears from various news reports 
that respective police stations were given the responsibility to provide protection to the 
witness, and they were not trained to identify the risk factors at various stages of the trial. 
Secondly, a witness who lives in the rural area could not be provided appropriate protection 
due to lack of resources. 
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             According to Eikel, it is important to develop an inclusive ‘inter-organ approach’ for 
appropriate protective measures for the witnesses and victims and define main duties for the 
relevant organs of the tribunals at the same time.1436 But the ICT-BD could not develop any 
such approach, and the ICT-BD registrar did not establish any permanent witness protection 
body within the tribunal's registry.  
             The legal mechanism itself is not enough to ensure the safety and security of the 
witnesses before criminal tribunals. Only the actual implementation of protective measures 
can achieve the desired outcome. All the parties involved with the proceedings that have 
sensitive personal data of the witnesses should be careful not to publish the information 
publicly. The main deficiency of the ICT-BD in terms of witness protection is the inability to 
keep personal information of the witnesses’ secret. The witnesses that had testified against 
the powerful and influential accused, found that their names were published in the national 
daily newspaper which had posed serious threats to the safety and security of the witnesses. 
            The majority of the interviewees were of the opinion that, in Bangladesh, the ICT-BD 
had given very little attention to assessing the risk of the witnesses who testified before the 
tribunal and did not take appropriate measures keeping witness identity safe. On the other 
hand, when cases were still ongoing, some newspapers were able to interview the witnesses 
who gave evidence before the court. The identities of the witnesses were publicly available. 
As discussed earlier, at least three witnesses of the ICT-BD were murdered, and family 
members of the witnesses also live in continuous fear.  
             The safety and security of the witnesses before international courts and tribunals are 
risky if there are no appropriate witness protection measures. It is always challenging to 
ensure the safety and security of the witnesses. The high-profile cases before the ICT-BD 
involved some influential figures with a great deal of financial resources and local power. The 
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ICT-BD has not been able to reflect the witness protection measures adopted by the earlier 
international tribunals. As a result, there were allegations of witness intimidation both by the 
prosecution and defence team. 
              The ICT-BD has been unable to establish any formal permanent witness protection 
program. Furthermore, it has also been unable to adopt any non-judicial measures. There is 
no information on assessment of the potential risk of witness protection before the tribunal 
started functioning. There is no specific domestic law to provide sufficient protection to the 
witnesses before the ICT-BD. The investigators, prosecutors, the registrar, and defence could 
not assess the scale of risk the witnesses possess. Also, in terms of securing personal data 
of the witnesses before the ICT-BD, there were no measures taken to keep the witnesses 
anonymous.  
Valuable lessons may be learned from the ICT-BD, such as providing appropriate 
training to the workforces who would administer the witness protection measures. To deal with 
the witness protection issue in Bangladesh, the Law Commission had provided a series of 
recommendations, the governing RoP was amended to include a legal provision relating to 
witnesses and victim protection. Further to that, committees were made at the district level to 
oversee the witness-protection issue. However, there was a shortage of logistics and 
adequately trained personnel to run the witness protection scheme. 
               The policymakers did not give sufficient importance to strengthen the witness 
protection aspect of the ICT-BD. The politicians, who took part in the interview, chose to 
remain silent on this point or avoided providing any answers whereas lawyers from both 
parties and judges did talk about witness protection in the ICT-BD. The reason behind the 
government's silence could be due to the lack of financial resources. Because establishing 
and running a permanent witness protection program is costly.  
            The contribution made by the ICT-BD concerning the development of witness 
protection is strengthening the local authorities. The authority in Bangladesh adopted a 
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delayed policy to deal with the witness protection issue. It now requires a significant 
investment of time and resources to train the personnel of the witness protection committee 
so that they can make an assessment of risk at various levels of the tribunal and adopt an 




















SENTENCING AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
9.1 Introduction 
            This chapter analyses the sentencing principles of the ICT-BD. Firstly, the researcher 
has analysed literature and guidance of determining punishment surrounding the ICL area. 
Secondly, he has analysed the interview data collected through semi-structured interviews. 
Thirdly, he has analysed some of the judgements of the ICT-BD (including judgements from 
the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh) in determining the practices of the 
ICT-BD when determining the sentences. As part of the literature analysis, this section dealt 
with the general objective of punishment, the historical context of punishment, theories of 
punishment and international norms and practices. This chapter also dealt with the 
relationship of human rights and sovereignty with the death penalty.  
            There is no clear guidance in the IHL and criminal law treaties regarding applicable 
penalties and sentencing issues.1437 Also, there is no provision on penalties in ICL conventions 
relating to the 27 categories of crime.1438 The main reason for this absence of penalties is that 
the conventions were adopted to apply through the ‘indirect enforcement system’.1439 It was 
thought that individual States will adopt the provisions of the conventions and reflect those 
into their domestic legislation and the issue of punishment was left to the individual States 
trying their own nationals in accordance with their domestic law.1440 However, problems would 
arise if international crimes are applied through the ‘direct enforcement system’.1441 
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             In Bangladesh, the death penalty is a recognised punishment throughout its judicial 
history. Also, Bangladesh is a Muslim majority country and the death penalty is seen to be the 
reflection of the Islamic criminal law principle which is strongly based on retribution and 
deterrence. Before analysing the general literature and practices of sentencing guidelines, it 
would be helpful to keep in mind the sentencing legal framework of the ICT-BD and criticisms 
it has attracted for retaining death penalty provision. 
9.1.1 Theories of punishment  
             According to Allison, ‘the current system of international criminal law poses theoretical 
challenges to any philosophical justification for criminal punishment and due to ‘…structural 
limitations, the system of ICL delivers exemplary justice, not equal justice’.1442 
There are two philosophical models justifying criminal punishment to the offenders. 
The first model is predominantly supported by utilitarianists who justify punishment by 
reference to societal good.1443 The second model is adhered by the retributivists who think the 
punishment is a deserved response to the offenders and the nature of punishment should be 
proportional to the gravity of the crimes committed. Also, other theorists suggest a hybrid 
model of utilitarianism and retribution justifying punishment in the sense that, the utilitarian 
view is the aim of the punishment and retributivist view is the guide to the extent of the 
punishment to be given to an individual offender.1444 
 According to Drumbl, there are three types of objectives of punishment such as 
retribution, deterrence/utilitarian and expressivism.1445 The Just Deserts principle and the 
retributive objective support the theory that criminals deserve punishment.1446 Fear of 
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punishment and the possibility of safer society due to dissuasion towards committing crimes 
is the core objective of the deterrence theory which supports that the law can be used 
effectively to facilitate this.1447 The expressivist theory is public trust and respect orientated,1448 
building faith of the public towards the system by way of trial, punishments and convictions 
rather than punishing criminals for their acts or for the purpose of deterrence.1449 
       All of the above objectives have some operational challenges. The retributive objectives 
have two limitations in terms of selectivity and severity of punishment.  Only some extreme 
evil gets punished, whereas many escape its grasp, often for political reasons.1450 Retribution 
requires proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the severity of sanction, it is 
the most difficult task of the judges to determine punishment. The main problem of deterrence 
is the lack of evidence that mass atrocity criminal trials have a deterrent function. 
In the particular context of Bangladesh, the just deserts theory is more convincing, 
justifying punishing the perpetrators of 1971. If we consider the gravity of the crimes and the 
impunity the perpetrators have already enjoyed, retribution may serve two purposes. Firstly, 
perpetrators will be punished for their wrongdoings. Secondly, the victims will feel that justice 
been served. The ICT-BD in its sentencing practices has adopted its own unique structure 
and sentencing practices are solely based on national law and the will of the people. As a 
Muslim majority country, the ICT-BD, in Bangladesh, has retained death penalty as the highest 
punishment. 
9.1.2 Scope of criminal punishment  
             The ICL Conventions did not place any limits on penalties except for the Convention 
on the prohibition of torture and other forms of cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or 
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punishment.1451 According to Bassiouni, international human rights law applies to the 
sentencing issue of an individual for international crimes and the death penalty is 
prohibited.1452 Although 94 countries have prohibited death penalties and 44 countries have 
limited its application, prohibition of death penalty is not yet universally recognised.1453 The 
RPE of the ICTY and ICTR provides the guidance that, judges shall take into account the 
gravity of the offence, the individual circumstances of the offender and any aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.1454 At the drafting stage of the governing statute of the ICTY, it was 
suggested that national penalty norms would be the starting point before determining the 
sentence.1455 However, the international criminal tribunals such as ICTY, ICTR and ICC’s legal 
provision did not include the provision of death penalty in the governing statutes and RPE. 
               But the prohibition of the death penalty is inconsistent with the retributive nature of 
international criminal justice and the sentencing principle of ‘just deserts’.1456 The principle of 
‘just deserts’ contends that punishment should be proportionate to the crimes committed by 
the perpetrator. So, lesser punishment for heinous crimes committed does not go with the 
core principle of ‘just deserts’. 
             Islamic criminal justice suggests that capital punishment should be available so that 
criminals receive the highest punishment and respect the norms in society.1457 During the 
preparatory work of the ICC, the sentencing issue was widely discussed and some delegates 
from Islamic countries proposed to include death penalty as the maximum punishment so that 
it can be representative of all legal systems.1458 Due to the fact that other delegates opposed 
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it, the ICC finally decided not to include death penalty but Article 80 of the Rome statute 
ensured that penalties provided under the statute will not affect the sentencing practice under 
the domestic law of individual States.1459 Accordingly, individual states are entitled to exercise 
their national practices of sentencing including the death penalty. To this extent, the ICT-BD’s 
retention of death penalty as highest punishment is permissible under domestic jurisdiction. 
9.1.3 State Sovereignty  
            State sovereignty is an important aspect relating to how a particular State would apply 
sentencing principles. In explaining sovereignty and human rights, White’s following remarks 
are important: 
The students I teach are quite bright, quite white, quite male, and quite conservative. 
And like most Americans, they are very unaware of the scope and depth of 
international criticism of the death penalty. When they are made aware of that, their 
response tends to be something like this: that's a violation of our sovereignty; we 
shouldn't pay any attention to that.1460 
The above view has actually reflected the view of John Ashcroft in the case of Zacarias 
Moussaoui, where France objected to the death penalty for their citizen, but Ashcroft made 
reference to their sovereign status as a defence.1461 Ashcroft also said that they are a 
sovereign nation and make judgments about crimes and penalties that exist in their land and 
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It is argued that sovereignty is a mechanism used by politicians to justify human rights 
violations.1463 In the case of Jens Soering, the ECHR held that the death penalty was not 
necessarily a violation of international human rights but it would be cruel and inhuman in the 
particular case of Soering, considering his age and illness.1464 However, the Soering case was 
heard before the introduction of Protocol 13 of the ECHR and now the position of death penalty 
is different. 
9.2 International norms and practices in relation to sentencing principles 
            Before analysing the interview data and the judgements, it is pertinent to discuss the 
existing literature on the punishment of ICL and transitional justice. An analysis of the literature 
suggests that there is no unified convention on criminal punishment and the prohibition of the 
death penalty did not yet gain the status of customary international law.  
           According to the Article 3 of the UDHR and the Geneva convention and Protocol 1, 
States are obligated to prosecute and punish grave breaches such as war crimes.1465 
Blumenson is of the opinion that, justice is not achieved without punishment.1466 Mettraux has 
expressed that it is hard to identify crimes more difficult to sentence than international 
crimes.1467 However, we will be approaching sentencing principles in the context of the ICT-
BD which is a domestic tribunal and it’s sentencing principle is primarily focused on retribution. 
Ashworth in his commentary stated that there needs to be a rational and coherent objective 
for sentencing.1468 The logic behind that is to achieve fairness, certainty and establish a 
precedent for cases with similar facts for other tribunals to follow. Punishment for war crimes 
is a relatively new and developing concept and has evolved in the Nuremberg, Tokyo, ICTR 
and ICTY tribunals. As it stands, there are no concrete guidelines in relation to sentencing 
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principles and penalties under ICL, and there seems to be a wide discretion in sentencing 
principles depending on the facts of each case.   
Inconsistency in sentencing principles in the ICT’s exists due to the application of 
judicial discretion in complex cases dealing with crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes.1469 Article 27 of the Nuremberg statue which stated that, “The Tribunal shall 
have the right to impose upon a Defendant, on conviction, death or such other punishment as 
shall be determined by it to be just” echoed that of Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter that left the 
sentencing entirely to the discretion of the judiciary to determine a ‘just’ punishment including 
capital punishment.1470 Judge Webb while drafting the Tokyo trial judgement, considered both 
retributive and deterrent justifications, he especially relied on deterrence as the primary 
justification and retribution as a secondary form of penological justification.1471 Although the 
IMT tribunals did not have any provisions to consider mitigating circumstances in determining 
sentences, the judges took into account the personal circumstances of the accused as 
aggravating and mitigating factors.1472 Nevertheless, the judgements did not provide sufficient 
reasoning behind sentencing and future tribunals were unable to rely on the IMT’s for 
sentencing guidelines.1473  
 
The ICTY and ICTR have adopted a similar mandate to that of each other and provided 
a much clearer insight into sentencing practices, however, they were many inconsistencies. 
Article 24(1) of the ICTY and Article 9(3) of the ICTR limited punishment to imprisonment and 
dictated to consider the gravity of the offence and the circumstances of the accused when 
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determining sentences.1474  Furthermore, Rule 101 (a) 1475 from the RoPE  of the ICTY 
considers mitigating and aggravating factors (e.g. cooperation with the prosecution and 
sentencing norms of the local courts) as stated in the guideline case of Nikolic.1476 
 
The cases of Tadic1477 and Erdemović1478 confirmed that the general practice of 
following guidelines from the previous courts in the former Yugoslavia is not binding, and the 
trial chambers should consider the applicability of written laws in a modern context and they 
did so by relying on the expertise of Prof. Sieber in his sentencing report.1479  In the  Delalic 
case, the sentence exceeded that of the normal sentencing practice in the courts of former 
Yugoslavia which was followed by other case laws.1480 Although the ICTY and ICTR have 
attempted to provide sufficient reasonings behind sentencing principles, no cohesive 
framework was available. Pickard proposed life imprisonment for genocide and crimes against 
humanity, 7-17 years for torture as crimes against humanity and 10-28 years for rape as 
crimes against humanity.1481  
 
In the particular context of Sierra Leone, where a significant number of offenders were 
underaged, two sets of punishments depending on the ages of the offenders were developed 
in the SCSL statue.  Article 19 stated that the punishment for adults was imprisonment for a 
specified term and Article 7.2 excluded juveniles from this punishment and instead provided 
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counselling, foster care, training and rehabilitation programmes and ordered them to be taken 
into care or supervision.1482  
Article 77 of the ICC Rome statue imposes life imprisonment depending on the gravity 
of the crime, specified term of imprisonment not exceeding more than 30 years and as an 
additional penalty, the imposition of fines and the possibility of confiscation of property.1483 The 
RoPE of the ICC also states that the punishment must be a reflection of the culpability of the 
accused and mitigating and aggravating factors must be considered including the level of harm 
caused and the circumstances of the accused including age, economic conditions, mental 
capacity or duress, prior convictions and any steps undertaken by the accused to compensate 
the aggrieved parties and cooperation with the prosecution.1484  
The provisions of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials and the ICTR, ICTY and SCSL have 
provided minimum guidelines for a definite sentencing framework and this was usually left to 
judicial discretion for sentencing. The ICC in contrast, provided specific provisions and 
sentencing phases, however setting a maximum penalty does not pledge fairness in 
sentencing.1485 Some academics are of the opinion that the sentencing framework provided 
by the ICC are articulate however, drafter’s application of these guidelines lacked rationale in 
justification and allowed flexibility.1486 
9.2.1 Death penalty in International Criminal Law 
                 The limited extent of directives relating to punishment can be traced back to the 
Genocide Convention which states that penalties shall be ‘effective’ and, the Torture 
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Convention states that penalties shall be ‘appropriate’ following the grave nature of the crimes 
concerned.1487  
                  As a result, the international criminal tribunal's judges have broad discretion in 
relation to sentencing. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals provided the death penalty as a 
just punishment for the mass atrocities committed by the perpetrators.1488 However, both the 
Tribunals did not provide any useful guidance in relation to sentencing and even the judgments 
paid little attention to the issue of sentencing as discussed above. 
              The recent development of human rights impacted the sentencing issue in the ICTY 
and ICTR and capital punishment was removed from both the tribunals' legal provision. It 
should be noted that originally, the ICCPR and ECHR did not prohibit the death penalty 
provision but restricted its use.1489 However, the additional protocols of the ICCPR and ECHR 
now prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances under Protocol No.13 of the ECHR.1490 
             According to Schabas, some of the authorities of international law supports that 
international crimes are punishable by death not only under national law but also under 
international law.1491 The Lieber Code, promulgated by President Abraham Lincoln, also made 
frequent reference to the death penalty as an appropriate punishment for crimes under ICL.1492 
Also, in the commentary on post-WWII war crimes trials, the UN War Crimes Commission 
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declared that under international law, perpetrators of war crimes may be punished with the 
death penalty.1493  
            It is observed that 24 men were given the death penalty by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
for war crimes and other similar offences such as crimes against peace, crimes against 
humanity and membership in a criminal organization.1494 The notable aspect of this sentencing 
is that nobody was executed for committing crimes against humanity or crimes against peace 
without any element of war crimes. So, it appears that war crimes were an important factor in 
executing capital punishment.  
9.2.2 Death penalty as retribution & deterrence 
               In the case of Todorovic, the ICTY held that the main purposes of punishment in ICL 
are retribution and deterrence.1495 The retentionists of the death penalty argue that capital 
punishment is embodied within the social context and serves justice through retribution for the 
most heinous criminals.1496 However, the abolitionists argue that retribution is cruel and 
modern criminal law does not endorse cruel and inhumane treatment.1497 Empirical data of the 
western world on death penalty, provide contradictory conclusions and scholars in the other 
parts of the world often make reference to those research findings when putting forward an 
argument in favour of the abolition.1498 On the other hand, retentionists adhere to the research 
findings of American studies that each death penalty can prevent at least 18 murder cases 
from reoccurring.1499  
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9.2.3 Death penalty: The abolitionist and retentionist debate 
                The theoretical basis of the death penalty debate can be traced back to the 
philosophical debate about morality, the value of life, and human rights.1500 In the 1700’s. 
arguments against the death penalty was put forwarded by English philosopher Jeremy 
Bentham based on his utilitarianism.1501 On the other hand, Emmanuel Kant put forward an 
argument in favour of the death penalty based on the ‘just deserts’ principle.1502 
              Abolitionists argue that nothing can justify taking someone’s life if there are 
alternative ways to escape the death of a person and capital punishment is a serious 
compromise to someone’s human rights.1503 One view suggests that the death penalty is an 
integral part of nature and that every individual will die one day and for this reason, the death 
penalty is even more humanly than life imprisonment.1504 According to Schabas, ‘the death 
penalty is the only sanction that can be justified from the standpoint of retribution, but he also 
made reference to the observation of Chief Justice Gubbay of the Zimbabwe Supreme Court 
who stated ‘retribution has no place in the scheme of civilised jurisprudence’.1505 
               Abolitionists argue that the death penalty is such that if we wrongly execute 
someone, we cannot give his life back as there is always a chance that human judgment can 
be fallible.1506 There may be a regional customary rules in relation to the death penalty in 
European countries, but that practice does not extend to the world as a whole.1507 According 
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to Schabas, the ICCPR allows retentionist States to continue to apply the death penalty in 
most serious crimes.1508  
              Despite contradictory opinions, both the abolitionist and retentionist agreed upon one 
point that based on current social structure, the complete abolition of the death penalty would 
be difficult and instead restrictive use of death penalty would be at least representative of the 
world’s criminal jurisdiction.1509 As a result, the death penalty remains in force in many 
countries but its use is declining day after day however still, prohibition did not gain the status 
of customary or universal norms.1510 
9.3 Legal framework of the ICT-BD relating to sentencing practices  
            Section 20(1) of the 1973 Act requires that judges should give reasons for the 
verdict.1511 So, if judges hand out capital punishment to any convict, they should give reasons 
for the conviction. Also, if they ordered any lesser punishment or acquittal, the Act requires 
them to give reasons. Section 20(2) of the 1973 Act provides that the ICT-BD is empowered 
to award capital punishment as the highest punishment and this particular section provides 
directive in determining punishment. When considering appropriate punishment, the Act 
requires the judges to make a balance between the gravity of the crimes and proportionate 
punishment.1512 However, it is up to the judges’ interpretation to consider whether a particular 
punishment is just and proper. 
9.3.1 Outcry related to ICT-BD’s death penalty 
             According to Robertson, ‘…the worst punishment is reserved for the worst offenders’ 
and death penalty provision in the 1973 Act was particularly aimed at the Pakistani army 
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officers who gave orders to commit the mass atrocities and local collaborators merely assisted 
the Pakistani Army officers and they should not attract capital punishment.1513 
              According to Amnesty International, death sentences given by the ICT-BD are 
'extremely regrettable’.1514 Amnesty International’s researcher Abbas Faiz stated that, ‘The 
death penalty violates the right to life as recognised in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and is the ultimate cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. We oppose it in all 
cases, without exception’.1515 However, Robertson in his book stated that, ‘…despite the clear 
modern trend in state practice towards abolition, there is still not sufficient consensus for 
execution to be prohibited as a matter of customary International Law’.1516 
              UN Special Rapporteur Christof Heyns raised concerns regarding the death penalty 
and stated that capital punishment may be imposed in a limited extent after full compliance 
with the fair trial principles and due process safeguards as stated in the ICCPR.1517 
9.4 Interview Data Analysis 
              A particular interviewee stated that from historical perspectives, in the Bangladeshi 
transitional situation, amnesty and reconciliation failed to serve justice.1518 For this reason, 
criminal prosecution was necessary to end the dispute of providing justice for the crimes 
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9.4.1 Sentencing aspect of the ICT-BD 
               Bangladesh is a Muslim majority country and death penalty is permitted under the 
national criminal code. Since retribution is one of the fundamental aspects of Islamic criminal 
law, Bangladesh retained the death penalty as the highest form of criminal punishment. In the 
last 10 years, the ICT-BD has announced verdicts in 41 cases. As of 24 March 2019, a total 
6 people were executed.1520 In explaining the sentencing aspect of the ICT-BD, an interviewee 
stated that perpetrators, who have been found guilty, should be served appropriate 
punishment proportionate to the crimes they have committed.1521 It seems the judges of the 
ICT-BD predominantly relied on the philosophical foundation of Emmanuel Kant, which states 
that wrongdoers should be given punishment which they deserve.1522 So, similar to other 
ICT’s, the ICT-BD relied on retribution in its sentencing principles. 
            Another interviewee stated that in the Bangladesh legal system, criminal jurisprudence 
and principles of sentencing are not entirely based on the concept of retribution but also 
deterrence.1523 He said the judges of Bangladesh follow the same sentencing principles as 
followed in other common law countries particularly UK, India, Australia, Canada and so on 
so.1524 According to him, retribution can play a part but the main objective of the sentencing 
system is actually deterring other people from committing crimes.1525 So, the ICT-BD’s 
objectives of punishment are retribution and deterrence.   
            This particular interviewee further stated that punishment in Bangladesh is a warning 
to the convict and to others who would potentially commit similar crimes.1526 In explaining the 
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national penal code of Bangladesh, this interviewee also stated that in the legal system of 
Bangladesh, the death penalty is permissible under the penal code.1527 He said under domestic 
criminal law, a murderer can either be sentenced to death or alternatively, he can be 
sentenced to life imprisonment.1528 He also explained that in relation to determining 
punishment, there is a degree of discretion which depends on many factors like the gravity of 
the offence and mitigating factors.1529 He said that sentencing is determined by balancing 
between the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.1530 In explaining the effect of 
punishment in society, this particular judge said that, ‘…it has always been felt that you can 
establish peace in the society by punishing the criminals’ [and] ‘there can be no peace, no 
reconciliation with leaving the criminals at large’.1531 He also adhered that the punishment 
given by the ICT-BD is an example that will deter future crimes similar in nature and heal the 
pain of the victims for not getting justice for a long time.1532  
             Another judge stated that the death penalty remains a big debate from a human rights 
perspective, but it is not uncommon in many other common law jurisdictions.1533 According to 
this judge, the advantages of the ICT-BD are that it is not very expensive, it is dealt by its own 
legal experts and attracts less interference from the international community and it is a quick 
process.1534 However, he acknowledged that the ICT-BD has attracted criticisms from human 
rights activists and organisations in relation to the death penalty.1535 
            One important aspect of the death penalty is that if Bangladesh could have prosecuted 













penalty would not have been such a big issue. As during that time, the human rights issue 
was not fully developed. Even a defence lawyer, who took part in the interview, stated that, 
‘…if the tribunals were to establish soon after the liberation war, there may not have been 
outrage or dispute about the death penalty’.1536 
             In explaining the decisive factors of capital punishment by the ICT-BD, a participant 
stated that universal sentencing guidelines have always been relevant in passing the 
sentence.1537 The judge also made reference to the Indian Supreme Court's decision on 
passing sentence where context was considered to be a decisive factor in determining capital 
punishment.1538  Another judge said there are so many arguments in favour or against the 
death penalty but it is the demand of the mass people of Bangladesh to retain death penalty 
at least for the perpetrators of the crimes of the Liberation war of 1971.1539  
9.4.2 Approaches of the ICT-BD in determining sentence  
              In explaining the sentencing principle in Bangladesh, a participant stated that, a court 
when trying a general case for murder, has to give reason to whether it passes a sentence of 
death or it passes life imprisonment and there should be justifiable reasons.1540 This judge also 
made reference to the judicial norm of India and stated that there is a slightly different 
approach in India where the norm is that the death penalty will be given, but only in exceptional 
cases.1541 However, in Bangladesh, the death sentence is not exceptional.1542 He also said that 
the Indian Supreme Court and the high court have passed many death sentences in 
exceptional cases.1543 This judge further stated that, death penalty depends on the 












the offence was committed, etc. He also mentioned that Indian courts have their own 
sentencing policy and in defining their sentencing policy they have given number of guidelines 
as to which cases the death sentence should be passed and in which cases life imprisonment 
should be passed.1544 According to this judge, the ICT-BD had more or less followed those 
guidelines in passing the sentence and the offences under the ICT 1973 Act.1545 He also 
explained that the crimes during the liberation war in 1971, were so grave that nothing short 
of the death sentence would have satisfied the aims of justice and that’s why the tribunals 
have passed death sentence and their sentences have been affirmed by the AD in those 
cases.1546  
            In explaining the cautious approach of determining death penalty, he said that the  
judges have taken in to account all the circumstances surrounding the case because they 
‘..kept in mind that life is precious and if possible life should be spared, but the offences they 
committed were so gruesome and dastardly’ and ‘…affected not only one individual, hundreds 
of people were killed and the evidence of rape that came before us were so aggressive and 
so inhumane that we felt nothing short of death sentence would satisfy the aims of justice’.1547  
           In relation to the abolitionist view, this judge acknowledged that, ‘…presently there is a 
demand for the abolition of death sentence but even then, half the world follow death 
sentences’.1548 He further stated that, ‘…if you look at the far Eastern countries, death 
sentence can be imposed for a much lesser offence like drug offences’.1549 So, the application 
of death penalty varies based on context. This interviewee also made reference to the practice 










sentences’.1550 According to him, ‘…it is not quite right that death sentences have been 
abolished’.1551 This particular judge made another valuable observation that, in some 
countries, death sentences were put on a moratorium and have been revived now because, 
they felt that due to absence of death sentences, crimes had gone up.1552 
             All of the judges who took part in the interview were of the opinion that Bangladesh 
has created an example in the field of Transitional Justice for the states that failed to prosecute 
the perpetrators for genocide such as Mexico and Vietnam. According to the majority of the 
interviewees, other countries will come forward to prosecute international crimes after seeing 
that Bangladesh has successfully completed their trials. A particular participant stated that 
there is a possibility that other countries in a similar situation will follow the Bangladeshi trend 
and will enact domestic law to prosecute the perpetrators with limited resources1553. 
9.5 Judgment Analysis 
            The judgments of the ICT-BD have provided valuable insight into how the judges came 
to determine sentences. The sections below have analysed some notable judgments relating 
to sentencing issues that arose from the ICT-BD’s practices. 
9.5.1 Death penalty principles in the case of Abul Kalam Azad 
             In the first case of Abul Kalam Azad1554, he was convicted by trial in absentia because 
he had absconded for a long time and was awarded the death penalty. Abul Kalam Azad was 
a member of Razakar force and later became the local commander of Al-Badar Bahini and 
took part in the atrocities in 1971. In the judgment, it is said that, ‘…It has been proved from 
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as an armed member of Razakar force’.1555 In relation to the verdict on sentence the following 
paragraphs are worth mentioning: 
Paragraph 333 
We have taken due notice of the intrinsic gravity of the offence of ‘genocide’ and 
murders as ‘crimes against humanity’ being offences which are particularly shocking 
to the conscience of mankind. We are of agreed view that justice be meet with if a 
single ‘sentence of death’ under section 20(2) of the Act of 1973 is awarded to accused 
Abul Kalam Azad @ Bachchu for convictions relating to the offences of murder as 
‘crimes against humanity’ (listed in charge no.s 3, 4 and 6) and for the offence of 
‘genocide’ (listed in charge no.7) of which he has been found guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt. 
Paragraph 334 
However, we are of the further view that considering the proportionate to the gravity of 
offences the accused Abul Kalam Azad @ Bachchu deserves imprisonment i.e. lesser 
punishment for convictions relating to the remaining offences as crimes against 
humanity (listed in charge no.s 1, 5 and 8).1556       
It appears from the judgment that Abul Kalam Azad was given death penalty for the 
grave crimes (Charges no 3, 4 and 6) and, he was also given lesser punishment for the other 
crimes (Charges no 1, 5 and 8). The above paragraphs of the first judgment indicate that 
judges came to determine the punishment by considering the gravity of the offence and 
proportionality with the severity of the punishment. 
9.5.2 Death penalty principles in the case of Abdul Quader Molla 
               The ICT-BD delivered its second judgment for Abdul Quader Molla on 5 February 
2013, where the tribunal awarded him life imprisonment instead of the death penalty. There 
are at least three important aspects to this judgment. Firstly, in determining life imprisonment, 
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the judges have considered ‘…the intrinsic magnitude of the offence of murders as ‘crimes 
against humanity’ being offences which are predominantly shocking to the conscience of 
mankind’.1557 Secondly, judges ‘…have carefully considered the mode of participation of the 
accused to the commission of crimes proved and the proportionate to the gravity of 
offences’.1558 Thirdly, the ‘principle of proportionality implies that sentences must reflect the 
predominant standard of proportionality between the gravity of the offence and the degree of 
responsibility of the offender’.1559 The people who are on the side of the victims were quite 
unhappy due to the fact that the ICT-BD did not award the highest punishment to the convict. 
As a result, there was a social movement in Bangladesh (popularly known as Shabagh 
movement)1560 demanding the highest punishment to the convict in accordance with the law. 
             The ICT-BD had awarded Abdul Quader Molla life imprisonment. However, the Court 
of Appeal eventually awarded him the sentence of death penalty saying that, ‘…the sentence 
of imprisonment of life awarded to the appellant in respect of charge No.6 is based on total 
non-application of mind and contrary to the sentencing principle’.1561 In explaining the charge 
no. 6, one of the three judges mentioned the following: 
that during the period of War of Liberation, on 26.03.1971 at about 06:00 pm you 
[accused Abdul Quader Molla] being accompanied by some Biharis and Pakistani 
arm[y] went to the house being house number 21, Kalapani Lane No.5 at Mirpur 
Section-12 belonging to one Hajrat Ali and entering inside the house forcibly, with 
intent to kill Bengali civilians, your accomplices under your leadership and on your 
order killed Hazrat Ali by gunfire, his wife Amina was gunned down and then 
slaughtered to death, their two minor daughters named Khatija and Tahmina were also 
slaughtered to death, their son Babu aged 02 years was also killed by dashing him to 
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the ground violently. During the same transaction of the attack, your 12 accomplices 
committed gang rape upon a minor Amela aged 11 years but another minor daughter 
Momena who somehow managed to hide in the crime room, on seeing the atrocious 
acts, eventually escaped herself from the clutches of the perpetrators. The atrocious 
allegation, as transpired, sufficiently indicates that you actively participated, facilitated, 
aided and substantially contributed to the attack directed upon the unarmed civilians, 
causing the commission of the horrific murders and rape.1562      
Many critiques including Robertson suggest that the Court of appeal awarded death 
penalty due to public sentiment.1563 However, the people in favour of the movement claim that 
the amendment to the law was nothing but to ensure equality of arms to ensure a fair trial both 
for the victims and accused.1564 The researcher if of the opinion that if there is inequality in the 
right of appeal, it must be rectified whenever it comes to light. In assessing the critics’ claim 
that whether the Court of Appeal awarded death penalty arbitrarily, it is important to look into 
the reasoning given by the Court of Appeal panel. The Court of Appeal in interpreting Section 
20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 observed that: 
A plain reading of sub-section (2) shows that if the tribunal finds any person guilty of 
any of the offences described in subsection (2) of section 3, awarding a death sentence 
is the rule and any other sentence of imprisonment proportionate to the gravity of the 
offence is an exception. Therefore, while deciding just and appropriate sentence to be 
awarded for any of the offences to any accused person, the aggravating and mitigating 
factors and circumstances in which the crimes have been committed are to be 
balanced in a disproportionate manner…1565    
            The Court of Appeal further observed that, ‘…in awarding the appropriate sentence, 
the tribunal must respond to the society’s cry for justice against perpetrators of crimes against 
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humanity’.1566 This aspect is worth to consider that the Court of Appeal considered that 
‘society’s cry for justice’ is an important factor which has to be properly balanced with the 
crimes against humanity.1567 There is a subtle difference between the sentencing approaches 
of the ICT-BD and the Court of Appeal in the case of Quader Molla. The ICT-BD had taken 
the approach of the ‘mode of participation of the convict’ as a deciding factor of sentencing on 
the other hand, the Court of Appeal had taken ‘society’s cry for justice’ as a deciding factor 
along with the interpretation of Section 20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 that death penalty is to be 
awarded in general and life imprisonment is to be awarded as an exception. 
            The Court of Appeal in justifying the death penalty stated that the convict has 
committed worst and barbarous types of crimes against humanity and participated in the killing 
and rape of innocent persons without just cause.1568 The Court of Appeal further observed that 
in determining the sentence for the convict, the court should not only focus on the right of the 
convict for just and fair punishment but also the expectations of the victims of the crimes and 
‘…the society’s reasonable expectation from the court for the proportionate deterrent 
punishment conforming to the gravity of the offence and consistent with the public abhorrence 
for the heinous crime committed by the accused’.1569 
            In the development of sentencing guidelines of ICL, the case of Quader Molla is quite 
significant where judges considered the ‘society’s reasonable expectation from the court’.1570 
Since the purpose of criminal punishment is to ensure retribution and deterrence, it is 
important to consider the social aspect that how people from a particular society perceive the 
death penalty and life imprisonment. Being a Muslim majority country, the public conception 
of justice in Bangladesh is that, for the gravest crimes the highest punishment of death penalty 
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must be awarded. Another important aspect is that the Court of Appeal interpreted Section 
20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 in a way that if certain crimes are proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then the death penalty is inevitable unless there are any exceptional issues involved.  
              In relation to the ‘Shabagh movement’, it appears that the protesters were able to 
pressure the government to amend the law so that the prosecution can appeal on the grounds 
of sentencing. There is no strong evidence as to whether the movement had any impact on 
the mind of the judges of the Court of Appeal since they have given reasoning in favour of the 
death penalty based on the interpretation of Section 20(2) of the ICT Act 1973. From the Court 
of Appeal’s judgment, it appears that ‘society’s cry for justice’ was an important factor to 
reassess the punishment. It seems the interpretation of section 20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 is 
the main basis for awarding death penalty. If we consider the charge no. 6 and the gravity of 
the crimes committed by the convict, it is just to say that he deserves the highest punishment 
on the land in accordance with the law.  
              Justice Wahab Miah in his dissenting stated that judges are human beings, and as 
citizens of Bangladesh, they have reasons to be emotional as to the atrocities.1571 However, 
he said judges are oath-bound to faithfully discharge the duties of their office according to law 
‘…without fear or favour, affection or ill-will’.1572 According to him, although there was a civil 
movement in Bangladesh demanding the highest punishment for Quader Molla, it did not 
affect the core aspect of the judgment given that they are oath-bound to serve justice.1573 
9.5.3 Death penalty issues from the case of Sayeedi 
              In the case of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the ICT-BD judges stated that, ‘in 
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Nos. 8 and 10, we unanimously held that the accused deserves the highest punishment as 
provided under section 20(2) of ICT Act of 1973’.1574 This particular convict was given the 
death penalty and he appealed against the conviction to the Court of Appeal. Mr Sayeedi’s 
appeal was allowed by majority and he was finally awarded life imprisonment instead of death 
penalty considering his age and the circumstances in which he committed crimes and 
punishment to be given in line with the gravity of crimes as required under the just deserts 
principle. However, a particular Justice has given his dissenting in relation to the charges No. 
8 & 10 that, ‘Having analysed in-depth the sentencing policy and practice prevalent in various 
jurisdictions, I am astutely[sic] convi[n]ced that the extreme sentence is the only appropriate 
one that would be conducive to the ends of justice’.1575 
9.5.4 Dissenting regarding capital punishment in the case of Sayeedi 
             In the dissenting judgment, Justice Shamsuddin stated that, ‘We have not as yet 
promulgated any textbook or rules on sentencing and by the same time, we have not 
developed uniform sentencing principles or criteria to assist in promoting the equitable 
administration of criminal laws’.1576 This particular judge made reference to the U.K Streatfield 
Committee’s (1961) recommendation that, the sentence to be given is to be proportionate to 
that of the offender’s culpability.1577 In this particular case, to assess the adequacy of a 
sentence the following factors are considerable:  
…the circumstances of its commission, the age and character of the offender, injury to 
individuals or to society, the effect of the punishment on the offender, and eye to the 
correction and reformation of the offender are some factors amongst many other 
factors which would ordinarily be taken into consideration by courts…1578         
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In determining the sentencing principle, Justice Shamsuddin made reference to 
various academics and legal scholars such as professor Andrew Ashworth, who observed 
that, ‘there is no doubt that the task of sentencing imposes a great burden on the Judges and 
that many of them say that it is the hardest and most disturbing of judicial task’.1579 Also, 
reference is made to Lord Bingham CJ  who observed that borderline case is ‘one of the most 
elusive problems of criminal sentencing’.1580 Another notable reference reflected in the 
judgment is Lord Taylor CJ’s opinion that Judges are free to determine the sentence on the 
basis of the facts and circumstances of a particular case and maintaining public confidence in 
criminal justice.1581 Justice Shamsuddin also made reference to Lord Taylor’s ‘right-thinking 
public approach’ in determining the sentence.  
9.6 Conclusion and interim findings 
                The international criminal tribunals established by the UN’s assistance did not 
include the provision of the death penalty for the world's worst crimes - genocide, war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.1582 It is one of the developments of the international criminal 
sentencing principle that the concept of fairness should be applied to sentencing and 
punishment must not be based on revenge.1583 
              Since ICL combines international law and criminal law through the mechanism of 
indirect enforcement, Carcano suggested that in assessing the gravity of international crimes, 
national criminal law approach would be valuable guidance.1584 It appears that ICL conventions 
did not provide any prescribed form of penalties and expressly did not prohibit the death 
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penalty. However, the question arises in relation to the applicable norms of human rights on 
the prohibition of death penalties.  
            It appears from the Interview data that judges referred to the ‘just deserts’ principle in 
determining the highest punishment as the death penalty. Section 20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 
allowed the ICT-BD to award death penalty as the highest punishment. This particular section 
was interpreted by the Court of Appeal that if certain crimes are proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, then death penalty is inevitable and if death penalty is not given then there should be 
appropriate reasoning for not awarding death penalty. However, the sentencing practices of 
the ICT-BD has not been consistent. In the first case of Adul Kalam Azad, he was awarded 
death penalty in abstention. On the other hand, in the case of Quader Molla, he was initially 
awarded life imprisonment due to the level of responsibility towards the crimes. However, 
Quader Molla’s conviction was changed to death penalty by the highest court of Bangladesh. 
In another case of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the tribunal awarded him the death penalty, but 
it was reduced to life imprisonment by the Court of Appeal by the majority. The dissenting 
judgment given in the Sayeedi case is significant in relation to assessing sentence in ICL from 
contextual approach. 
              The application of the international criminal justice in the Bangladeshi situation has 
been reflected through ‘indirect enforcement system’ and this process of domestication of ICL 
has included the national practices of punishment including the death penalty. In the first 
judgment of the ICT-BD, the judges came to determine the punishment considering the gravity 
of the offence and proportionality with the severity of the punishment. In the second judgment 
of Quader Molla, mode of participation of the accused to the commission of crimes and degree 
of responsibility were important factors in determining his punishment. However, the Court of 
Appeal in the same case interpreted Section 20(2) of the ICT Act 1973 from a different point 
of view stating that it had required the judges to award capital punishment if charges are 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. Another important aspect of this particular appeal judgment 
is that ‘social conception of justice’ is also a decisive factor in determining punishment so that 
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victims feel that justice been served through the punishment. If a particular society feels that 
justice has not been served, then the punishment would not serve any valuable purpose in 
terms of retribution and deterrence. This echoed the approach adopted by Lord Taylor’s ‘right-
thinking public approach’ in determining punishment.1585 
              In relation to the case of Quader Molla, many critics claim that movement by the 
section of the society impacted the punishment of Quader Molla. However, the reasoning 
given by the Court of Appeal indicates a different position that the social movement of 
Shahbagh enabled the government to amend the law which allowed the Prosecution to appeal 
against the conviction. The judgment of the Court of Appeal reflected that judges are human 
beings; they may become emotional knowing the facts of the heinous crimes, but they are 
oath-bound to serve justice and would not take any decisions based on ill-motives or external 
influence. 
            In the case of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the ICT-BD awarded him the death penalty. 
But on appeal, he was awarded lesser punishment of life imprisonment. This case was 
particularly a borderline case and it was difficult for the judges of the AD to determine 
punishment. As observed by Lord Bingham CJ, determining sentence in borderline cases is 
the most difficult task of the judges in practice.1586 It appears that Henham has rightly identified 
that inconsistency in sentencing does exist in almost all the international criminal tribunals 
which may affect the credibility of a particular tribunal as an institution.1587  In relation to 
Robertson’s criticism mentioned earlier, it seems that the gravity of the crimes committed by 
the perpetrators of 1971 is gruesome. Robertson’s argument is that sentencing guidelines 
should follow the individual convict’s responsibility. However, the court of appeal in the case 
of Quader Molla, rejected such an approach. According to Robertson, the death penalty was 
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presumably retained to punish the Pakistani army officers, not the local collaborators who 
merely assisted the Pakistani army. However, the analysis of the judgments demonstrated the 
seriousness of the charges against the convicts and how judges have balanced between the 
gravity of the offence and proportionality with the severity of the punishment. 
             In relation to the criticism adhered by Amnesty International, it important to consider 
whether the death penalty given by the ICT-BD is contrary to the right to life and human rights 
principle. The theoretical analysis suggests that prohibition of death penalty is not yet 
customary international law but there is a growing trend to make its use limited. Regionally, 
European countries accepted to prohibit the death penalty but, in the Asian regions the death 
penalty is still a valid punishment. Also, Islamic countries have retained the punishment of 
death penalty due to religious and cultural aspects. Moreover, Bangladesh is a sovereign 
country and it has the privilege to exercise its sovereign power to retain death penalty as the 
highest punishment. Considering the judicial history and political and economic culture in 
Bangladesh, there is nothing wrong, at least legally, to retain the death penalty for the crimes 
under the ICT Act 1973. Even in some societies, retribution and deterrence would not work 
merely by imposing life imprisonment. As explained above, a particular judge observed that 
Pakistan did not prosecute the identified war criminals handed over to them and as a result, 
the Pakistani army officers are reportedly committing the same offence in the Balochistan 
region of Pakistan.1588 The majority of the judges who took part in the interview were of the 
opinion that in the situation of delayed justice, the abolition of death penalty would not serve 
any useful purpose of retribution and deterrence. If the death penalty is not given in a situation 
like Bangladesh where there was a long period of a culture of impunity, life imprisonment as 
the highest punishment for most heinous crimes would become only a symbolic punishment. 
The perpetrators have already enjoyed a free life over the past three decades and they are at 





provided valuable insights in relation to the sentencing approaches adopted by a particular 
society. In assessing the punishment, the judgments of the ICT-BD referred to national wishes 




















KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS FOR ICL AND TJ 
10.1 Introduction 
           Analysing the ICT-BD’s operation as a transitional justice mechanism provides us a 
valuable insight on how crimes under international criminal law can be prosecuted through a 
domestic judicial mechanism. Although, there are both restorative and retributive mechanisms 
of transitional justice, Bangladesh has decided to adopt a retributive response to deal with 
gross human rights violations during the country’s Liberation War in 1971.  
The age old debate between universalists and cultural relativists in the context of  
transitional justice have presented International customary law such as UDHR as a western 
concept and a one size fits all model with little importance for diversity and cultural norms, the 
local approach to global transitional justice must be met with equal importance as the global 
approach to local transitional justice systems and efforts.1589 The development of transitional 
justice in a Muslim majority country such as Bangladesh provided that a balance between 
universality and cultural relativity can be maintained as demonstrated by the ICT-BD. The 
system of transitional justice in the context of Bangladesh has succeeded in achieving the 
inclusivity of local practices and universally recognised norms into its transitional justice 
system. 
Returning to the questions posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to 
state that this thesis has provided a more in-depth insight into the domestication of ICL. This 
research also attempted to make a comprehensive assessment of the delayed justice based 
on domestic legislation, undertaken by an ad hoc domestic tribunal without the direct help of 
the international community. The analysis of the semi-structured interview data undertaken 
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for this research has extended our knowledge of the domestic prosecution of international 
crimes in Bangladesh. This research may add valuable insights to the growing body of 
research that indicates even though justice is delayed, justice can be served. The findings of 
this research would enhance our understanding of delayed justice in post-conflict situations 
and methods used for the ICT-BD may be applied to other post-conflict situations elsewhere 
in the world. 
10.1.1 Transitional Justice in the context of Bangladesh  
            Public trust in the transitional justice system in the context of Bangladesh is crucial to 
the operation and appreciation of the ICT-BD. Drawing examples from the struggle of the 
transitional justice process in countries like Nepal1590 and Sri Lanka1591 due to lack of faith and 
loss of trust from the public, the transitional justice process in Bangladesh and the ICT-BD can 
be exampled as an effective model for a systematic approach to justice in similar situations of 
conflict, especially in situations where prosecution is delayed. Bangladesh in adopting a 
domestic tribunal, placed a considerable importance on internal actors and local laws based 
on local practices and has rejected international assistance.  
           The balance between International human rights and cultural norms in the context of 
Bangladesh has drawn criticisms from across the globe. The ICT-BD recognises the fair trial 
rights under Article 17 of the ICT Act 1973, however, there are many criticisms in relation to 
guaranteeing a fair trial under Article 14 ICCPR, due to the appointment of judges by the 
government of Bangladesh, lack of witness protection and the lack of supervision from 
International bodies. However, the amendment of ICT BD’s RoP has included the provisions 
for a fair trial in accordance to customary international law and the verdicts of the ICT-BD can 
be challenged in the highest court of the land.  
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10.2 Lessons Learned: The way forward for the ICT-BD 
           The ICT- BD, as the transitional justice mechanism in Bangladesh, was constructed to 
address violations committed during the Liberation War of 1971. There had been a gap of 39 
years between when the atrocities were committed and the establishment of the ICT-BD. 
Since it began operations, the ICT-BD has been continuously prosecuting local collaborators 
and auxiliary forces that had aided, assisted or participated in committing mass atrocities 
against the Bangladeshi population. These crimes included crimes against humanity, 
genocide, war crimes, crimes against peace, and other crimes under ICL. The majority of the 
interviewees stated that the perpetrators had enjoyed a long period of impunity due to the 
political turmoil and the assassination of Prime Minister Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 1975. 
The ICT Act 1973, was the first legislation based on the legacy of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, and historically, it was a significant development for the national prosecution of 
international crimes.1592 The parliamentary debates suggest that during the bill stage, the ICT 
Act 1973 had incorporated the then international criminal jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Act 
has contributed to the development of the ICL in 1973 and being domestic legislation, it has 
made provisions for an appeal right to be given to the accused. The only international element 
of the tribunal is the definition of the crimes which are borrowed from customary international 
law. Though in their jurisprudence, the judges, prosecution and defence also referred to 
international due process standards. 
While a majority of the interviewees supported criminal prosecutions, the defence 
lawyers and the politicians of Jamaat-e-Islami suggested an alternative mechanism of 
conditional amnesty. Moreover, the majority of the interviewees, opposed restorative means 
of justice without criminal prosecution because it could not provide an acceptable remedy to 
the victims. However, the same interviewees were of the opinion that reparation could be an 
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effective supplement to prosecution. Most of the interviewees have stated that in the absence 
of criminal prosecution, accountability would not serve any meaningful purpose in the 
Bangladeshi society. 
Kelsall in assessing the efficacy of the SCSL, in the particular context of Sierra Leone, 
argued that, ‘…Western legal precepts and procedures were unsuited to judging adequately’ 
the facts, nature of crimes and credibility of witnesses in the cultural context of Sierra 
Leone.1593 According to him, local culture is an important factor, to take into account, for 
administering proper justice.1594 Similarly, the majority of the interviewees stated that the ICT-
BD, being a domestic tribunal, is in a better position than other modes of accountability 
mechanisms such as ad hoc or hybrid tribunals. So, it seems that domestic prosecutions may 
be better than international ones because of the nuances of culture. Considering the situation 
in Bangladesh, a domestic tribunal would have a greater social impact and more acceptability 
from the citizens of Bangladesh. There are however, divided opinions about the efficacy of 
domestic tribunals dealing with international crimes. The defence lawyers and politicians of 
Jamaat-e-Islam shared their concerns regarding the high risks of judges in domestic tribunals 
performing their duties partially as they were linked to the country and therefore potentially 
susceptible to political influences. Public sentiments and personal political ideologies may also 
motivate the judges. Nevertheless, the authority of Bangladesh decided to set up a domestic 
tribunal because domestic experts were very well equipped with local knowledge and culture. 
Also, there was a legal framework to establish domestic tribunals since 1973, e.g. the ICT Act 
1973. The local policymakers resisted forming an international criminal tribunal as they 
considered it to be a threat to the sovereignty of Bangladesh and thought that it would be a 
gateway for international political interference in Bangladesh. Contrarily, being a purely 
domestic tribunal, the ICT-BD did not receive any financial or technical assistance 
internationally. The ICT-BD also employed local personnel to run the Tribunal. This has 
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resulted in a cost-effective mechanism. In less than a period of ten years, the ICT-BD has 
delivered at least 38 Judgements as of July 2019. 
Concerning the substantive laws of the ICT-BD, the definition of crimes against 
humanity under the ICT Act 1973 deviated from current definitions of these crimes because it 
does not explicitly contain the ‘widespread or systematic’ element for constituting the crimes 
against humanity.1595 Also, the requirement of ‘knowledge’ of the accused, about the nature of 
atrocity is absent from the definition. According to Linton, this ambiguity is against the principle 
of legality.1596 However, there was no dispute that the atrocities committed in Bangladesh were 
‘widespread or systematic'.  
Under the ICT Act 1973, the definition of genocide extended to ‘political group’ which 
also reflected the contemporary understanding of genocide as understood from the 
perspective of Bangladesh. This aspect of the definition of genocide in itself can be classed 
as a contribution to the development of ICL. However, the ICT-BD did not find anyone guilty 
of genocide for attacking a political group. The nature of genocide charges before the ICT-BD 
are mostly related to the perpetrators who have encouraged or assisted in the commission of 
genocide.1597 The application of the substantive laws of the ICT-BD has also heavily relied on 
the inchoate offense and joint enterprise in ICL.  
The definition of genocide adopted by the ICT Act 1973 can be criticized, stating that 
it has departed from the treaty law and customary international law. However, it could also be 
conversely argued that the inclusion of political groups as a protected group within the ambit 
of genocide by the ICT Act 1973 is a progressive, forward-thinking approach of protecting 
political groups. Many academics, including Schaack, support this notion.1598  
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1598 Beth Van Schaack, ‘The Crimes of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot’ 
(1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2259. 
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The governing Act of the ICT-BD enabled it to try and assess those individuals who 
merely attempted, abated, conspired or involved or failed to prevent any crimes under the Act. 
It appears from the judgment that in cases where the principal offenders could not be brought 
to justice, it was still possible to prosecute the accomplices. This aspect of the ICT-BD is 
crucial as it could possibly contribute towards the deterrence of crimes in the future. 
ICL can learn many lessons from the procedural aspect of domestic prosecution of 
international crimes. The unique features of the ICT-BD’s procedural framework are stipulation 
of time limit to complete investigation within 12 months, right of appeal to highest court of land, 
right of review the Court of Appeal’s decision and appointing qualified judges of the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh. Equally, lessons can be learnt, from the several weaknesses of the 
procedural framework, such as lack of independence in the appointment procedure of the 
judges and prosecutors, lack of initial experience. These weaknesses offer lessons for 
improvement in the future. 
The ICT-BD's sentencing principles are determined by the social and cultural aspect 
as well as long denial of justice and public wishes. The procedural laws of the ICT-BD have 
been criticized by various quarters from the very beginning. As a result, both the governing 
act and the RoP’s had to be amended to incorporate the accepted standard of due process. 
Presumption of innocence, beyond a reasonable doubt, interlocutory appeal was also included 
as part of procedural laws. 
Critics have also pointed to the judge and prosecutor appointment process of the ICT-
BD. There is no separate body to appoint judges and prosecutors; therefore, the Bangladeshi 
government is empowered to appoint the required individuals. This appointment process is 
questionable in terms of independence of the judges. 
This thesis has also analysed in detail, the effectiveness of the ICT-BD as an avenue 
of transitional justice through which mass atrocities can be addressed and impunity fought. It 
has brought to light the inherent tension between fighting impunity and seeking delayed justice 
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in Bangladesh. Part of this research was dedicated to collecting data from judges, politicians, 
and lawyers (defence and prosecution) and a semi-structured interview method was adopted 
to facilitate this data collection. The view of the majority of the interviewees was that the ICT-
BD can contribute in the development of ICL and transitional justice. They based their opinions 
in regard to lessons from the ICT-BD concerning ending impunity, delayed justice, providing 
reparation, due process, considering old evidence, witness protection and sentencing 
practices. The findings from the semi structured interviews and academic literature are 
presented in the sub sections below to provide a framework for the lessons that can be learnt 
from the ICT-BD.  
10.2.1 Ending Impunity 
In relation to culture of impunity, this study set out to gain a better understanding of the 
nature of the culture of impunity in the context of Bangladesh, and this may contribute towards 
the development of ICL. The culture of impunity is one of the main problems of ICL. Many 
countries around the world could not serve justice for the past atrocities that they have 
suffered.1599 Hence, the establishment of the ICT-BD is a significant milestone to decrease the 
culture of impunity for the past atrocities in Bangladesh, which may serve as an example for 
other jurisdictions in the future. 
Majority of the interviewees stated that although the prosecution was delayed, the ICT-
BD has taken a substantial step to end the culture of impunity. They have also asserted that 
the establishment of the ICT-BD will bring peace in the society in the long run, and the 
judgments delivered by the tribunal will establish historical truth.1600 Despite the approval, 
there are divided opinions from other interviewees who think that criminal prosecution is 




1599 Lemarchand (n 574). 
1600 J4-Q-A 
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As an institution, the majority of the interviewees considered the establishment of the 
ICT-BD to be remarkable because it would affirm that there is no scope of impunity. One judge 
stated that as an institution, the ICT-BD is establishing a precedent in the area of delayed 
prosecution.1601 
The Bangladeshi situation provided valuable insight into how impunity may develop in 
a post-conflict society. Soon after the liberation war, a country like Bangladesh had to focus 
on other issues such as rebuilding international relationships and the necessary infrastructure 
of the country. According to Opotow, ‘the main root of the impunity is the political consideration 
and compromise’.1602 Most of the interviewees stated that the primary source of the impunity 
in Bangladesh is set on political consideration. Majority of the interviewees also opined that 
ineffective early legal attempts, due to relying on the domestic evidence Act, also contributed 
towards the culture of impunity. Additionally, majority of the politicians stated that a newly 
independent country’s priority should be focused on rebuilding the nation rather than 
instigating criminal prosecutions, this contributed towards the culture of impunity.  
The ICT-BD's contribution to the ICL concerning a culture of impunity can be 
summarized from three different points of views. Firstly, the establishment of the ICT-BD is an 
attempt to decrease the culture of impunity and increase accountability in Bangladesh, even 
after a long delay. Secondly, the ICT-BD addresses the issue of historical trauma that has 
been built up through the development of the culture of impunity and, the majority of the 
interviewees suggested that it would have a general deterrent effect in ICL. Thirdly, the 
majority of the interviewees stated that after a substantial period of delay, restorative means 
of justice no longer played any meaningful role in addressing the issue of impunity and 




1602 Opotow (n 560) 149. 
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this study focuses on the situation in Bangladesh, the findings may well have a bearing in the 
field of ICL jurisprudence.  
10.2.2 Delayed Justice 
Regarding delayed justice, this research set out to understand the views and 
experiences of the delayed justice process in Bangladesh. The ICT-BD reaffirmed that there 
is no bar under international criminal jurisprudence to set up domestic tribunals to deal with 
delayed prosecutions. 
Most of the interviewees stated that the ICT-BD had offered new lessons and insights 
into the area of delayed prosecutions. In terms of such delayed prosecutions, the ICT-BD has 
at least two significant lessons to offer. Firstly, while the several violations which had been 
committed during the 1971 Liberation war were well-known, these had gone unpunished for 
many decades, breeding a sense of impunity and injustice in the Bangladeshi society. The 
first lesson, therefore, is that where there have been massive violations of IHL, there may be 
no peace without justice. Secondly, the ICT-BD has shown that it is possible to bring criminal 
prosecutions to address the culture of impunity even after the passing of several decades from 
the original events. Despite this, the ICT-BD has also shown that such delayed prosecutions 
bring with them significant challenges. 
The ICT-BD is, of course, not the first instance of delayed prosecutions. In Cambodia, 
the ECCC’s were established in 2003 for violations that had occurred in the 1970’s. Germany 
had also convicted a 91-year old Nazi war criminal, John Demjanjuk on 12 May 2011. John 
Demjanjuk acted as a guard at the Sobibór extermination camp 70 years ago. This suggests 
that in some cases, justice may be delayed but justice must be served.1603 Similarly, the 
contribution made by the ICT-BD with respect to delayed justice can be quite significant. The 
establishment of the ICT-BD tends to support the view that even long delays should not act 
 
 
1603 Jn Arno Hessbruegge, ‘Justice Delayed, Not Denied: Statutory Limitations and Human Rights Crimes (2011-
2012) 43 Geo. J. Int'l L. 335, 384. 
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as an impediment for prosecuting atrocities around the world, because there is no time bar for 
prosecuting crimes under ICL. Further to that, the ICCPR enabled states to abolish any legal 
provisions which may potentially hinder the prosecution of gross violation of human rights.  
This research has raised important questions about the nature of delayed prosecutions 
of international crimes. As an institution, it can be said that the ICT-BD contributed to the 
justice process by decreasing the culture of impunity. The lessons learned from the 
Bangladeshi situation in terms of delay would help assist in designing similar tribunals 
elsewhere in the world. Majority of the interviewees stated that the ICT-BD contributed as an 
institution in establishing the fact that although justice was delayed, justice was served. 
10.2.3 Reparation 
According to Teitel, criminal prosecution of international crimes is the partial objective 
of transitional justice and to maximize achieving the goals of transitional justice, reparatory 
justice is necessary.1604 In Bangladesh, there was a prolonged denial of justice, and as a result, 
many perpetrators have died naturally without facing a trial. A concise study of the data 
collected from the interviews presented that all lawyers, judges, and politicians have 
acknowledged that the ICT-BD could not develop a comprehensive reparation mechanism for 
the victims of 1971. It is still open for the judges of the ICT-BD to amend its RoP’s to include 
reparation and compensatory provisions for the victims. At the same time, the legislators of 
Bangladesh could introduce reparation related national laws.   
It is not too late for the government in Bangladesh to look into the issue of creating 
appropriate legislation which would enable the victims to seek compensations from the 
convicted war criminals. The interview data from the policymakers mirrored the view that the 
first challenge of the ICT-BD was to prosecute the perpetrators of the 1971 and there was 
 
 
1604 Teitel (n 174) 119. 
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speculation that the main purpose of establishing the ICT-BD would be affected if the focus 
was to be shifted to reparation. 
10.2.4 Due Process 
In relation to due process, this research has examined the tensions between a lengthy 
denial of justice for the victims and due process rights for the accused. The generalized 
concept of due process was elaborately articulated in Article 14 of the ICCPR and majority of 
the interviewees stated that the ICT-BD had provided adequate due process safeguards to 
the accused.1605 The initial stages of drafting the governing Act of the ICT-BD appeared to 
show that, due process was considered at least to the extent that the perpetrators were saved 
from summary execution to give them legal rights by trial. However, the critics alleged that the 
amended ICT Act 1973 did not provide suspects a right against self-incrimination or a right to 
legal counsel when being questioned by the police, nor did it give them adequate time to 
prepare a defence.1606 The majority of the interviewees stated that the ICT Act 1973 and its 
RoP afford all the standard fair trial safeguards under Article 14 of the ICCPR to the accused. 
On the other hand, there is conflicting opinion by other interviewees that in practice, due 
process principles have not been followed appropriately.1607 
There are also divisive opinions on the procedural due process of the ICT-BD. The 
judges of the Tribunal stated that sufficient time was handed to the defence team to prepare 
their case, and interlocutory appeal rights were available. In contrast, the politicians of Jamaat-
e-Islam and the defence lawyers provided a contradictory opinion that in practice, there was 
no proper procedural due process for the accused in the pre-trial stage and accused could not 




1606 Chopra (n 935) 4. 
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The judgments of the ICT-BD reflect that while due process comprises some minimum 
standards, it is a contextual concept, and the ICT-BD has defined due process in line with the 
national context, long denial of justice and recognized international norms and jurisprudence. 
The majority of the interviewees opined that minimum standard of due process has been 
provided to the accused under the ICT Act 1973 because, the RoP’s were amended in 2011 
to include right to the presumption of innocence, right to a fair and public hearing with counsel 
of their choice, right to apply for and be granted bail, prohibition on convicting a person twice 
for the same crime, prohibition on requiring the accused to confess guilt, prosecution bears 
the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt, creation of a victim and witness 
protection system.1608 The Human Rights Watch comments on the amendments were that the 
ICT-BD's RoP’s, addressed the key problems of the due process issues but left out other 
aspects such as clarifying the definition of crimes, victim and witness protection.1609 
Despite these criticisms, the constitutional issue of the ICT Act 1973 can also be a 
significant aspect of development in the area of domestication of the ICL. The ICT Act 1973 
was given special protection under Article 47A of Bangladeshi Constitution. Many critics, 
including Robertson, Menon, and Chopra argued that since the subsequent amendment of 
the Act excluded the accused from constitutional safeguards, it has an impact on the quality 
of the due process. However, Professor M Rahman argued that the validity of Constitution is 
derived from the people of Bangladesh and Bangladesh is a democratic country, so it is 
entirely a domestic judicial matter of Bangladesh on how they define due process applicability 
to the accused under the national criminal code and the accused under the 1973 Act.1610 
 
 
1608 Jon Lunn and Arabella Thorp, ‘Bangladesh: The International Crimes Tribunal’ (3 May 2012) House of 
Commons: International Affairs and Defence Section 3. 
1609 Bangladesh: Guarantee Fair Trials for Independence-Era Crimes, Human Rights Watch, 11 July 2011  
available from https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/07/11/bangladesh-guarantee-fair-trials-independence-era-crimes 
Last accessed 15 March 2019. 
1610 Rahman & Billah (n 26) 18. 
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In relation to the rights of an accused during the investigation stage, it appears from 
the Rule 9(5) of the RoP that, the suspects have the right to bail if the investigation cannot be 
completed within one year. This stipulation of time can be of significance because other ICT’s 
mention a reasonable time without providing a time frame. In terms of clarity and arbitrary 
detention, this aspect of the ICT-BD may be considered as a small contribution to the 
development of ICL. 
This study has found that most of the interviewees were supporters of the Tribunal and 
opined that due process is broadly consistent with the international standards. On the other 
hand, there are divided opinions from the defence lawyers and politicians. Despite inviting 
criticisms, the ICT-BD has reassessed one significant aspect of the due process principle of 
how over a period of time, the notion of due process has evolved in the area of ICL. It has 
demonstrated the nature of competing interests of due process and rights of an accused and 
delayed prosecution. To this extent, the ICT-BD emphasized that the national wishes and long 
denial of justice to victims are significant factors to define due process when domestic tribunals 
would deal with crimes under ICL.  
10.2.5 Evidential Rules and Old Evidence 
In relation to evidential rules, the ICT-BD has adopted comprehensive rules of 
evidence and the judgements referred to the practices established by the earlier tribunals. 
Both the RoP and Judgments, reflected that presumption of innocence had been maintained 
and the overall burden of proof is on the prosecution. In relation to the availability of evidence, 
it appears that the judges had ample evidence before them to establish judicial truth. There 
were many eyewitnesses, along with documentary evidence. 
It appears from the judgments that, in assessing oral evidence of the witnesses, the 
judges have considered the totality of evidence rather than undermining the whole evidence, 
based on mere inconsistencies. The judges have reflected on the significant period of time 
lapse which might have affected the memory of the witnesses. The ICT-BD judges had the 
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relevant cultural knowledge to assess the evidence in its contextual framework. This is an 
important aspect according to Cryer, as such cultural factors are relevant when considering 
the evidence and giving weight.1611 
The ICT-BD's rules of evidence clarified that, although it is the prosecution that must 
prove the allegation against the accused, the defence has to prove the claim of an alibi of 
defence. However, from a critical point of view, it seems the shifting of the burden of proof 
may hamper the right of an accused that the accused is presumed to be innocent until proven 
guilty. In order to safeguard this right, the RoP of the ICT-BD was amended in 2011. The rules 
made it clear in this regard that, ‘...Mere failure to prove the plea of an alibi and or the 
documents and materials by the defence shall not render the accused guilty'.1612  
When considering hearsay evidence, the judges were able to assess the probative 
value of the evidence. Most importantly, the judges of the ICT-BD adopted a newer, more 
rigorous approach of corroborative evidence. The Prosecution referred to the case of Tadić 
and argued that, there is no requirement that hearsay evidence must be supported by 
corroborative evidence. Nevertheless, during several occasions, the judges declined to accept 
hearsay evidence for the lack of corroborative evidence. The ICT-BD has now developed 
guidelines for adopting hearsay evidence. For there to be probative value, hearsay evidence 
should be supported by other corroborative evidence. In assessing the probative value of 
hearsay evidence, the judges of the ICT-BD considered the ‘social value' and ‘human 
behaviour' of the Bangladeshi society.   
Dealing with old evidence (evidence of events that happened several decades ago) is 
another important aspect of the ICT-BD's evidential rule. The ICT-BD has demonstrated a 
specific approach in dealing with old evidence. Due to significant time-lapses, the judges 
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1612 Rule 51(3) of the ICT-BD. 
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discounted minor inconsistencies of the witnesses if the core aspect of the statement is 
credible and in other situations, considered the cultural factors. 
10.2.6 Witness Protection 
Concerning the witness protection, the primary deficiency of the ICT-BD is the inability 
to keep the personal information of the witnesses confidential. In Bangladesh, the ICT-BD had 
given very little attention to assessing the risks to the witnesses who had testified before the 
tribunal and did not take appropriate measures in concealing witnesses identity. The identity 
of the witnesses was available in the public domain. The majority of the interviewees stated 
that at least three witnesses of the ICT-BD were murdered, and family members of the 
witnesses were also living in continuous fear of their lives. 
The ICT-BD has been unable to establish any formal permanent witness protection 
programme. Furthermore, it could not employ any non-judicial measures. There is no specific 
domestic law to provide sufficient protection to the witnesses before the ICT-BD. The 
investigators, prosecutors, the Registrar, and defence were not able to assess the scale of 
risks that the witnesses faced.   
To effectively deal with the witness protection issue in Bangladesh, the Law 
Commission had provided a series of recommendations. The governing RPE was amended 
to include legal provisions relating to witness and victim protection. In addition to that, 
committees were set up at the district level to oversee the problems associated with witness 
protection. However, there was a shortage of logistics and adequately trained personnel to 
run the witness protection scheme. The policymakers did not give sufficient importance to 
strengthen the witness protection aspect of the ICT-BD. Most of the politicians who took part 
in the interview remained silent on the arising dilemmas of witness-protection. However, 
lawyers from both parties and the judges did speak about the witness protection of the ICT-
BD and opined that the reason behind the Government’s silence could be due to the lack of 
financial resources.  
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Even with these shortcomings, the ICT-BD has indicated the development of witness 
protection committees within local authorities. The authority in Bangladesh adopted a delayed 
policy to deal with witness protection issues. Valuable lessons may be learned from the ICT-
BD, such as providing appropriate training to persons that oversee the administration of 
witness protection measures. 
10.2.7 Sentencing Practices 
Focusing on the sentencing principles, the majority of the Judges made references to 
the ‘just deserts' principle in determining the severest punishment as the death penalty. The 
theoretical analysis suggests that prohibition of the death penalty is not yet customary in 
international law, but there is a growing trend to make its use limited.1613 However, the 
sentencing practices of the ICT-BD has not been consistent. Taking the example of the case 
of Abdul Kalam Azad, he was awarded the death penalty in absentia. Whereas, in the case of 
Quader Molla, he was initially awarded life imprisonment due to the level of involvement in the 
crimes. However, Quader Molla’s conviction was changed to the death penalty by the highest 
court of Bangladesh. In the case of Delowar Hossain Sayeedi, the ICT-BD awarded him the 
death penalty. Although, on appeal, he was awarded the lesser punishment of life 
imprisonment. 
The majority of the interviewees stated that if the death penalty is not awarded in a 
situation like that of Bangladesh where there has been a long period of a culture of impunity, 
life imprisonment as the highest punishment for the most heinous crimes would become only 
a symbolic punishment. The judgments of the ICT-BD provided valuable insights in relation to 
the sentencing principles adopted by a particular society. It is suggested by the ICT-BD that 
punishment should reflect the cultural factors, national wishes, and the sufferings of the victims 
due to a lengthy period of impunity. 
 
 
1613 Bassiouni (n 295) 475. 
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10.3 Concluding Remarks  
It is now possible to state that this thesis has provided a more in-depth insight into the 
domestication of ICL. This research also attempted to make a comprehensive assessment of 
delayed justice based on domestic legislation, undertaken by a domestic tribunal without the 
direct help of the international community. The analysis of the semi-structured interview data 
undertaken for this research has extended our knowledge of the domestic prosecution of 
international crimes in Bangladesh. A consistent theme among the majority of the participants 
was that, the ICT-BD has both institutional and symbolic value providing an operative platform 
for the victims to seek justice and witnesses to give evidence. 
The establishment of the ICT-BD is an important contribution to ICL because it has 
established that perpetrators cannot enjoy impunity indefinitely. Bearing similarities to other 
ICT’s, the ICT-BD is not free from criticisms and deficiencies. For instance, the governing Act 
of the ICT-BD has no independent appointment process for judges. Also, it could not develop 
an effective witness protection scheme or reparation programme. Nevertheless, the ICT-BD 
can encourage other South Asian and Muslim majority counties in similar situations to tackle 
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (TRIBUNALS) ACT, 1973 
 
 (ACT NO. XIX OF 1973)  
 
                                                                               [20 July, 1973] 
 
 
An Act to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of persons for 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under international 
law. 
 
WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the detention, prosecution and punishment of 
persons for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other crimes under 
international law, and for matters connected therewith; 
 
It is hereby enacted as follows: - 
 
   




1. (1) This Act may be called the International Crimes (Tribunals) 
Act, 1973. 
 
(2) It extends to the whole of Bangladesh. 
 
(3) It shall come into force at once.        
  Definitions 
  
2. In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or 
context, - 
 
(a) “auxiliary forces” includes forces placed under the control of the 
Armed Forces for operational, administrative, static and other 
purposes; 
 
1[ (aa) “armed forces” means the forces raised and maintained 
under the Army Act, 1952 (XXXIX of 1952), the Air Force Act, 1953 
(VI of 1953), or the Navy Ordinance, 1961 (XXXV of 1961);]  
 
(b) “Government” means the Government of the People's Republic 
of Bangladesh; 
 
(c) “Republic” means the People's Republic of Bangladesh; 
 
2[ *** ] 
(e) “territory of Bangladesh” means the territory of the Republic as 
defined in article 2 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of 
Bangladesh; 
 
(f) “Tribunal” means a Tribunal set up under this Act.        
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3. 3[ (1) A Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish any 
individual or group of individuals, 4[ or organisation,] or any 
member of any armed, defence or auxiliary forces, irrespective of 
his nationality, who commits or has committed, in the territory of 
Bangladesh, whether before or after the commencement of this 
Act, any of the crimes mentioned in sub-section (2).] 
 
(2) The following acts or any of them are crimes within the 
jurisdiction of a Tribunal for which there shall be individual 
responsibility, namely:- 
 
(a) Crimes against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, abduction, confinement, 
torture, rape or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population or persecutions on political, racial, ethnic or religious 
grounds, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the 
country where perpetrated; 
 
(b) Crimes against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances; 
 
(c) Genocide: meaning and including any of the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnic, racial, religious or political group, such as: 
 
(i) killing members of the group; 
 
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
 
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated 
to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
 
(iv) imposing measures intended to prevent Births within the group; 
 
(v) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group; 
(d) War Crimes: namely, violation of laws or customs of war which 
include but are not limited to murder, ill-treatment or deportation to 
slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population in the 
territory of Bangladesh; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war 
or persons on the seas, killing of hostages and detenues, plunder 
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
 
(e) violation of any humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts 
laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949; 
 
(f) any other crimes under international law; 
 
(g) attempt, abetment or conspiracy to commit any such crimes; 
 
(h) complicity in or failure to prevent commission of any such 
crimes.       
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  Liability for 
Crimes 
  
4. (1) When any crime as specified in section 3 is committed by 
several persons, each of such person is liable for that crime in the 
same manner as if it were done by him alone. 
 
(2) Any commander or superior officer who orders, permits, 
acquiesces or participates in the commission of any of the crimes 
specified in section 3 or is connected with any plans and activities 
involving the commission of such crimes or who fails or omits to 
discharge his duty to maintain discipline, or to control or supervise 
the actions of the persons under his command or his subordinates, 
whereby such persons or subordinates or any of them commit any 
such crimes, or who fails to take necessary measures to prevent 
the commission of such crimes, is guilty of such crimes.        
  Official position, 





5. (1) The official position, at any time, of an accused shall not be 
considered freeing him from responsibility or mitigating 
punishment. 
 
(2) The fact that the accused acted pursuant to his domestic law or 
to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from 
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if 
the Tribunal deems that justice so requires.        
  Tribunal 
  
6. (1) For the purpose of section 3, the Government may, by 
notification in the official Gazette, set up one or more Tribunals, 
each consisting of a Chairman and not less than two and not more 
than four other members. 
 
5[ (2) Any person who is a Judge, or is qualified to be a Judge, or 
has been a Judge, of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, may be 
appointed as a Chairman or member of a Tribunal.] 
6[ (2A) The Tribunal shall be independent in the exercise of its 
judicial functions and shall ensure fair trial.] 
 
(3) The permanent seat of a Tribunal shall be in 7[ Dhaka]: 
 
Provided that a Tribunal may hold its sittings at such other place or 
places as it deems fit. 
 
(4) If any member of a Tribunal dies or is, due to illness or any 
other reason, unable to continue to perform his functions, the 
Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, declare the 
office of such member to be vacant and appoint thereto another 
person qualified to hold the office. 
 
(5) If, in the course of a trial, any one of the members of a Tribunal 
is, for any reason, unable to attend any sitting thereof, the trial may 
continue before the other members. 
 
(6) A Tribunal shall not, merely by reason of any change in its 
membership or the absence of any member thereof from any 
sitting, be bound to recall and re-hear any witness who has already 
given any evidence and may act on the evidence already given or 
produced before it. 
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(7) If, upon any matter requiring the decision of a Tribunal, there is 
a difference of opinion among its members, the opinion of the 
majority shall prevail and the decision of the Tribunal shall be 
expressed in terms of the views of the majority. 
 
(8) Neither the constitution of a Tribunal nor the appointment of its 
Chairman or members shall be challenged by the prosecution or by 
the accused persons or their counsel.        
  Prosecutors 
  
7. (1) The Government may appoint one or more persons to 
conduct the prosecution before a Tribunal on such terms and 
conditions as may be determined by the Government; and every 
such person shall be deemed to be a Prosecutor for the purposes 
of this Act.  
 
(2) The Government may designate one of such persons as the 
Chief Prosecutor.        
  Investigation 
  
8. (1) The Government may establish an Agency for the purposes 
of investigation into crimes specified in section 3; and any officer 
belonging to the Agency shall have the right to assist the 
prosecution during the trial.  
 
(2) Any person appointed as a Prosecutor is competent to act as 
an Investigation Officer and the provisions relating to investigation 
shall apply to such Prosecutor.  
 
(3) Any Investigation Officer making an investigation under this Act 
may, by order in writing, require the attendance before himself of 
any person who appears to be acquainted with the circumstances 
of the case; and such person shall attend as so required.  
 
(4) Any Investigation Officer making an investigation under this Act 
may examine orally any person who appears to be acquainted with 
the facts and circumstances of the case.  
 
(5) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions put to him 
by an Investigation Officer and shall not be excused from 
answering any question on the ground that the answer to such 
question will criminate, or may tend directly or indirectly to 
criminate, such person:  
 
Provided that no such answer, which a person shall be compelled 
to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved 
against him in any criminal proceeding.  
 
(6) The Investigation Officer may reduce into writing any statement 
made to him in the course of examination under this section.  
 
(7) Any person who fails to appear before an Investigation Officer 
for the purpose of examination or refuses to answer the questions 
put to him by such Investigation Officer shall be punished with 
simple imprisonment which may extend to six months, or with fine 
which may extend to Taka two thousand, or with both.  
(8) Any Magistrate of the first class may take cognizance of an 
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offence punishable under sub-section (7) upon a complaint in 
writing by an Investigation Officer.  
 
(9) Any investigation done into the crimes specified in section 3 
shall be deemed to have been done under the provisions of this 
Act.        
  Commencement of 
the Proceedings 
  
9. (1) The proceedings before a Tribunal shall commence upon the 
submission by the Chief Prosecutor, or a Prosecutor authorised by 
the Chief Prosecutor in this behalf, of formal charges of crimes 
alleged to have been committed by each of the accused persons. 
 
(2) The Tribunal shall thereafter fix a date for the trial of such 
accused person. 
 
(3) The Chief Prosecutor shall, at least three weeks before the 
commencement of the trial, furnish to the Tribunal a list of 
witnesses intended to be produced along with the recorded 
statement of such witnesses or copies thereof and copies of 
documents which the prosecution intends to rely upon in support of 
such charges. 
 
(4) The submission of a list of witnesses and documents under 
sub-section (3) shall not preclude the prosecution from calling, with 
the permission of the Tribunal, additional witnesses or tendering 
any further evidence at any stage of the trial: 
 
Provided that notice shall be given to the defence of the additional 
witnesses intended to be called or additional evidence sought to be 
tendered by the prosecution. 
 
(5) A list of witnesses for the defence, if any, along with the 
documents or copies thereof, which the defence intends to rely 
upon, shall be furnished to the Tribunal and the prosecution at the 
time of the commencement of the trial.        
  Procedure of trial 
  
10. (1) The following procedure shall be followed at a trial before a 
Tribunal, namely:- 
 
(a) the charge shall be read out; 
 
(b) the Tribunal shall ask each accused person whether he pleads 
guilty or not-guilty; 
 
(c) if the accused person pleads guilty, the Tribunal shall record the 
plea, and may, in its discretion, convict him thereon; 
 
(d) the prosecution shall make an opening statement; 
 
(e) the witnesses for the prosecution shall be examined, the 
defence may cross-examine such witnesses and the prosecution 
may re-examine them; 
 
(f) the witnesses for the defence, if any, shall be examined, the 
prosecution may cross-examine such witnesses and the defence 
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may re-examine them; 
 
(g) the Tribunal may, in its discretion, permit the party which calls a 
witness to put any question to him which might be put in cross-
examination by the adverse party; 
(h) the Tribunal may, in order to discover or obtain proof of relevant 
facts, ask any witness any question it pleases, in any form and at 
any time about any fact; and may order production of any 
document or thing or summon any witness, and neither the 
prosecution nor the defence shall be entitled either to make any 
objection to any such question or order or, without the leave of the 
Tribunal, to cross-examine any witness upon any answer given in 
reply to any such question; 
 
(i) the prosecution shall first sum up its case, and thereafter the 
defence shall sum up its case: 
 
Provided that if any witness is examined by the defence, the 
prosecution shall have the right to sum up its case after the 
defence has done so; 
 
(j) the Tribunal shall deliver its judgment and pronounce its verdict. 
 
(2) All proceedings before the Tribunal shall be in 8[ Bangla or] 
English. 
 
(3) Any accused person or witness who is unable to express 
himself in, or does not understand, English may be provided the 
assistance of an interpreter. 
 
(4) The proceedings of the Tribunal shall be in public: 
 
Provided that the Tribunal may, if it thinks fit, take proceedings in 
camera. 
 
(5) No oath shall be administered to any accused person.        
  Trial in absentia 
  
9[ 10A. (1) Where a proceeding is commenced under sub-section 
(1) of section 9, the tribunal, before fixing the date for the trial 
under sub-section (2) of the said section, has reason to believe that 
the accused person has absconded or concealed himself so that 
he cannot be produced for trial, may hold the trial in his absence 
following the procedure as laid down in the Rules of Procedure 
made under section 22 for such trial. 
 
 
(2) Where the accused person is tried under sub-section (1), the 
Tribunal may direct that a Counsel shall be engaged at the 
expense of the Goverment to defend the accused person and may 
also determine the fees to be paid to such Counsel.]        
  Powers of Tribunal 
  
11. (1) A Tribunal shall have power- 
 
(a) to summon witnesses to the trial and to require their attendance 
and testimony and to put questions to them; 
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(b) to administer oaths to witnesses; 
 
(c) to require the production of document and other evidentiary 
material; 
 
(d) to appoint persons for carrying out any task designated by the 
Tribunal. 
 
(2) For the purpose of enabling any accused person to explain any 
circumstances appearing in the evidence against him, a Tribunal 
may, at any stage of the trial without previously warning the 
accused person, put such questions to him as the Tribunal 
considers necessary: 
 
Provided that the accused person shall not render himself liable to 
punishment by refusing to answer such questions or by giving false 
answers to them; but the Tribunal may draw such inference from 
such refusal or answers as it thinks just; 
 
(3) A Tribunal shall- 
 
(a) confine the trial to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised 
by the charges; 
 
(b) take measures to prevent any action which may cause 
unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant issues and statements. 
 
(4) A Tribunal may punish any person, who obstructs or abuses its 
process or disobeys any of its orders or directions, or does 
anything which tends to prejudice the case of a party before it, or 
tends to bring it or any of its members into hatred or contempt, or 
does anything which constitutes contempt of the Tribunal, with 
simple imprisonment which may extend to one year, or with fine 
which may extend to Taka five thousand, or with both. 
 
(5) Any member of a Tribunal shall have power to direct, or issue a 
warrant for, the arrest of, and to commit to custody, and to 
authorise the continued detention in custody of, any person 
charged with any crime specified in section 3. 
 
(6) The Chairman of a Tribunal may make such administrative 
arrangements as he considers necessary for the performance of 
the functions of the Tribunal under this Act. 
      
  Power to transfer 
cases 
  
10[ 11A.(1) At any stage of a case, a Tribunal may, on its own 
motion or on the application of the Chief Prosecutor, by an order in 
writing, transfer the case to another Tribunal, Whenever it 
considers such transfer to be just, expedient and convenient for the 
proper dispensation of justice and expeditious disposal of such 
cases. 
 
(2) Where a case has been transferred under sub-section (1), the 
Tribunal which thereafter tries such case shall, subject to the 
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provisions of this Act, proceed from the stage at which it was so 
transferred.]    
  Provision for 
defence counsel 
  
12. Where an accused person is not represented by counsel, the 
Tribunal may, at any stage of the case, direct that a counsel shall 
be engaged at the expense of the Government to defend the 
accused person and may also determine the fees to be paid to 
such counsel.      
  Restriction of 
adjournment   
13. No trial before a Tribunal shall be adjourned for any purpose 
unless the Tribunal is of the opinion that the adjournment is in the 
interest of justice.    




14. (1) Any Magistrate of the first class may record any statement 
or confession made to him by an accused person at any time in the 
course of investigation or at any time before the commencement of 
the trial. 
(2) The Magistrate shall, before recording any such confession, 
explain to the accused person making it that he is not bound to 
make a confession and that if he does so it may be used as 
evidence against him and no Magistrate shall record any such 
confession unless, upon questioning the accused making it, he has 
reason to believe that it was made voluntarily.        
  Pardon of an 
approver 
  
15. (1) At any stage of the trial, a Tribunal may with a view to 
obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been 
directly or indirectly concerned in, or privy to, any of the crimes 
specified in section 3, tender a pardon to such person on condition 
of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the 
circumstances within his knowledge relative to the crime and to 
every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in 
the commission thereof. 
 
(2) Every person accepting the tender under this section shall be 
examined as a witness in the trial. 
 
(3) Such person shall be detained in custody until the termination 
of the trial.        
  Charge, etc 
  
16. (1) Every charge against an accused person shall state- 
 
(a) the name and particulars of the accused person; 
 
(b) the crime of which the accused person is charged; 
 
(c) such particulars of the alleged crime as are reasonably 
sufficient to give the accused person notice of the matter with 
which he is charged. 
 
(2) A copy of the formal charge and a copy of each of the 
documents lodged with the formal charge shall be furnished to the 
accused person at a reasonable time before the trial; and in case 
of any difficulty in furnishing copies of the documents, reasonable 
opportunity for inspection shall be given to the accused person in 
such manner as the Tribunal may decide.        
  Right of accused 
person during trial 
  
17. (1) During trial of an accused person he shall have the right to 
give any explanation relevant to the charge made against him. 
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(2) An accused person shall have the right to conduct his own 
defence before the Tribunal or to have the assistance of counsel.  
 
(3) An accused person shall have the right to present evidence at 
the trial in support of his defence, and to cross-examine any 
witness called by the prosecution.        




18. A witness shall not be excused from answering any question 
put to him on the ground that the answer to such question will 
criminate or may tend directly or indirectly to criminate such 
witness, or that it will expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose 
such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind: 
 
Provided that no such answer which a witness shall be compelled 
to give shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution or be proved 
against him in any criminal proceeding, except a prosecution for 
giving false evidence.     
  
  Rules of evidence 
  
19. (1) A Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of 
evidence; and it shall adopt and apply to the greatest possible 
extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and may admit 
any evidence, including reports and photographs published in 
newspapers, periodicals and magazines, films and tape-recordings 
and other materials as may be tendered before it, which it deems 
to have probative value. 
(2) A Tribunal may receive in evidence any statement recorded by 
a Magistrate or an Investigation Officer being a statement made by 
any person who, at the time of the trial, is dead or whose 
attendance cannot be procured without an amount of delay or 
expense which the Tribunal considers unreasonable. 
 
(3) A Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge 
but shall take judicial notice thereof. 
 
(4) A Tribunal shall take judicial notice of official governmental 
documents and reports of the United Nations and its subsidiary 
agencies or other international bodies including non-governmental 
organisations.        
  Judgment and 
sentence 
  
20. (1) The Judgment of a Tribunal as to the guilt or the innocence 
of any accused person shall give the reasons on which it is based: 
Provided that each member of the tribunal shall be competent to 
deliver a judgment of his own. 
 
(2) Upon conviction of an accused person, the Tribunal shall award 
sentence of death or such other punishment proportionate to the 
gravity of the crime as appears to the Tribunal to be just and 
proper. 
 
11[ (2A) A copy of judgment under the seal and signature of the 
Registrar of a Tribunal shall be provided, free of cost, to the 




(2B) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, rule or 
legal instrument for the time being in forcé, when a copy of 
Judgment is provided under sub-section (2A), it shall be used as 
certified copy of the judgment of the Tribunal for the purpose of 
preferring an appeal under section 21.] 
 
(3) The sentence awarded under this Act shall be carried out in 
accordance with the orders of the Government.        
  Right of Appeal 
  
12[ 21. (1) A person convicted of any crime specified in section 3 
and sentenced by a Tribunal may appeal, as of right, to the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against 
such conviction and sentence. 
 
(2) The Government or the complainant or the informant, as the 
case may be, may appeal, as of right, to the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh against an order of acquittal or 
an order of sentence. 
 
(3) An appeal under sub-section (1) or (2) shall be preferred within 
30 (thirty) days from the date of conviction and sentence, or 
acquittal or any sentence, and no appeal shall lie after the expiry of 
the aforesaid period. 
 
(4) The appeal shall be disposed of within 60 (sixty) days from the 
date of its filing. 
 
(5) At the time of filing the appeal, the appellant shall submit all 
documents as may be relied upon by him.]        
  Rules of 
procedure 
  
22. Subject to the provision of this Act, a Tribunal may regulate its 
own procedure.        
  Certain laws not to 
apply   
23. The provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (V of 
1898), and the Evidence Act, 1872 (I of 1872), shall not apply in 
any proceedings under this Act.        
  Bar of Jurisdiction 
  
24. No order, judgment or sentence of a Tribunal shall be called in 
question in any manner whatsoever in or before any Court or other 
authority in any legal proceedings whatsoever except in the 
manner provided in section 21.        
  Indemnity 
  
25. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against 
the Government or any person for anything, in good faith, done or 
purporting to have been done under this Act.        
  Provisions of the 
Act over-riding all 
other laws 
  
26. The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding 
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the 





1 Clause (aa) was inserted by section 2(a) of The International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
 
2 Clause (d) was omitted by section 2(b) of The International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
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3 Sub-section (1) was substituted by section 3 of The International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
 
4 The words and comma “or organisation,” were inserted after the word and comma 
“individuals,” by section 2 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 2013 
(Act No. III of 2013) (with effect from 14th July, 2009). 
 
5 Sub-section (2) was substituted by section 4 (a) of The International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
 
6 Sub-section (2A) was inserted by section 4 (b) of The International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
 
7 The word “Dhaka” was substituted for the word “Dacca” by section 4 (c) of 
The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
 
8 The words “Bangla or” were inserted before the word “English” by section 5 of 
The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act No. LV of 2009). 
 
9 Section 10A was inserted by section 2 of The International Crimes (Tribunals) (Second 
Amendment) Act, 2012 (Act No. XLIII of 2012). 
 
10 Section 11A was inserted by section 2 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) 
(Amendment) Act, 2012 (Act No. XXI of 2012). 
 
11 Sub-section (2A) and (2B) were inserted by section 3 of The International Crimes 
(Tribunals) (Second Amendment) Act, 2012 (Act No. XLIII of 2012). 
 
12 Section 21 was substituted by section 3 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) 

















INTERNATIONAL CRIMES TRIBUNAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, 2010 
[as amended by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules pf Procedure (Amendment), 2010 
and International Crimes Tribunal Rules Of Procedure (Amendment), 2011] 
 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES TRIBUNAL 




Dated: 28 June 2011 
No. Anto: Apo: Tri:/87/Bidhi/10 The Tribunal, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 
22 of the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act,1973 (Act XIX of 1973) (hereinafter referred to 
as the “Act”), has introduced the following amendments in the International Crimes Tribunal 





1. Short title and commencement. 
1) These Rules may be called the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure, 2010. 
2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on and from 25th March of 2010.  
2. Definitions: — 
In these Rules, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, 
1)   [“accused” means the person against whom an investigation of an offence under the 
Act has been started;]1614 
2)      “Act” refers to the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, 1973 (Act XIX of 1973); 
3)     “bail” refers to setting an accused at large on furnishing bond before the Tribunal; 
4)    “Chairman” refers to the Chairman of the Tribunal;  
5) “charge” refers to the accusation of crimes against an     accused framed by the 
Tribunal; 
6) “complaint” means any information oral or in writing obtained by the Investigation 
Agency including its own knowledge relating to the commission of a crime under section 
3(2) of the Act; 
 
 
1614 Amended by International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011 by substituting the 
following: ‘“accused” means the person against whom formal charge is submitted before the Tribunal’. 
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7) “counsel” refers to a person who is enrolled as an advocate in the Bangladesh Bar 
Council; 
8)   “Deputy Registrar” refers to the Deputy Registrar of the Tribunal; 
 
9) “evidence” means all statements which the Tribunal permits or requires to be made 
before it by witnesses, and it includes all other materials, collected during investigation, 
placed before the Tribunal in relation to matters of fact;  
10)    “Form” refers to Forms as are contained in the Schedule;  
11) “formal charge” means accusation of crimes against the accused in the form of a 
petition lodged by the Prosecutor with the Tribunal on receipt of the Investigation Report;  
12) “International Crimes Tribunal” refers to the Tribunal constituted under section 6 of 
the Act;  
13)   “Investigation Agency” refers to the Agency established under section 8 of the Act;  
14)  “Investigation Officer” refers to any member of the Investigation Agency;   
15)  “Investigation Report” refers to the report submitted by the Investigation Agency after 
completion of investigation in a case under the Act; 
16) “law enforcing agency” refers to  any member of the Bangladesh  Police under the 
Police Act,1861 (Act V of 1861), or the Armed Police Battalions or the Rapid Action 
Battalions (RAB) under the Armed Police Battalions Ordinance, 1979 (Ord. XXV of 
1979), or the Bangladesh Rifles under the Bangladesh Rifles Order, 1972 (P.O. 148 of 
1972), or the Ansar Force under  the Ansar Force Act, 1995 (Act 3 of 1995), or the 
Battalion Ansar under the Battalion Ansar Act, 1995 (Act 4 of 1995), or the Coast Guard 
Force under the Coast Guard Act, 1994 (Act 26 of 1994);  
17)   “Member” refers to a Member of the Tribunal; 
18) “oath” refers to making such declaration or affirmation by a witness prior to testifying 
before the Tribunal in Form No. 12;  
19)   “offence” means any of the crimes described in section 3(2) of the Act;  
20)  “Prosecutor” refers to a Prosecutor appointed under section 7 of the Act;  
21)  “Registrar” refers to the Registrar of the Tribunal;  
22)  “Rules” refers to these Rules of Procedure;  
23)  “Schedule” refers to the SCHEDULE appended at the end of these Rules;  
24)  “seal” refers to the seal of the Tribunal;  
25)  “section” refers to the section of the Act.   
[26)  “victim” refers to a person who has suffered harm as a result of the commission of the 
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crimes under section 3 (2) of the International Crimes (Tribunal) Act, 1973.]1615 
 
Chapter II 
Powers and Functions of the Investigation Agency 
 
3. 1) The Investigation Agency established by the Government shall be responsible for    
investigation of a case. 
2) [The Government may nominate or assign a member of the Investigation Agency as 
Coordinator to - 
a.  supervise overall functions of the Agency; 
b.  control and monitor the speedy progress of any investigation; and  
c. perform any other function for efficient running the Agency.]1616 
4.  An Investigation Officer shall act and work in accordance with the provisions of 
sections 8(1), 8(3), 8(4), 8(5), 8(6) and 8(7) of the Act while investigating a case.   
5. The Investigation Agency shall maintain a Complaint Register with necessary particulars 
on putting date and serial numbers of the complaints meant for initiating investigation under 
the Act.  
6. If the Investigation Officer has reason to believe that any offence has been committed, 
he shall proceed in person to the spot, investigate the facts and circumstances of the case 
and if necessary, take steps for the discovery and arrest of the accused.   
7. If the Investigation Officer finds and is satisfied that there is no sufficient ground for 
investigation, he may stop investigation with the concurrence of the Chief Prosecutor.   
8. (1) The Investigation Officer shall maintain a Case Diary for each case in connection 
with the investigation mentioning its day-to-day progress until completion of such investigation. 
(2) The Investigation Officer may use the Case Diary at the time of deposition before the 
Tribunal to refresh his memory or to explain any fact entered therein.  
(3) The defense shall have no right to examine or use the Case Diary in defense of a case. 
 
(4) The Tribunal may peruse the Case Diary for clarification or understanding of any fact 
transpired at the time of investigation.  
 [(5)      The Tribunal, if it considers expedient, may direct the prosecutors to present 
the progress report of investigations for its perusal.]1617 
 
 
1615 Sub-rule 26 was inserted by International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1616 Amended by International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2010 substituting the following: 
‘Government may nominate one of the members of the Investigation Agency as Chief Investigator for supervising 
overall functions and speedy progress of the investigation.’ 
1617 Sub-rule 5 inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011 
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9.   (1) The Investigation Officer, through the Prosecutor, may obtain a warrant of arrest 
from the Tribunal for arrest of a person at any stage of the investigation, if he can satisfy the 
Tribunal that such arrest is necessary for effective and proper investigation. 
 (2) The law enforcing agency of the area where the person to be arrested resides 
shall execute the warrant of arrest issued by the Tribunal.  
 (3) At the time of executing the warrant of arrest under sub-rule (2) [or later on]1618, a 
copy of allegations is to be served upon such person. 
 [4) If a person is already in custody in connection with an offence or any case other 
than under the Act and the Tribunal is satisfied that a detention order is necessary for effective 
and proper investigation of any offence under the Act, the Tribunal may issue a production 
warrant and direct the person to be detained in custody.]1619 
 [5) If an accused is in custody during investigation period, the investigation officer 
shall conclude the investigation within one year of his arrest under the Rules. In case of failure 
to complete the investigation as specified above, the accused may be released on bail subject 
to fulfillment of some conditions as imposed by the Tribunal. But, in exceptional 
circumstances, the Tribunal by showing reasons to be recorded in writing may extend the 
period of investigation and also the order detaining the accused in custody for a further period 
of six months. 
 6)  After every three months of detention of the accused in custody the investigation 
officer through the prosecutor shall submit a progress report of investigation before the 
Tribunal on perusal of which it may make a review of its order relating to the detention of the 
accused.]1620 
 
10. An Investigation Officer, if he thinks it necessary, may search and seize any documents 
or things under a seizure list prepared in presence of two witnesses. 
11. After completion of investigation, the Investigation Officer shall submit an Investigation 
Report together with all the documents, papers and the evidence collected during investigation 
of offence(s) as specified in the Act committed by a person(s) before the Chief Prosecutor.  
12. The Investigation Officer shall prepare more than one set of his Investigation Report 
together with all the accompanying documents for the purpose of preserving one set in the 
office of the Investigation Agency.   
13. Each and every document, paper and evidence accompanying the Investigation Report 
 
 
1618 The words “or later on” were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 
2010. 
1619 Sub-rule (4) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2010. 
1620 Sub-rules (5) and (6) were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 
2011. 
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under rules 11 and 12 shall be duly authenticated and endorsed by the Investigation Officer 
who investigated the case.  
14. The [Prosecutors]1621 and the Investigation Agency shall take necessary measures to 
ensure the confidentiality of any information, the protection of any witness or victim and the 
preservation of all the evidence collected. 
15. Any Judicial Magistrate of the first class may take cognizance and hold trial of an offence 
under sub-section (7) of section 8 of the Act upon a complaint in writing by an Investigation 
Officer.  
16. (1) The Investigation Officer if thinks it necessary, may apply through the Prosecutor 
to the Tribunal to commit the arrested person(s) in his custody for the purpose of interrogation 
and the Tribunal can pass order for such custody of the person(s) arrested, for a maximum 
period of three (3) days if it upon consideration of facts and circumstances of the case is of 
opinion that for proper investigation such order is indispensable.   
 (2) No person during investigation under the Act shall be subjected to any form of 
coercion, duress or threat of any kind. 
 
Chapter   III 
Powers and Functions of the Prosecution 
 
17. [The Chief Prosecutor or any other Prosecutor authorized by the Chief Prosecutor shall 
conduct the prosecution of a case or appear before the Tribunal for any matter relating to the 
case.]1622    
18. [(1)]1623    Upon receipt of report of investigation of offence(s), the Chief Prosecutor or 
any other Prosecutor authorized by him shall prepare 8a formal charge in the form of a petition 
on the basis of the papers and documents and the evidences collected and submitted by the 
Investigation Officer and shall submit the same before the Tribunal. 
 [(2)    The Investigation Agency shall 
a. work with the Prosecutors in preparing the report under rule 18 (1), and after 
submission of the report, shall assist the Prosecutors in the task of formulating the 
formal charge including arrangement of documents and materials; and 
b. also assist the Prosecutors in tendering evidence at any stage of trial. 
 
 
1621 The word ‘Prosecutors’ was substituted for the word ‘Prosecution’ by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules 
of Procedure (Amendment), 2011 
1622 Rule 17 was amended by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2010 by 
substituting the following words: ‘[a]ny Prosecutor who is authorized by the Chief Prosecutor shall conduct the 
prosecution of a case before the Tribunal’. 
1623Rule 18 was renumbered as Sub-rule (1) of Rule 18 by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
 XVII 
 (3)     As and when directed by the Tribunal, the Investigation Agency shall produce 
witness before the Tribunal as required by the Prosecutors. The law enforcing agency of the 
concerned area shall provide all necessary assistance to the Investigation Agency in 
executing the process issued for securing attendance of witness.  
  (4)    The Chief Prosecutor shall file extra copies of formal charge and copies of 
other documents for supplying the same to the accused(s) which the prosecution intends to 
rely upon in support of such charges so that the accused can prepare his defense. 
  (5)      The Chief Prosecutor shall also file three sets of formal charge and other 
documents intended to be relied upon before the Tribunal in compact disk (CD) or digital 
versatile disk (DVD) while submitting the formal charge under sub-rule (1). 
 
  (6)       The defense shall also require to submit three sets of list of witnesses along 
with the documents which the defense intends to rely upon before the Tribunal in compact 
disk (CD) or digital versatile disk (DVD) while furnishing the same under section 9 (5) of the 
Act.]1624 
19. If any Investigation Report does not disclose a prima facie case against an accused the 
Chief Prosecutor may initiate further investigation or stop the said investigation.  
20.  (1) At the time of submitting a formal charge in the form of a petition, it must 
contain the name and address of the accused person, witness, and the date, time and place 
of the occurrence.    
 (2) The Chief Prosecutor, or any other Prosecutor authorized by him in this regard, 
shall file necessary [papers, documents and materials]1625 in support of such case for a 
process to be issued by the Tribunal for appearance of the accused before the Tribunal if the 





21. All the offences as are described in section 3(2) of the Act shall be cognizable, non-
compoundable and non-bailable.  
22. After taking cognizance of an offence the Tribunal shall fix a date for appearance [if he 
is not already in custody]1626 of the accused and issue summons or warrant for appearance 
 
 
1624 Sub-rules (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6) were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
1625 The words ‘papers, documents and materials’ were substituted for the words ‘papers and documents’ by the 
International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2010. 
1626 The words ‘if he is not already in custody’ were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2010. 
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as it thinks proper. 
23. If the Tribunal does not take cognizance of an offence, the case shall be dismissed.  
24.  [1) Where the Tribunal makes an order for recording of confession, a Judicial 
Magistrate of the first class directed by the Tribunal shall record the confession of an accused 
pursuant to that order.  
 [1A)   At the time of recording confession under rule 24 (1) the Judicial Magistrate shall 
allow  the engaged counsel for the accused to be present there, provided that the counsel 
shall not be allowed to interfere or speak in course of recording such confession.]1627  
 2)  If any member of the Investigation Agency makes a petition to any Judicial 
Magistrate of the first class for recording of any statement of witness, that Magistrates shall 
record such statement.]1628 
25. (1) The Judicial Magistrate shall record the confession of an accused or the statement 
of a witness in plain white papers.  
 (2) The Judicial Magistrate shall then make a memorandum or endorsement 
indicating whether the confession so recorded is voluntary, and while recording confession, 
shall also comply with the requirements of section 14(2) of the Act.  
26.  (1) Presence of all the Members in all sittings of the Tribunal is not compulsory, but at 
the time of taking cognizance of an offence and delivery of the judgment the presence of all 
the Members of the Tribunal is compulsory. 
 (2) All other orders may be passed even by one Member in sitting and shall be 
deemed to have been passed by the Tribunal.  
 [3) The Tribunal, on its own motion or on the application of either party, may 
review any of its order including the order of framing charge (s) in the interest of justice.]1629 
27. After recording of the testimony, the witness shall put his signature or thumb impression 
on each page of the deposition sheet.  
28.  [1)]1630     Bench Officers and Assistant Bench Officers shall be individually and 
collectively responsible for preservation of the documents, materials and evidence produced 
before the Tribunal along with the records of the respective cases pending before the Tribunal.  
 [2) Record of disposed of cases shall be preserved and archived forever by the 
 
 
1627 Sub-rule (1A) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1628 Sub-rule (1) and (2) were inserted substituting the original Rule 24 by International Crimes Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure (Amendment), 2010. The original Rule 24 was as follows: “Any Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall 
record the confession of an accused and the statement, if any, of a witness as and when he is required to do so 
by an order of the Tribunal.”  
1629 Sub-rule (3) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1630 Rule 28 was renumbered as Sub-rule (1) of Rule 28 by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011.  
 XIX 
Tribunal at the place and in the manner as arranged by the government.]1631 
 
Chapter V 
Powers and Functions of the Tribunal 
 
29. (1) The Tribunal shall take cognizance of an offence against any accused upon 
examination of the formal charge, the Investigation Report, the papers, documents and the 
evidence submitted by a Prosecutor in support thereof, if they disclose a prima facie case for 
trial of the accused.   
 [2) If no such disclosure as mentioned in sub-rule (1) is there, the Tribunal shall   
dismiss the case.]1632  
30.  After cognizance of an offence is taken, the Tribunal shall issue process or warrant, as 
it thinks fit and proper, in accordance with rule 22.  
31. If the process issued under rule 22 is returned unserved, the Tribunal shall make an 
order to publish a notice in two daily newspapers, one in English and another in Bangla asking 
the accused to appear before the Tribunal on the date fixed therein.  
32. If the accused, despite publication of notice in daily newspapers, fails to appear before 
the Tribunal on the date and time so specified therein, and the Tribunal has reason to believe 
that the accused has absconded or concealing himself so that he cannot be arrested and 
produced for trial and there is no immediate prospect for arresting him, the trial of such 
accused shall commence and be held in absentia.  
33. In Pursuance of any summons, when an accused appears before the Tribunal, he shall 
be sent to the prison if he is not enlarged on bail by the Tribunal. 
34. (1) The Police shall produce the arrested accused direct before the Tribunal within 24 
(twenty-four) hours of arrest excluding the time needed for the journey.  
 (2) When the accused is produced before the Tribunal under sub-rule (1), he 
shall be sent to the prison if he is not enlarged on bail by the Tribunal.  
[3) At any stage of the proceedings, the Tribunal may release an accused on bail 
subject to fulfillment of some conditions as imposed by it, and in the interest of justice, may 
modify any of such conditions on its own motion or on the prayer of either party. In case of 
violation of any such conditions the accused may be taken into custody cancelling his bail.]1633 
35. When the case is ready for trial, the Tribunal shall proceed to hear the case in 
accordance with the procedure of trial under section 10 of the Act on the basis of a charge to 
 
 
1631 Sub-rule (2) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1632 Sub-rule (2) was deleted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1633 Sub-rule (3) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
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be framed considering the formal charge, Investigation Report together with the documents 
and materials produced and submitted in support of such report.  
36. Persons accused of the same offence committed in the course of the same transaction, 
or persons accused of abatement or attempt to commit such offence, or persons accused of 
conspiracy or planning or design in the commission of an offence or more than one offence, 
or persons accused of more than one offence may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, 
every such offence.  
37. When the accused appears or is brought before the Tribunal, and if the Tribunal, upon 
consideration of record of the case and documents submitted therewith and after giving the 
prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, finds that there is no sufficient 
ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, it shall discharge the accused 
and record its reasons for so doing.  
38. [1)]1634  If, after consideration and hearing under rule 37, the Tribunal is of opinion 
that there is sufficient ground to presume that the accused has committed an offence, the 
Tribunal shall frame one or more charges for the offences of which he is accused and he shall 
be asked whether he admits that he has committed the offence with which he is charged.  
[2) An accused pleading not guilty will get at least three weeks’ time for preparing his 
defense.]1635 
39. If the accused admits that he has committed the offence charged with, his admission 
shall be recorded in his own words, and upon such admission the Tribunal may convict him 
accordingly or may keep such admission with the record for consideration usually at the time 
of trial and pronouncement of judgment. 
40. Whenever the Tribunal considers that the production of any document or other thing is 
necessary or desirable for the purpose of investigation or trial or other proceedings under the 
Act, the Tribunal may issue a summons, or an order to the person in whose possession or 
power such document or thing is believed to be, requiring him to attend and produce it at the 
time, place and date stated in the summons or order.  
41. The Tribunal may, for ensuring fair justice, appoint one or more amicus curie to assist 
the Tribunal in a particular case.  
42. The Tribunal may allow appearance of any foreign counsel for either party provided that 
the Bangladesh Bar Council permits such counsel to appear.  
43. [1)]1636      Where an accused is not represented by any counsel in the trial of a case, the 
 
 
1634 Rule 38 was renumbered as sub-rule (1) of Rule 38 by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
1635 Sub-rule (2) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1636 Rule 43 was renumbered as sub-rule (1) of Rule 43 by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
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Tribunal shall appoint a counsel to defend such an accused at the expense of the Government.  
[2) A person charged with crimes as described under section 3 (2) of the Act shall be 
presumed innocent until he is found guilty. 
(3) No person shall be tried twice for the same offence described under section 3 (2) of 
the Act. 
(4) The accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing and to engage his counsel at 
his choice who is legally authorized to appear before this tribunal. 
(5) The accused shall be tried without undue delay. 
(6) No accused shall be punished without giving him an opportunity of being heard. 
(7) No accused shall be compelled to testify against his will or to confess his guilt. 
(8) The accused is entitled to get a copy of judgment (under section 10 (j) of the Act) free 
of cost.]1637 
[43A.   If the accused on bail fails to appear and or the accused being in custody refuses to 
come to the Tribunal for any reason and or he could not be brought to the Tribunal due to his 
long ailment, the Tribunal shall have authority to proceed with the proceedings in presence of 
his counsel or pass any order which it thinks fit and proper.]1638 
44. The Tribunal shall be at liberty to admit any evidence oral or documentary, print or 
electronic including books, reports and photographs published in newspapers, periodicals, 
and magazines, films and tape recording and other materials as may be tendered before it 
and it may exclude any evidence which does not inspire any confidence in it, and admission 
or non-admission of evidence by the Tribunal is final and cannot be challenged.  
45. In pursuance of section 11(4) of the Act, the Tribunal may draw a proceeding against 
any person who obstructs or abuses the process of the Tribunal, or disobeys any order or 
direction of the Tribunal, or who does anything which tends to prejudice the case of a party 
before the Tribunal, or tends to bring the Tribunal or any of its Members into hatred or 
contempt, or does anything which constitutes contempt of the Tribunal.  
46. [1)]1639       Upon hearing the person and consideration of the explanation submitted, if 
any, to a notice to show cause issued, if the Tribunal is of opinion that such person is guilty of 
an offence under section 11(4), it may accordingly convict and punish such person. 
 [2)     Upon conviction of an accused person under section 20 (2) of the Act, the sentence 
of imprisonment shall commence from the date of judgment. In case of absconding convict, it 
shall commence from the date of his surrender before the Tribunal, or from the date of his 
 
 
1637 Sub-rules (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7) and (8) were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of 
Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1638 Rule 43A was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 




 3) Proportionate to the gravity of the crime, in sentencing the accused, the Tribunal 
may also impose fine and or pass reparation order which is deemed to be fit and proper. 
             4)     Clerical or numerical errors or omissions in the judgments or orders may at any 
time be corrected by the Tribunal either on its own motion or on the application of either 
party.]1640 
[46A.   Nothing in these Rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power 
of the Tribunal to make such order(s) as may be necessary to meet the ends of justice or to 





47.  Prior to testifying before the Tribunal, every witness shall swear an oath or make an 
affirmation in Form 12 of the Schedule.  
48. (1) The Tribunal may, at any stage of trial of a case, summon any person as a witness, 
or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or re-call and re-
examine any person already examined.  
 (2) The Tribunal shall summon and examine or re-call and re-examine any such 
person if his evidence   appears to it essential to the just decision of the case.   
49. The Tribunal may take consideration of the confession of an accused or the statement 
of a witness recorded by the Judicial Magistrate under rule 25(1) and in the manner as stated 
in rule 25(2) if the confession is proved by such Judicial Magistrate or any other Judicial 
Magistrate who is acquainted with his signature or writing when the recording Judicial 
Magistrate is dead or not available.  
50. The burden of proving the charge shall lie upon the prosecution [beyond reasonable 
doubt]1642.  
51. (1) The onus of proof as to the plea of ‘alibi’ or to any particular fact or information 
which is in the possession or knowledge of the defense shall be upon the defense.   
 
 (2) The defense shall also prove the documents and materials to be produced by them 
in accordance with the provisions of section 9(5) of the Act.  
 
 
1640 Sub-rules (2), (3) and (4) were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
1641 Rule 46A was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1642 The words ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ were inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
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 [3) Mere failure to prove the plea of alibi and or the documents and materials by the 
defense shall not render the accused guilty.]1643 
52. Where there are several accused, the reference of the accused on behalf of whom the 
evidence was submitted, shall be noted.  
53. The testimony of a witness shall be recorded either in English or in Bangla as the 
Tribunal directs [and mode of its recording will be decided by the Tribunal at the time of 
trial]1644. 
54. [1)]1645    The prosecution may prove a document by the person who was the author of 
such document or who knows the handwriting or signature of such author, and when any of 
such persons is dead or not available, the person from whom it was collected or who knows 
from whose possession it was collected.  
 [2) Pursuant to section 19 (1) of the Act, the Tribunal may admit any document or its 
photocopies in evidence if such documents initially appear to have probative value.]1646 
55. Once the document is marked as exhibit, the contents of a document shall be 
admissible. 
56. (1) The Tribunal shall give due weight to the primary and secondary evidence and 
direct and circumstantial evidence of any fact as the peculiar facts and circumstances of the 
case demand having regard to the time and place of the occurrence. 
 (2) The Tribunal shall also accord in its discretion due consideration to both hearsay 
and non-hearsay evidence, and the reliability and probative value in respect of hearsay 
evidence shall be assessed and weighed separately at the end of the trial.  
             [3)   Any statement made to the investigation officer or to the prosecutor in course 
of investigation by the accused is not admissible in evidence except that part of the statement 
which leads to discovery of any incriminating material.]1647 
57. The Tribunal shall apply these Rules which will best favor a fair determination of the 
matter in issue before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Act.  
58. (1) Evidence that is produced by the prosecution or the defense shall be suitably 
identified, proved by the respective party and marked with consecutive numbers as exhibits.   
 (2) Exhibits of the prosecution shall be marked with English numerals while those of 




1643 Sub-rule (3) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1644 The words ‘and mode of its recording will be decided by the Tribunal at the time of trial’ were inserted by the 
International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1645 Rule 54 was renumbered as sub-rule (1) of Rule 54 by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 
1646 Sub-rule (2) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
1647 Sub-rule (3) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
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Chapter VIA 
Witness and Victim protection 
 
58A. (1) The Tribunal on its own initiative, or on the application of either party, may pass 
necessary order directing the concerned authorities of the government to ensure protection, 
privacy and well-being of the witnesses and or victims. This process will be confidential, and 
the other side will not be notified.  
 2)      The government shall 
a. arrange accommodation of witness(s)/victim(s), if so prayed for; 
b. to ensure security and surveillance during the stay of witnesses/victims as 
directed by the Tribunal; and 
c. take necessary measure to escort the witnesses/victims to the courtroom by 
the members of the law enforcing agency.  
 3)     In case of holding proceedings in camera under section 10 (4) of the Act, both 
the prosecution and the defense counsel shall provide undertakings regarding confidentiality 
of the proceeding including identity of the witness. Violation of such undertaking shall be 
prosecuted under section 11 (4) of the Act.]1648 
 
Chapter VII 
Office of the Tribunal 
 
59. (1) The Office of the Tribunal shall be composed of a Registrar, a Deputy Registrar, 
[Assistant Registrar(s)]1649 and other personnel and employees.   
 (2) The Registrar shall, with approval of the Chairman, organize and direct the works 
of   the Office.  
 (3) The Office shall provide necessary secretarial services to the Tribunal and perform 
such other duties as may be assigned by the Chairman.  
 (4) All communications intended to the Tribunal shall be delivered to the Registrar.  
 (5) The working hours of the Office shall be from 10.00 A.M to 01:00 P.M and 02.00 
P.M to 05.00 P.M, and the judicial work shall be held from 10.30 A.M to 04.30 P.M with 
recesses of one hour from 01.00 P.M to 02.00 P.M.   
 (6) The Office shall be closed on Friday and Saturday for weekly holidays.  
 (7) The Tribunal shall fix up fresh official and judicial working hours for the month of 
 
 
1648 Chapter VIA, including Rule58A, was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure 
(Amendment), 2011. 




 [(8) In case of absence or temporary indisposition of the chairman, the Senior Member 
of the Tribunal shall be acting as the Chairman.]1650 
 
Chapter VIII 
Powers and Functions of Registrar and Deputy Registrar 
 
60. The Registrar shall 
1) be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Office of the Tribunal and receive the cases 
submitted by the Prosecutor for the purpose of laying them before the Tribunal;   
2) assist the Tribunal in the performance of its functions under the authority of the Chairman 
and shall be responsible for the administration and service of the [Tribunal, shall 
represent the Tribunal as its spokesman]1651 and shall serve as its channel of 
communication;  
3) maintain a Duty Roster of other personnel and employees of the Office;  
4) maintain a Case Register of the cases in Form-15 and shall make entry of necessary 
particulars thereof, and such cases so registered and numbered shall be called as ICT-
BD Case;   
5) be responsible for custody of the record of the cases;  
6) make correspondence with the government and other offices on behalf of the Chairman;  
7) be responsible for issuing summons or warrant of arrest under his signature for securing 
attendance of the accused or the witness or search warrant etc. from the Office as 
required by the Tribunal, bearing its seal, and be responsible also for maintaining a 
Process Register in this regard;  
8) be the ‘Drawing and Disbursing Officer’ (DDO) and be responsible for the accounts of 
the money sanctioned to the Tribunal, and he shall manage and deal with the financial 
matters by taking initiative for placement of budget and spend the fund when needed for 
providing services to the Tribunal on sanction of the Chairman;  
9) keep Taka 20,000/00 as Permanent Advance in hand to meet up day to day expenses 
of the Tribunal either in cash or in voucher, or in both; 
10) maintain the Office Order Book and other registers including the Register of Letters 
Issued and the Register of Letters Received, and the Daily Attendance Register of staff 
of the Office shall be duly maintained and signed by him, and also maintain a Peon Book;  
 
 
1650 Sub-rule (8) was inserted by the International Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2010. 
1651 A comma and the words ‘shall represent the Tribunal as its spokesman’ were inserted by the International 
Crimes Tribunal Rules of Procedure (Amendment), 2011. 
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11) supply or cause supply a certified copy of the Judgment of the Tribunal, upon an 
application filed by the accused or Prosecutor, prepared  in offset white paper on 
payment of a fees of Taka 10(ten) for each page of the copy while an absconding 
accused shall not get the such a copy unless he surrenders before the Tribunal or he is 
arrested;  and  
12) be bound to do any official work meant for smooth functioning of the Tribunal as assigned 
by the Chairman.  
61. Except clause (1), (2), (8) and (9) of rule 60, the Registrar may delegate any of his 
powers under these Rules to the Deputy Registrar and in such a case he shall inform the 
matter to the Chairman.  
62. (1) For the smooth functioning of the Tribunal, the Registrar may control the entry of 
people including the counsels in the courtroom of the Tribunal as and when required by the 
Tribunal for maintaining discipline and order.  
 (2) For ensuring orderly and disciplined state of affairs inside the court- room of the 
Tribunal, no counsel, journalist, media person or other people shall be allowed to enter the 
court room without having ‘entry pass’ issued by the Registrar.  
63. (1) The Deputy Registrar shall assist the Registrar in his works and act as per direction 
of the Registrar.   
 (2) The Deputy Registrar shall automatically assume the powers and perform 
necessary functions of the Registrar under these Rules during the absence of the Registrar. 
 
Chapter IX 
Representation and Fees etc. 
 
64. A counsel may represent a party before the Tribunal upon filing a ‘Vakalatnama’ duly 
executed by and obtained from such party.   
65. Every application to the Tribunal shall bear a court-fee of Taka 10 (ten) and the 





66. These Rules [are not exhaustive and]1652 may be amended, altered, added or repealed 
by the Tribunal if it thinks necessary and expedient for the smooth functioning of the Tribunal. 
 
 







PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM 
 
Name of the Participant: 
 
Title of the project: What is the role and impact of the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh 
(ICT-BD) in International Criminal Law? 
 
Main investigator and contact details:  
 
Name: Sajib Hosen 
Email: sajib.hosen@pgr.anglia.ac.uk 
 
First supervisor:   Dr Aldo Zammit Borda 
 
1. I agree to take part in the above research. I have read the Participant Information Sheet 
(Version: 16/03/2017) for the study.   
I understand what my role will be in this research, and all my questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. 
 
2. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the research at any time, without giving a reason. 
 
3. I am free to ask any questions at any time before and during the study. 
 
4 I understand what will happen to the data collected from me for the research. 
 
5. I have been provided with a copy of this form and the Participant Information Sheet. 
 
Data Protection:  I agree to the University1653 processing personal data which I have 
supplied.  I agree to the processing of such data for any purposes connected with the 
Research Project as outlined to me* 
Name of participant (print)…………… …..Signed………………..….Date…………….                                                                     
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
I WISH TO WITHDRAW FROM THIS STUDY. 
If you wish to withdraw from the research, please speak to the researcher or email them at 
(sajib.hosen@pgr.anglia.ac.uk) stating the title of the research. 
You do not have to give a reason for why you would like to withdraw. 
Please let the researcher know whether you are/are not happy for them to use any data from 











PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
I would like to invite you to take part in a research study. Before you decide you need to understand 
why the research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take time to read the following 
information carefully. Ask questions if anything you read is not clear or would like more information. 
Take time to decide whether or not to take part.   
Section A:  The Research Project 
 
1. Title of project: What is the role and impact of the International Crimes Tribunal of 
Bangladesh (ICT-BD) in International Criminal Law? 
 
2. Brief summary of research. 
 
The nature of accountability under domestic criminal justice system is much higher than that of the 
international criminal justice system. By means of the international legal mechanism, such as 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and internationalised tribunals, it is difficult to establish effective 
retributive justice system to increase accountability in the field of International Criminal Law (ICL). The 
main aim of this research is to assess the appropriateness of the domestication of international 
criminal law to ensure an effective system of accountability. The subject matters of this research are 
the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh (ICT-BD) and judgments delivered by the tribunal(s).   
 
3. Purpose of the study  
 
I am conducting this research as part of my PhD degree at Anglia Ruskin University. This research 
will attempt to contribute increasing accountability and decreasing impunity in the field of international 
criminal law. 
 
4. Name of my Supervisor: Dr Aldo Zammit Borda 
 
5. How many people will be asked to participate? 
 
Total 15 people will be asked to participate. 
 
6. What are the likely benefits of taking part?   
 
This study will help us to increase the understanding of the importance of accountability in 
international criminal law. 
 
7. Can I refuse to take part? 
 
Taking part is voluntary.  If you don’t want to take part, you do not have to give a reason and no 






8. Has the study got ethical approval?  
 
This study has ethical approval from an ethics committee at Anglia Ruskin University.   
 
9. What will happen to the results of the study?  
 
The result of this study will be disseminated for writing up my PhD thesis. 
 




Section B:  Your Participation in the Research Project 
 
1. What will I be asked to do? 
 
If you agree to take part, we will ask you to answer some questions relating to International Crimes 
Tribunal(s) of Bangladesh.  There aren’t any right or wrong answers – we just want to hear about your 
opinions.  The discussion should take about an hour at the longest.   
 
2. Will my participation in the study be kept confidential?   
 
All the information you give us will be confidential and used for the purposes of this study only. The 
data will be collected and stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and will be disposed 
of in a secure manner.  The information will be used in a way that will not allow you to be identified 
individually.   
 
Only the people associated directly related to this project will have access to confidential information. 
 
3. Whether I can withdraw at any time, and how.   
 
You can withdraw from the study at any time and without giving a reason by email 
(sajib.hosen@pgr.anglia.ac.uk) or any other means of communication. Therefore, you have the option 
to withdraw from the study and have your data removed. However, it must be effectively 
communicated before I have written up my thesis. After I complete my thesis, it will not be possible to 
remove any data but may be amended. 
 
4. Contact details for complaints. 
 
If you have any complaints about the study, you are encouraged to speak to me or my Supervisor in 
the first instance.  You also have the option for formal complaint following Anglia Ruskin University’s 
complaints procedure. 
Email address: complaints@anglia.ac.uk 
Postal address: Office of the Secretary and Clerk, Anglia Ruskin University, Bishop Hall Lane, 
Chelmsford, Essex, CM1 1SQ. 
 










Semi Structure Interview 
Target group: Lawyers & Judges 
Name of Interviewer  
 
 
Name of Interviewee 
 
 
Place of Interview 
 
 
Date of Interview 
 
 
Confirm that the interview has read and understood the Participant Information Sheet 
and agreed to the Consent Form 
YES / NO 
 
The study addresses the following main questions. 
 
g. Is the ICT-BD an appropriate mechanism for the specific circumstances in Bangladesh in the 
context of transitional justice? And why? (A) 
 
-How does the Bangladeshi model relate to the notion of transitional justice?  (A1) 
-Is the ICT-BD only mechanism in place, Was there a policy of lustration or other forms of reparative 
justice? (A2) 
-How appropriately ICT-BD is functioning in relation to other forms of transitional justice? (A3) 
 
h. Why it took over 42 years to establish ICT-BD in Bangladesh? (B) 
-What are the problems ICT-BD facing because of time lapse? (B1) 
- Why Bangladesh could not establish tribunals soon after the liberation war is over?  (B2) 
- Why is it necessary to prosecute people who have committed crimes 42 years ago? (B3) 
 
i. Are the judgments of the ICT-BD contributing to develop international criminal law? (C) 
-To what extent ICT-BD is successful in terms of ensuring justice? (C1) 
-To what extent due process has been followed in the ICT-BD? (C2) 
- What are main criticisms of the ICT-BD and why? (C3) 
 
Semi Structured Interview 
Questions Remarks  
Introduction  
1. What’s your role in the ICT-BD and what do you do on a day-to-day basis? 
How long have you been working with the ICT-BD? 
What is your experience of working with the ICT-BD? 
 
How ICT-BD is functioning related question  
1. How would you evaluate the importance of ICT-BD to deal with past human rights 
violation and/or gross violation of international humanitarian law? 
 
2. What in your view are the main purposes for which the ICT-BD was established?  
2. How does the Bangladeshi model relate to the notion of transitional justice?    
Some of the goals of transitional justice include prosecuting perpetrators, achieving 





3. In your opinion, is the ICT-BD a sufficient mechanism to ensure the goals of 
transitional justice in Bangladesh? Yes or NO.  
If NO, what further measures/mechanisms would you recommend to complement 
it? 
4. What other alternative(s) could have been adopted in Bangladesh, if any? Do you 
think some measure should be taken to complement the achievements of the 
prosecution process? If so, what measures/mechanisms would you recommend.) 
 
5. Is the ICT-BD only mechanism in place, Was there a policy of lustration (a measure 
barring officials and collaborators of a former regime from positions of public 




Time lapse related question  
  
6. What problems have you faced as a defense/prosecution lawyer because of time 
lapse? How could these problems be resolved? (Gathering evidence/ witnesses) 
 
 
7. How may this time-lapse have impacted on the prescription of crimes, 
retrospectivity of punishment, and compliance with international standards to 
ensure due process of all parties involved? 
 
 
8. What would be different if ICT-BD type tribunal could be established soon after the 
liberation war ended in 1971? 
 
In your opinion, how effectively are the judges/lawyers dealing with the time-lapse 
related issues? Are you aware of any training which has been provided? In your 
opinion, is such training necessary? 
 
 




10. What are the impacts of time lapse on the witnesses / victims of 
crimes/perpetrators? And How would you evaluate this?  
 
11. What legal issues have risen because of time lapse?   
12. How has the time-lapse impacted on the deterrence effect of ICT-BD?  
  
Evaluating ICT-BD related question  
13. To what extent is the ICT-BD successful/unsuccessful? In terms of number of 
people prosecuted, convicted and released? 
To what extent ICT-BD is successful? In terms of time, costs, fairness 
 
14. In your opinion, does the framework of the ICT-BD enable lawyer to carry out 
their duties effectively? 
 
 
15. To what extent is due process been followed effectively by the ICT-BD? How 
would you evaluate the judgments of the ICT-BD? 
 
16. In its operation, have you come across any novel aspects of law or process, which 
had not arisen in that past? If yes, what were they and how did you resolve them? 
 
17. In your opinion, what are the greatest contributions that the ICT-BD as an 
institution will make to Bangladeshi society and international criminal law in the 
present and future? 
 




18. What are the advantages/disadvantages of the ICT-BD as a domestic mechanism 
for the prosecution of crimes in Bangladesh? 
 
What could be different if ICT-BD would have been established as an international or 
internationalised tribunal? What are the main criticisms of the ICT-BD and why? 
 
19. One of the most common criticism levelled towards domestic tribunals is that 
they may be more susceptible to political interference. Have you got any views on 
this?  
 
20. How important is it conducting research in this particular area, what is your 
opinion? 
 
Have you got any further views or observations you wish to add, which we have not 
covered? 
 
Have you got any recommendations to improve the work of the ICT-BD going 
forward? 
 
Thanking the interviewee & End  
 
 
Semi Structure Interview 
Target group: Politicians 
Name of Interviewer  
 
 
Name of Interviewee 
 
 
Place of Interview 
 
 
Date of Interview 
 
 
Confirm that the interview has read and understood the Participant Information Sheet 
and agreed to the Consent Form 
YES / NO 
 
The study addresses the following main questions. 
 
a. Is the ICT-BD an appropriate mechanism for the specific circumstances in Bangladesh in the 
context of transitional justice? And why? (A) 
 
-How does the Bangladeshi model relate to the notion of transitional justice?  (A1) 
-Is the ICT-BD only mechanism in place, Was there a policy of lustration or other forms of reparative 
justice? (A2) 
-How appropriately ICT-BD is functioning in relation to other forms of transitional justice? (A3) 
 
b. Why it took over 42 years to establish ICT-BD in Bangladesh? (B) 
-What are the problems ICT-BD facing because of time lapse? (B1) 
- Why Bangladesh could not establish tribunals soon after the liberation war is over? (B2) 
 XXXIII 
- Why is it necessary to prosecute people who have committed crimes 42 years ago?(B3) 
 
c. Are the judgments of the ICT-BD contributing to develop international criminal law? (C) 
-To what extent ICT-BD is successful in terms of ensuring justice? (C1) 
-To what extent due process has been followed in the ICT-BD? (C2) 
- What are main criticisms of the ICT-BD and why? (C3) 
 
Semi Structured Interview  
Questions Remarks  
Introduction  
1. What’s your role in the ICT-BD and what do you do on a day-to-day basis? 
How long have you been working with the ICT-BD? 
What is your experience of working with the ICT-BD? 
 
How ICT-BD is functioning related question  
2. In your view, what are the main purposes of establishing ICT-BD?  
3. How would you evaluate the level of support of Bangladeshi society for the 
establishment of the ICT-BD? 
 
4. In your opinion, does the ICT-BD have any political value in Bangladesh? What is 
your observation on diplomatic relationship with other countries relating to ICT-BD? 
 
 
5. How would you evaluate the performance of the ICT-BD in prosecuting 
perpetrators? 
 
6. How would you evaluate the ICT-BD in terms of resources it has to deal with crimes 
under international law? How is the budget of the tribunal finalized?  
 
 
Some of the goals of transitional justice include prosecuting perpetrators, achieving 
peace and reconciliation, establishing the truth and delivering reparations to 
victims.  
 
7. In your opinion, is the ICT-BD a sufficient mechanism to ensure the goals of 
transitional justice in Bangladesh? Yes or No.  
If Yes, how (ask to elaborate)  
If No, what further measures/mechanisms would you recommend to complement it? 
Are you aware of any other mechanisms in Bangladesh to address the above goals? 
 
8. In some media articles, it was suggested that there have been some instances of 
lustration (a measure barring officials and collaborators of a former regime from 
positions of public influence in a country after a change of government) in 
government. Have you got any views on this? 
 
 
Time lapse related question  
  
9. Why could Bangladesh not establish tribunals soon after the liberation war was 
over?  
 
10.  Why is it necessary to prosecute people who have committed crimes 42 years 
ago? 
 
11. What are some of the political or legal challenges which arisen because of time 
lapse? 
 
12. What are the impacts of time lapse on the witnesses / victims of 
crimes/perpetrators? And how could these challenges be addressed? 
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13. Because of the time-lapse and the ordinary time it takes courts to do their work, 
it is likely that some perpetrators will not face criminal justice because of the length 
of time. In these circumstances, what are your views on the provision of reparations 
to victims? 
 
14. What is your opinion on ICT-BD in terms of public faith/trust in judicial process?  
  
Evaluating ICT-BD related question  
15. To what extent is the ICT-BD successful? In terms of time, costs, perceptions of 
fairness 
 
16. How would you evaluate the ICT-BD from your own political 
ideology/perspective? 
 
17. In your opinion, to what extent due process has been followed in the ICT-BD?  
18. In your opinion, what are the greatest contributions that the ICT-BD as an 
institution will make to Bangladeshi society and international criminal law in the 
present and future? 
 
(How would you evaluate the judgments of the ICT-BD establishing truth?) 
 
19. How would you evaluate the judgments of the ICT-BD in terms of 
political/economic stability?  
 
20. To what extent the ICT-BD has achieved its goal/objectives? How would you 
evaluate the fact that the ICT-BD rendering justice to victims, families/relatives, and 
the society as a whole?   
 
21. One of the most common criticism levelled towards domestic tribunals is that 
they may be more susceptible to political interference. Have you got any views on 
this? 
 
22. Is it worthy conducting research on ICT-BD?  
 
Have you got any further views or observations you wish to add, which we have not 
covered? 
 
Have you got any recommendations to improve the work of the ICT-BD going 
forward? 
 
Thanking the interviewee & End  
 
